

Ottawa Light Rail Commission

Stephen Lennerton
on Thursday, May 19, 2022



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OTTAWA LIGHT RAIL COMMISSION
ATU LOCAL 279/ALSTOM - STEPHEN LENNERTON
MAY 19, 2022

--- Held via Zoom Videoconferencing, with all
participants attending remotely, on the 19th day of
May, 2022, 3:00 p.m. to 6:31 p.m.

1 COMMISSION COUNSEL:

2
3 Emily Young, Litigation Counsel Member

4 Fraser Harland, Litigation Counsel Member

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6
7 PARTICIPANTS:

8
9 Stephen Lennerton, Alstom

10 Jaime Lefebvre, Jewitt McLuckie & Associates LLP

11
12
13 ALSO PRESENT:

14
15 Joanne Lawrence, Stenographer/Transcriptionist

16 Benjamin Bilgen, Virtual Technician

1 -- Upon commencing at 3:00 p.m.

2 EMILY YOUNG: So I'll just start today
3 by giving a brief introduction about the purpose
4 and parameters of the interview.

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Uh-huh.

6 EMILY YOUNG: The purpose of today's
7 interview is to obtain your evidence, under oath or
8 solemn declaration, for use at the Commission's
9 public hearings. This will be a collaborative
10 interview such that my co-counsel, Mr. Harland, may
11 intervene to ask certain questions. If time
12 permits, your counsel may also ask follow-up
13 questions at the end of the interview.

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Uh-huh.

15 EMILY YOUNG: The interview is being
16 transcribed, and the Commission intends to enter
17 this transcript into evidence at the Commission's
18 public hearings. Either at the hearings or by way
19 of procedural order before the hearings commence.

20 The transcript will be posted to the
21 Commission's public website along with any
22 corrections made to it after it is entered into
23 evidence. The transcript, along with any
24 corrections later made to it, will be shared with
25 the Commission's participants and their counsel on

1 a confidential basis before being entered into
2 evidence. You will be given the opportunity to
3 review your transcript and correct any typos or
4 other errors before the transcript is shared with
5 the participants or entered into evidence.

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Any non-typographical
8 corrections made will be appended at the end of the
9 transcript.

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay.

11 EMILY YOUNG: Pursuant to Section 33
12 (6) of the Public Inquiries Act 2009:

13 "A witness at an inquiry shall
14 be deemed to have objected to answer
15 any question asked him or her upon
16 the ground that his or her answer
17 may tend to incriminate the witness
18 or may tend to establish his or her
19 liability to civil proceedings at
20 the instance of the Crown or of any
21 person, and no answer given by a
22 witness at an inquiry shall be used
23 or be receivable in evidence against
24 him or her in any trial or other
25 proceedings against him or her

1 thereafter taking place, other than
2 a prosecution for perjury in giving
3 such evidence."

4 As required by Section 33(7) of that Act, you are
5 hereby advised that you have the right to object to
6 answer any question under Section 5 of the Canada
7 Evidence Act.

8 And the last thing is that if you need
9 a break at any point, just let us know and we'll
10 take one. But we usually try to take one about
11 halfway through, so for this interview, that will
12 be around 4:30.

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay.

14 EMILY YOUNG: So to start,
15 Mr. Lennerton, could you briefly describe your
16 educational and professional background for us.

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well,
18 education-wise, I just have high school. But
19 experience-wise and my background, I've been in a
20 lot of construction situations; I did a lot of
21 telecommunications; I have a very strong mechanical
22 background and, more specifically, in hydraulics,
23 which is what led me to work at Alstom.

24 Other than that, it's pretty much like
25 I'm a -- you show me it once and I get it done kind

1 of thing, so that's how I go about my jobs.

2 EMILY YOUNG: And at a fairly high
3 level for now, could you tell us how you were
4 involved in Stage 1 of the Ottawa LRT project.

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: When you say
6 "Stage 1," are you referring to the production part
7 of it?

8 EMILY YOUNG: Referring to the
9 construction process of the Confederation Line and
10 as well as the opening and operations of that line
11 as well. As opposed to the extension.

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay. So -- okay.
13 So I started off in production approximately a year
14 to a year and a half into when the project had
15 started. I started out as a production technician,
16 which was a very general job statement. I had a
17 pretty -- I ended up being in a pretty specific
18 position, which still fell under production
19 technician.

20 I just started off working on
21 connectors and stuff until I learned the train.
22 And then once I was able to show that I had a very
23 strong mechanical background and hydraulic
24 background, I was put into working on the trains
25 once they were finished and they were being turned

1 on and we needed to make sure that they were
2 working and all the mechanical things that needed
3 to be done in order for it to be able to go for a
4 dynamic test was what my primary focus was.

5 EMILY YOUNG: And those roles were both
6 for Alstom?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So -- well, so
8 that's -- in production, that's kind of, like, a
9 grey area. So production brought in a company
10 called Randstad, which is basically like a
11 third-party hiring company. This was basically
12 like they were there to be the ones that give care
13 to us kind of thing. Like a -- from a union point,
14 like, when they come in, they try to figure out who
15 gives care to the actual employee to see who's
16 responsible for them.

17 So there was a middle man between us,
18 so I actually worked for a company called Randstad,
19 but everything I wore, all my identification,
20 everything I did, all the rules I followed were for
21 Alstom. So that's pretty much how that
22 relationship worked. Like, I would go to Randstad
23 for a complaint, and they were to apply it to
24 Alstom that that actually happened. Never did I
25 actually -- it wasn't until I was in maintenance

1 that I was officially an Alstom employee.

2 EMILY YOUNG: And when you were working
3 for Randstad on construction of the vehicles, were
4 you receiving instructions from Alstom to do your
5 work?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. Everything
7 came -- all the micros came from Alstom's
8 engineering team. Pretty much anything to do with
9 the train itself was from Alstom. The only time
10 where Randstad would really step in was, like, HR
11 concerns, let's say, or if there were, you know,
12 attendance issues and stuff like that.

13 EMILY YOUNG: And when, Mr. Lennerton,
14 you talked about working on the trains when they
15 were finished to prepare them for dynamic testing,
16 would that be considered the static testing phase?

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So yeah, they would
18 have, like, a static test where the train would be
19 turned on, we'd test all the electronics, and while
20 they were doing that, I was getting basically
21 the -- like, the gear boxes ready. So the bogies
22 didn't come to us complete, so my production part
23 was to install all of the gear boxes, the calipers,
24 the HPUs, all the fixings that go with it to
25 connect everything. And then I would actually make

1 them function, so I would have to flush them and
2 insert -- like, put the hydraulic fluid into it,
3 make sure they were all functioning. That was more
4 of my production side of it, and then the actual
5 function part of it was where I would do some
6 static testing, where it was basically visually
7 seeing that it's functioning properly and relaying
8 that information to the test team so that they
9 could confirm that they were safe to actually go
10 out on the track and not have brake issues.

11 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And can you tell
12 us -- you said you started in production about a
13 year to a year and a half after the project
14 started. Would that have been 2014? Do you
15 remember the year?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. It would have
17 been, like -- well, maybe it's a little bit longer
18 than that. I'm terrible with time. I'm pretty
19 sure it's around 2017, 2018 is when I joined.

20 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And at what point
21 did you switch to the role where you were doing --
22 involved in the static testing?

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So it -- how do I
24 explain that? I never actually changed roles.
25 Like, my job title never changed. So Randstad

1 controlled that, as in everybody was, like, equal,
2 so everybody had the same job description. It was
3 just that I was put at a different part of the
4 production process where I didn't sit at a table
5 and install wiring harnesses to the roof or
6 anything like that. The train was always
7 constructed or finished being put together when I
8 started to actually work on it.

9 So it was more or less like I went into
10 that position because it was -- at the time that I
11 was there, it was their weakest point. Like, they
12 were -- they were behind the most in that point.
13 And because I have such a strong ability to do it,
14 they placed me there, and that's where I stayed. I
15 was actually on a team called the retrofit team, if
16 that makes it a little bit clearer. Still under a
17 production technician job title to the -- like, for
18 instance, to the labour board or something like
19 that, but I was on a team, a retrofit team.

20 EMILY YOUNG: And you mentioned that
21 you were joining it when you were -- when -- and,
22 sorry, to help with the weakest point that was
23 behind.

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. I wanted to
25 make a really big, positive impact. I was tired of

1 listening to it on the radio, like, failing, so I
2 wanted to do what I could to help there, and I was
3 extremely interested in these machines. They had
4 never been built anywhere else in the world, and so
5 the opportunity to pioneer the things that I got to
6 pioneer was very, very interesting to me and
7 exciting - a lot of learning, a lot of learning
8 with that whole project. So that's what really
9 intrigued me.

10 EMILY YOUNG: And do you know why that
11 part was far behind?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, the
13 willingness to do it, really. The job that I was
14 doing was extremely physically demanding, so when
15 you're being paid the amount that we were paid at
16 the time, it was very difficult to get somebody who
17 was, you know, in their early 20s to actually be
18 motivated enough to push our pace so that we could
19 actually keep up with things.

20 So, for example, when I got there, to
21 put -- on a single unit, to put all of the things
22 that I told you on the train, it took three people
23 2 and a half weeks, roughly, to do it, which meant
24 we couldn't sell the train until it was done, so
25 that would take 2 and a half weeks per train. And

1 I was able to complete it in 5 days, so that bumped
2 us up to being able to sell a train every 5 days,
3 which is what pushed us to actually meet the
4 deadlines that we were falling back on. I actually
5 caught up with the production team over an 8-week
6 period. I was able to beat a team of approximately
7 100 people just by myself, which was also extremely
8 fun, and it made it a challenge in the shop for
9 everyone. Like, everyone wanted to beat me, so it
10 was fun.

11 EMILY YOUNG: And when did you
12 transition from that role into the role where you
13 were directly working for Alstom? And it sounds
14 like you were working for Alstom maintenance?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes, so I joined
16 the MVT team, which was the carrot at the end of
17 the stick, so to speak, for the production -- in
18 production. So the entire thing of production, we
19 were told at the end of this, you would get this
20 MVT team, so approximately -- I think it was, like,
21 in July -- I can't even remember the dates off the
22 top of my head right now. I'm pretty sure I
23 submitted that information. But it was a couple of
24 months after they had -- or actually it would have
25 been almost a year after they had actually started

1 hiring people for it, but there was this dormant
2 time before the trains were actually handed over.
3 So the maintenance people that were hired just
4 actually basically sat there and did computer
5 things, like -- what would you call it? Like,
6 where they learn about, like, management behaviour
7 and, like, their behaviour and stuff like that in
8 the workplace. So I was held back -- I willingly
9 stayed back from that hiring procedure to finish
10 things that needed to be done in production before
11 I switched over. I don't know if that directly
12 answers the question or not. Sorry.

13 EMILY YOUNG: No, it -- that helps a
14 lot. It sounds like you would have, I assume,
15 switched over around when service was starting.

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. It was much
17 closer to that because my -- my skill set was
18 required right up basically until the last day. So
19 I was approached by two people from the validation
20 team who asked me, you know, if you want to, you
21 can be hired to maintenance right now - I would
22 have been number 3 or 4 in seniority at the time -
23 and then they said, or we would really love your
24 help with this brake project, which is going to
25 take approximately 2 months, and I willingly said I

1 will help you with it because that's, at that
2 point, what I was there to do. I didn't want to
3 have unfinished work. And to be honest with you,
4 if I didn't do it, we would have had even more
5 problems into maintenance, and I thought I'm not
6 going to set myself up for a headache, so I agreed
7 to it.

8 EMILY YOUNG: Right.

9 FRASER HARLAND: Just for the record,
10 to jump in, you mentioned MBT [sic]. Can you tell
11 us what --

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: MVT, yeah.

13 FRASER HARLAND: And can you tell us
14 what that stands for?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: It's maintenance
16 vehicle technician.

17 EMILY YOUNG: Thank you. And how long
18 did you stay in that role as a maintenance vehicle
19 technician?

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I want to say,
21 like, close to 2 years. It's hard for me to give
22 an exact time. I don't really remember dates very
23 well. And the way that I left was not exactly,
24 like -- it was an -- like, as a -- it was a really
25 negative way that left. Like, I was basically

1 pushed out the door, in my own opinion, so it
2 wasn't exactly something that I try to remember all
3 the time.

4 EMILY YOUNG: That's fair enough. Do
5 you remember, like, the year?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, it would have
7 been approximately a year ago from now. I've been
8 over -- a little over a year I've been away from
9 there. I just -- I personally have no physical
10 record of that date, so I don't want to necessarily
11 want to say a date because I can't give you an
12 exact one.

13 EMILY YOUNG: That's fine. That's no
14 problem. And you're a member of ATU Local 279?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I was at the time.
16 I'm no longer a member of that. After -- a year
17 after you leave, you are no longer a member.

18 EMILY YOUNG: And that union -- correct
19 me if I'm wrong on anything here. That union
20 represents OC Transpo operators?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: On the bus side,
22 yes. I believe -- from the information I was
23 given, I'm pretty sure they represent all the city
24 bus drivers, yeah, for OC Transpo.

25 EMILY YOUNG: And do you know if they

1 represent any other OC Transpo workers?

2 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not to my
3 knowledge, no.

4 EMILY YOUNG: And obviously they
5 represent at least some Alstom workers?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes, specifically
7 the MVT team. And I -- I'm not 100 percent sure,
8 but I think there may be other entities there that
9 they have, but I was not made aware of that. But I
10 know for sure that the specific MVT team, which I'm
11 assuming is approximately around 18 people, is who
12 they represent.

13 EMILY YOUNG: But they don't
14 represent -- or they didn't represent the
15 production technicians?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. We didn't have
17 a union at the time. At the very end of
18 production, people in production actually contacted
19 a union and tried to make it a union, and now -- in
20 Toronto now, from what I understand, they are
21 unionized, as far as I've been told, due to the
22 process that's been going on.

23 EMILY YOUNG: Would that be in the
24 facility in Brampton?

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I believe so, yes.

1 That was where they were trying to get a lot of
2 people -- I was requested to go there and stuff
3 like that, so I think that's the one.

4 EMILY YOUNG: And when you were a part
5 of the union, what was your involvement with the
6 union like?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The union was
8 awesome. I was actually -- just before I left,
9 like, the day that I went into resign, Jason
10 actually contacted me, and he was in the process of
11 setting me up to be shop steward. So they were
12 very interested in me being able to help out in
13 that aspect due to the problems that we were having
14 with management at the time.

15 EMILY YOUNG: And who is Jason?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Jason would be my
17 union rep, I believe is his proper title.

18 EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember his last
19 name?

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not off the top of
21 my head, no, sorry.

22 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. No problem. Maybe
23 your counsel can come back to us on that point.

24 And I'll just note, for the record,
25 that Ms. Lefebvre is nodding her head.

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I'm sure she knows
2 his last name. She's aware of him too from -- from
3 when we have spoken previously.

4 EMILY YOUNG: We can't hear you,
5 Ms. Lefebvre. I'm not sure if something is going
6 on with your mic. Okay.

7 Mr. Lennerton, do you remember when
8 Alstom workers joined the union?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: In production or in
10 the maintenance part?

11 EMILY YOUNG: Your MVT team.

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: It was always in --
13 that was from Day 1, so that agreement was made
14 prior to even hiring anyone. So they -- it was
15 always known that we were going to be a part of
16 this union. I think it has to do with the fact
17 that the trains are technically owned by OC Transpo
18 or the City in some way, so they were automatically
19 already going to take part in that.

20 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And would the MVT
21 team have been its own separate bargaining unit?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I don't know.
23 That's too in depth in the -- this. I wouldn't
24 have cared to pay attention to that. I was more
25 worried about working on the trains.

1 EMILY YOUNG: And so you mentioned that
2 it was always known that the MVT team would join
3 the union, but it sounds like it wasn't always
4 known for all Alstom workers. Can you speak a
5 little bit about why other Alstom workers wanted to
6 join the union.

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, in production
8 it was a different union, not the local one with
9 Jason, and they wanted to join just because a lot
10 of people on the floor felt they were being very
11 mistreated by what was going on. One of the
12 biggest issues there was our pay. Randstad took
13 almost \$10 over the top of our pay, so every hour
14 you worked, you're paying somebody that's not
15 really doing much of anything for you, so they
16 would get pretty upset about it.

17 There was a lot of people that looked
18 at the now instead of the future. I was more
19 focussed on getting to maintenance, which was the
20 career thing, so I didn't really care what they
21 were paying me at the time. I just knew that I
22 needed to make these trains work so that I could
23 have a job later.

24 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And why did you
25 end up resigning from the maintenance team?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, that's a big
2 question. There was a lot of stuff. Morals was
3 one of them, but I was very badly deceived by
4 Alstom at the very end by the operations manager
5 and the vehicle maintenance manager. One of the
6 biggest deceptions was is they actually -- how do I
7 explain this quickly? There's a flush cart that we
8 use to make the brakes work, and this flush cart
9 did not come assembled for us to be able to attach
10 it to the train, so they had requested me to do it
11 because I had previously done this type of work to
12 another flush cart that was in production. Under
13 the union rules, I'm not supposed to work on
14 machinery that's used on the train. Somebody
15 that's technically qualified for that should.

16 So I had contacted Jason and asked
17 them, you know, they're asking me to do this; am I
18 allowed to do it? I'm a stickler for rules. I
19 follow the rules. So Jason said no, that's not
20 your job. I could observe and give information to
21 somebody else to do it, but I wasn't allowed to
22 physically do the job. So when the manager
23 contacted me and asked me to go over and do it, I
24 said, well, the union is saying no, and I am
25 100 percent willing to do it, but you have to speak

1 to the union. The union has to give permission.

2 He then went and contacted the union
3 almost right away, from what I remember. And
4 later -- I think it was either the next day or the
5 day after or my next shift, sorry, and he told me
6 that the union had said it was okay to do it, so I
7 willingly went over to do it. It was something I
8 was very interested in and wanted to do. I went
9 over there and did the job.

10 And then later on, I found out from
11 Jason that he had not given permission to the
12 manager for me to do that and that they had lied to
13 me, and then now I had done something against my
14 union technically. Not that the union was upset
15 with me or willing to take any action against me,
16 but I was very, very upset that I had been tricked
17 into breaking the rules, especially with also
18 being -- you know, Alstom is very big on having to
19 follow the rules, and then they broke them.

20 And then to compile on that, the
21 other -- the maintenance vehicle manager had
22 contacted me for overtime, telling me that I needed
23 to come in to change calipers and to flush them.
24 This would be task-specific overtime, meaning he's
25 able to skip the people ahead of me in -- in

1 seniority and ask me specifically because, at this
2 time, I was the only one in the building that could
3 do this. And I willingly said yes, I will come in
4 on my day off, and I will do this for you, because
5 I was always doing favors for them.

6 And when I got there, they decided this
7 was no longer going to be done, and that I was
8 going to go to a different task, which was to fix
9 the sanding injectors, which was not task-specific.
10 So I made a statement to the management that by the
11 rules of my union and to be fair to my union
12 members, you need to go back and call number 1 and
13 then call number 2. And then if they keep refusing
14 until you get to me, then I will either oblige or
15 continue or whatever.

16 I was responded to with I don't get to
17 make the rules, I don't get to make these
18 decisions. Voices started to be raised, a lot of
19 aggressive mannerisms towards me. I was told that
20 I didn't do enough overtime in comparison with the
21 other MVTs. I expressed that I had worked here for
22 many years and there were people that hadn't even
23 worked regular hours that even competed with my
24 overtime yet. Obviously this didn't go over well.

25 In that room, the other manager who had

1 lied to me who I just found out about lying decided
2 to come in and start yelling at me as well, which
3 is why I then informed him that I was aware that he
4 too has lied to me. And at this point, when you
5 had worked for a company that hard and had built
6 such a loyal work relationship with them and you
7 were as invested as I was, like, in all aspects to
8 this project, that was crushing to me. Like, that
9 really, really, really affected me. It made it
10 basically impossible for me to basically return and
11 stand in front of these people.

12 So at that point, I immediately went
13 out and requested 2 weeks of vacation that I had.
14 They granted it immediately, and when I came back,
15 I put my resignation in. It was so bad that I
16 wasn't even able to finish that day. I was so
17 frustrated with the place, and I felt so betrayed
18 that I just left. And that was it.

19 I did -- actually, sorry, I did have an
20 HR meeting within that, this -- I believe it was
21 the same day that the incident happened, but I
22 actually spoke with Alex L'Homme and the HR lady -
23 which I can't remember her name at this time -
24 about the incident. And their mannerisms in there
25 showed me that they didn't care about my situation

1 and that they were just there to protect their
2 manager. They were more concerned that other
3 people were going to find out that he had lied
4 instead of actually correcting the problem, which
5 showed me that, you know, the future there was not
6 really bright. So I decided to leave.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Thank you for telling us
8 about that. Other than -- you mentioned that there
9 was a -- a significant issue with pay when you were
10 back in construction, and Randstad was taking quite
11 a bit of your salary. Were there any other --

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: That was the --
13 that was the agreement, though -- sorry to
14 interrupt. That was the agreement, though. So I
15 don't -- I don't want it to be depicted as they
16 were stealing or anything. They were taking what
17 was rightfully -- I signed a contract that I agreed
18 to the terms. This was why I really didn't have a
19 problem with it. If you had an issue, then you can
20 quit. You know, nobody's forcing you to work
21 there. But just to make that clear, that they
22 weren't -- they weren't taking something that
23 wasn't theirs. It was part of the agreement.

24 EMILY YOUNG: Were there any other
25 issues that the workers on the construction side

1 were concerned about, that were motivating them to
2 want to unionize?

3 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The fact that their
4 jobs were ending, that was one. Most of it was
5 just money-driven, and unfortunately, at the time,
6 the gentleman that had actually made contact, they
7 were actually being somewhat fooled by the union.
8 The union obviously wanted to get in there and
9 expand themselves. It was some sort of food union.
10 I can't remember the name of it, but they were
11 trying to get a lot more members.

12 I do a lot of research when I get
13 approached, and I looked up some of the stuff and I
14 noticed that they were small, so they wanted to
15 jump onboard with this. This was a big project.
16 So they were saying, you know, you should be making
17 \$30 an hour and all this kind of stuff, and when
18 you're only making \$18 and somebody tells you that,
19 you know, it's pretty motivating for a younger
20 fellow to, you know, go after something like that.
21 And they also -- there was a little bit of, like --
22 there were some quarrels between certain people and
23 the management, and it was almost as though there
24 was a little bit of a revenge thing in there. They
25 wanted to take away the power that they had to --

1 you know, with their -- like, withhold them from
2 making the amount that they felt they should make.

3 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that the
4 membership of the MVT workers in the union had any
5 impact on the project and operations?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: You mean, like, to
7 the quality of the machine, or?

8 EMILY YOUNG: Any impact that you can
9 think of - I mean work environment, quality.

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, so for me
11 personally, one of the things that I noticed - and
12 this was definitely something that other people
13 noticed - was being in that union group and not
14 having the supervisors and the management in the
15 union group, it posed a barrier between us. So
16 basically the supervisor's job is to launch every
17 train every day to avoid penalties, and it's pushed
18 so much on them that it's almost to the point of at
19 any cost, whereas in the union, I'm there to be
20 treated a certain way, I'm there to do my job
21 properly, and I'm there to follow these -- these
22 rules and instructions. So it created this --
23 like, they wanted more control to force us to do
24 more things, but the union stood in the way of them
25 being able to do that. So the union was looked at

1 more as a barrier more by these managers as opposed
2 to something that they would be willing to work
3 with, if that makes -- if that makes more sense.

4 EMILY YOUNG: That does make sense.
5 And so the people who were in charge of getting the
6 trains out every day were managers?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, supervisors
8 and stuff like that. The MVT's job is to literally
9 go and inspect the train. Unless we're doing a
10 maintenance thing to it -- like, say, at 150,000
11 kilometres, you do a 150K check. But, for
12 instance, if we were doing an inspection and you
13 found something wrong with the train, we were to
14 report it.

15 We had a different classification of
16 reporting it. You had a P1, P2, P3, and a P4. P1
17 stops the train from going out on the track until
18 it's fixed and the file is closed. So when you go
19 to a manager who's got 11 trains total, and he has
20 to launch 11 trains, which is the agreement at the
21 time, and you tell him one of those trains now
22 can't go out, this is -- you know, he knows he's
23 going to hear it from his boss. Like, you know,
24 there's penalties, and they -- you know, whatever
25 they go through behind the scenes to the point

1 where they would actually manipulate what was in
2 there so that the train could go out.

3 They would tell MVTs to, you know,
4 where rewrite their inspection, or they would just
5 go on the computer and override your authority and
6 bump it from a P1 to a P2 so they could launch the
7 train. And then once the train was out there, it
8 would have a fault, and then they would say, oh,
9 look, it happened on the track, and this would
10 avoid those penalties of not launching the train.

11 EMILY YOUNG: So there was a lot of
12 pressure to launch all the trains in the morning?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. And in that
14 instance, when you're making those reports -- for
15 instance, I'll use sanders as a problem. If you
16 found more than two sanders that were not working
17 in your daily inspection, those trains could not go
18 out until those were fixed.

19 So there were numerous times where you
20 would -- I would bring a report back and say I
21 found six of them, and they would literally crumple
22 up the piece of paper and tell me to write it again
23 and only write down two sanders. And I would tell
24 them, you know, that's not happening; like, I don't
25 break rules like that. That's a safety feature on

1 the train for braking. You could overshoot your
2 landing. So I was not willing to do that, which is
3 what created more turmoil between us and the
4 management.

5 EMILY YOUNG: And how would management
6 generally respond to you if you refused to change
7 your report, let's say --

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They would -- they
9 would definitely get upset with me and express to
10 me that I'm being ridiculous and why don't I just
11 listen to them. Like, they're my boss; you're
12 supposed to listen to me. And in my opinion, like,
13 I have this vast experience with these trains, and
14 this person has just shown up, and they're telling
15 me to break rules that have been embedded in my
16 brain for the last couple of years that I had been
17 working in production.

18 So there would be, you know, I'm your
19 boss; I'm telling you what to do; do it. And I
20 would say, you're telling me to do something that's
21 wrong; I refuse to do it. But the thing is because
22 they were wrong, they would never take it any
23 further. And I don't know how they would get
24 around it after that, but I personally always
25 refused. I know that there are some MVTs that

1 complied out of fear for their job and stuff.
2 There were a lot of times where people were told
3 they were going to be fired if they didn't comply.
4 So there was -- some of the people who had come
5 here from, let's say, another country who were
6 unaware of how our rules worked, that would alarm
7 them because maybe in their country that could be
8 done to them, but here they didn't understand that
9 it couldn't. So it would make them make decisions
10 under the wrong type of pressure.

11 EMILY YOUNG: And did you ever see
12 trains that you had classified as having a P1
13 issue, you would have said this shouldn't go out
14 based on the rules, going out after you had made
15 that report?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Absolutely, yep.
17 That was actually not -- that was actually more
18 common than it should be. I actually --

19 EMILY YOUNG: And do you know what
20 happened?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: As for a specific
22 instance, there was a supervisor named
23 Fakah (phonetic), who actually had worked in
24 production prior. I had found a brake failure
25 issue. It wasn't technically a brake failure. It

1 was a leak in the hydraulic line, which if you lose
2 too much hydraulic fluid, this train stops. So I
3 had reported this, and I had made a P1 for it, and
4 he went into the system and changed it to a P2 and
5 launched the train. And then later on, that --
6 like, shortly after it was launched, it had a brake
7 failure and came back.

8 EMILY YOUNG: And if a -- a supervisor
9 or manager had gone in to change your
10 classification, was there anything that you could
11 do about that?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No.

13 EMILY YOUNG: And --

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, actually,
15 sorry, I could make another report. Like, I could
16 go into the system and make another P1 order, but
17 he could then just do the same thing again. I
18 mean, as far as I know, they could erase it as
19 well. They could completely remove it from the
20 system, as far as I know. I didn't know too much
21 about their end, but it seemed as though they could
22 because stuff was very well hidden.

23 EMILY YOUNG: And was this type of
24 approach present from the start of service, or is
25 it something that developed later?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yes, more at
2 the beginning than it was later on. So, like, for
3 instance, I used the sanders as an example because
4 they were a very big problem on the train. At the
5 very beginning, almost all the sanders wouldn't
6 work, especially when wintertime came. They're not
7 really -- they don't really function very well in
8 the winter. So when wintertime came, there was a
9 lot of trains who -- that shouldn't be going out
10 because of these sanders, and there was a lot of
11 changes that were made in order to launch the
12 trains. There were some nights, to be completely
13 honest with you, that -- there was probably maybe
14 three, four units that should have actually been
15 allowed to go out in the entire fleet, and we still
16 launched the entire fleet.

17 EMILY YOUNG: And how many trains were
18 in the entire fleet at that point?

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: That were -- well,
20 so we built -- oh, my goodness. I don't remember
21 these numbers now. What train did I stop building?
22 I think we stopped building at Train 36. I'm
23 pretty sure there's 17 -- no, there's 15 to 17
24 total units.

25 Sorry, in production, I built them as

1 single units, so once they coupled them together,
2 that scrambled me for numbers, but I believe it's
3 between 15 to 17 working units. The agreement was
4 that we would launch 15. When we were unable to
5 obtain that number, I believe the agreement was
6 changed to 11, and that's what we went off of.

7 EMILY YOUNG: So, Mr. Lennerton, are
8 you aware of the original plan for where the train
9 would be constructed?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, I knew the
11 first train was constructed somewhere in the
12 States, and then it was transported up here, and
13 that was supposed to be, like, a guideline for us
14 to build the trains after that. That was the
15 original train set 1. That train did not go into
16 service, as far as I can remember.

17 But that was the only other location
18 that I knew of that the trains would be built. And
19 then, obviously, we built them in the facility we
20 were in.

21 EMILY YOUNG: And then we touched on
22 this a bit more. It sounds like there was a -- a
23 change to move assembly of the trains to Brampton
24 for the Stage 2 trains.

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know why that
2 decision was made?

3 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I believe because
4 the facility that we have now would not be able to
5 facilitate all the way up to 72 single units,
6 because I -- I know the whole number was 72
7 single-unit trains were going to be built for the
8 entire project. I believe the rest of them
9 actually go into the Phase 2 part is when they're
10 supposed to be released. So there would be no way
11 for us to facilitate maintenance plus construction
12 of the trains, so that's why they needed to move.

13 I believe that date was actually bumped
14 up, and they moved a little bit sooner than they
15 had planned. And I -- I can't attest to
16 necessarily what that exact reason was, but there
17 was a lot of things said about the fact that the
18 union was trying to come in and take over that they
19 were -- it was kind of an attempt to stop that.

20 EMILY YOUNG: And do you think that
21 that decision, that move of production to Brampton,
22 was helpful?

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes and no. It
24 was -- it was because right now you'd be a lot
25 worse off in the -- with the facility you have now

1 because it would be overloaded, but in that
2 process, the people who had been building the
3 trains for the time duration already were the most
4 experienced people in the entire world on these
5 trains, and they got rid of most of them, so the
6 majority of the people in that new facility are
7 literally starting from scratch again. So in a
8 way, that would create a learning curve that would
9 have a negative impact on the project. But at the
10 same time, there were a handful of people that went
11 from production and moved to Brampton to take on
12 positions to help out with this. Like, they -- it
13 was almost like they got to be promoted type of
14 thing.

15 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that the MSF
16 facility in Ottawa was suitable for train assembly?

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not even close.
18 Not even close. The second facility that was
19 built, when you put a train inside of it, you can't
20 even open the side skirts on the train to work on
21 the train. So they have pillars that were built,
22 and they're approximately, like, 3 inches off the
23 side of the train. So when you pull the train in,
24 I'd say about 50 percent of the side skirts that
25 you would open to actually access the mechanics on

1 the train are unaccessible, to -- for one.

2 The other facility is not too bad. It
3 has four bays, so you could have four single units
4 or two coupled units in it, so that was a little
5 bit better. But in my personal opinion, with the
6 amount of trains we have, only being able to
7 facilitate two coupled units in a building, with
8 the amount of failures that are happening, it's
9 just not going to keep up. There's just not enough
10 people and not enough room to work on all of them.

11 FRASER HARLAND: Can you help us
12 understand what you mean by "a second facility"?
13 So we know there's the MSF. Was there an
14 additional facility built beside that?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. So MSF 1 is
16 where production took place, and then MSF 2 is the
17 building that was built -- if you're looking at
18 where the shed is where they actually park the
19 trains, it's just a little bit behind that, almost
20 connected to that building. That facility was --
21 oh, I can't even -- I don't remember when they
22 started building that or if the building was
23 already there and they put things inside of it, but
24 that was to be the MSF 2. That was originally
25 supposed to be where all the MVTs worked the whole

1 time. That was supposed to be specifically for the
2 MVT team, from what I was told. And then obviously
3 only being able to facilitate one train in there to
4 work on in a bay and then having the wheel lathe --
5 like, they can't -- again, can't really keep up
6 with the amount of things they needed to do. So we
7 were moved back to MSF 1 after production had
8 completely left and then that is where we remain,
9 for the most part.

10 So MSF 2 is mostly used for lathing the
11 wheels. If they need to remove bogies, they have a
12 jack system there that they can do it in. And then
13 there's obviously the bay where they can pull the
14 train in and work on it where it has an overhead
15 catenary system to be able to power the train.

16 EMILY YOUNG: So MSF 1 is where the
17 construction would have been taking place for phase
18 1, or assembly?

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. Yes.

20 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And did you think
21 that MSF 1 was a suitable place for that work to be
22 happening?

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, it definitely
24 wasn't designed for that, but I have to tip my hat
25 to the management team in production: They

1 definitely made that facility work as best they
2 could for that situation. It was tight, but it --
3 we got the job done in that facility. I wouldn't
4 say that it hindered us to the point of failure.
5 It was not ideal, but it wasn't the most worst
6 thing ever.

7 EMILY YOUNG: And how could you tell
8 that it hadn't been designed for that purpose?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: It's not
10 necessarily that I was -- like, I could -- well,
11 room, so to speak, but also just that was what we
12 were being told by management. You know, why --
13 you'd say, Why are we having this issue? Well, the
14 building wasn't built for this, so we're trying to
15 do this. Also the fact that they had to come in
16 and, you know, put things -- like, bolt things to
17 the ground to make it -- so that we could use that
18 area as a station and stuff like that showed that
19 the facility wasn't there, ready to flip chassises
20 over and that kind of thing.

21 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any
22 issues that Alstom encountered in gaining access to
23 the MSF when it wanted access?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: To which MSF? MSF
25 1?

1 EMILY YOUNG: MSF 1, yes.

2 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not -- not to my
3 knowledge. I had full access of the entire
4 building. Alstom went anywhere they wanted in
5 there. The only time there was any restriction to
6 access is if there was a safety issue.

7 So for instance, if the OCS went down,
8 they may barricade, for safety purposes, a certain
9 area so that they could fix the problem safely,
10 with the people who were qualified to do it. But
11 by way of saying, like, Alstom, you can't use this
12 facility, I never really experienced that.

13 EMILY YOUNG: Was there any delay in
14 Alstom being able to use the MSF?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not to my
16 knowledge, no.

17 EMILY YOUNG: Okay.

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not to my
19 knowledge, no. Maybe in the beginning, but I don't
20 have any knowledge of that. I didn't come in until
21 later, when we had full access.

22 EMILY YOUNG: So our understanding is
23 that the train, the Citadis Spirit, relied on
24 modular technology, which meant that in the MSF, it
25 was only final assembly being done there; is that

1 right?

2 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The entire
3 construction of the train was done there. So it
4 would literally come in with a chassis, and you
5 would start putting all your hydraulic parts on in
6 the first station. So they'd flip the chassis
7 upside down, put all your piping in, put all your
8 brackets on to hold all your wiring harnesses and,
9 you know, the HPU trays and that kind of stuff.

10 And then they would float that to the
11 next station, and they would put more wiring
12 harnesses on. And then it would go to ASO 2, which
13 is where we would put, you know, the walls on,
14 actually attached the nose -- or not the -- yeah,
15 attached the nose of the car to LMC 1 or LMC 2.
16 And then that would be -- and then it would go to
17 the next stage and have the interiors put in.

18 And then it would go to a -- another
19 static testing place where they would run power
20 through the wiring harnesses to make sure that the
21 wiring harnesses were sound and not shorting out or
22 anything like that. And then it would go to ASO 5,
23 which is where they would actually put the car onto
24 the bogie and then we would couple the cars
25 together. And then it would go to another static

1 test, which was more of a -- it was a static test
2 because the train wasn't moving, but it was a live
3 test because, at this point, the train would be
4 turned on.

5 FRASER HARLAND: Just to clarify that a
6 little bit more. I mean, I understand that things
7 like the walls and the roof, these were welded and
8 assembled elsewhere and came to the shop to then be
9 sort of bolted --

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Put together, yeah.

11 FRASER HARLAND: Is that a fair
12 description of how --

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. Like, the
14 chassis would be all welded and everything in a
15 solid unit. The walls would be put together and
16 the components and then the -- those small
17 components that were welded would, then, be bolted
18 together by the technicians, and that's how it
19 would be constructed. So yes, I would say that's a
20 fair assessment, yeah.

21 FRASER HARLAND: Is it fair to say
22 there was a -- and this isn't to diminish the hard
23 work that you did in any way, but there was perhaps
24 a slightly less specialized knowledge required
25 or -- and specialized tooling required because you

1 wouldn't have had, you know, welding, painting,
2 various things like that? It was much more sort of
3 bolting pieces together? Just to help us
4 understand that.

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So the painting
6 level was just on a repair thing. So if something
7 got scratched, they had a painter that could fix a
8 scratch. But by way of, like, painting the red and
9 the white onto them, no, as far as I know, there
10 weren't there. We didn't have any spray booths or
11 anything like that. By way of specialty tools, we
12 did have speciality tools. Obviously not to do
13 welding - we weren't actually allowed to have open
14 fire in the building, so the welding was done at a
15 different facility.

16 And yes, you are correct. A lot of the
17 things were bolting pieces together. On the actual
18 production floor itself before it actually made it
19 to the static test stage, there was a lot of
20 putting zip ties on and just kind of bolting things
21 together, bolting pipes together, and getting the
22 windows in and stuff like that. And then once you
23 got to the static test, where the test team and I
24 would take over, that's when you got into more
25 specialized things concerning hydraulics or

1 concerning the electronics of the train.

2 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know where the
3 various parts of the train that were being
4 assembled in the MSF were coming from? Like, where
5 were they built?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I don't know every
7 single one, but I know, for instance, like,
8 Faiveley and Wabtec, who -- so Faiveley, at the
9 time, owned the calipers, and -- sorry, created the
10 calipers. And Wabtec manufactured the HPUs. And I
11 know those came from, like -- for instance, the
12 HPUs came from, like, South Carolina. I know a lot
13 of engineering was done there. Just -- my memory
14 might not pose too well. I believe the windows
15 came from either Turkey or Israel, and I -- the
16 only reason I remember that is because a gentleman
17 came to help us with it, and he was a very
18 interesting person.

19 And then other than that, Sorel is
20 where our bogies came in from, which is a place in
21 Montreal, where they were getting their ports from
22 I'm not sure. I know a lot of pieces came from
23 France and Europe places. A lot of people came
24 from parts of Europe. Whenever, you know, a
25 specific engineer was requested to come in to give

1 specific insight on something, a lot of it was from
2 Europe. There's a -- there's only a few parts of
3 the train that are, like, we would call them
4 American parts, so the pantograph and then the HPUs
5 and the calipers are the ones I remember for sure.

6 FRASER HARLAND: In your experience on
7 the project, did you notice any of these particular
8 parts causing challenges for construction or
9 failing during construction?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yeah. Oh,
11 yeah. So specifically to the calipers, the
12 Revision 1 caliper that we have -- so right now,
13 you have a Revision 2 caliper. The first ones had
14 a 50 to 70 percent failure ratio. So I'd install
15 14 of them, and at minimum, I'd change 5, sometimes
16 even cycling through them, like, one after another.
17 In some cases, I could literally physically look at
18 the caliper and know that it was not going to work,
19 due to, like, defects in the manufacturing.

20 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know --

21 FRASER HARLAND: Did -- sorry, Emily.
22 Did they move to what you called Rev 2 as a result
23 of those issues? Is that --

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes, that was -- so
25 the calipers specifically, it was -- very early on,

1 we knew we were getting a second set of calipers
2 because it had been determined very early on that
3 these were not going to be sufficient - not due to
4 the manufacturing; it was actually due to the cycle
5 number. So those calipers are expected to do -- I
6 can't remember the exact number, but for the sake
7 of the conversation, they needed to be able to do
8 roughly 3.5 million cycles before needing
9 maintenance done to them, and the ones we had
10 originally would only do roughly 2 million before
11 they needed it, so it wasn't going to meet the
12 requirements of the kilometres versus the
13 maintenance needed. It wouldn't -- the lifetime
14 wouldn't last long enough. So that was one of the
15 major things they changed, but the failure rate
16 pushed that to happen faster.

17 FRASER HARLAND: And so were those used
18 temporarily and then they would have been swapped
19 out during --

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, yeah. So at
21 one point, eventually -- once we had proven that we
22 had -- that they were a failure, Wabtec was then
23 required to come in with a team of people and
24 change them all because I was not going to do that
25 myself. They actually brought in, like, a bunch of

1 people to do that because it was very overwhelming
2 to change the entire fleet as fast as they wanted
3 it to be. And because it was the fault of Wabtec
4 that we had proven the failures to be done, they
5 were under contract made to do it.

6 FRASER HARLAND: Were there any other
7 parts that stand out to you in terms of challenges
8 or failures, other than the calipers?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The HPU, that went
10 through a numerous amount of retrofits in order to
11 be compatible with them. Some of those updates, I
12 will admit, changed due to the change of the
13 caliper, so that was proper, I would say. I know
14 the CVS causes a lot of problems computer-wise.
15 I'm not -- I'm very sound on the mechanics. I'm
16 not so sound on the electronics. So just by
17 talking to colleagues, I knew the CVS was an issue,
18 which is one of the computer components on the top.
19 There was -- the same idea with the air
20 compressor happened, so there was issues with the
21 air compressor, and that was changed to another
22 revision, so we had changed out the majority of
23 those.

24 I'm trying to think what else. I mean,
25 mostly some of the electronics. But really those

1 would have been the ones that stood out the most.
2 Like, I was changing calipers left, right, and
3 centre, like it was a never-ending thing.

4 EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall whether
5 Wabtec would have been a new supplier for Alstom?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: As far as I knew,
7 Wabtec was there the entire time. The only thing
8 that happened that I know with Wabtec is -- so for
9 instance, Wabtec and Faiveley were almost the same
10 company, and so Faiveley owned the calipers and
11 Wabtec owned the HPUs, and at some point, between
12 the two of them, Wabtec bought Faiveley, and
13 everything became Wabtec.

14 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether
15 Alstom had worked with Wabtec on any projects other
16 than the Ottawa project?

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So there are trains
18 in Toronto, I believe, that are running which have
19 HPUs and calipers that are also provided from
20 Wabtec.

21 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know if there are
22 any other of the suppliers that Alstom was using
23 that were new suppliers for them?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not that I can say
25 100 percent for sure.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember whether
2 there were any supply chain issues that Alstom had?

3 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, lots. Lots.

4 EMILY YOUNG: Can you speak a bit about
5 those?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, at one point,
7 the States closed the border -- or -- I can't
8 remember the incident that happened, but they
9 closed the border, and that set us back quite a
10 bit. Some of the supply chain issues were that
11 because parts were -- so they -- how do I say this
12 quickly? They do -- they have, like, a
13 skeleton-type production thing. So there's only
14 one part for each thing. So when they have a part
15 that breaks, they have to go to the next set of
16 parts for the next train and take from there, and
17 then they order down the line and bump everything
18 up. So because there were so many failure rates,
19 the manufacturers weren't really even able to keep
20 up.

21 So for instance, like, with Sorel, we
22 needed bogies so badly and so fast that they
23 couldn't send them to us with gearboxes on them
24 and, you know, a gearbox shaft and have it
25 connected to the motor and the calipers and

1 everything else that goes with them. So it wasn't
2 necessarily the fault of Alstom that we weren't
3 getting them, but definitely some of the failure
4 rates contributed to why we didn't have part.

5 We actually -- we actually changed
6 to -- train set 8 was my parts train. I had full
7 permission to take anything that I needed from that
8 train, which is still sitting in the shed with a
9 lot of stuff missing.

10 EMILY YOUNG: And -- and I would guess
11 that the result of those failures and having to
12 sort of cannibalize other trains is probably delay?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. It would
14 cause -- it would cause some of the delays, for
15 sure. That was a lot of the stuff that they talked
16 about in the radio and stuff like that, like,
17 people outside that would make comments that they
18 knew nothing of -- about.

19 EMILY YOUNG: Did you feel that you had
20 appropriate tooling available in the MSF to do the
21 assembly work?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: In production, yes,
23 I had every tool I wanted. If I -- I could walk up
24 to Thomas, who was the director at the time, and
25 I'd say I need this, and within 4 hours I'd have

1 it. Like, they jumped when I needed tools. I know
2 that the -- in production, there were some times
3 where tools were lost by employees very quickly,
4 and the company was a lot less -- or a lot more
5 reluctant to provide them again right away due to
6 the -- to expenditures. But for me personally, I
7 had it.

8 Now, in maintenance, that's a totally
9 different story. I didn't have anything I needed.
10 I had begged for tools for the entire time that I
11 had been there, and I was never given them. So for
12 instance, like, when we started in maintenance,
13 they bought a Snap-on toolbox, and the -- Hussein,
14 the maintenance vehicle manager, he bought one set
15 of wrenches, gear wrench or a Snap-on, and it went
16 from 6-mil to 19-mil, and that basically covered
17 maybe, you know, 40 percent of the sizes on the
18 train. And obviously you had to explain to them
19 that nuts have, like, a bolt and a nut setup have a
20 nut side and then the bolt side, so you'd actually
21 need two wrenches in order to turn it. So they
22 were very, very lacking on the tools needed to work
23 on it.

24 There was also this stigma that we were
25 not going to touch the trains as MVTs until the

1 warranty was all done, but obviously that's not the
2 case.

3 FRASER HARLAND: May be a silly
4 question, but, I mean, where did the tools from the
5 construction phase go? Why weren't you able to --

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: To Brampton.

7 FRASER HARLAND: Oh, okay. They --

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So even though
9 production and maintenance was Alstom, they weren't
10 helping each other. So for instance, all the
11 information I had to build the train, all the
12 micros I memorized in production, they never
13 transferred those to them. It was almost like they
14 wanted to recreate these instructions. Because now
15 that they -- they had thought, well, those are
16 production instructions, and we're not producing
17 the train anymore - we're doing maintenance. So we
18 need to make our own instructions -- right -- but
19 essentially when you're doing maintenance to the
20 train, you're basically replacing parts. Like,
21 we're not reengineering the part, and we're
22 certainly not remanufacturing the part when we're
23 in their facility, so they would have used all of
24 those, but they decided not to. I personally
25 believe it's due to some of the egos of the

1 management team, but some would say that it was
2 contractual and all that kind of stuff.

3 EMILY YOUNG: So Alstom maintenance
4 would create their own manual when --

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes.

6 EMILY YOUNG: -- you could have used
7 documents from construction to make that a lot
8 easier? Is that what you're saying?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. I mean, at
10 the beginning, obviously you're going to have a
11 massive learning curve. So out of, like, the
12 roughly 150 people that built the train, there was
13 6 or 7 or something like that that they actually
14 kept. So the management that came in regarded all
15 the people who built the trains as not -- how do I
16 say this politely? They weren't educated enough,
17 in their mind, to be able to do maintenance, which
18 baffled my brain. So they regarded them as being,
19 like, a hindrance to what was going on, so they
20 didn't want to hire them. They wanted to hire
21 anybody who had a -- if you had a mechanical
22 engineering degree or an electrical engineering
23 degree, like, you're in right away. You know what
24 I mean? Even though it's not a requirement to work
25 there, they still wanted that to happen.

1 So this learning curve that would have
2 happened at the beginning of maintenance could have
3 been lessened by using some of those instructions
4 until they had created the ones that they wanted.
5 I'm not saying that wanting to create the new
6 instructions was a bad thing, because it did have
7 to be transformed into a maintenance-type
8 instruction, but we could have -- for instance,
9 like, all the mechanics on there -- like, if a
10 caliper fails, I'm not opening up the caliper and
11 rebuilding it there on the train. I'm taking the
12 caliper off and putting a new one on. That's as
13 far as you go with it. You know what I mean? If
14 they sent it to the manufacturer and have it
15 rebuilt or something, that's on them. So just even
16 for a caliper, for instance, even just having the
17 instructions from production to remove and put a
18 caliper on would have been huge for them to be able
19 to do, but this information was far and few
20 between.

21 I actually obtained a USB card at one
22 point that had the micros for all the bogies on
23 them that I used in production, and I installed it
24 with a friend of mine on the computer that the
25 maintenance team used, and that was an avenue for

1 information that they would come to. This would
2 provide things like torque values, part numbers.
3 So for instance, if you need to get a specific
4 bolt, it would give you the number for that bolt
5 that you could go to the parts section and get the
6 specific bolt.

7 EMILY YOUNG: And if you hadn't done
8 that, would you not have had that information
9 available to you? It sounds like information you
10 need to do your maintenance job.

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. It's
12 extremely crucial. So it's not that it wouldn't
13 have been available at all. It's that they would
14 have had to go to the supervisor, and the
15 supervisor would have to request it from
16 engineering and then engineering would have to
17 transfer it down to them. So having it readily
18 available at the click of a mouse -- like, one of
19 the issues we had with management is that they
20 spent all this money giving them all these
21 electronics and computers and things to do their
22 job, but they couldn't provide us with the torque
23 value for a bolt. You know what I mean?

24 So we were a little bit frustrated with
25 our access to it, so we kind of did our own thing

1 to try to get ahold of this information. A bunch
2 of us that were still there from production got
3 together and said, hey, we need to pull this
4 information out that we would from before and get
5 it to these guys because, like, they're going to do
6 things wrong that's going to have stuff fall off
7 the train - which has happened - and, you know, we
8 need to help out as much as we can.

9 EMILY YOUNG: Was that ever improved
10 over the time that you worked in maintenance? Did
11 it start to get easier?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The time that --
13 no. In my opinion, it actually got worse. So for
14 instance, with the sanding injectors, they've --
15 they've been doing a lot of work on the sanders.
16 Obviously there's been a lot of trouble with them.
17 And then when we got to the point where we were
18 basically being taught how to clean them, the
19 instructions came from a co-op student who had
20 written it, who was becoming an engineer. So they
21 had an entire engineering team, and then they
22 brought in a co-op student who is now telling me
23 how to fix the train. So he's never seen this
24 before, he's not even a complete engineer, and he's
25 sending me information that has the wrong name of

1 parts; he's referring to things that don't do
2 certain things and telling us to do things to them
3 that you can't even really do. And there were
4 multiple occasions where even, like, Hussein would
5 tell me go and remove said part from the train, and
6 I would have to look at him and inform him that
7 that part doesn't actually exist, so I can't go and
8 take it off the train, and they would be upset with
9 me for arguing with him about it.

10 EMILY YOUNG: What would have been, in
11 your view, the proper process to provide
12 instructions on how to fix some of the issues with
13 the sanders? Rather than having the co-op student,
14 what should they have done?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, it needed
16 to be revamped by engineering. They needed to --
17 the biggest problem is when they bought the trains,
18 they forgot we have winter every year. It's as
19 though we don't -- they bought these things and
20 launched them as though winter's not going to come
21 anymore because we bought these trains or
22 something. So the problem with the sanders, in my
23 opinion, is not necessarily the engineering of the
24 device. If you were to drive this thing around on
25 a beautiful California day, the sanders are going

1 to work fine all day. But the second you add our
2 level of humidity and, you know, this cold and the
3 change of temperatures and all that kind of stuff,
4 this is where it starts to clog up.

5 So in my personal opinion, those
6 sanders need to be completely revamped in order to
7 do be able to actually do what they want them to
8 do. They did attempt to change the sand that was
9 in there to a different type of sand, but this also
10 failed as well, so...

11 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether the
12 sanders were identified as an issue before service
13 started, or was it only discovered after service
14 started?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So because -- in
16 the production, we had it kind of easy in the sense
17 that if there was a massive snowstorm outside, we
18 didn't go out with the train due to safety, right,
19 because we were still in the testing stage. So
20 we -- some of us there knew, like, as employees --
21 like, I -- like, I myself knew that this thing was
22 going to cause a huge problem. Like, I could even
23 tell just if -- if the sand got a little bit wet,
24 it had a problem. So I knew that this was going to
25 be a little bit of a headache. But by way of them

1 actually knowing at a testing engineering level,
2 they wouldn't have been able to know for the simple
3 reason that they never really actually tested that
4 much before going. Like, it was a function test.
5 Did it deploy the X amount of sand that we need it
6 to deploy upon request? Yes, so it passes.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Did they run it in
8 winter?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: In some cases, they
10 were run in winter. But, I mean, when you take the
11 train from the facility and it's warm run and you
12 take it outside and you run it up and down the
13 track two or three times and come back, you know,
14 it's not sitting out in the shed overnight in minus
15 30 and then coming out in the morning when it goes
16 up to plus 2, and then running it during the day,
17 and as the day goes on, it drops back to minus 20.
18 Like, these variables that change, you know,
19 obviously create condensation inside the sanding
20 well and obviously creates more issues as it goes.

21 EMILY YOUNG: So would they have needed
22 to, more realistically, mimic operations to kind of
23 figure that issue out?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, it could
25 have been a suggestion, but at the time, the

1 testing we were doing was all underneath the
2 requirements that they had agreed upon. So, I
3 mean, maybe it should have happened, but to see
4 Alstom step up and say, we need to do more testing
5 because, you know, we're worried about this and
6 then it would cost them more money, at a -- as a
7 business look, that's not going to be something
8 that -- they're not going to go out and willingly
9 spend more money to do more things -- you know what
10 I mean? -- when they don't have to, right, because
11 the City at that time was content with the
12 agreements that they had had.

13 EMILY YOUNG: So in your view, should
14 there have been a more stringent winter testing
15 requirements in the agreement?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. I would
17 have -- I would have 100 percent suggested that.
18 Absolutely. I mean, in my personal opinion, the
19 train was doomed from the beginning. This is not a
20 train that's sold in countries that have winter.
21 It rides too low. It needs to be stored in minus 5
22 to plus 15 temperatures. It's in an open shed --
23 you know what I mean? -- so whatever outside is is
24 what it's stored at. I mean, the only thing that
25 they could really do for the storage right now is

1 they can keep it on, which is their only real
2 chance. Like, they can keep the heat on and
3 everything in them.

4 But when it comes to being in the
5 facility -- like, for instance, like the shed that
6 they built, they didn't close all the walls because
7 it costs more money in Canada because then it
8 becomes a building, so then there's more
9 inspections; there's more rules or stuff like that
10 surrounding it. So they left the top portion of it
11 open. So for instance, you're in the shed and
12 you're doing an inspection, and there's a huge
13 windrow up against the side of a train because snow
14 has been blowing in through this opening. So it's
15 not really being stored the way that the
16 requirements were, I guess.

17 I don't know who built the facilities
18 and all that - like, who made the decisions on
19 these requirements for the facilities - so I can't
20 really point the finger to that, but I can
21 definitely tell you that it's not -- like, in my
22 personal opinion, these problems are not about to
23 go away at any point unless we seriously change the
24 trains.

25 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that

1 these -- these issues, that the train was not
2 really fit for the Ottawa climate, was known at the
3 beginning.

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They were known for
5 certain people, for sure. For sure. There were
6 people who had come from all over the world
7 building trains for them. Like, people came --
8 they had been in China for 2 years; they had these
9 amazing jobs where they travelled all over the
10 world building all these types of trains in all
11 these different types of scenarios. And a lot of
12 the stuff that was talked about is, like, you know,
13 we have -- you have open vents on the top for
14 certain fans, like, for the -- the coil conductor,
15 I believe -- I can't remember the name of the part.
16 There's a conductor on top that kept exploding, and
17 it was open to the elements, so when you're driving
18 down the track, like, stuff's going in there -- you
19 know what I mean? -- like, elements are going in
20 there, and I don't think that that was necessarily
21 what it was made to do, to have, like, freezing
22 rain go in there or anything like that.

23 So it's -- it definitely was not suited
24 for those temperatures, for sure. And the people
25 who had worked on it, you know, would say, like,

1 you know, when the winter comes, like, this isn't
2 going to work. You know what I mean? So -- and
3 now we're seeing that. I think we can all agree,
4 like, winter is the worst season for those trains.

5 EMILY YOUNG: And were those types of
6 concerns, about how the trains would work and
7 perform in winter, were they sort of escalated up?

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They were escalated
9 amongst us in the sense that, you know, we were
10 trying to put things together properly so they
11 could work as best as they could. Our only -- as
12 technicians, our only defence to what was going on
13 was building the train exactly to the micro. So
14 we -- everything I did was exactly the way the
15 design said to do it. I never strayed from that.
16 But by way of Alstom communicating to the City, I
17 mean, the way I guess Alstom looked at it, from my
18 standpoint, was that we were giving them what they
19 requested. So they had purchased a certain train,
20 and this is the design to build it, and that's what
21 we're building. You know what I mean?

22 I'd give an analogy of it's almost
23 like, you know, the City went to a car dealership,
24 and there was the choice between a Mazda 6 and a
25 Ferrari, and you're going out on a racetrack. And

1 then the City went in and said, Well, I want the
2 Ferrari because it's cheaper, and Alstom said,
3 Well, this Ferrari is what's going to win you the
4 race. And they said, Well, it's okay, we want the
5 Mazda instead. And then once they bought the
6 Mazda, the Mazda was built, they turned around and
7 said, This isn't a Ferrari, and Alstom said, Well,
8 you've bought a Mazda; you didn't buy the Ferrari.
9 And then the City basically went, Well, you need to
10 turn this into a Ferrari. And that's obviously not
11 possible.

12 That's -- that's how I see the -- some
13 of the conversations that were had and the -- in
14 some cases where City members came in, they were --
15 you know, Well, I didn't know this; you know, they
16 would do this kind of stuff. But I think that was
17 more of like a -- they were trying to pass blame on
18 each other a lot. A lot of the project was, like,
19 No, you did; no, you did - not, like, Let's work
20 together. Because there's businesses, right? So
21 the business is trying to make a profit, and the
22 City is trying to save money, and -- and all this
23 kind of stuff, so it's -- I guess that would be the
24 best way to describe that.

25 EMILY YOUNG: So it sounds like you

1 think the City picked the wrong kind of train.

2 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Absolutely. And I
3 think there's fault on Alstom for not telling them
4 you shouldn't buy this, or not even presenting it
5 to them as -- like, Alstom should not have
6 presented a train to the City that would not be
7 adequate for their working conditions. And the
8 City should not have bought a train without doing
9 enough research to find out if it was going to
10 work.

11 I mean, there's many examples all
12 across the world where Alstom has built trains that
13 run in the winter that are very successful. Like,
14 Alstom is actually a very successful train building
15 company. They've built a lot of amazing machinery.
16 It's just that here, the conflict of -- like, in my
17 own opinion, like, we're penny-pinchers here. So
18 because of -- like, I believe, like, the majority
19 of the decision was based solely off the cost of
20 it, right?

21 EMILY YOUNG: Can you elaborate on that
22 a little bit more. Do you mean just the cost in
23 the initial selection of the vehicle, or would you
24 say that there were cost-cutting measures
25 throughout the construction process that you saw?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I would say, from
2 what I researched, that the -- the want -- like,
3 the main concern from the City was making sure that
4 the train they bought was as cheap as possible is
5 what I would say. I wouldn't say that there was
6 any -- like, there were cost-cutting measures in,
7 like, the way we did things, to be able to reduce
8 the cost of doing it for the company, which is just
9 sensible business.

10 But by way of saying, Oh, you know, we
11 could put this part on, but Alstom's going to
12 secretly downgrade the part, that kind of stuff
13 didn't happen. Like, we built the trains as per
14 the design. I mean, I wouldn't say that they're
15 completed, but, you know, we -- the things that are
16 on there are built to the design.

17 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that the
18 Citadis Spirit is a proven vehicle? Or was a
19 proven vehicle when the City purchased it?

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, it's the
21 first time they've ever built it. So that was,
22 like, the big thing, right? Like, they -- these
23 trains -- it was a brand-new design. It was
24 basically, like, a mixture of some other ideas.
25 And so I guess Alstom was wanting to present this

1 in this -- you know, they're new to this country.
2 They're trying to get into the country to work in
3 our economy, and then they're also trying to
4 introduce new technology and new things. But, I
5 mean, realistically, it's a railcar that a train
6 should be driven down the middle of a street on a
7 warm, sunny day, not on, like, a VIA Rail track.

8 EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall whether
9 Alstom experienced any power issues in the MSF?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yeah. We had
11 breakers break -- like, we had fuses go all the
12 time with the OCS. There were a couple of power
13 outages that happened. We always used to joke
14 around - when the lights went off, we used to say,
15 Oh, they didn't pay the power bill again.
16 Obviously it was a joke. But yeah, there were
17 times where the power would go out a bit. And then
18 you would have a backup thing, but it would limit
19 us in doing, you know, like, testing with the power
20 on, obviously. So there were some issues with
21 that.

22 EMILY YOUNG: Were there issues with
23 stinger power?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. So the
25 stingers we actually pretty much -- so it's

1 interesting that you ask that. Are you aware of
2 the difference between the OCS and the stinger? Or
3 are you referring to the OCS when you say that?

4 So really quickly, the OCS is the line
5 that runs above the train that the pantograph
6 attaches to -- right -- that's what goes down all
7 of our tracks. In the shop, there's a thing called
8 the stinger, which is a power source that could be
9 plugged into the train so that they can do about 80
10 to 90 percent of the things that the train will do
11 without having to use the overhead catenary system.
12 It's actually a safer way to power the train and be
13 able to be on the roof. Because with the OCS on,
14 you can't go on the roof of the train because you
15 have to be at least, like, 9 metres away from the
16 OCS so you don't die. And with the stinger, we
17 were able to -- they were -- the electrician guys
18 were able to test the top of the train.

19 But those -- I know for the longest
20 time, only one of those worked. And they were
21 always up and down, up and down - like, they would
22 fix one and then it would break again. And it got
23 to the point where they just said, Screw it, we're
24 not going to use those. It was just too much of a
25 headache.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know what -- do
2 you know what the causes of those power issues
3 were?

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. No, I wasn't
5 given that information. They had, like, techs that
6 came in that did that that are, like, power line
7 technicians for the train. They'd work on the OCS
8 and stuff.

9 So I was always removed from that for
10 safety reasons. Like, I'm not an electrical guy,
11 so I don't --- you know, so I'm not going to be in
12 there if I don't need to sort of thing. So no, I
13 wasn't -- I do not know the details of what would
14 have caused that.

15 FRASER HARLAND: And with the fuses,
16 did you have any sense of what was causing those to
17 blow?

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. We -- we --
19 like, we had speculation that some of the guys had
20 told me. But it didn't really concern me too much,
21 so I didn't really pay too much attention to it.

22 EMILY YOUNG: What impact did those
23 power issues have on your work, assembling the
24 vehicles?

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: When the building

1 power went out, I couldn't see, so that would be
2 one. But by way of mine was mostly mechanical. So
3 if the train couldn't be turned on, I couldn't
4 actually test the brakes and stuff. But by way of
5 being able to install parts on the train and stuff,
6 I could still work that way. There was still stuff
7 I would do. It would stop a few things here and
8 there, but it didn't really impact me specifically.
9 It was more of an impact to the testing team, who
10 needed the power to be on to do their job.

11 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether an
12 electrical fire ever occurred in the MSF?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not a fire. There
14 was an electrical fire that happened on the rail,
15 but not in the facility, to my knowledge. I know
16 one person got electrocuted by a capacitor. But
17 nothing that like -- nothing that I know to -- oh,
18 there was a -- oh, yes, there was. There was a
19 wiring harness in one of the CVSSs or one of the
20 computer components on the train where one of the
21 wires had caught fire. But I can't remember if
22 that had caught fire on the track and they brought
23 it back in, or if it had actually caught fire in
24 the facility. But I know stuff caught fire on the
25 track.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know what the
2 cause of those fires was?

3 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, the one big
4 one was the fact that the driver drove the train
5 too far past the end of the track, and the nose of
6 the train touched the OCS as it came down into the
7 ground. So at the end of the rail, the OCS goes
8 from the top of the pole down into the ground where
9 it's grounded. And he had gone past a barrier and
10 the horn on top of the train touched the OCS and
11 the big huge light thing happened and there was a
12 little fire there, stuff like that.

13 EMILY YOUNG: Would that have been at a
14 stage when that operator was in training, or was
15 that --

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: That wouldn't have
17 been --

18 EMILY YOUNG: -- later on.

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: As far as I
20 remember, that was later on. I don't believe that
21 was an OCS -- or an OC driver. That would have
22 been somebody employed by the OLRT at that time.

23 EMILY YOUNG: Okay.

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: None of the
25 production guys drove the train. So every time a

1 train went out for dynamic, somebody was sent from
2 OLRT to drive the train. Usually it was a guideway
3 tech.

4 EMILY YOUNG: And do you know whether
5 there were any mitigations put in place as a result
6 of these electrical fires?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, so the
8 barrier was put in properly. They immediately put
9 safety protocols in for that. I know they --
10 one -- one good thing about Alstom, especially in
11 production, is once something was either -- if they
12 knew something was unsafe, things were stopped, and
13 they would put in safety measures. And then also,
14 you know, when fluke things happened when we're
15 unaware of, you know, obviously major changes were
16 made for safety purposes.

17 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that Alstom
18 had the workers that it needed in the MSF in the
19 construction phase?

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Construction for
21 the trains still, or the building?

22 EMILY YOUNG: The trains.

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, yes. There
24 was a lot of people there that were very good at
25 what they were doing. Like, there was a lot of

1 guys that were very passionate about it, and they
2 were definitely very qualified to do it. But just
3 like any facility, you're going to have people who
4 are there, and they don't care about what they're
5 doing. You know, there was a lot of younger
6 people, who, you know, this is just a job because I
7 need a paycheque, and they cared more about going
8 and partying on Friday night than they do about
9 what's going on on the trains.

10 I think because of Randstad, it made it
11 a little bit less appetizing to people to get a job
12 because, you know, you're \$18 an hour, and you are
13 required to do a ton of stuff, and a lot of the
14 people, a lot of the younger guys that were in
15 there, they didn't want anything to do with
16 maintenance. Like, they didn't care. They were
17 going to go on to something else, and so they just
18 wanted the paycheque that they were getting to, you
19 know, go out and party and stuff.

20 So I think if they had made more
21 incentives to it, there would have been a little
22 bit more quality in the people that were there.
23 But then when you got into, like, jobs as though --
24 like, somebody that's on the test team, they were
25 paid much better due to the fact that they came in

1 with, like, electrical engineering degrees, and
2 they were very qualified to do what they were
3 doing.

4 EMILY YOUNG: And did Alstom retain
5 Randstad to do the recruitment for the assembly
6 crew?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, so that's how
8 it was advertised. So actually -- I actually -- a
9 friend -- so my sister's best friend's boyfriend
10 worked there. And he actually told me, like, Hey,
11 man, like, your skill set could really be used
12 here. You should look into it. This is what made
13 me start looking into what the project was. And
14 then I actually went to the Randstad website to
15 apply for the job. So that's -- like, I didn't go
16 to an Alstom website and apply. It was applied
17 through Randstad. So they would have -- they would
18 have recruited and -- I guess -- if they
19 advertised -- I don't know if they did, but if they
20 advertised for it, it would have been through
21 Randstad.

22 EMILY YOUNG: And so it sounds like
23 you're suggesting that the -- the overall quality
24 of people might have been better if Alstom had done
25 recruiting directly and paid people more.

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. I mean,
2 like, I made \$18 an hour, and I think it was \$8
3 above that went to Randstad. So that was money
4 that I should have been making. And then on top of
5 that, they would tell you right at the beginning,
6 like, You're not getting a raise. So how it worked
7 was I made \$18 an hour and Randstad made \$8. Now,
8 if I got bumped up to \$20 an hour, that meant
9 Randstad only made \$6, and then if I got bumped up
10 to 21, they only made 5. You know what I mean? So
11 when you went and asked for a raise, they didn't
12 want to give it because they were making a profit.

13 So for instance, to get a raise, later
14 on in the project, my value as an employee was
15 extremely high because I was now at a certain point
16 where I was the only one in the world who was doing
17 these things because they're not being built
18 anywhere. I know that sounds pretty elaborate, but
19 it was part of the coolness of this job. So for
20 instance, I got to the point where my job was
21 being -- I was required to do too much, so I went
22 to the production manager, and I said you need to
23 give me more money. And he says, well, I can't do
24 that. And I says, well, Friday's my last day, and,
25 miraculously, the next day I was bumped up to \$26

1 an hour, and I had been back-paid for that
2 difference the last 2 months.

3 So you had to corner them to do that.
4 And you had to have leverage in order to do it,
5 which I -- when I look back at now, it's not really
6 fair, so to speak, because it's not really fair to
7 the other people who are making the \$18 an hour.
8 But it also wasn't fair to the people who were much
9 more valuable in the sense of how driven they were
10 and their expertise in what was going on.

11 EMILY YOUNG: What kind of training did
12 you receive for the construction work on the
13 vehicles?

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So formal training,
15 you would get torque and glue training, so there
16 was some gluing that went on. And then torque
17 training would be, like, how to set a torque
18 wrench, how to properly torque a bolt because that
19 was a lot of what was going on. And then after
20 that, you would have more person-to-person
21 training. So for instance, like, if you went to
22 the first station, a gentleman named Easy was --
23 well, his actual name was Malaku (phonetic), and
24 his nickname was Easy. He was the team lead for
25 that station. So then you would go and work with

1 him, and he would shadow you and show you how to
2 read the micro and back and forth.

3 But by way of formal training for this,
4 they had -- Alstom has this idea that if they make
5 the instructions readable to a Grade 9 level, then
6 anyone that they hire with a high school education
7 is going it to be able to walk in and do this.
8 There's definitely this idea of that -- at Alstom
9 that everybody's replaceable and anybody can come
10 in and just do anything. Like, you -- you know
11 what I mean? Like, if I don't do it, somebody else
12 will -- right? -- which, in a very specific
13 situation that we were in here, that was not the
14 case, and that kind of -- kind of hindered things a
15 little bit.

16 EMILY YOUNG: So your view is that not
17 just anyone could walk in from the street and read
18 Alstom's instruction and do the job?

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. No.
20 Definitely not. Like, you'd never seen the thing
21 before. That would be like can you go in and do a
22 heart surgery on your first day. You know, like,
23 you can't. Like, nobody can. Even after going
24 through medical school, you can't just walk in
25 after medical school and do a surgery. There's --

1 there's multiple different tests and things they do
2 leading up to that, right? So this was controlled
3 by the team leads.

4 Like, for the first 6 months you were
5 there, the average person was not actually allowed
6 to do anything without a team lead watching them.
7 So that was how they had to do the training. And
8 the situation of that it was built nowhere else is
9 what caused this type of training. It was not that
10 they were doing it out of negligence; it was that
11 there was no -- like, we were still learning as we
12 went. There was a lot of trial and error going on.

13 So they couldn't really just hand you
14 an instruction book that was already set in stone
15 and you could go out and figure your way out, you
16 know. There was a lot of times where the team lead
17 would look at me and say, we got to go to
18 engineering because I'm at a point where I don't
19 even know, and this person had been there for a
20 year, let's say. So then you'd use your
21 engineering and stuff like that.

22 So there was a lot of learning as we
23 go, which is why I imply that having higher pay
24 would have brought people who are more interested
25 in it, which would have brought a higher learning

1 level into a facility.

2 FRASER HARLAND: You mentioned earlier
3 that you are able to do things -- I can't remember
4 the exact numbers you gave, but I think you did
5 something in 5 days that --

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah.

7 FRASER HARLAND: -- had taken others
8 3 weeks, so --

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: 2 and a half weeks,
10 yeah.

11 FRASER HARLAND: 2 and a half weeks?
12 Okay.

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah.

14 FRASER HARLAND: So what -- what
15 explains that? Is that your level of experience at
16 that point compared to people who are
17 unexperienced? People's motivation? What was
18 going on there?

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I would say it
20 encompassed all of it. So when I first got there,
21 they were still -- like, they knew what they were
22 doing, but -- how do I explain that? They knew the
23 procedure that they were doing, but also the
24 repetitions that they had, at that point, weren't
25 very high either.

1 So one of the big learning things is
2 how many times you've done something. Once you --
3 if you've done something twice, you're not going to
4 be as good as it as if you've done something a
5 hundred times.

6 So there was that aspect, and then also
7 the motivation. There was a lot of, like, I'm not
8 paid enough to go that fast; I don't care about
9 their deadline because, you know, I'm only paid \$18
10 an hour; whereas I walked into the facility and
11 said if I do, it's going to be undeniable that I go
12 to maintenance, right? Like, my whole goal was to
13 get to maintenance. Like, they could have paid me,
14 like, minimum wage for all I care, and I still
15 would have worked that hard to get it done. So a
16 lot of it was motivation.

17 And then also, yeah, my experience -
18 like, I was able to pick up on it a lot faster than
19 some of them were. And then also just my -- my --
20 being a little bit older and some of the other jobs
21 I had, I was able to manage the job a little bit
22 better, so I was a little bit more organized, I
23 knew all the tools I needed.

24 And then there was memorization too.
25 Like, I literally memorized all these micros.

1 Like, to this day, I could name you probably all of
2 the torque values of all the bolts as we pointed to
3 them type thing. So being able to do it out of my
4 brain instead of having to look at an instruction
5 all the time also sped things up.

6 Now, there were certain -- I want to be
7 clear too, there were certain components of what I
8 was doing in those 5 days which would require
9 somebody else to be with me, and in some cases they
10 would have someone work with me just because they
11 thought they were working me into the ground, and
12 they thought it would make things a little bit
13 easier for me.

14 EMILY YOUNG: Can you just clarify for
15 us, Mr. Lennerton: What is a micro?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So a micro is like
17 an instruction. So for instance, like -- it's a
18 French term. So, like, if you buy a barbecue and
19 you pull out the instructions, that's a micro to
20 them, just more detailed, I guess you would say.

21 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that the
22 training you were given to prepare you for your job
23 assembling the vehicles was sufficient?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: For me it was
25 because I was able to learn extremely quickly, but

1 I don't think overall, to the majority of the
2 people in there, it was sufficient. I mean, in
3 some stations there were people who literally spent
4 all day putting zip ties on. Like, that's all they
5 did. They would put a wiring harness down in
6 front, put a zip tie on. They might tighten a
7 10-mil bolt every now and then.

8 So by -- in that aspect, it wasn't
9 really needed that much. I know in some
10 stations -- like, for instance, ASO 2 was a very
11 big station in the sense of like the components
12 they were using were heavy, and they used, like,
13 more power tools. So that person would spend more
14 time with the team lead learning a little bit of
15 different things than somebody who's putting zip
16 ties on. You know what I mean?

17 EMILY YOUNG: What do you think that
18 they could have done better to train everyone who
19 wasn't maybe as quick a learner as you or as
20 committed?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, they
22 definitely should have had, like, specific training
23 to where the point of -- like, for instance,
24 when -- how do I say that? So, like, when I went
25 and worked with the team lead when I first started

1 there, the job we were doing was not specifically
2 to train me. It was still to complete the task
3 that he was assigned to do. So there wasn't
4 anything where, like, you would go and walk up to
5 the side of the train and you would do something
6 that, even if you messed up, it didn't affect
7 production -- you know what I mean? -- so it was,
8 like, specifically to training.

9 I think if they isolated that more
10 instead of having a person sit there and do a --
11 so, like, for instance, the team lead is trying to
12 train me, but at the same time, he's trying to keep
13 up. Like, he's got to finish this job in enough
14 time to get his next job done and for us to meet
15 his deadlines.

16 So it's not like they were in a relaxed
17 scenario where they could take the time to explain
18 it and then go through the things they know and
19 then have the person try it, fail, try again, maybe
20 have a little bit of success or -- and adjust in
21 that aspect. I think that would have helped a lot
22 more.

23 But, again, information on the train
24 was still being developed as we were going, like
25 figuring out why certain things were the way they

1 were or fit the way they fit, like things like that
2 was not as known, so it wouldn't have been -- they
3 wouldn't have really had the information to be that
4 direct.

5 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any
6 issues that were encountered in integrating the
7 Thales and Alstom systems?

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. Thales is --
9 Thales is junk. That stuff doesn't work. We were
10 actually -- like, I actually installed Thales at
11 one point. I put in, like, over a thousand wires
12 into a train to construct it. They would give us a
13 list of lines that would have remove this and put
14 it to this and take this out and -- completely and
15 add this wire in.

16 So Thales was originally supposed to
17 come already built into all of our wiring harnesses
18 and everything like that. Due to the failure of
19 Thales, that didn't happen, so we actually had to
20 put it in after the train was built, and then
21 obviously now we know that Thales has -- came in
22 during maintenance, and we know that they then had
23 tons of trouble. I mean, I was even told that in
24 Toronto or in another project -- I don't think it
25 was the one in Brampton, but they were actually

1 walked off the site due to the incompetence of what
2 they were doing. So Thales -- like, the automated
3 system in the train, that is -- like, at this
4 stage, with what's going on, it would be horrifying
5 to me if we were even trying to use that. So it's
6 kind of a blessing in disguise, but yes, there were
7 major, major problems with the Thales system.

8 EMILY YOUNG: And was the -- the main
9 problem, it sounds like you're saying, is that
10 Alstom was expecting to receive the system, like,
11 ready to go, kind of plug-and-play into the trains,
12 and that's not what it got.

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, that's --
14 that's essentially what it seemed like to me is
15 that -- like, we were there to assemble the train,
16 turn it on -- make sure it works, turn it on, and
17 sell it to you -- you know what I mean? -- not
18 reengineer the Thales system because they failed on
19 it. You know what I mean?

20 And then at that point too, because of
21 the amount of wires on the train, it's hard for
22 them to -- like, they would send us something
23 that's not complete because we needed to keep
24 going. So then you'd have to put it in after,
25 which then made it even more difficult, which, in

1 turn, could cause more problems due to damaging
2 something else or whatever at the time.

3 EMILY YOUNG: So you were under a time
4 crunch, Alstom was, to --

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah.

6 EMILY YOUNG: -- complete the vehicles,
7 and you didn't have what you needed from Thales
8 when you needed it, so sometimes you had to kind of
9 move ahead and then go back and retrofit or fix
10 the --

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Exactly, yeah.
12 Retrofit is the exact word, yeah. That was
13 basically what -- and that situation was -- I felt
14 was forced on us due to the lack of completion from
15 Thales.

16 EMILY YOUNG: And did that have effects
17 on Alstom's work as well --

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yeah. Well,
19 they had to -- so you had a retrofit team that was
20 supposed to be going around and saying, you know --
21 like, for instance, like, this air control panel,
22 well, there's a revision on it, and they've changed
23 one of the valves, so I would go up to it, unbolt
24 that one, bolt the new one on, connect it all up.
25 And in my case, I would turn the train on and make

1 sure it worked. But in most cases, testing would
2 do that.

3 So that's what we were supposed to be
4 doing, but now we had to go in and facilitate a
5 train to come back in that's completed and supposed
6 to be sold. Now we've got to bring that back in;
7 then we've got to allot people to it to do it,
8 right, which then takes manpower away from other
9 things, then causes the need for more hiring, which
10 makes the spending go up and all that sort of
11 stuff, right, so it was like a snowballing effect.

12 Now, in my opinion, we got done what we
13 were supposed to get done, but I think we're all
14 aware that the Thales system is not working, to say
15 the least.

16 EMILY YOUNG: And are there still
17 retrofits ongoing to the Thales system?

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I would assume so.
19 I know Thales -- when I was still there, I know
20 Thales was still in and out of there all the time.

21 EMILY YOUNG: And when you say that
22 having to do those retrofits in the Thales system
23 was taking people power away from other things,
24 what were those other things that were being --

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, so the

1 retrofit team that I was on was the one that would
2 do it. So for instance, like -- I don't know --
3 we'd have, like -- one of the things that the
4 retrofit team did was closing points. So we would
5 have all the little tiny things that needed to
6 be -- so the City is coming, and they want a
7 brand-new train, right? Well, this seat here, for
8 whatever reason, has a tear on the cushion, so we
9 need to fix that because they're buying a new
10 train, not a train with a torn cushion. So you
11 would need somebody to change that cushion.

12 Well, that team of people that would go
13 in to do this -- now, to put it into perspective of
14 what we're doing, there's, like, a list of, like,
15 hundreds of things that would need to be done,
16 little -- we're talking little paint dings and,
17 like, little things like that would need to be
18 fixed as well. So you'd have a team of, let's say,
19 six people that would be assigned to do that.
20 Well, two of those people need to go and do Thales,
21 let's say. So then you would have the four people,
22 which would mean, you know, either those people are
23 pushing to do more work, or they're falling behind
24 because they don't have enough people to complete
25 all those tasks.

1 EMILY YOUNG: I see that it's -- oh.

2 FRASER HARLAND: Sorry. Other than the
3 complications that the Thales system created in
4 terms of retrofits and train construction, are you
5 aware of issues that the Thales system caused for
6 the operation or reliability of the trains,
7 especially during revenue service?

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I know that
9 sometimes the testing team would say, you know,
10 this component is, you know, causing an issue or
11 whatever that would have Thales components in it.
12 But I don't know any specifics of that because it
13 goes into the electrical realm, and I -- I didn't
14 have -- I didn't have enough time to learn all that
15 as well. I know that train set 2 -- our original
16 train set 2, almost all of Thales was bypassed by
17 the driver so that he could actually test the train
18 without being interrupted by it because it wasn't
19 working on his train.

20 EMILY YOUNG: What do you mean
21 "bypassed"?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So, like, train set
23 2 was a validation train. So if he needed to test
24 specific safety features on the train, in order for
25 them to work, he would have to bypass the computer

1 system that wouldn't allow it to happen. So for
2 instance, like, would the door stay shut when the
3 train is driving, you know? He would have to
4 bypass that system in order to get the train to do
5 the wrong thing first to see that the train would
6 respond correctly. So he would have to force
7 issues in order to get to the correct response from
8 the safety feature, if that -- I don't know if that
9 explains that well enough.

10 EMILY YOUNG: And is that because just
11 the Thales system wasn't working?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. Yeah.

13 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware --

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: From what I --
15 that's from what I understood, yeah.

16 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether there
17 were any other integration issues between systems?

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The compressor.
19 The compressor gave us problems, so we changed to a
20 new compressor. By way of, like, integrating them,
21 I mean, it was more -- like, some of the delays
22 that would happen is, like, if you had to put in
23 new wiring, so a technician would go in to change
24 the wiring and they would accidentally damage
25 something else. You know what I mean? Like, that

1 kind of an issue.

2 But by way of, like, it affecting
3 programming and stuff, I -- I don't know. I
4 didn't -- again, I didn't do a lot of the
5 electrical stuff. It was mostly towards mechanical
6 failure and stuff like that.

7 EMILY YOUNG: I think it might be a
8 good time for a break, unless, Mr. Harland, did you
9 want to jump in with another question?

10 FRASER HARLAND: No, this is a good
11 time for a break.

12 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So maybe we can
13 come back at 4:45, if that works.

14 -- RECESS AT 4:33 --

15 -- UPON RESUMING AT 4:45 --

16 EMILY YOUNG: So, Mr. Lennerton, there
17 was something you wanted to clarify about your job
18 description.

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. So later on
20 in the project, I think probably within the last
21 year -- I wouldn't say it was a full year, but --
22 the retrofit team got smaller, and I was moved to
23 a -- like, a -- one of the production parts, which
24 was called PCO 9. It was the last train of the
25 before it went to testing, and they made me a team

1 lead of that section. So I actually, in one part,
2 did all of that -- or all of the mechanical stuff
3 that you were talking about from before. And then
4 I would also manage a team under an EPU manager to
5 finish, like, closing points and stuff like that,
6 which was more of a production role than it was the
7 other one.

8 I just wanted to throw that in there
9 because one of my questions was if my title
10 changed, so technically I went to a team lead
11 position.

12 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Thank you. And so
13 did you have any specific role in testing and
14 commissioning, or you were on the retrofit team
15 throughout that phase?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So the extent of my
17 testing was the brakes. Because the people who
18 were testing the train were electrical, once the --
19 like, obviously the electricity powers a mechanical
20 device, so on the mechanical side, I would give a
21 lot of yeses or nos as to whether something was
22 working.

23 So if the caliper wasn't working -- I
24 would set all the hydraulic fluid and everything,
25 and then they would cycle the brake from inside the

1 train, and I would stand in front of the brake and
2 give them yes or no as to whether it's working. We
3 would also then look at, like, hydraulic pressures
4 and things like that and how fast they dropped and
5 things to see if there were other issues because
6 this was more in my avenue of expertise and a
7 little bit outside of what they were. So we kind
8 of colabbed a little bit in that.

9 I didn't normally go for a dynamic
10 test, so -- at one point, though, I was rewarded --
11 one of the things I wanted to do was ride the train
12 before any regular citizen was able to do it. It
13 was just -- I just wanted to see what it was like.
14 I wanted to hear it. Sound was a big way of
15 testing things. So there was a couple of occasions
16 where -- well, in one instance I got to actually go
17 for a dynamic test with the testing team and
18 visually test the brakes the way they did out on
19 the track, which gave me an enormous amount of
20 information to make me even better at my job. And
21 then there was also the validation team who would
22 go out on the track, and he would need somebody to
23 assist him in certain things. I would also rescue
24 his train as well during his testing. So I would
25 go out to the track and do it.

1 But by way of actually testing
2 electronics and stuff, that was not -- that was not
3 me. I could bring to the attention that something
4 wasn't working, but the final decisions were made
5 by the people who were qualified in that department
6 to do so. But my word did have a lot of weight in
7 it. So if a production person from the floor just
8 said, Hey, I don't think that's working, they
9 wouldn't -- like, they maybe look at it for a
10 second to see, but there wouldn't be really too
11 much done about it. But if I told them there was
12 something that wasn't working, you know, things
13 would stop and we would figure it out.

14 EMILY YOUNG: So you were helping with
15 both validation and serial testing?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I was helping with
17 validation, production, the retrofit team, and then
18 when warranty started at the very end, I also
19 assisted that warranty team a lot. So pretty much,
20 like, anything -- any -- any time anything turned
21 into a mechanical issue, I was on it. I was -- I
22 would -- I would consider myself, like, the
23 mechanic of the shop. I was the closest thing they
24 had to, like, an actual licenced mechanic, I would
25 say, without being licenced. I do not have a

1 mechanical licence or anything like that.

2 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of
3 validation testing being delayed on the project?

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: In some cases, yes.
5 Not due to the person in the validation team,
6 but -- for instance, when we switched from the
7 Revision 1 calipers to the second revision
8 calipers, the caliper itself came to us before the
9 hoses that connect to the train were sent. So we
10 had the device, but we couldn't actually make it
11 function on a whole train because the other
12 component that we needed was not there. So there
13 were ways around it to test it in a static
14 situation, but by way of going out onto the track
15 to do it, that definitely would have caused a
16 delay.

17 But usually the person who was doing
18 validation, the main person for it doing the
19 testing, he will -- he was very ambitious, so he
20 would just simply switch to something -- he would
21 go and test something different in the time being.
22 So it didn't necessarily completely stop them. In
23 some cases, I guess it would have delayed it by a
24 bit.

25 Obviously, failures for it too would

1 delay him. Like, for instance, when we first got
2 the brakes working on train set 2, the new set of
3 brakes, we were not told that the software in the
4 HPU would have to change, so when he went out to
5 test, the second he applied the brakes, they
6 applied at 100 percent, and this locked up the
7 wheels and caused flat spots. Now -- whereas now
8 we deal with flat spots by lathing the wheels. At
9 that point, we didn't have a lathe wheel, and
10 because the train is still being built, they don't
11 want lathe wheels. They need new ones. So for
12 instance, he went out and came back and I had to
13 change 11 wheels on that train because they had so
14 many flat spots due to something like that.

15 So that would have been a delay, but I
16 mean, again, I would do things very quickly and
17 high quality, so I changed all 11 wheels in 3 days,
18 so it wasn't too bad.

19 EMILY YOUNG: Was validation testing
20 still ongoing as serial production was underway?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. So train set
22 2 was built obviously after train set 1, and that
23 was immediately went into validation right away.
24 So he had been validating that train the entire
25 duration of time.

1 EMILY YOUNG: And sorry, when the
2 validation was going on on 1 and 2, were others
3 also being produced in serial production?

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. Trains were
5 still being produced, yeah.

6 EMILY YOUNG: And is it your
7 understanding that normally you would want to have
8 your validation testing done before you start
9 serial production?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, in a
11 perfect world, when they've built a train that --
12 you know, they already know the design of the
13 train. It's built somewhere else, let's say, and
14 they're re-creating it, I could see that being a
15 possibility, but given that these things were being
16 made, tested and everything all at one time, I
17 don't really see that being possible.

18 Now, I personally -- because of when I
19 started, I don't know if, you know, like, if train
20 set 2 had started validation before production had
21 officially started. At the very beginning of the
22 project, there was a handful of people who had
23 applied right away and were hired, and they were
24 sent to a location in the States where they were
25 trained on how to build train set 1, and that's how

1 we got our start of information. So I don't know
2 if, like, right after that they built train set 2
3 right away, and that's when validation started or
4 if they had built train set 1, then built train set
5 2, validation started and then production started,
6 but I know that validation and production
7 overlapped each other during the time for sure.

8 EMILY YOUNG: Does -- is the result of
9 that, not having validation done before you go into
10 production of others vehicles, that more retrofits
11 would be required?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: It -- I definitely
13 would say that it's, like, you know -- let's say,
14 for instance, he gets train set 2, and he's
15 validating the train, and, you know, now train set
16 3, 4, and 5 are built and then he finds an issue,
17 so now they can only start implementing that on the
18 next train that's built, and 3, 4, and 5 would have
19 to be retrofitted to fix said issue, shall we say.

20 EMILY YOUNG: And did that happen on
21 the construction process for these vehicles?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I would say yes. I
23 would say it would because that's where a lot of
24 our changes would come from, right? Like, he would
25 report back and say -- you know, for instance,

1 let's use calipers as an example. He reports back
2 and says, These calipers are not up to standard;
3 this is not going to work. And then we would have
4 to continue on with those brakes in order to, you
5 know, be able to continue on with the project while
6 we waited for the new calipers to be brought in.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether there
8 were any issues with getting access to the track to
9 do testing?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: During
11 construction, because the track wasn't completely
12 installed, they were limited to how far they could
13 go. Safety also limited them too in the sense that
14 they didn't have all of their control systems in,
15 so it was -- there was a lot of permits that needed
16 to be in place and certain construction on the site
17 might stop these things from happening at certain
18 times. But that was all, like, kind of part and
19 parcel of everything. You know what I mean? Like,
20 obviously you can't drive down a track that doesn't
21 exist, so -- you know what I mean? That would
22 be -- that would be horrific kind of thing, so
23 obviously those sort of things had an issue.

24 I know that the state of the tracks --
25 I don't know if you guys are aware, but the tracks

1 are not built very well, and so it would cause
2 issues in the sense of -- like, they would say, We
3 think we hear a problem, right, but we can't tell
4 because there's so much other noise being made by
5 the tracks -- you know what I mean? -- so that
6 would hinder that as well.

7 EMILY YOUNG: What do you mean when you
8 say the tracks weren't "built very well"?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: To give a good
10 example, I sat on the train one time when we were
11 out on a validation run, and I could look straight
12 down on the track and see that it was not straight,
13 like you could visually see, like, the track would
14 go like this and then one would go like this. And,
15 you know, stuff like that. You could look out the
16 front of the bay and see a huge bow in it and stuff
17 like that. So I personally don't think the quality
18 of the tracks was kept up to par, shall we say.

19 EMILY YOUNG: Do you have a sense of
20 whether the testing and commissioning phase on the
21 project was compressed or rushed?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, Alstom
23 obviously wanted to push it to keep going, but the
24 managers for the test team were amazing, and they
25 wouldn't let -- because they're liable too, they

1 wouldn't let certain things go by. So, like, if
2 the -- if the testing commissioner -- or sorry, not
3 a commissioner but, like, if the testing engineer
4 said, No, we're not going out to test that, there
5 wasn't much Alstom could do about it. So even
6 though they still wanted to stick to their plans --
7 it's not like they were saying, hey, go do
8 something unsafe, you know.

9 Like, obviously they would communicate
10 about this topic or whatever, but they would
11 definitely say -- you know, like, we can't, you
12 know, the pantograph won't stay up. Like, we can't
13 go and test. You know, without the pantograph
14 attached to the OCS, let's say -- it's just as an
15 example. I'm not saying this happened all the
16 time, but it's just as an example. If the
17 pantograph can't stay up, we can't go out and test,
18 so it would be foolish for Alstom to say get out
19 there and do it anyways. You know what I mean?

20 EMILY YOUNG: And who would be the
21 person saying that type of thing? Like, the
22 pantograph is not properly in its place --

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So the testing team
24 would test it, find out there's a fault, let's say,
25 and they would report that back to their manager,

1 which was the engineering manager for the test
2 team, and then he would go into this meeting and he
3 would explain this issue of what's happening, and
4 then they would revamp their planning in order to
5 either keep the train in there or move it for now,
6 like have it towed out so they could work on
7 something else until they had the ability to fix
8 said problem.

9 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any
10 changes to the original plan for testing and
11 commissioning or any kind of value engineering in
12 that process?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. That's a
14 little bit above my head, I think.

15 EMILY YOUNG: Can you just briefly
16 explain for us what the difference between static
17 and dynamic serial testing is?

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay. So the first
19 stage of static test was put in what we called the
20 cage. So at the end of the station, there was this
21 big cage that we had that they would put the car
22 in, and then members of the testing team would plug
23 in certain machinery that would be able to send
24 power down the line from one end of the line to the
25 other, and it would tell which wires have issues or

1 pins are not where they need to be or things like
2 that. So that testing would be done to make sure
3 that, obviously, when they turn the whole train on
4 full power that nothing blows up, let's say - which
5 didn't happen, by the way. Nothing every detonated
6 inside the building.

7 But then that train would be put into
8 the last stage of production, where it would be
9 attached and put into a full train. Then it would
10 go to the second stage of static testing, which
11 would be in the LMB, which is the MSF 1s and 2s,
12 and it would sit there stationary, and they would
13 test all the components that are working. And once
14 they've determined that, one of their last tests
15 would be what's called an earth test, which is they
16 test all the major grounding in it. So they would
17 actually force power down the ground lines in order
18 to make sure that if there was a fault, it would
19 ground properly.

20 And then they would do what's called a
21 bump test. So they would move the train under
22 power inside the bay, you know, a couple of feet to
23 make sure that, one, they're going to have proper
24 propulsion and then also that they would have
25 brakes that would work.

1 And then after -- sorry, the dynamic
2 part would then be they would schedule a time to go
3 out on the track, and they would go up and down the
4 track and make sure that it does all those
5 different components at different speeds. And then
6 they would test the doors too. So, like, for
7 instance, one of the tests would be they would have
8 to get up to like, let's say -- actually, they did
9 it at 55 kilometres an hour, I believe. And then
10 at 55 kilometres an hour, you know, one of the
11 technicians would push on the door and to make sure
12 that the door is not going to just open while the
13 train's flying down the track, right?

14 And then they would test the braking in
15 that too. So they would go through, like -- they
16 would go through a dead man's test - so, like, for
17 instance, if the driver has to hold a handle in
18 place, and if the driver were to - you know, heaven
19 forbid - pass away while driving, he would let go
20 of this handle. If this handle is not held, the
21 train would automatically go into an emergency
22 braking system, and it would stop the train
23 immediately. So they would do that sort of test.

24 And then they do the test where they
25 pull the brake all the way back, and that would be

1 like regular braking that the driver would do if
2 he's in control of the train. And then there would
3 be the emergency stop that they would press that
4 would be a full-on, manually initiated test.

5 And also in concerning to Thales,
6 Thales does work in certain aspects in -- like,
7 it's connected to, like, the GPS system in the
8 train, so it is used in a certain extent to know
9 where it is on the track and stuff like that. It
10 also automates the braking and stuff like that.
11 Like, the drivers are mostly just pushing a button
12 at this point. But by way of it working in an
13 unautomated system is not happening, just to be
14 more clear on that.

15 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know how much time
16 the trains had on the track to run and test before
17 service, how it compared to other rail projects?

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I don't know how it
19 would compare to other rail projects, but I
20 definitely know that, for instance -- like, all the
21 trains had a dynamic test. But, like, for
22 instance, when OC Transpo started to take over,
23 they wanted to start training drivers, and as we
24 were building trains, not all those trains -- like,
25 it's not like they cycled through all of the

1 trains, from what I understood. They would have
2 certain trains that were designated to allow the
3 drivers to practice on.

4 EMILY YOUNG: So does that mean that
5 some trains were getting a lot more kilometres than
6 others?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes, yeah.

8 EMILY YOUNG: Could that lead to any
9 issues?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, I mean,
11 obviously, like, wear and tear on the machine is
12 going to bring, you know, maintenance sooner. It's
13 going to -- you know, stuff is going to wear down
14 faster. So, you know, definitely if they had flat
15 spots and stuff like that when they did it, the
16 wheels had to be replaced and things like that.
17 But by way of it causing any, like, difference in
18 the issues we're having now versus -- like, you're
19 not going to be able to go there and say, like,
20 well, we know this train's having a lot more
21 problems than this one and then directly relate it
22 to that issue is probably not possible. It
23 wouldn't have been that much. It did put more
24 kilometres on it, yes, but I don't think to that
25 extent.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Did you have any role in
2 the trial running phase?

3 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. I was never --
4 not -- not to, like, learn how to drive the train
5 or anything like that. I -- I don't even -- I
6 don't even recall being on the train when OC
7 Transpo drivers were on it until later in
8 maintenance.

9 EMILY YOUNG: Would you say or is your
10 understanding that there were a lot of deferred
11 retrofits going into service as compared to what
12 you might see on other projects?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: By way of being
14 able to compare that to another project, I've
15 personally never been a part of another project,
16 and being able to gather that information from an
17 outside source is very difficult. Alstom is very
18 private with some of their information. Like, the
19 measurement of the wheel flange is, like, one of
20 their most sacred things. Like, no -- like, train
21 companies do not share their measurement of the
22 wheel flange with each other, and if you ask them
23 what it is, they look at you sideways like, you
24 know, why are you asking this question kind of
25 thing. It's a funny topic. We used to tease them

1 with it.

2 EMILY YOUNG: Fair enough. I'll
3 reframe it this way: Did you have any concerns
4 going into service about the amount of retrofits
5 that still had to be done to the trains?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, absolutely.
7 Absolutely. Like, when the trains got launched,
8 the auxiliary line on the brakes is not even hooked
9 up at all. There's no reservoir tank for it.
10 There's no oil in it at all.

11 EMILY YOUNG: What does that mean?
12 Like, what's the effect of that?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay. So you have
14 a main line, which is what functions all the time
15 when you're driving the train, right? It's
16 controlled by the HPU, right, so technically when
17 the train breaks on the track, we have to do what's
18 called a rescue. So right now, what they have to
19 do to rescue the train is they have to turn the
20 train off and then they have to turn on certain
21 components of the train, which is basically the
22 HPUs; they have to tell the HPU to release the
23 brakes. Then the HPU and the accumulator are
24 required to then hold this pressure so that the
25 brakes stay released, and then they would tow the

1 train back, right?

2 The correct way to do it is that
3 there's actually a hand pump that's supposed to be
4 mounted inside the train that a technician such as
5 either myself or a warranty technician - whoever's
6 qualified at the time - would go onto the train and
7 connect this device to a quick connect outlet
8 that's behind a small trap door. He would then
9 physically pump the pressure required to hold the
10 brake open, and then they would tow the train.

11 The importance of that is that the HPU
12 and the accumulator are only capable of holding
13 pressure for approximately 7 to 8 minutes. So once
14 you turn all that on and put the pressure in, they
15 have to turn the train back off, so then the timer
16 starts ticking, so then they start to tow the
17 train.

18 Well, while this is happening, the
19 pressure in the calipers are dropping, which means
20 the pressure is now -- or the caliper is now
21 reapplying pressure to the rotors, which would then
22 lock up the wheels. This is why -- I don't know of
23 how much you're aware of the project, but this is
24 why when they rescue a train, the wheels have to be
25 lathed because they've basically just dragged the

1 thing back. So the problem with that retrofit is
2 they need to put what's called an overflow tank in.
3 And that tank needs to sit somewhere -- like, for
4 instance, you can't put a high-pressure tank behind
5 a piece of plastic that would be directly next to a
6 customer's, like, body -- you know what I mean? --
7 in case there was a catastrophic failure.

8 So there would have to be a pipe --
9 like, a hose put in. It would have to be mounted
10 properly. And up to the point of where I left, I
11 never even saw any sort of drawings of this or
12 anything. And to me personally, that's, like --
13 the amount of problems that they're having, not
14 being able to rescue the train properly is one
15 thing that I find is very much, like, in the way of
16 what's going on.

17 EMILY YOUNG: In the way in the sense
18 that it hinders the ability to do maintenance of --

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: To -- well, it --
20 it hinders the ability to rescue the train on the
21 track in a timely manner, and it also -- if they
22 had those components in the train, they would be
23 able to rescue the train without further damaging
24 the train. So the way they're doing it now when it
25 fails, it damages the wheels, and that causes more

1 work. So for instance, it can't just come back in
2 and have a quick fix done and go back out. It's
3 got to be in for a day to be fixed; then it's got
4 to go to the wheel lathe; then it's got to be
5 lathed. All that has to happen and then it can go
6 back into service. So that's definitely something,
7 in my personal opinion, that highly contributes to
8 delays.

9 EMILY YOUNG: Were there any other
10 retrofits that had yet to be done at the time of
11 service that concerned you?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not like that, no.
13 I mean, there were probably little things here and
14 there, but they were out of my scope of work at
15 that time, so I didn't really pay attention to
16 that. I mean, my thing was, like, I was doing the
17 brakes, right, and that's arguably the most
18 important part of the train. So my -- I was so
19 focussed on that that these -- like, you know, oh,
20 this zip tie's not in the right spot, I personally
21 don't care about that zip tie -- you know what I
22 mean? -- that kind of thing.

23 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think it's fair to
24 say that the push to get to service would have
25 downloaded more work onto maintenance?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, maintenance
2 doesn't do anything -- like, maintenance doesn't
3 take care of any retrofits or changes to the train,
4 so I think what would have hurt more was the
5 warranty team in the sense that, like, things
6 obviously wouldn't have worked properly, and the
7 warranty team is what looks at that.

8 The -- the maintenance team is more
9 supposed to be preventive maintenance - so, you
10 know, at 150,000 kilometres, you need to grease
11 your caliper pins; you need to flush the train; you
12 need to check your wheels and fix the sander or,
13 like, do, you know, maintenance to the sanders and
14 other components, re-level the train, like, things
15 like that - whereas the warranty team would
16 actually have to -- so for instance, if there's a
17 retrofit where a program in one of the computer
18 systems needs to be changed, the warranty team
19 would be the one that would go in and change it.

20 EMILY YOUNG: Would that have an effect
21 on Alstom maintenance by making it harder to get
22 access to the trains to do maintenance?

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Absolutely. If
24 this takes time and stuff like that -- so for
25 instance, if the train is scheduled to come in for

1 150K maintenance but warranty has control of the
2 train because they're trying to do something to it,
3 obviously the train is not going to be able to be
4 brought in for that, and vice versa. Like, they
5 might say, Okay, forget about the warranty thing
6 for now; let's do the maintenance. They're still
7 going to have to do the warranty part after. So no
8 matter what, it's causing that extra step in there.

9 FRASER HARLAND: Is there a hierarchy
10 between maintenance and warranty? Like, who would
11 get precedence to get their work done if there's
12 demand for the trains like that?

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, in the
14 beginning -- in the beginning stages, when the
15 train is still under warranty, I would assume that
16 the warranty team would, for the most part, get the
17 priority to it - not necessarily because their
18 hierarchy is -- or, like, they're in more control
19 of it, but just for the simple reason that the
20 maintenance team can go to another train and do
21 maintenance -- right -- so they would sub out
22 another train that we'd go and do maintenance to
23 that one while the warranty team was working on the
24 other one. So I think that's the way they would
25 make that decision, as opposed to saying, like, I

1 am -- I am a higher level of management or
2 something like that, so I deem this to be more
3 important to me. The warranty team is the team
4 right now that's supposed to be doing the fixes to
5 the trains because it's still, obviously, under
6 warranty.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of the
8 agreement between the City and RTG at the beginning
9 of service that allowed 13 trains at peak times
10 instead of 15?

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, we heard --
12 now, by way of, like, all the legal details within
13 it, no, I never saw a physical contract or
14 anything. But, obviously, when you're, you know,
15 the team that's launching the trains, we are told,
16 you know, hey, we're not launching 15 anymore, we
17 only need to get this number type of thing, so that
18 we know what we're planning and everything like
19 that. So I was aware that that was happening.

20 I -- it's actually funny, I had a
21 conversation about that with the validation guy one
22 day, like, back in production, and he was like,
23 They won't even be able to keep all 15 trains
24 going; they're going to have to lessen that number.
25 Because you -- there's no -- like, when you build

1 15 trains and then you want to launch 15 trains, it
2 doesn't really leave much room for error, right?
3 Like -- but I think in respect to Alstom, that was
4 one of their biggest faults is their planning
5 structure was amazing; they were on top of
6 everything, but they never left room for error. So
7 the second something in their plan went wrong, it
8 shattered the whole thing, and they would have to
9 redo all this planning. And of course they planned
10 it, let's say, over a 6-month period, and a problem
11 happens that takes place, you know, a month to fix,
12 that drastically changes that aspect. The Alstom
13 plan for this to go off without a hitch, like, no
14 issues ever, we're just going to plug and play and
15 here we go, but obviously things are a lot more
16 complicated than what the employers, I guess, would
17 want to think. You know what I mean?

18 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether the
19 15 vehicles for morning peak service was reached,
20 like when it went back to that level?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: By the time I had
22 left, I mean, there might have been a couple of
23 times in there where we hit that mark, I would say.
24 But on a consistent basis, I would say I never
25 really experienced that much. I mean, they may

1 have said, hey, we're going to launch 15 trains,
2 but I don't think there were ever -- like, I can't
3 recall where there were 15 trains that were working
4 properly in order to do that, like, in my
5 experience.

6 EMILY YOUNG: Did lower ridership
7 during COVID provide an opportunity to work out
8 more bugs with the trains and get more trains back
9 up to an operational level?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, in theory
11 it should have, but it didn't change the demand for
12 the amount of trains being launched, right? So
13 even during COVID, I think they went down to 11
14 trains I think is what it was -- I'm not
15 100 percent sure, but -- it may have helped a
16 little bit, but they -- they still needed to meet
17 all those intervals. Like, the train needed to be
18 at this station at this time over and over and over
19 again, and in order to reach that, they still
20 needed the same number of trains on the track.
21 Otherwise, you'd have a void area in that time
22 where there was no train to pull into the station.

23 So they would have to change -- you
24 know, for instance, like a city bus is expected to
25 be at a bus stop at a certain time, so you call it,

1 they tell you it's going to be there, and you can
2 wait for it, right? Well, if they take that bus
3 out of service and they don't replace it with
4 another one, there's a gap between that bus and the
5 next one. You know what I mean? So it would have
6 had the same effect on -- on the -- on them in that
7 case.

8 So I would say for the most part no,
9 but in some aspects, they might have gotten an
10 extra train in. But at the same time, they only
11 had so many MVTs. So you could throw every train
12 at the maintenance team: They don't have the
13 people, and they don't have the facility to work on
14 all of them at the same time. So it -- it wouldn't
15 have had that much of a -- of an impact, especially
16 not with the size of issues that are happening,
17 like the wheel cracks.

18 EMILY YOUNG: Would you say that there
19 was any unnecessary running of the trains that
20 would have sort of speeded up the need for
21 maintenance?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No, I don't think
23 so.

24 EMILY YOUNG: So you spoke about there
25 being quite a learning curve at the start of

1 maintenance for the MVT team. Could you tell us a
2 little bit more about who was brought in to work on
3 that team, how many of them were previously with
4 Alstom construction?

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: So by way of, like,
6 exact numbers, I'm not going to be able to remember
7 those, but I know there's, like -- like, the number
8 one guy in seniority right now, he was a Day 1-er.
9 He started Day 1 of the production process. But
10 then you've got two guys after him who had never
11 seen the project until maintenance. And then
12 there's a couple of us that are sprinkled in there,
13 let's say. I'd say there would be, like, five to
14 six now that are there.

15 And even at that, some of the guys that
16 were brought in from production, they didn't really
17 do very much that translates to maintenance. Like,
18 my tasks specifically related to maintenance while
19 the trains were, like, being dynamic tested, right?
20 Like, when the train needed to be fixed, it didn't
21 go back to production to be fixed. It came to me
22 when it was mechanical. So their experience in a
23 station -- like, one guy who's there, I mentioned
24 Easy before, Malaku: Amazing person, great worker
25 and knew his station very well, but his station

1 only consisted of connecting some brackets to it
2 and hooking up a couple of hoses, like a couple of
3 rigid hoses, a couple of wiring harnesses, maybe.

4 So by way of him getting any hands-on,
5 like, testing -- for instance, he can't go out on
6 the track and hear a sound and know what it is,
7 whereas I could drive down the track and I could
8 say, This gear box tooth is broken; I can hear it
9 clicking. You know what I mean? So that kind of
10 knowledge.

11 So even the people who were hired there
12 didn't all have that level of dynamic training. So
13 it's like their mindset is they're just going to
14 follow this micro, and because they've been
15 following micros all the way through production,
16 they should be able to do this properly. They
17 would have an advantage in the sense of they know
18 where parts are, they know what they're called,
19 they know what certain torque values are, things
20 like that and what tools they would need. That
21 would help with the learning curve, but by way of
22 diagnosing something, you know -- like, I've even
23 seen some of them: They look at something that I
24 know is not right, but they don't notice it because
25 they're not used to seeing it.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Did Alstom make efforts
2 to try and hire the sort of people who were in
3 roles more like yours who would be --

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No.

5 EMILY YOUNG: -- well-suited to
6 maintenance?

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Actually, the
8 complete opposite. Like, I was resisted against by
9 the maintenance vehicle manager. He --

10 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know why?

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, because he
12 wants to be right, and he's not. So that -- we're
13 kind of touching into a different -- a bit of a
14 different topic. So, like, for instance, when I
15 was hired, as I spoke before, I was called and
16 asked if I would take part in this brake project
17 before moving on - or if I wanted to, I could just
18 move on, right? So I had had this conversation
19 prior to them. They literally looked at me and
20 said, when this project is over, you go to
21 maintenance because we want you in maintenance -
22 like, the production managers did.

23 This manager then came in and thought,
24 well, he's not a mechanical engineer or an
25 electrical engineer, so he's not going to be able

1 to be part of maintenance. The argument to that
2 was the company's not requiring those requirements
3 in order to do the job.

4 So then, for instance, the day that
5 everybody left from that brake project, I was
6 called upstairs to his office 45 minutes after they
7 left. And I walked in, and he closed the door, and
8 told me that he had fight with everybody to hire
9 me, when I already knew what was happening because
10 he didn't know that these conversations had
11 happened before. So he tried to play it off as
12 though he was, like, my buddy and doing a favour
13 for me by hiring me because he didn't think I was
14 qualified -- he actually told me that was I was
15 going to have a hard time transitioning from
16 production to maintenance because I was not as
17 educated as everyone else, when in reality it was
18 the complete opposite. I had the most experience
19 in the entire country at least, if not the world,
20 for this type of stuff, and I was the best suited
21 for the position.

22 So right away I knew -- you know, for
23 instance, we would be standing in certain
24 situations where we would be talking, and he would
25 give out information, which I would abruptly

1 correct because wrong information leads to wrong
2 decisions which leads to problems. So I would
3 correct this, so he didn't like that because it
4 would make him look like he didn't know what he was
5 doing. So there was that turmoil between us, so
6 there was always that game going on.

7 So what he wanted to do, in my personal
8 opinion from what I saw, is that he wanted to
9 remove the people who could correct him so that he
10 could then look as though he knows everything
11 that's going on. It's what -- in my personal
12 opinion, he's basically, like, a fake it 'til you
13 make it kind of manager. Like, he doesn't know
14 what's going on, to the point where I actually
15 questioned his actual education that he claimed -
16 like, I formally went to management above him and
17 said, I don't believe that he actually knows what
18 he's talking about - because it was becoming
19 concerning. He was literally giving instructions
20 to MVTs that were wrong and then the MVT would
21 carry out that instruction.

22 FRASER HARLAND: Are you able to tell
23 us who that maintenance vehicle manager was?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: His first name is
25 Hussein, and I'm unaware -- I don't even know if I

1 can pronounce his last name, but his name is
2 Hussein.

3 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think,
4 Mr. Lennerton, that Alstom missed out on recruiting
5 people involved in construction who would have been
6 good at maintenance --

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yeah, I could
8 have put you together a team of 18 people that
9 would have be able to walk up to that train and do
10 anything that was needed without any of those
11 micros. Like, when I went to PC09, I -- so for
12 instance, they looked at me and said, Would you go
13 to maintenance? We need somebody that can flush
14 the brakes. So I trained a guy on the brakes. And
15 then they found some -- Randstad found some little
16 excuse to fire him because they had a bonus
17 incentive.

18 So they told all the production
19 technicians, if you stay to this date, we're going
20 to give you X amount of dollars. I don't remember
21 the exact number, but if you stay to this date, you
22 will -- you'll have it. Well, Randstad turned
23 around and realized, oh, everybody's going to stay.
24 That's a lot of money. So then they turned around
25 and started nit-picking people and getting rid of

1 them so they wouldn't make it until that time.
2 They tried to do it and make it a legal thing.
3 When you're there, you know what's happening. So I
4 literally trained this person and then they fired
5 him for, like, some sort of -- like, 2 minutes of
6 misappropriation of time or something like that,
7 like something ridiculous. You know what I mean?

8 EMILY YOUNG: You said that you thought
9 about five or six people were hired on from
10 construction to maintenance. How many maintenance
11 people were there at the start?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I think by the time
13 I left, we were upwards around -- like, at one
14 point, we were at 18 people, and people were
15 leaving. They actually hired three people from the
16 test team, but because the schedule was so bad --
17 like, there was -- like, Hussein took -- put effort
18 into making the schedule as miserable as possible,
19 so they would leave because of that, and these
20 testing guys to me are even better than I am for
21 the maintenance position. So they left for better
22 opportunities, whether it was completely outside of
23 the company or if they just -- like, I know two of
24 them moved to the help desk and stuff, which better
25 suited their liking because they did not want to

1 work under Hussein. I don't know if that answered
2 everything or not.

3 EMILY YOUNG: Yeah. No, that's very
4 helpful. Thank you. I'm wondering if you could
5 speak about the transition from OLRTC to RTM or
6 Alstom construction to Alstom maintenance and
7 whether you think that that was a smooth
8 transition, was managed well or not so well.

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Absolutely
10 terrible. Hussein didn't do anything for the -- he
11 was there a year early and had all this time to
12 prepare to get all of our tools and set up the
13 facility, and when I got to maintenance, I had no
14 tools. So for instance, like, when I first
15 started, I was hired, like, number 12, I think, was
16 my first level of seniority. Everyone up to that
17 point got tools, right, then I didn't. So they had
18 a little toolbox and they'd get this tool kit that
19 covered some basic tools, like basic hand tools,
20 nothing too crazy, and then when it got to me, I
21 conveniently did not have any tools. And then the
22 next person who was hired got tools. And then
23 another person got hired and they didn't get tools.
24 And then another person would. And then even at
25 one point -- I had been requesting tools for a very

1 long time.

2 And at one point, another gentleman's
3 toolbox broke, and this person had a very good
4 rapport with Hussein. They got along with each
5 other. And his toolbox was replaced in an hour.
6 Within the hour, he had a brand spanking new one.
7 And I had been asking for an extremely -- like,
8 we're talking almost a year I had been asking. So
9 that lack of commitment to making sure that
10 everyone was up to par with what was going on.

11 And then the mistakes that he was
12 making with purchasing things caused budget issues,
13 which then Alstom stopped approving things that
14 they needed. So for instance, when I went and said
15 I needed tools, they said, Well, no, you don't;
16 Hussein says you have them. So they just went off
17 with what he said, right? So he definitely failed
18 miserably in preparing everything to be set up to
19 launch at that year mark.

20 EMILY YOUNG: I -- sorry, go ahead.

21 Mr. Harland, I see your...

22 FRASER HARLAND: Could you just explain
23 a little bit more. You said a year mark, so can
24 you give us a rough indication of what that year
25 was? Was that a year prior to revenue service?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah -- sorry, a
2 year prior to -- for the sake of the conversation,
3 let's say the year prior to handing the keys over
4 to OC Transpo for their drivers to take over and
5 actually start putting customers on the train,
6 there was a portion of time where they were going
7 through the hiring process and they were supposed
8 to be setting up MSF 2 in order to be able to take
9 on this maintenance, and that is the part where --
10 for instance, like, for the majority of the time
11 there, the technicians that were hired, the MVTs
12 that were hired, they sat in a room on a computer
13 to do these -- you know, when you start a job and
14 they give you your safety stuff and all that kind
15 of thing, you've got to fill out these little skits
16 that they put up in front of you? They did all
17 those. And then they finished them, but because he
18 didn't have anything together -- and they didn't do
19 anything else other than that.

20 So, like -- for instance, like, they
21 should have been going and, like, you know, seeing
22 what was going on. Like, they may not have been
23 able to touch anything, but they should have gone
24 and shadowed other people that were working on the
25 trains to get used to the trains, especially the

1 ones that were just getting there. So they didn't
2 really get exposed to anything until the launch
3 happened and then they're like, Hey, here's the
4 trains; start telling us what was wrong. You know
5 what I mean? So there was no lead-up to that.

6 And in that time, for instance, like, I
7 remember he bought a -- it's for sheet metal. It's
8 for bending like aluminium and stuff like that,
9 which is a manufacturing thing. We don't
10 manufacture anything in there. Like, we don't make
11 these parts. So it was a completely useless tool
12 that will never be bought, right, and he spent
13 thousands of dollars on it.

14 So these problems were affecting the
15 budget and affecting, like, the MVTs having access
16 to what they needed in order to get off on a better
17 foot during that time.

18 FRASER HARLAND: So if I can just
19 paraphrase your evidence quickly, you're saying
20 there was a team of MVTs, of maintenance workers
21 hired in the lead-up to maintaining the trains, and
22 they did not work with the trains at all until they
23 actually took over maintenance. Is that fair?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They had little
25 training bits in there where, like, you know, they

1 were -- like, for instance, they were trained on
2 the wheel lathe. So, like, a guy came from -- I
3 believe it was Germany, and he came and trained --
4 actually, don't take my word for that. They may
5 have sent somebody from America. I know that the
6 machine is made in Germany. But they sent someone
7 to the facility to train them on the wheel lathe,
8 but by way of, like -- by way of going to the train
9 and actually physically doing something to that, it
10 didn't come until way later on in that year, like
11 much closer to the transition. Like, for instance,
12 the trains were already in service when I started
13 in the maintenance position.

14 EMILY YOUNG: Do you feel like the
15 training that the MVTs received in advance of
16 maintenance got them ready to maintain?

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No.

18 EMILY YOUNG: What should have
19 happened?

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They should have
21 been shadowing people. That entire team should
22 have followed me around all fricking day, like all
23 day long and listened to everything I said. And,
24 like, I'm not trying to be arrogant in that aspect,
25 but, like, I had an enormous amount of information

1 that I could have given them to prepare them for
2 what's going on: Hey, guys, you got to keep an eye
3 on this because this is what happens when the train
4 vibrates down the track; you know, so this will
5 come loose or this will happen, so you need to keep
6 an eye on them when the trains are in here.

7 There's little things like that.

8 Or even just how to take something off.

9 So for instance, like removing a gearbox off, for
10 instance, there's a way to do that, and it's
11 different taking it off than it is putting it on,
12 and it changes when the train has been driven and
13 there's dirt all over it and, like, all that kind
14 of stuff. It changes the aspects of doing the
15 jobs.

16 So for instance, when maintenance had
17 started -- I remember I missed a day of work and
18 they had to change a gearbox. So when I came in
19 the next day, the operations manager and the number
20 one guy at that time, who was Dennis, came up to me
21 and said, Hey, man, we changed a gearbox
22 yesterday -- because, like, this was a big thing.
23 I had changed all of the gearboxes up until that
24 point. And I looked at them and I said, Well, how
25 long did it take you? And they said, Well,

1 8 hours. Well, I can change a gear box in
2 45 minutes, so I looked at them and I said, Well,
3 that's a really long time. Did you follow the
4 instructions? Like, did you put the o-ring in the
5 back? Because that's one of the things that's
6 missed with new guys when they go to try to do
7 this. I said did you put the O-ring in the back,
8 and did you clean off the heat spray and put new
9 stuff on? And they looked at me cross-eyed, being,
10 like, what O-ring and this kind of thing. So I
11 looked at the operations manager and I said, You
12 need to bring that train back to me, and we need to
13 put the proper things on.

14 And so then he told me, Well, we don't
15 have 8 hours to do that, and I said, Well, we'll do
16 it in 45 minutes, and they doubted me drastically
17 on this, and I explained to the technician what it
18 was, and we changed it and everything was fine.

19 So there were a lot of gaps in their
20 instruction, and I believe even in that specific
21 situation, I believe Dennis went to engineering and
22 was upset because the instructions that I gave him
23 to do weren't in the instructions he was given. So
24 even if he had followed those to the tee, which he
25 did, the instruction wasn't there to do it. So

1 they didn't know what to do with that o-ring. So
2 they did what they thought they should do, which is
3 where I believe the issue is with, like, hiring
4 people who aren't necessarily trained in that
5 field, right? Like, when you run into a problem
6 where you don't know the answer, there's -- you
7 need to stop what they're doing and go and get the
8 answer, not guess -- you know what I mean? -- due
9 to the lack of experience.

10 EMILY YOUNG: So the instructions were
11 deficient, then?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. Oh, yeah.
13 Oh, yeah.

14 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know who would
15 have prepared the instructions?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: That would have
17 been their engineering team, most likely.

18 EMILY YOUNG: And at what -- so when
19 you're describing this process of them changing the
20 gearbox, not knowing how to do it, was that before
21 service started? Was --

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No, I was on the
23 MVT team at that time.

24 EMILY YOUNG: So it sounds like they
25 hadn't received proper training on how to change a

1 gear box before service started?

2 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Correct. It was a
3 situation of, You're supposed to be able to read
4 this micro at a Grade 9 level. We've provided you
5 with said micro from engineering, so follow it, and
6 that's that.

7 FRASER HARLAND: Can I ask how you knew
8 what to do with the O-ring? I understand that
9 you're more experienced, but, you know, was there a
10 complete manual that --

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes, there were
12 full micros on the bogies. So for instance, Sorel,
13 who built the bogies, sent over two binders that
14 were hundreds of pages - because we have a motor
15 bogie and we have a trailer bogie, so there's two
16 different sets. Most of the instructions are the
17 same in both of them. But yes, I had that.

18 And then I also had the fact that they
19 had -- at the beginning of the project, when they
20 knew that they needed to do this, engineering
21 before I got there was involved in figuring out how
22 to do this and obtaining the correct information
23 for the production technicians. But like I said
24 before, once maintenance hit, they just said, We
25 don't want any of your information because it's to

1 build the train, and we want information to fix the
2 train, which a lot of it would have -- a lot of it
3 would have, like, meshed together with each other.

4 EMILY YOUNG: So the information that
5 you had was from the construction phase, and the
6 maintenance people didn't have that information.

7 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They had some of it
8 but not all of it.

9 EMILY YOUNG: And is that sort of
10 reflective of how document transfer went in
11 general?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: In my opinion,
13 yeah. In maintenance, it was -- I remember the
14 first time I went to the supervisor, and I said,
15 Where's the micro for the bogies? I know it's in
16 the building somewhere. Where is it? I want it.
17 And they said, Well, we have control over our
18 version, and it's not ready to be given to you. So
19 it's just, like -- like, when I'm not there, I
20 can't correct anything, and I can't be there
21 24 hours a day. This is a 24-hour thing; right?

22 In production, I was there the entire
23 time, so any of these questions that I knew could
24 be asked, right, but then there was also the whole
25 thing of, like, okay, so we don't have the

1 information, but then telling Hussein, telling
2 somebody to go ask Steve would admit that he
3 doesn't know, which makes him look bad, so they
4 would avoid that at all costs.

5 EMILY YOUNG: Who is Steve, sorry?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Me.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Oh.

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: That's okay.

9 EMILY YOUNG: I was going, who's the
10 Steve who's higher up who has more information?
11 Thank you. Were you often receiving the
12 maintenance documents that you needed late, or did
13 you get them in advance with enough time to train
14 on them?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: It's almost like
16 they would come together with -- so like I said,
17 maintenance is supposed to be a preventive thing,
18 and due to the lack of knowledge on it, it became a
19 reactive thing quickly. So for instance, the
20 sanding thing would happen, so immediately
21 engineering's priority is figuring this out. So
22 very quickly -- well, we'll say relatively quickly,
23 we would get information concerning those
24 injectors. Now, whether they were correct or not,
25 sometimes yes, sometimes no, but that's how they

1 would work: Oh, this gear box needs to be changed,
2 quick scramble, let's try and find these
3 instructions; if not, let's create them.

4 Also, at the beginning of it, there was
5 a gentleman called Bashar (phonetic), and he was
6 part of a different entity to the validation team,
7 and he actually had an entire -- his whole job in
8 production was to set up a maintenance manual --
9 right -- Hussein didn't like him, so they had
10 quarrels between each other, which actually forced
11 him out the door. So he left due to issues with
12 Hussein. He would always complain that Hussein
13 would not let him kind of take charge with what
14 needed to be done, and he would in fact, like, stop
15 him, I guess you would say, from doing what he
16 needed to do, so that was a huge setback when he
17 left because the next people stepping into the
18 position were great at what they did. They were
19 from production. But their whole thing in
20 production was not to do what Bashar was doing. So
21 it created, again, a learning curve in order for
22 them to get up to speed.

23 EMILY YOUNG: And did that mean that it
24 took longer to finish the maintenance manual that
25 Bashar had been working on?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I would say yes. I
2 mean, I can't speak to, like, any direct thing
3 because I would not be involved in those
4 conversations, but I would assume that the fact
5 that this person who just spent all that time in
6 production learning all that information leaving,
7 you know, it's going to leave out areas that you
8 might need to consult the person in order to figure
9 out some of the stuff that was going on.

10 EMILY YOUNG: Did the MVTs have
11 training leading up to service on some of those
12 basic skills you were talking about before like
13 torquing bolts --

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, yeah. They
15 had to go through torque training. I'm not going
16 to lie to you, I can't remember all of them because
17 by then, I had done -- like, for instance, they
18 made me go and do torque training because it was a
19 technicality, but I had actually done the torque
20 training class like four or five times in
21 production because you have to renew it and stuff.
22 And I had also taught that class twice with the
23 instructor. So it was really kind of ridiculous
24 for me to go and do that again, but at the same
25 time it was a technicality.

1 So the -- like, everybody had to go
2 through that, but to be honest with you, that's --
3 like, I don't want you to think, like, this torque
4 training is not some extensive thing. They just go
5 through and teach you that when you torque the
6 bolt, you're stretching it. This is why you don't
7 stretch it too much. This is what happens if you
8 do. This is what happens if you don't. And then
9 you would actually test torquing bolts, and that
10 would be about it. So it was not some sort of
11 elaborate training thing.

12 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that it was
13 sufficient to teach the technicians how to properly
14 torque a bolt?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. I believe the
16 instructions actually covered what they needed to
17 do. I would say yes.

18 EMILY YOUNG: Was the MSF properly
19 equipped for you to start doing maintenance at the
20 beginning of service?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I would say no.

22 EMILY YOUNG: What would have been
23 missing?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, for instance,
25 like, they had to use my old flush cart to flush

1 the brakes, and the production team had to do that
2 because the new machine that had come in did not
3 get up and running fast enough for them to keep up
4 with it, like, as an example. So when we were
5 going through, like, the maintenance stuff, they
6 weren't touching the brakes. Now, there could be
7 an aspect of that where that has something to do
8 with the warranty and meaning that they can't touch
9 it, but I knew, like, for instance, they still used
10 that old cart, which is now broken, but that was
11 the direction that they went with that. So it
12 would affect other things as well, I guess, like
13 other job situations.

14 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that Alstom
15 maintenance was sufficiently staffed going into
16 revenue service?

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. 18 people is
18 not enough people to take care of that many trains
19 with that many problems. They need more people.
20 They -- they needed to retain people who knew what
21 they were doing, and they needed to hire more
22 people, and they needed to have the people who had
23 been there train the people who were not,
24 basically.

25 EMILY YOUNG: And they didn't do those

1 things?

2 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. They --
3 they -- Hussein consistently looked for, like --
4 for instance, like, Hussein was huge about this.
5 So on the air conditioning system, there is a
6 certain type of gas that you're supposed to have a
7 certain certificate that you get at Algonquin,
8 right? You go to Algonquin for 8 hours or
9 something, like, you do this little course and then
10 they give you a certificate so that you understand
11 what you're doing with this gas, right, because a
12 certain amount of it can't emit into the air for
13 emissions purposes, right?

14 He was so amazed, like, we're getting
15 this training; like, we're giving you all this
16 training; and literally you never have to do that
17 to the train. Like, it's one of the things that
18 works, and you don't always have to be doing this.
19 So it was basically, like, if he thought he was
20 doing something that was good in getting us
21 training, he would blow it up real big, but it
22 would have, like, a small, small, small impact on
23 it.

24 Like, one -- with these trains, you
25 can't go to school for trains. There's no

1 course -- like, I looked. There's no course in
2 Algonquin that teaches you how to build a train,
3 and then especially not one that's never been built
4 before, right? So the training would have had to
5 specifically come from the people with experience.

6 So again, with one of the biggest
7 faults for Alstom, they wanted to look at people
8 only with an education, and they thought experience
9 isn't good enough. They want to be able to say --
10 like, for instance, the City comes and says, This
11 is broken because the person that's working on it
12 doesn't know what they're doing. They say, Well,
13 here's his electrical engineering degree; you can't
14 say he's not educated, right?

15 Whereas, like, for instance, with
16 someone like me, their argument would have to be,
17 Well, he's been here for this amount of time,
18 which, unfortunately, the way things are in the
19 work field, education supersedes experience over
20 and over. While these kids -- well, not kids but
21 people were in school getting this education, I was
22 doing what they were trying to learn about. So
23 it's -- I mean, a good mixture of both is there.
24 I'm not taking away from people who obtain
25 education, but when you can't learn about it

1 anywhere else other than in that facility. Like,
2 school for that train was production. That was
3 your schooling, and production ended, so there's no
4 more school. You know what I mean?

5 And then when you have the aspect of
6 training, the trainer knows 100 percent of what
7 they're training. They train the person, and it's
8 assumed by statistics that that person would know
9 80 percent of what they were trained until they
10 gain more experience, right? So if that person
11 goes and trains somebody else, they're going to
12 leave out information too due to lack of
13 experience, and then as you trickle down the
14 training, you know, it becomes less and less and
15 less. So they would have needed to stay with the
16 priority of the person who knew what they were
17 doing.

18 And I'm not the only one that could
19 have participated in that either. They were other
20 people that they could have used for certain
21 aspects of training. So essentially when they
22 would come out with -- so for instance, when the --
23 when they were having problems with the levelling,
24 right, there were certain things we needed to do to
25 fix certain components of the train so that we

1 could level things properly, so the engineer
2 himself would have to come down and talk to two of
3 the maintenance guys and say, This is what we're
4 trying to do, and they would trial and error it,
5 and that would be their level of training in that
6 aspect.

7 But they wouldn't sit in a room and
8 have formal training like -- like, for instance,
9 when you're in the legal system, you're going to
10 sit in a room, and they're going to simulate legal
11 systems so, like -- you know, so that you can get
12 an idea of how things work, right, and that kind of
13 wouldn't really happen because there was literally
14 no one there to do it. You can't call somebody at
15 a training facility and say, hey, come and train us
16 on something you've never seen. So it made it --
17 they were definitely in a difficult situation, but
18 they didn't make the correct decisions in a
19 difficult situation to make it not so difficult, I
20 guess you would say.

21 EMILY YOUNG: So if they didn't have
22 the people who knew how the trains worked - like
23 you and others - doing the training, who was doing
24 the training of the new maintenance people?

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, for instance,

1 when I did the torque training thing, a guideway
2 tech taught me it. They literally tightened, like,
3 one or two bolts at the frogs and stuff. They
4 checked bolt -- like, one single bolt tightness
5 for, like, the entire track kind of thing.

6 So it's like, again, I'm having
7 somebody who's never physically worked on the
8 trains teach me, who built them, how to work on the
9 train.

10 EMILY YOUNG: And so it sounds like, in
11 your view, they didn't have the right people doing
12 the training.

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, not -- they
14 did at one point, but they shunned them away. They
15 made it so that they wouldn't -- like, I remember
16 when we were going through the hiring process, tons
17 of people from the floor applied, right, and all of
18 them -- like, they would all come up to me because
19 they knew I could go and say things to people and
20 try to help them out, and they would come up to me
21 and say, Steve, why am I not getting an interview?
22 I just watched this other guy come in off the
23 street for an interview, I have the exact same
24 education that he has, and I've been here for a
25 year. I have all this experience. Why are they

1 not interviewing me?

2 And that goes back to the stigma that
3 they thought that us in production were just a
4 bunch of failures because, you know, a deadline
5 didn't get met -- you know what I mean? -- that
6 kind of thing.

7 There was a lot of negativity pushed
8 towards us. Like, I -- I spoke with Jaime about
9 this when we met before. Like, for instance, I
10 couldn't -- it got to the point where I couldn't
11 turn the radio on when I drove to work because they
12 would talk so badly about a certain problem that I
13 am dealing with, so it would mentally affect me
14 when I was going into work. I would be angry at --
15 this person is in a radio studio, telling me I
16 don't know what I'm doing, when all he does is push
17 a button and talk into a microphone. You know what
18 you mean? And none of them would come -- I would
19 always say, go to Randstad, apply, come down here
20 and tell us how to do it then. You know what I
21 mean?

22 So that would -- that was also, like, a
23 huge problem. Like, the media and the outside view
24 of what was going on definitely affected me and
25 other people that were in there. It became a

1 little bit personal, to be honest with you.

2 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that RTM and
3 Alstom had sufficient processes put in place to
4 make sure that maintenance was done correctly?

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, personally
6 I don't because, obviously, the information wasn't
7 there to give, but I could definitely see them
8 arguing that in the sense that, like, they'd be
9 able to provide a binder with, like, what they
10 would consider instructions and stuff like that.
11 So I would say, like, they had a lot of procedures
12 in place, certainly safety procedures were in
13 place, even to the point of too much. Like, the
14 safety issues were -- like, they would -- they made
15 some small issue like a huge safety thing, so you'd
16 have to spend like 20 minutes setting up this
17 safety procedure to do something that takes
18 5 minutes, when you could just safely walk up to it
19 and do it, right?

20 So those procedures were certainly
21 there. Even track maintenance and stuff, like,
22 I -- for instance, sig and comms, like for the
23 camera system and stuff like that, I have a friend
24 that worked on the sig and comm thing, and he's
25 like, I'm going down there, and I've got no

1 instructions; I have no idea what I'm doing; I just
2 have to figure it out. You know what I mean? So
3 there was that aspect in other teams as well.

4 So I would personally say that no, they
5 weren't there to the point of being accessible to
6 the people who needed them, but I could definitely
7 see them making the argument of, like, we have
8 them -- like, we have them over here; look at this
9 type thing.

10 So I don't know exactly how to answer
11 that because it's kind of like a grey area, I would
12 say.

13 EMILY YOUNG: And what was the main
14 barrier to accessing them for the techs in your
15 position?

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, they didn't
17 want us touching the train. So there was an aspect
18 of it that they knew in the back -- like, they
19 wouldn't say it, but they knew that they couldn't
20 just let everyone walk up to the train and touch it
21 because they might not do it right. Like, guys
22 were putting levelling valves on upside down and --
23 you know, like, some guys weren't even -- like, I
24 know there was some guys that weren't even
25 physically capable of torquing the bolt to the

1 value that it needed, so the bolt wouldn't get
2 torqued to that value. And a lot of the guys
3 would -- like, I don't want to say -- speak poorly
4 to the MVTs, but there were guys who would just
5 say, Well, I can't do it, so, you know, torque mark
6 it, away it goes. Like, there was no way around
7 it.

8 So for instance, you have somebody
9 like, you know, I'm 230 pounds. You know what I
10 mean? Like, I can torque 400 Newton-metres no
11 problem, right, but you get a younger 22-year-old
12 who's only, you know, 140 pounds soaking wet - you
13 know, never been to a gym before, never played
14 sports growing up. He's not physically in the same
15 strength level as, say, I am, so he would have an
16 extremely large difficulty doing this.

17 Now, what Alstom should be doing is
18 providing them with what's called, like, for
19 instance, in this specific case, a torque
20 multiplier, which would allow somebody of that
21 stature to do it, which is the correct thing in the
22 work field to do. I don't think anyone should be
23 discriminated based off their physical abilities or
24 anything, right? We have a lot of technology
25 nowadays to allow people to do that. But those

1 things weren't there to do that. Like, there was
2 one torque multiplier, for the sake of the
3 conversation, to put the coupler -- or -- yeah, to
4 put the coupling system on. But that had a 1,500
5 Newton-metre torque, so, like, no one in the
6 building could physically do that. You'd need,
7 like, Eddie Hall, strongest man in the world kind
8 of thing.

9 So -- but when you get to the lesser
10 amounts -- like, for instance, putting a shaft on,
11 like a gearbox shaft, you need a lot of physical
12 strength to do that. So there were definitely
13 those situations that arose. Now, I don't think
14 the MVT did that out of spite. I think they did it
15 out of the fact that they were physically unable to
16 do it and not given the proper things to do it.
17 Like, I don't think it was a malicious action.

18 EMILY YOUNG: And, sorry, so they just
19 didn't do it because they couldn't to it, or did
20 they ask you or someone else to do it? What was
21 the solution to that problem?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, if I was
23 there, they would definitely ask me, and I would
24 also know what they were doing, and I would
25 approach them to make sure that it was being done

1 correctly. But like I said, I can't be there all
2 the time, right? And in some cases, the MVTs that
3 were paired up were all -- you know, would all be
4 physically incapable of hitting something -- like,
5 a torque value like that.

6 EMILY YOUNG: And so would the result
7 be that the bolt is just not torqued to the proper
8 value?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, in that
10 specific instance, yes.

11 EMILY YOUNG: And do you know
12 whether --

13 STEPHEN LENNERTON: There's also
14 knowing the torque value. Like, they may not even
15 know the correct torque value as well.

16 EMILY YOUNG: Although that would be
17 something that will be in the instructions, would
18 it not?

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, if they had
20 got ahold of said instructions.

21 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Do you know
22 whether Alstom now has the proper equipment to
23 assist technicians in torquing to the proper value?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I've been gone for
25 over a year, so no, I don't know what changes -- a

1 lot can happen in a year.

2 EMILY YOUNG: But when you left, they
3 didn't have it?

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No. There was no
5 torque multiplier for somebody to hit 400
6 Newton-metres. The torque multiplier was, like,
7 huge, right, because it was used for a 1,500
8 Newton-metre torque value, so you couldn't turn
9 around and put that torque multiplier on a smaller
10 bolt type thing.

11 EMILY YOUNG: What would be preventing
12 a tech in that case to access the instructions to
13 find out the proper torque value if they didn't
14 know it?

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, for instance,
16 like, when we put that micro onto the computer,
17 that computer crashed and stopped working. Like,
18 it wouldn't turn on anymore, and they never fixed
19 it. So we went from having that torque value in
20 that instance to not. So then the process to get
21 that torque value would be, you know, talk to the
22 supervisor; the supervisor would then go to
23 engineering; engineering would look up said thing,
24 and then the information would flow back down.

25 This would take time, especially if --

1 if it's at midnight, let's say, and there's no
2 engineering there because they're not on 24 hours,
3 then, you know, that has to wait for the next time.
4 So for a technician to say, I can't do this until
5 tomorrow, a lot of those supervisors would say,
6 Just get it done because we need to launch the
7 train. So that would create -- again, like I had
8 spoken before about, that would create the
9 incorrect pressure on the technician to get the job
10 done, and they would just go ahead and do it.

11 EMILY YOUNG: And a failure to torque a
12 bolt to the right level could -- is that a
13 potential safety issue?

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, that's why
15 you have sanding blocks falling off the train.
16 That's why your wheel fell off. Like, that
17 probably has -- like, I can't say 100 percent
18 that's the cause, but I would say that there would
19 be something to do with torque values there or
20 definitely lack of maintenance to the components
21 involved in that said incident, which could be a
22 torque value thing.

23 It -- I also think that would be a
24 greasing issue. I know some of the axles, where
25 you grease these bearings, don't even have grease

1 nipples on them, so you can't even physically do
2 it.

3 FRASER HARLAND: What about the
4 gearbox? Can you just actually explain briefly
5 what goes into torquing a gearbox.

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Okay. So first,
7 you have to have a gearbox shaft, it goes in the
8 centre of the wheel, okay? It has 12 bolts on it,
9 and they have to be torqued in a certain pattern.
10 The torque pattern for those is you torque it to
11 50 Newton-metres so that everything sets in
12 properly. And to give you the idea of a torque
13 pattern, it would be similar to torquing the wheels
14 on your car. I don't know if you guys -- if
15 everyone's aware, but just in case people aren't,
16 you always go in a -- like an opposite pattern,
17 right? You don't just go around in a circle. You
18 go across from each other, right? So there's a
19 certain pattern to it.

20 It's not directly the same, but there's
21 a number code to it that you do certain bolts in a
22 certain order. So you'd go to 50 Newton-metres in
23 this pattern. And then you would go to
24 150 Newton-metres with a torque -- with a torque
25 wrench, but then the next value is you turn the

1 bolt 135 degrees from that 150 Newton-metre torque
2 value in order to reach the maximum torque value
3 that that bolt takes.

4 This isn't done with a torque wrench.
5 This is -- you use a -- you would measure out the
6 distance on the bolt and then you would use what's
7 called a breaker bar is what we would use, which is
8 a very long piece of steel that gives you a lot of
9 leverage to be able to do this.

10 This takes an enormous amount of
11 strength to do. Like, you have to -- like,
12 small -- smaller weighted people would literally
13 slide across the floor when trying to push this
14 wrench.

15 So then once that's on, you would then
16 apply this heat coating. So there's, like -- it's
17 like a metallic grease that's supposed to prevent
18 the -- everything from heating up too much. You
19 would then put a vegetable grease -- a
20 vegetable-based grease onto the o-ring in the back,
21 and you would place it into a ring where it sits.
22 Then, you would actually physically put the gearbox
23 onto this shaft, okay, and then in all of this,
24 you're torque-marking bolts and all of the little
25 things that go into it.

1 So you would then put the gearbox onto
2 this. Then there's what's called the torque
3 reaction link, which has two connections that go to
4 the top of the frame of the gearbox and then the
5 other section connects to the frame of the train,
6 okay? So you would torque both of those on.

7 Then, the shaft sticks through the
8 centre of the gearbox, and you have this little
9 opening where you'd unscrew this plate and there
10 would be three holes and you put another puck
11 inside. It's like a thick piece of metal about
12 this thick, it's got three holes in it, and it's
13 circular, and it sits -- it covers over the end of
14 the shaft, but it also covers over a section of the
15 gearbox to hold the gearbox to the actual train.

16 Then this -- these three bolts are
17 torqued to 95 Newton-metres. That may have changed
18 in the time. I know that there was revisions on
19 what the torque value needed to be. This also
20 required a washer. Then you put another o-ring
21 that's coated in the same vegetable-grade grease
22 inside another sling in the front, which then you
23 would put your plate back on, and that would seal
24 the front of it.

25 At this point, you've now installed the

1 physical gearbox on the train. Then you have two
2 couplings that you would connect the front of the
3 gearbox to the motor of the train, and that would
4 require a series of bolts. And then you would
5 torque that down as well and then that would be it.
6 You would have your gear box on the train.

7 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know which part of
8 that process was the part that failed and caused
9 the second derailment?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Second -- second
11 derailment to me happened back in production, so
12 I'm --

13 EMILY YOUNG: Sorry. The second one in
14 operation, so in September of 2021.

15 STEPHEN LENNERTON: The one that just
16 happened, where they lost, like, most of the wheel
17 and stuff? To be honest with you, I don't know
18 where the separation from the train actually
19 happened. I don't know if it was -- if the wheel
20 actually physically stayed on the train, or if the
21 wheel, the gearbox, and the shaft came off the
22 train. So there's a hub behind the wheel as well,
23 so if that was neglected, that could cause
24 everything to come off, right?

25 The other thing too is if the wheel

1 itself was replaced, that also has a bolt pattern
2 on it, that if that wasn't torqued correctly --
3 which I don't think would have been the case
4 because that's only 40 Newton-metres, and they
5 would have probably torqued that in sequence
6 properly.

7 But in that aspect, like, if you didn't
8 torque the shaft to the train properly, absolutely
9 it would fall off. The amount of torque that's
10 going on in there -- one of those motors out of the
11 six motors on one of those trains, one motor is
12 powerful enough to propel both units. Like, it's
13 complete overkill in the power, right, so you can
14 just imagine the amount of torque that's going
15 through that gearbox onto that shaft. So if that's
16 not properly torqued, those bolts are being heaved
17 on immensely.

18 And then when you -- when you have, for
19 instance -- like, the motor also has assisted
20 braking, so when the train starts to brake, now you
21 have reverse torque on that shaft going the other
22 way. So you're -- so if this thing is loose,
23 you're constantly jolting it back and forth like
24 this while you're going. And I mean, if you take a
25 paperclip in your fingers and bend it like this,

1 eventually it breaks. You know what I mean? This
2 happens at all levels of metal when you have enough
3 force in order to do that.

4 So there's a plethora of things that
5 could have happened in that situation. So I don't
6 want to say specifically what it is because I've --
7 obviously, now that I'm out of there, I haven't
8 been given this information, right?

9 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that it
10 would have helped Alstom do maintenance work if the
11 yard had been automated?

12 STEPHEN LENNERTON: What do you mean by
13 "automated"? I'm not too -- I don't -- I don't
14 understand that. Sorry. Like, if the whole thing
15 was computerized? Like, the -- the train -- like,
16 if Thales worked for the train system?

17 EMILY YOUNG: No. I think more to do
18 with if the movements in the MSF were automated.

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I think if they
20 cleaned up the facility, it would have helped. I
21 mean, I don't know if anybody's ever seen the
22 inside of that facility, but when I left, it looked
23 like a scrap yard vomited in the middle of the
24 floor, to be quite honest with you. Like, I
25 just -- like, it was a shock too because in

1 production, the -- Alstom has a thing called 5S,
2 which is a cleaning thing. Like, it's an
3 organization system. And they have what's called a
4 footprint, which is like a -- they -- they
5 literally paint out lines on the ground where a
6 cart sits, right?

7 Once maintenance started, there was so
8 much all over the place that Alstom didn't
9 implement this 5S system because they, themselves,
10 could not follow it. So the complete
11 disorganization of the entire facility would -- is
12 definitely a major issue. You know what I mean?
13 Like, it's not like -- it's not like they're
14 properly using the entirety of that facility,
15 that's for sure.

16 EMILY YOUNG: Can you tell us how many
17 derailments there were in the yard before service?
18 You had mentioned that I think there were two at
19 least.

20 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, man. Okay. So
21 I can't -- I can't give you a specific number
22 because I can't remember them all, but I definitely
23 can tell you that there were derailments that the
24 City never knew about. Like, I remember there was
25 a derailment that happened outside of the shed, and

1 they actually got a forklift driver to go out and
2 move the chassises over and place them in front of
3 the place so that when the media showed up, they
4 couldn't take a video of it. So I think that was
5 the second derailment out of production.

6 So the first -- it's actually funny,
7 when I looked at the news, they actually used the
8 picture from the first derailment to talk about it
9 because they could hear on the radios what was
10 going on, so they knew something happened, but they
11 couldn't get a visual on things because they had
12 placed things in front of it.

13 There was also things like train set 17
14 and train set 19 were -- collided into each other
15 in the shed about 3 kilometres per hour when a
16 movement was being made. It smashed the entire
17 front of both trains, smashing the windows and
18 everything. This -- there was a lot -- now, I
19 don't know all of the exact details on the
20 engineering side, but there was a lot of talk going
21 around that this was enough speed to actually
22 panned the chassis, which would, then, eliminate
23 the train completely. Like, you would have to
24 change that chassis.

25 Now, obviously, engineering made

1 decisions, and I'm -- I'm not going to sit here and
2 tell you that the chassis bent and didn't get
3 replaced or anything. I don't think anything that
4 crazy like that happened, but there were -- like,
5 the City never knew about that. Like, I remember
6 being looked at by one of the managers and being
7 specifically told to not speak about this outside
8 of the building.

9 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know what the
10 causes of the derailments were?

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: It's really -- I
12 mean, I would -- I would blame most of that on the
13 track, to be honest with you, if I were to say. I
14 had a -- like, again, I'm not at that level of
15 engineering, and I did not research that very much,
16 but in talks with -- with, for instance, the
17 validation guy, he expressed all the time, like,
18 these tracks are terrible. You can go and look at
19 the wheel flange and see that in certain -- like
20 you can see markings on the wheel flange that
21 actually show that the track actually rode up the
22 side of the flange too high. So there's that.

23 There's also -- like, for instance, and
24 the first derailment happened because -- the train
25 was still overtop of one of the switches, and the

1 switch was operated while the train was on top of
2 it, so it pushed the train off the track, right?
3 Obviously the derailments that are happening on the
4 track, if it's not overtop of a switch, then it's
5 either going to be the train or the track.

6 Now, again, with the wheel coming off
7 and all that kind of stuff, I don't know if they
8 were overtop of a switch or anything like that to
9 speak on it, but there -- definitely I would say
10 the track is the number one enemy of that train
11 when out there operating. Like, it's -- they have
12 a section of track that they were supposed to be
13 able to go through it doing approximately 60
14 kilometres per hour, I believe, or even 80, and
15 they have to slow down to, like, 35 or 40 because
16 it's just -- like, the train, like, vibrates and
17 it's just so loud and you can't really do anything
18 about it. So if they were to fly through there too
19 fast, they would probably flow throw the train off
20 the track.

21 EMILY YOUNG: And so if I'm
22 understanding the timeline correctly, you had left
23 before the August and September 2021 derailments
24 occurred?

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: With the wheel one

1 that we're talking about?

2 EMILY YOUNG: Yeah, so the one -- so
3 the second one was the gearbox falling off.

4 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah. So really
5 funny -- really funny thing: With -- with the one
6 that was serious, where the wheel fell off and the
7 gearbox and stuff, my last meeting with HR, I
8 looked at Alex L'Homme and I said you've got months
9 left until you lose an entire piece of equipment
10 off the side of the train, like you have months
11 left, like, I'm warning you. And it was kind of
12 shrugged off, like that's crazy, Steve, we're
13 not going to -- you know, the wheel's not going to
14 fall off. That's a little bit too much, you know?
15 And then, you know, sure enough, there it is.

16 EMILY YOUNG: And why did you think
17 that was the case?

18 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Because they're not
19 maintaining the trains properly. Like, so for
20 instance, like -- well, there's a couple -- there's
21 a bunch of things that could have happened in that.
22 Like, again, I don't know if the wheel specifically
23 came off with it or not, or if it was just the
24 gearbox. I did hear from technicians who had
25 talked to me that they had installed the gearbox in

1 MSF 1, and when they literally went to drive the
2 train out, it fell off the train before it even
3 made it out of the bay and smashed all over the
4 stairs and stuff like that.

5 To -- to speak to the issues that were
6 out on the track, like, for instance, behind the
7 hub, there's, like, a -- there's these grease
8 nipples to grease this bearing, right? In order to
9 grease it correctly, you have to take out a set
10 screw on the other side, so when you push grease
11 in, the bad grease has to come out. Also, if you
12 have a sealed area and you push fluids or grease
13 into it, air is what pushes that in there. So now
14 you've pressurized this compartment, which is not
15 supposed to be pressurized. That puts pressure on
16 the bearings and it makes them sit weird and then
17 they grind and stuff like that, right?

18 Now, those set pins are very difficult
19 to take out. And I know that there were a lot of
20 guys who were like, I don't want to deal with that,
21 so they would just inject the grease. They would
22 think, Well, I'm an engineer, right? Like, they've
23 been to school, they've got their mechanical
24 engineering, and they think it's okay to just pump
25 the grease in without taking the set screw off,

1 because why would anything happen -- right -- like,
2 the grease is still in there. But because they
3 don't understand the whole thing, you know what I
4 mean, they're making decisions that are not on
5 their shoulders to make, so to speak.

6 EMILY YOUNG: And when you say that
7 they weren't doing maintenance properly, could you
8 sort of summarize the main points of weakness that
9 you saw?

10 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, the due
11 diligence to go through everything. They're very
12 behind. Like, the kilometres are way higher on the
13 trains than where they're at ready to do
14 maintenance, in my opinion, at least when I was
15 leaving. I would say specifically to just not
16 caring. Like, when I touch the train, I can't help
17 my brain but think, like, humans are going to get
18 on this thing. Like, I may not know them, I may
19 not care about them, but, like, other people do,
20 and I should at least do my job well enough that
21 they're not going to get hurt, right? But some of
22 them are just there for a paycheque, so, like, I'm
23 not going to get down there and get all dirty and
24 crawl on the ground to take this one pin out when I
25 can just pump it in.

1 So I'd say, like, maintenance on the
2 brake system for sure, like, by way of flushing the
3 fluids and stuff, they weren't doing that properly.
4 I mean, I remember walking through the bay and
5 asking the manager or the guy for the production
6 guys that are flushing the train being like, What
7 are they doing over there? And he's like, Oh,
8 they're flushing the brakes. And I would say,
9 Well, I can see the flow metre on the machine that
10 I installed, and it says zero, so you're not even
11 pushing any fluid. Like, they're not doing it
12 correctly. So they'd hook this machine up, turn it
13 on, and they wouldn't have it set right, so it
14 wouldn't do anything to the train, and then they'd
15 disconnect it and be like, yep, done, good to go,
16 and off they would go. So there's that.

17 The wheel lathing is not consistent for
18 sure. You'd have some -- so for instance, like,
19 the wheel lathe system works -- they've got to
20 break it down into sections, right? When you're
21 lathing something that's metal, especially that
22 size, you don't take an inch off at a time. That's
23 a large amount of material to take off under that
24 level of force. So you want to take it off in,
25 like, 2 to 3-mil increments, you know what I mean?

1 So a lot of guys would do it correctly. Like, I
2 worked with a guy who would 100 percent -- he
3 didn't care what timeline they were given - he was
4 going to do it properly. So he would set it up so
5 that the machine would lathe the wheel on three
6 separate occasions.

7 So for instance, you need to take a
8 whole entire mil off, he would make the machine
9 divide that by three and take it off in three
10 smaller increments, which is the correct way to
11 lathe something. But then you'd have people who
12 want to look good in front of the managers, and
13 they would say, we need to take a mil off, so
14 they'd say, whatever, let's do it in one shot. You
15 know what I mean?

16 So that's going to have an effect on it
17 too. It leaves like a -- have you ever touched,
18 like, a record, and you know how it's, like, has
19 divots in it if you run your finger across it? It
20 would create the same effect to the wheel, which
21 you think is not a big deal, but now you've got
22 separation, so you've got these, like, high points
23 and low points on the wheel, and the high points
24 are making contact and the low points aren't, so
25 you just lost a certain amount of your surface area

1 on the wheel touching the rail. You know what I
2 mean? So that's the level of importance to that.

3 And that specific task also speaks to
4 my analogy of, like, the trainer came and trained
5 the couple of guys that were in there, and they got
6 about 80 percent of the information, right?

7 Because they don't have enough experience yet to
8 learn all the rest of it. Well, those MVTs are the
9 ones who showed the next one, and then the next one
10 and the next one, right?

11 So when you've got a guy there who was
12 trained at the end, and the other ones that have
13 more experience aren't there, he's going to make
14 decisions based on what he knows, right? So that's
15 where they're making wrong decisions. And again,
16 to the technician's defence, they're put under
17 pressure to get things done, right? So cutting a
18 corner is, like, you know, in some cases to them,
19 they think they're saving their job, so to speak.

20 EMILY YOUNG: I'm conscious that we've
21 gone a bit past 6. Is it okay for everyone if we
22 go for a few more minutes?

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I'll sit here all
24 night with you if you want. It doesn't matter to
25 me. This is my last chance to be able to help this

1 project. Like, I can't work there anymore because
2 of what happened, so if you've got more questions,
3 ask away. I'm not going anywhere.

4 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And one more
5 question, going a bit back to sort of the worker
6 side of things: Is there a high degree of turnover
7 of Alstom maintenance employees?

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, it's hard
9 to say, like -- to say, like, it's a high rate of
10 turnover because you don't really have very many of
11 them, but you get this -- so for instance, like, an
12 MVT gets paid \$60,000 a year, right? In the world
13 of, like, a 22-year-old, let's say, or a
14 25-year-old, that's a lot of money, right? That's
15 a pretty hefty paycheque for someone like that,
16 especially during the times that we're in right
17 now. So someone walking in who has ability to go
18 to another job -- like, for instance, myself, I
19 could put my résumé into a job searching thing, and
20 I'd have a call right away because I have a very
21 extensive résumé, right? Like, I've worked a lot
22 in the country. But when you've got guys who are
23 just getting here and they don't have that résumé,
24 they're stuck there.

25 So what you found was a lot of higher

1 qualified people would come in, and they'd be like,
2 this schedule sucks, the organization isn't here, I
3 don't have any fricking tools, I don't know what
4 I'm doing, so I'm just going to go to this better
5 place; This other place offered me the same amount
6 of money or even, like, a little bit less, but it's
7 much more -- it's a lot nicer to work there, so I'm
8 just going to take off. You know what I mean? So
9 you'd lose people like that for sure. I guess you
10 could say there's a high turnover rate because,
11 like, when I was hired at number 12, like, I
12 remember three people quit within, like, the first
13 month or so that I was in that position, and these
14 were people from the testing team and stuff like
15 that, like people I knew.

16 EMILY YOUNG: So we want to speak
17 briefly about some of the technical issues that
18 arose on the trains.

19 STEPHEN LENNERTON: M-hm.

20 EMILY YOUNG: First of all, the wheel
21 flats.

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah.

23 EMILY YOUNG: Can you tell us briefly,
24 if possible, what Alstom maintenance's response was
25 to that?

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, when you get
2 a flat spot, you bring the train in, and if the
3 flat's -- so in the world of trains, if you have
4 anything that's really, like, the size of a dime,
5 let's say, and it doesn't divot in more than a
6 certain amount of millimetres -- which I can't off
7 the top of my head remember exactly what that
8 number is, but if it's that small and it's not
9 disrupting, it's actually recommended that you just
10 drive the train until it works itself out. It will
11 actually -- like, over time, it will basically beat
12 itself back into submission kind of thing.

13 But when you get bigger ones that are,
14 you know, the size of a toonie or even larger, then
15 you have, like, a massive flat spot. I know it's a
16 little bit of an exaggeration, but you've almost
17 turned the wheel into part of a square, so then you
18 would have to wheel lathe it, and that's the extent
19 of what they do in response to that. You know what
20 I mean?

21 The causing of it, though, is, like,
22 different. Like, I don't think they would
23 necessarily -- like, nothing that the MVTs are
24 doing are causing the trains to go out and have
25 flat spots unless they're, like, totally neglecting

1 the brakes and stuff like that, but at this point,
2 Wabtec is still there doing maintenance on them as
3 well, so I don't think it would be to neglect.
4 Like, to answer your question, the wheel lathe is
5 their response to flat spots.

6 EMILY YOUNG: And were there any
7 problems getting the wheel lathe working? I mean,
8 we understand at the beginning --

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yes. Oh, all
10 the time. Always this side down. So there's two
11 sides to the wheel lathe, so you could do a whole
12 bogie at a time, and a lot of times, it's like, you
13 know, the other side won't work. Like, it's got an
14 error; it won't let us do anything, right? This
15 could be due to the fact that, like, I know there's
16 safety features in that thing if, you know, you
17 avoid a couple of things or go to far with a couple
18 of things, that might cause the errors. I
19 personally was never formally trained on the wheel
20 lathe, and because of that, I would always tell
21 them, I'm not doing that on my own. I will assist
22 somebody who's trained, but because you have not
23 brought me the number one guy to train you, I'm not
24 going to take -- I don't want training from
25 somebody who doesn't know 100 percent of the

1 information, so I would refuse to do that. Some
2 other guys would do that as well.

3 But yeah, that thing was down all the
4 time. Like, there was one time where the whole
5 thing was down, and they had a guy come in, and he
6 working there for weeks on it, like pulling the
7 whole thing apart, so -- and to their defence,
8 like, that's more of the company-side thing, like
9 the company who provided it. Like, it was like a
10 \$2 million device. You know, you'd expect it to do
11 \$2 million-worth of amazing things, not break. You
12 know what I mean? So it's not entirely their fault
13 for that. Like, you can't point a finger at them.

14 EMILY YOUNG: That's OLRTC's
15 responsibility.

16 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yes. They're to
17 maintain the machinery and stuff like that in the
18 building. Absolutely.

19 EMILY YOUNG: And what about the
20 cracked wheels? Can you talk about the cause and
21 the response?

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: That was a
23 nightmare. Well, I can't speak to the cause
24 because I'm not 100 percent sure. I was told
25 certain -- for instance, like, I was told by a

1 couple of Sorel guys -- I had a pretty good rapport
2 with Sorel in Montreal, and I was told that when
3 they transport the wheel, there's a brace that they
4 put onto the wheel, and sometimes where those
5 cracks were were around these little set screws,
6 and that set screw would be proud past that piece
7 of metal -- or sit higher, sorry. And when they
8 manoeuvred this brace around and put it on, it
9 would put pressure on this set screw, which could
10 potentially cause that crack.

11 All of the cracks that I saw - and I
12 found one of the earlier ones - were all coming
13 from that set screw hole, and it was also on a
14 piece of -- like, the metal that it was cracking
15 was not the actual, physical, whole entire wheel,
16 right? Like, there was a piece that was overtop of
17 it that was the part that was cracking. Not to
18 take anything away from the severity of the crack,
19 but that was more or less what was going on.

20 Now, I don't know 100 percent that that
21 is what caused it from Sorel. It could be the fact
22 that there's so much banging around, and the
23 track -- from the tracks that are so bad that this
24 could be causing it, and that could be a weak point
25 on the wheel, but, I mean, judging from what I saw,

1 the set screw being out of there and stuff like
2 that seems like one of the most plausible ideas or
3 scenarios for that.

4 EMILY YOUNG: What did maintenance do
5 to fix that?

6 STEPHEN LENNERTON: They hired a bunch
7 of random people from a hiring company and brought
8 them in to look for them. So I would sit in the
9 sand bay with an iPad, and the train would pull in,
10 and I would go on, and I'd put my lock on and make
11 the train safe for all these workers, and then they
12 would go to each skirt, open the skirt with a
13 flashlight, and they would inspect each wheel. So
14 this went on for a while - for, like, maybe 2
15 days - and I went to management, and I said, how
16 are you supposed to check for cracks through a
17 bunch of grease and debris? Like, they're not
18 cleaning the wheel off. Like, you're telling me
19 they can see through that?

20 So then they had to change it. They
21 had brake cleaner, and they would spray the brake
22 cleaner onto it. Well, now they've washed off all
23 of the corrosion protection. So you need to put
24 the corrosion protection back on, but then we're
25 not doing that either. So, like, again, it was

1 this reactive thing. Like, oh, this is stopping
2 us? Okay, this is the quick solution; let's do
3 this, you know?

4 So, basically, a whole bunch of random
5 people off the streets from a hiring company, you
6 know, came in outside of the union -- so one of the
7 loopholes that the company uses is that if they
8 hire a full fleet -- so let's say they decide that
9 they need 18 people to work on an MVT team, right?
10 If they hire all 18 people, okay, then from my
11 understanding, what I discussed with the union,
12 that means that from that point forward, if they
13 have to hire anybody else to work on the train,
14 they have to be an MVT, right? And the company
15 does not -- like, Alstom does not want to hire more
16 people. It's expensive. So they keep it so that
17 they don't hire that full fleet of people so that
18 they can use a loophole to bring in other people
19 that are there.

20 Because I remember, like, a lot of guys
21 went to the union and were like, Hey, why are you
22 bringing in these random people and not hiring
23 MVTs? And this was roughly what was explained to
24 us. There may be more legal details in that that
25 I'm unaware of, but generally that's what it seemed

1 as though they were doing. But people who had
2 never seen the train, some of them, like, couldn't
3 even -- some of them couldn't even communicate it
4 to me properly, like, at all. Like, they couldn't
5 communicate to me properly in English to even relay
6 what they were finding, right? And it got to the
7 point where that procedure got so redundant and so
8 annoying to the people that were working in there
9 that I can almost guarantee you that, at some
10 point, they weren't checking them properly.

11 There also came this time where we had
12 assumed or they had assumed that, like, the cracks
13 were caused by some sort of issue not on the track,
14 so we had found the ones that were cracked and
15 that, you know, people wouldn't look as hard for
16 them because we weren't finding them anymore. So
17 there was that. That was a nightmare. That whole
18 entire procedure was an absolute nightmare.

19 EMILY YOUNG: And for the door
20 problems, my understanding is that's sort of more a
21 computer issue.

22 STEPHEN LENNERTON: M-hm.

23 EMILY YOUNG: Is that something you
24 know about?

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, I

1 personally know the gentleman who installed those
2 doors, and I'll tell you he did his job the same
3 way I did. He put those things in there exactly
4 for the design. So I would say the electrical
5 would be more of the issue than anything. I mean,
6 I remember at the beginning they went and -- they
7 sent me to Canadian Tire to buy remote controlled
8 lights so that they could put them in the fronts of
9 the trains with the driver so that they would have
10 these other people from another hiring company
11 stand at the platform and push a button to turn
12 said light on so that the driver could know that
13 the doors were closed. Like, that was one of their
14 solutions to it.

15 EMILY YOUNG: And the switch failures,
16 that's something that's more track-related?

17 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, that's too
18 outside of my spec to speak on.

19 EMILY YOUNG: And I think there's also
20 been an issue with track buckling, but you've
21 already told us about your view on the quality of
22 the track, so...

23 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I don't know
24 anything about the construction of tracks either,
25 so I just know that I can see that the track is

1 supposed to be straight and it's not, you know. I
2 think anybody could see it.

3 EMILY YOUNG: Do you have any sense as
4 to the reason for all of these issues with the
5 vehicles that arose after service started? What
6 could have mitigated those problems, prevented them
7 from arising?

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: If we could get rid
9 of winter, that would be basically the main
10 solution. I mean, maybe store them, at least,
11 properly. Like, basically winter is our downfall,
12 humidity. Like, for instance, those coils in the
13 roof were exploding when it went through the wash
14 bay, so just the water, the salt water that they
15 spray with -- or not salt water, sorry, but there's
16 a chemical in the water to clean the trains, and
17 this thing would drive through and it would
18 explode. Sorry, "explode" is a very strong word
19 here. It wasn't like there was a detonation, and
20 then there was shrapnel everywhere. It was just
21 you'd hear a loud, thunder-like pop, and then
22 obviously the train would cease to work at that
23 point, and then you'd have this coil that's just
24 like, you know, all covered in soot from basically
25 some crazy electric arc that went on in there. And

1 their solutions were to change hardware, clean the
2 bay that it was in -- like, clean the little box
3 that it was in, but it was all not actual solutions
4 to the problem.

5 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think the
6 reliability of the trains would have increased if
7 there had been a burn-in period?

8 STEPHEN LENNERTON: What do you mean by
9 a "burn-in period"?

10 EMILY YOUNG: More time for the trains
11 to just run the full length of the track and figure
12 out whether there are bugs that needed to be
13 resolved.

14 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I think if we did
15 that, you would have delayed launching the
16 maintenance, for sure. You would have delayed it
17 because you would have found all this stuff, and
18 stuff would have started falling off before we had
19 customers on there. I mean, some of that is
20 because, like, for instance, sanders were falling
21 off -- I don't think any of this stuff made the
22 news like big things, but, like, the sanding block
23 on the first one has, like, a 5-pound piece of
24 metal that has, like, a -- it has an angled piece
25 on the front which is to deflect things away from

1 the wheel.

2 When they replaced -- they have to take
3 these off to lathe the wheel, and when they do
4 that, one of Alstom's rules -- and this is
5 something that would come from production training.
6 When you take hardware off -- a crush washer, in my
7 opinion, can only be used once. To their
8 standards, they can use it twice, but a locking nut
9 needs to be replaced every single time, and that
10 was not happening. So things like that, like reuse
11 of hardware and things like that is also causing
12 certain problems. They may have corrected that
13 problem by now, but that for sure.

14 But basically, like, in my personal
15 opinion, like, these trains do not run in our
16 weather conditions, period, full stop. Like, so
17 unless you get a new train, in my personal opinion,
18 these problems will never go away. Like, it rides
19 too low for the amount of snow that we get, and
20 then, for instance, the snow deflector - or we'll
21 call it a snowplow - that sits on it on an angle is
22 a flimsy piece of rubber that you can bend with
23 your hands, so it's not going to deflect the type
24 of snow we get. We have a pretty intense winter.
25 You know what I mean? So that's going to be your

1 biggest downfall to it, in my opinion.

2 EMILY YOUNG: Has the reliability of
3 trains and the level of maintenance improved over
4 time?

5 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Not when I was
6 there. I mean, guys were learning stuff, I would
7 say, and, you know, you had your core group of
8 people who were, you know, hellbent on making sure
9 that things were done correctly, but, I mean, it's
10 not like when I was leaving, they were launching
11 all these training things and all this information
12 was coming out, you know what I mean? Like, we
13 were getting a new grease gun when I left. Like,
14 that was, like, the big thing. Like, oh, they
15 bought a new Milwaukee grease gun. It's like
16 whoop-de-doo, like, you know, like, I need way more
17 stuff than that. Like, I personally, like,
18 estimated, like, if they gave me a budget, I would
19 have needed anywhere from, like, 100 to \$150,000
20 worth of tools.

21 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that RTM and
22 Alstom maintenance were partly overwhelmed by the
23 number of work orders that were coming through?

24 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Oh, yeah. Oh,
25 yeah. Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, you had --

1 the thing that made it overwhelming is, again, you
2 have somebody -- so you have a guy who takes an
3 iPad, has never seen this train before until he's
4 started at this job, right? So he's got minimal
5 time seeing this. He's going to walk up to
6 something - again, never seeing it before - and
7 look at it, and then have to tell somebody if it's
8 right or wrong. You know what I mean? So, like,
9 for instance, like, in my case, speaking with
10 Jaime, she's giving me legal information about,
11 like, the summons, let's say -- right? -- and so
12 I'm asking questions because I've never seen a
13 summons. So I can't look at her and say, Oh, I
14 know everything about this. Like, I've never seen
15 it before.

16 So now you got, like I said, somebody
17 who walks up, and it's like they say, Oh, this is
18 okay, but then I'd walk up and say, No, this is
19 bent; like, this is supposed to be like this; or
20 this isn't working anymore; or do you hear that
21 sound? That means this is broken. Like, this is
22 leaking air, or, you know, look, this has fluid on
23 it; like, this isn't supposed to be wet. So, like,
24 they don't see those things. They just think --
25 you know, recognizing water versus hydraulic fluid,

1 you know, like, these kind of things. They don't
2 know that. So then you make an order that says
3 this is what's wrong, let's say, and then you have
4 to send somebody out to try and fix something
5 that's not actually there.

6 So now the next person goes who's never
7 seen this train before, walks up to a situation
8 that somebody else said that something's wrong.
9 Now, if anybody with half a brain looks at that,
10 they're going to think, well, if I don't do
11 anything to it, then it's obviously not fixed,
12 right? Like, if I'm walking up to something, and
13 it's broken and I don't change it, then it's
14 obviously staying in a broken stage. So if they
15 say something's broken and it's not broken, then
16 the person's going to alter that item, right, and
17 once they've altered it, now it's for sure broken.
18 You know what I mean? Or not functioning or not
19 installed properly.

20 And this is a continuously snowballing
21 effect, right, because now the first person who
22 found something thinks they know something, so then
23 they go and tell the other, Hey, I know this -
24 like, I did this; I know this. But their
25 information is wrong, so they just passed wrong

1 information on to the next person who then goes,
2 Hey, I've been educated by that guy, so now I'm
3 going to educate this, and then you just -- like,
4 you see the snowball effect that's happening. You
5 know what I mean?

6 And that aspect of it, when I was
7 there, was insanelly, insanelly frustrating for me,
8 like, mentally because they wouldn't listen to me
9 either, right? Like, I'd say, No, that's on
10 backwards, and I remember one guy turning around,
11 looking at me, and being like, I'm a mechanical
12 engineer and you're not, so I say that's right.
13 And it's like, well, I've fixed that over a
14 thousand times in the time I've been here, and I'm
15 telling you it's wrong.

16 And so it got to a point where I didn't
17 want the conflict anymore. I didn't argue with
18 them anymore. It was getting to the point where I
19 had to give up because I was so overwhelmed by
20 everything that was going on. I mean, and I know
21 that's continuing to happen. Like, and that's a
22 very scary thing to me, like, for the fact that we
23 put humans on that thing and fly them up and down a
24 track at 80 kilometres an hour. You know what I
25 mean? Especially for, like, levelling systems and

1 stuff like that. You have to put things back the
2 way they're supposed to be, to the design to the
3 design of the train, to even have a small chance of
4 this thing working.

5 EMILY YOUNG: So the people at the
6 beginning of service, I understand they were City
7 staff who were looking at, you know, the track and
8 the trains and spotting issues. Sounds like your
9 view was that they weren't properly qualified or
10 trained to be doing that?

11 STEPHEN LENNERTON: I mean, qualified,
12 sure. You can come in with whatever education you
13 want, and if you want to say that that's qualified,
14 sure. When you're looking at the track, I don't
15 know because I don't know what kind of experience
16 they have. But my point -- my direct point to what
17 I'm saying is that when you don't retain the
18 experience, you're not going to be able to pass on
19 the things that happen. I know what the inside of
20 the HPU looks like. There's only four other people
21 in Canada who know that, who have opened up an HPU.
22 I'm the only one in Canada to rebuild two calipers.
23 None of the MVTs have ever seen the inside of a
24 caliper, so how are they going to know how it works
25 inside. You know what I mean? To be able to say

1 that's not doing what it's supposed to do type
2 thing, right?

3 So I would say that it's not
4 necessarily that they're coming in unqualified in
5 the sense of, like, you know, education gives you
6 qualifications. I think it's the fact that they
7 just detest experience there. They don't want
8 somebody to tell them they're wrong. Like, Alstom
9 will never admit they're wrong. They'll say it's
10 because of something else. You know what I mean?
11 You really got to prove to them that it's their
12 fault before they'll make any admittance to it,
13 right? So that's definitely -- that's horrifying
14 to me, to say the least.

15 EMILY YOUNG: You mentioned earlier
16 that there were some occasions on which Alstom
17 maintenance people had pointed out or noted issues
18 with the trains that meant that they, according to
19 the rules, shouldn't go out on the tracks, and
20 sometimes those trains still went out?

21 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, me
22 specifically.

23 EMILY YOUNG: Could that lead to
24 failures on the track and --

25 STEPHEN LENNERTON: 100 percent.

1 EMILY YOUNG: -- potential safety
2 issues?

3 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Yeah, absolutely.
4 Like I had said, I had notified my supervisor,
5 Fakah, hey, this pipe on the main line of our brake
6 system is physically leaking. It's dripping oil.
7 I need to disconnect that, then I need to reconnect
8 it and see if it's the actual Parker fitting that's
9 not working or if I need to replace the hose
10 altogether, and then I need to re-flush the train
11 and re-setup that braking system, and then I need
12 to cycle it and see that it's working before it
13 goes out. That means that this train is not going
14 anywhere, right? But it's just a little leak to
15 him. He thinks like, oh, it's just a little thing,
16 and because he's not mechanically sound like I am
17 or with the same experience on the brakes as I am,
18 so he just thinks that's, you know, whatever. Like
19 bit's just a little leak. Like, what's the worst
20 that could happen, right?

21 Well, that thing starts leaking, and
22 the next thing you know, by the other end of the
23 track, we've lost a litre of fluid and the HPU
24 throws a low fluid fault, and now your brakes are
25 locked up. You got to rescue the train. You know

1 what I mean? And that causes more -- now you got
2 to stop the whole track to get the guys out there
3 to tow the stinking thing back. And it's all just
4 so that -- like, that whole scenario is so that
5 Alstom can say, Well, it happened out there on the
6 track; it has nothing to do with us. You know what
7 I mean? So I made a work order for that and
8 nothing ever came of it. It got launched. Like,
9 the train got launched.

10 So that specific situation, like,
11 infuriated me. Like, I was extremely angry that
12 that was happening because, like, I've had to tell
13 my own family, You are not allowed to get on the
14 train. Like, my sister wanted to use this train to
15 commute, and I told her, You are literally
16 forbidden from getting on the train; like, do not
17 do it. You know what I mean? So she won't ride
18 them for those type of reasons because I was seeing
19 that in front of my face. You know what I mean?
20 So it's alarming.

21 Like, I remember on train set 6, I
22 wasn't allowed to do anything because it was in the
23 shed, and I would walk by this train, and I could
24 smell that the brake pads were literally melting
25 off the train. There is a brake failure here. I

1 can smell it -- like, whatever, right? And you're
2 walking by these warranty technicians that are
3 supposed to identify that -- or even the Wabtec
4 team, right? And you go to them and say, Can you
5 not smell that? And they're like, Yeah. I said,
6 Well, it's coming from here, so do something about
7 it. And they're like, Listen, I don't have a work
8 order for it; I haven't been told to touch it. Or,
9 like, Wabtec would be like, It's not part of our
10 warranty until it's brought up to us, and then it
11 would be this big, like, I don't want to deal with
12 it. And then I'd go in and say, This is a fricking
13 problem; we need to do it. And they would tell me,
14 like, Stay in your lane, Steve. Like, fill out
15 your check sheet. It's not part of your check
16 sheet, you know, leave it alone. And it would
17 drive me mad knowing that this -- like, because now
18 it's going to make flat spots, and then I'm going
19 to have to fricking lathe the damn thing, or, like,
20 whatever, we're going to have to keep the train
21 back and have it lathed again.

22 And then the thing's going to melt -- I
23 remember taking two calipers off the train that at
24 some point were physically on fire because they
25 were malfunctioning so bad, and it's like, I'm

1 taking these off, and it's alarming me because
2 there were people sitting above it. And, like,
3 when they did the testing for the fire resistance
4 in it, it didn't exactly pass with flying colours.
5 You know what I mean? And to think that there's,
6 like, an open flame underneath someone who's
7 sitting on the train, like, it made my blood boil,
8 so to speak. I mean, you can probably tell that
9 I'm getting agitated just talking about it, but
10 it's -- like, it was so horrifying, and that's part
11 of the moral reasons that I left.

12 Like, I personally believe that they're
13 going to kill someone, like a customer. Like,
14 they're going to do -- it's going to happen. We're
15 headed in that direction. Like, when I was
16 speaking before about the sanding block, if that
17 falls off at 40 kilometres an hour and bounces up
18 onto the platform properly and hits someone square
19 in the chest, a 5-pound object at 40 kilometres an
20 hour, that person's gone. Like, that's it for
21 them, you know what I mean? And that's horrifying
22 to me that that's -- so I -- like, that's part of
23 also the reason that I left. I would not be able
24 to mentally handle someone being, like, deceased
25 because of potentially an action of a team that I'm

1 on. You know what I mean? So that was also --
2 sorry. That was a little bit touchy for me there.

3 EMILY YOUNG: If you saw something on a
4 train that you thought was, like, an imminent
5 safety issue, who could you talk to aside from your
6 manager to -- if you had a real concern, could you
7 talk to the -- contact the City's chief safety
8 officer or something like that?

9 STEPHEN LENNERTON: No, no, no, I could
10 never do that. I would have to contact somebody
11 within Alstom. And to speak on that, we're during
12 COVID, right? Like, 90 percent of the facility is
13 sitting at home, right? So they're not even there.
14 Like, when we were in production, if this manager
15 who's like, let's say, an EPU manager told me
16 something that was wrong, I'd go right to the head
17 of the entire thing and say, This is what's
18 happening; stop doing it right now, or I'm going to
19 go sit in a chair, and you're going to sell no
20 trains until you fix it, and that would make them
21 jump, right? But now I don't have that say
22 anymore, so, you know, the only thing I could do is
23 make this work order, but they had so much control
24 over the work order that they would just bypass it,
25 right? And then it's like, what is the purpose of

1 me being there? Like, why am I even bothering,
2 right? Like, I need to report this, and I'm -- the
3 only reason I'm reporting it is so that I'm not
4 liable anymore. Like, that's what it came to for
5 me. Like, I have to put this into the system so
6 there's a record of it. Like, I've reported it so
7 that it doesn't come back on me. At least I've
8 passed it on to somebody else. But that's a really
9 bad way to run a facility like that, you know what
10 I mean? Like, it's like I said, we're putting
11 humans that other people love on the train. Like,
12 we're putting other people's family members on
13 there. So it's alarming.

14 EMILY YOUNG: Mr. Harland, do you have
15 any more questions?

16 FRASER HARLAND: Well, I think,
17 Ms. Young, you and I could probably talk to
18 Mr. Lennerton for another several hours, but given
19 the time and given especially the court reporter's
20 time, I think we should probably wrap things up
21 soon.

22 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Well, I think
23 that's all that I have for now, and we'll let you
24 know if there's any need to have Mr. Lennerton
25 back.

1 STEPHEN LENNERTON: Well, thank you
2 very much to everyone that's involved in this
3 because this is very important that this is
4 happening, and it's wonderful that I got to partake
5 in it.

6 -- Concluded at 6:31 p.m.

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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE


2
3 I, JOANNE A. LAWRENCE, Registered
4 Professional Reporter, certify;

5 That the foregoing proceedings were
6 taken before me at the time and place therein set
7 forth, at which time the witness was put under oath
8 by me;

9 That the testimony of the witness
10 and all objections made at the time of the
11 examination were recorded stenographically by me
12 and were thereafter transcribed;

13 That the foregoing is a true and
14 correct transcript of my shorthand notes so taken.

15
16 Dated this 13th day of June, 2022.

17
18 

19 _____
20 NEESONS, A VERITEXT COMPANY

21 PER: JOANNE LAWRENCE, RPR, CSR

22 COURT REPORTER
23
24
25

WORD INDEX

< \$ >

\$10 19:13
\$150,000 181:19
\$18 25:18
72:12 74:2, 7
75:7 79:9
\$2 172:10, 11
\$20 74:8
\$26 74:25
\$30 25:17
\$6 74:9
\$60,000 168:12
\$8 74:2, 7

< 1 >

1 6:4, 6 18:13
22:12 33:15
36:15 37:7, 16,
18, 21 38:25
39:1 40:15
44:12 94:7
95:22 96:2, 25
97:4 117:9
163:1
1,500 148:4
150:7
100 12:7 16:7
20:25 47:25
59:17 95:6
115:15 141:6
151:17 166:2
171:25 172:24
173:20 181:19
186:25
10-mil 81:7
11 27:19, 20
33:6 95:13, 17
115:13
12 124:15
152:8 169:11
13 113:9
135 153:1
13th 194:16
14 44:15
140 147:12
15 32:23 33:3,
4 59:22 113:10,
16, 23 114:1, 19
115:1, 3
150 52:12
152:24 153:1
150,000 27:10
111:10

150K 27:11
112:1
17 32:23 33:3
159:13
18 16:11 122:8
123:14 138:17
175:9, 10
19 1:8 159:14
19-mil 50:16
19th 1:13
1-er 117:8
1s 102:11

< 2 >

2 11:23, 25
13:25 14:21
22:13 23:13
33:24 34:9
36:16, 24 37:10
40:12, 15 44:13,
22 45:10 58:16
61:8 75:2 78:9,
11 81:10 88:15,
16, 23 95:2, 22
96:2, 20 97:2, 5,
14 123:5 126:8
165:25 174:14
20 58:17 145:16
2009 4:12
2014 9:14
2017 9:19
2018 9:19
2021 155:14
161:23
2022 1:8, 14
194:16
20s 11:17
21 74:10
22-year-old
147:11 168:13
230 147:9
24 133:21 151:2
24-hour 133:21
25-year-old
168:14
279 15:14
279/ALSTOM
1:7
2s 102:11

< 3 >

3 13:22 35:22
78:8 95:17
97:16, 18 159:15

3.5 45:8
3:00 1:14 3:1
30 58:15
33 4:11
33(7) 5:4
35 161:15
36 32:22
3-mil 165:25

< 4 >

4 13:22 49:25
97:16, 18
4:30 5:12
4:33 90:14
4:45 90:13, 15
40 50:17 156:4
161:15 190:17,
19
400 147:10
150:5
45 120:6 130:2,
16

< 5 >

5 5:6 12:1, 2
40:22 44:15
59:21 74:10
78:5 80:8
97:16, 18 145:18
50 35:24 44:14
152:11, 22
55 103:9, 10
5-pound 179:23
190:19
5S 158:1, 9

< 6 >

6 4:12 52:13
62:24 77:4
167:21 188:21
6:31 1:14 193:6
60 161:13
6-mil 50:16
6-month 114:10

< 7 >

7 52:13 108:13
70 44:14
72 34:5, 6

< 8 >

8 49:6 108:13
130:1, 15 139:8

80 67:9 141:9
161:14 167:6
184:24
8-week 12:5

< 9 >

9 67:15 76:5
90:24 132:4
90 67:10 191:12
95 154:17

< A >

abilities 147:23
ability 10:13
101:7 109:18,
20 168:17
abruptly 120:25
absolute 176:18
Absolutely
30:16 59:18
64:2 107:6, 7
111:23 124:9
156:8 172:18
181:25 187:3
access 35:25
38:22, 23 39:3,
6, 21 54:25
98:8 111:22
127:15 150:12
accessible
146:5
accessing
146:14
accidentally
89:24
accumulator
107:23 108:12
Act 4:12 5:4, 7
action 21:15
148:17 190:25
actual 7:15 9:4
42:17 75:23
93:24 121:15
154:15 173:15
179:3 187:8
add 57:1 83:15
additional 36:14
adequate 64:7
adjust 82:20
admit 46:12
134:2 186:9
admittance
186:12
advance 128:15
134:13

advantage
118:17
advertised 73:8,
19, 20
advised 5:5
affect 82:6
138:12 144:13
after 3:22 9:13
12:24, 25 15:16,
17 21:5 25:20
29:24 30:14
31:6 33:14
37:7 44:16
57:13 75:19
76:23, 25 83:20
84:24 95:22
97:2 103:1
112:7 117:10
120:6 178:5
aggressive
22:19
agitated 190:9
ago 15:7
agree 62:3
agreed 14:6
24:17 59:2
agreement
18:13 24:13, 14,
23 27:20 33:3,
5 59:15 113:8
agreements
59:12
ahead 21:25
85:9 125:20
151:10
ahold 55:1
149:20
air 46:19, 21
85:21 139:5, 12
163:13 182:22
alarm 30:6
alarming 188:20
190:1 192:13
Alex 23:22
162:8
Algonquin
139:7, 8 140:2
allot 86:7
allow 89:1
105:2 147:20, 25
allowed 20:18,
21 32:15 42:13
77:5 113:9
188:13, 22

Alstom 2:9
5:23 7:6, 21, 24
8:1, 4, 9 12:13,
14 16:5 18:8
19:4, 5 20:4
21:18 38:22
39:4, 11, 14
47:5, 15, 22
48:2 49:2 51:9
52:3 59:4
62:16, 17 63:2,
7 64:3, 5, 12, 14
65:25 66:9
71:10, 17 73:4,
16, 24 76:4, 8
83:7 84:10
85:4 99:22
100:5, 18
106:17 111:21
114:3, 12 117:4
119:1 122:4
124:6 125:13
138:14 140:7
145:3 147:17
149:22 157:10
158:1, 8 168:7
169:24 175:15
181:22 186:8,
16 188:5 191:11
Alstom's 8:7
65:11 76:18
85:17 180:4
alter 183:16
altered 183:17
altogether
187:10
aluminium 127:8
amazed 139:14
amazing 61:9
64:15 99:24
114:5 117:24
172:11
ambitious 94:19
America 128:5
American 44:4
amount 11:15
26:2 36:6, 8
37:6 46:10
58:5 84:21
92:19 107:4
109:13 115:12
122:20 128:25
139:12 140:17
153:10 156:9,
14 165:23

166:25 169:5
170:6 180:19
amounts 148:10
analogy 62:22
167:4
angle 180:21
angled 179:24
angry 144:14
188:11
annoying 176:8
answered 124:1
answers 13:12
anybody 52:21
76:9 175:13
178:2 183:9
anybody's
157:21
anymore 51:17
56:21 113:16
150:18 168:1
176:16 182:20
184:17, 18
191:22 192:4
anyways 100:19
apart 172:7
appended 4:8
appetizing 72:11
applied 73:16
95:5, 6 96:23
143:17
apply 7:23
73:15, 16
144:19 153:16
approach 31:24
148:25
approached
13:19 25:13
appropriate
49:20
approving
125:13
approximately
6:13 12:6, 20
13:25 15:7
16:11 35:22
108:13 161:13
arc 178:25
area 7:9 38:18
39:9 115:21
146:11 163:12
166:25
areas 136:7
arguably 110:17
argue 184:17

arguing 56:9
145:8
argument 120:1
140:16 146:7
arising 178:7
arose 148:13
169:18 178:5
arrogant 128:24
aside 191:5
asked 4:15
13:20 20:16, 23
74:11 119:16
133:24
asking 20:17
106:24 125:7, 8
165:5 182:12
ASO 40:12, 22
81:10
aspect 17:13
79:6 81:8
82:21 114:12
128:24 138:7
141:5 142:6
146:3, 17 156:7
184:6
aspects 23:7
104:6 116:9
129:14 141:21
assemble 84:15
assembled 20:9
41:8 43:4
assembling
68:23 80:23
assembly 33:23
35:16 37:18
39:25 49:21
73:5
assessment
41:20
assigned 82:3
87:19
assist 92:23
149:23 171:21
assisted 93:19
156:19
Associates 2:10
assume 13:14
86:18 112:15
136:4
assumed 141:8
176:12
assuming 16:11
attach 20:9
attached 40:14,

15 100:14 102:9
attaches 67:6
attempt 34:19
57:8
attendance 8:12
attending 1:13
attention 18:24
68:21 93:3
110:15
attest 34:15
ATU 1:7 15:14
August 161:23
authority 28:5
automated 84:2
157:11, 13, 18
automates
104:10
automatically
18:18 103:21
auxiliary 107:8
available 49:20
54:9, 13, 18
avenue 53:25
92:6
average 77:5
avoid 26:17
28:10 134:4
171:17
aware 16:9
18:2 23:3 33:8
38:21 67:1
83:5 86:14
88:5 89:13
94:2 98:25
101:9 108:23
113:7, 19 152:15
awesome 17:8
axles 151:24

< B >
back 12:4 13:8,
9 17:23 22:12
23:14 24:10
28:20 31:7
37:7 48:9
58:13, 17 69:23
75:5 76:2 85:9
86:5, 6 90:13
95:12 97:25
98:1 100:25
103:25 108:1,
15 109:1 110:1,
2, 6 113:22
114:20 115:8
117:21 130:5, 7,

12 144:2
146:18 150:24
153:20 154:23
155:11 156:23
168:5 170:12
174:24 185:1
188:3 189:21
192:7, 25
background
5:16, 19, 22
6:23, 24
back-paid 75:1
backup 66:18
backwards
184:10
bad 23:15 36:2
53:6 95:18
123:16 134:3
163:11 173:23
189:25 192:9
badly 20:3
48:22 144:12
baffled 52:18
banging 173:22
bar 153:7
barbecue 80:18
bargaining
18:21
barricade 39:8
barrier 26:15
27:1 70:9 71:8
146:14
based 30:14
64:19 147:23
167:14
Bashar 135:5,
20, 25
basic 124:19
136:12
basically 7:10,
11 8:20 9:6
13:4, 18 14:25
23:10 26:16
50:16 51:20
55:18 63:9
65:24 85:13
107:21 108:25
121:12 138:24
139:19 170:11
175:4 178:9, 11,
24 180:14
basis 4:1
114:24
bay 37:4, 13
99:16 102:22

163:3 165:4 174:9 178:14 179:2 bays 36:3 bearing 163:8 bearings 151:25 163:16 beat 12:6, 9 170:11 beautiful 56:25 becoming 55:20 121:18 begged 50:10 beginning 32:2, 5 39:19 52:10 53:2 59:19 61:3 74:5 96:21 112:14 113:8 132:19 135:4 137:20 171:8 177:6 185:6 behaviour 13:6, 7 believe 15:22 16:25 17:17 23:20 33:2, 5 34:3, 8, 13 43:14 47:18 51:25 61:15 64:18 70:20 103:9 121:17 128:3 130:20, 21 131:3 137:15 161:14 190:12 bend 156:25 180:22 bending 127:8 Benjamin 2:16 bent 160:2 182:19 best 38:1 62:11 63:24 73:9 120:20 betrayed 23:17 better 36:5 72:25 73:24 79:22 81:18 92:20 123:20, 21, 24 127:16 169:4 big 10:25 20:1 21:18 25:15 32:4 65:22	70:3, 11 79:1 81:11 92:14 101:21 129:22 139:21 166:21 179:22 181:14 189:11 bigger 170:13 biggest 19:12 20:6 56:17 114:4 140:6 181:1 Bilgen 2:16 bill 66:15 binder 145:9 binders 132:13 bit 9:17 10:16 19:5 24:11 25:21, 24 33:22 34:14 36:5, 19 41:6 48:4, 10 54:24 57:23, 25 64:22 66:17 72:11, 22 76:15 79:20, 21, 22 80:12 81:14 82:20 92:7, 8 94:24 101:14 115:16 117:2 119:13 125:23 145:1 162:14 167:21 168:5 169:6 170:16 191:2 bits 127:25 bit's 187:19 blame 63:17 160:12 blessing 84:6 block 179:22 190:16 blocks 151:15 blood 190:7 blow 68:17 139:21 blowing 60:14 blows 102:4 board 10:18 body 109:6 bogie 40:24 132:15 171:12 bogies 8:21 37:11 43:20 48:22 53:22 132:12, 13	133:15 boil 190:7 bolt 38:16 50:19, 20 54:4, 6, 23 75:18 81:7 85:24 137:6, 14 143:4 146:25 147:1 149:7 150:10 151:12 153:1, 3, 6 156:1 bolted 41:9, 17 bolting 42:3, 17, 20, 21 bolts 80:2 136:13 137:9 143:3 152:8, 21 153:24 154:16 155:4 156:16 bonus 122:16 book 77:14 booths 42:10 border 48:7, 9 boss 27:23 29:11, 19 bothering 192:1 bought 47:12 50:13, 14 56:17, 19, 21 63:5, 8 64:8 65:4 127:7, 12 181:15 bounces 190:17 bow 99:16 box 118:8 130:1 132:1 135:1 155:6 179:2 boxes 8:21, 23 boyfriend 73:9 brace 173:3, 8 brackets 40:8 118:1 brain 29:16 52:18 80:4 164:17 183:9 brake 9:10 13:24 30:24, 25 31:6 91:25 92:1 103:25 108:10 119:16 120:5 156:20 165:2 174:21 187:5 188:24, 25 brakes 20:8 69:4 91:17	92:18 95:2, 3, 5 98:4 102:25 107:8, 23, 25 110:17 122:14 138:1, 6 165:8 171:1 187:17, 24 braking 29:1 103:14, 22 104:1, 10 156:20 187:11 Brampton 16:24 33:23 34:21 35:11 51:6 83:25 brand 125:6 brand-new 65:23 87:7 break 5:9 28:25 29:15 66:11 67:22 90:8, 11 165:20 172:11 breaker 153:7 breakers 66:11 breaking 21:17 breaks 48:15 107:17 157:1 brief 3:3 briefly 5:15 101:15 152:4 169:17, 23 bright 24:6 bring 28:20 86:6 93:3 105:12 130:12 170:2 175:18 bringing 175:22 broke 21:19 125:3 broken 118:8 138:10 140:11 182:21 183:13, 14, 15, 17 brought 7:9 45:25 55:22 69:22 77:24, 25 98:6 112:4 117:2, 16 171:23 174:7 189:10 buckling 177:20 buddy 120:12 budget 125:12 127:15 181:18	bugs 115:8 179:12 build 33:14 51:11 62:20 96:25 113:25 133:1 140:2 building 22:2 32:21, 22 35:2 36:7, 17, 20, 22 38:14 39:4 42:14 60:8 61:7, 10 62:13, 21 64:14 68:25 71:21 102:6 104:24 133:16 148:6 160:8 172:18 built 11:4 23:5 32:20, 25 33:18, 19 34:7 35:19, 21 36:14, 17 38:14 43:5 52:12, 15 60:6, 17 63:6 64:12, 15 65:13, 16, 21 74:17 77:8 83:17, 20 95:10, 22 96:11, 13 97:2, 4, 16, 18 99:1, 8 132:13 140:3 143:8 bump 28:6 48:17 102:21 bumped 12:1 34:13 74:8, 9, 25 bunch 45:25 55:1 144:4 162:21 174:6, 17 175:4 burn-in 179:7, 9 bus 15:21, 24 115:24, 25 116:2, 4 business 59:7 63:21 65:9 businesses 63:20 button 104:11 144:17 177:11 buy 63:8 64:4 80:18 177:7 buying 87:9 bypass 88:25 89:4 191:24
---	--	---	--	---

bypassed 88:16, 21

< C >

cage 101:20, 21

California 56:25

caliper 44:12, 13, 18 46:13 53:10, 12, 16, 18 91:23 94:8 108:20 111:11 185:24

calipers 8:23 21:23 43:9, 10 44:5, 11, 25 45:1, 5 46:8 47:2, 10, 19 48:25 94:7, 8 98:1, 2, 6 108:19 185:22 189:23

call 13:5 22:12, 13 44:3 115:25 142:14 168:20 180:21

called 7:10, 18 10:15 44:22 67:7 90:24 101:19 102:15, 20 107:18 109:2 118:18 119:15 120:6 135:5 147:18 153:7 154:2 158:1, 3

camera 145:23

Canada 5:6 60:7 185:21, 22

Canadian 177:7

cannibalize

49:12

capable 108:12

146:25

capacitor 69:16

car 40:15, 23 62:23 101:21

152:14

card 53:21

care 7:12, 15 19:20 23:25 72:4, 16 79:8, 14 110:21 111:3 138:18 164:19 166:3

cared 18:24 72:7

career 19:20

caring 164:16

Carolina 43:12

carrot 12:16

carry 121:21

cars 40:24

cart 20:7, 8, 12 137:25 138:10 158:6

case 51:2 76:14 85:25 109:7 116:7 147:19 150:12 152:15 156:3 162:17 182:9

cases 44:17 58:9 63:14 80:9 86:1 94:4, 23 149:2 167:18

catastrophic

109:7

catenary 37:15

67:11

caught 12:5 69:21, 22, 23, 24

caused 68:14 77:9 88:5 94:15 95:7 125:12 155:8 173:21 176:13

cease 178:22

centre 47:3 152:8 154:8

certain 3:11 25:22 26:20 39:8 56:2 61:5, 14 62:19 74:15, 80:6, 7 82:25 92:23 98:16, 17 100:1 101:23 104:6, 8 105:2 107:20 115:25 118:19 120:23 139:6, 7, 12 141:20, 24, 25 144:12 152:9, 19, 21, 22 160:19 166:25 170:6 172:25 180:12

changes 32:11 71:15 97:24 101:10 111:3 114:12 129:12, 14 149:25

changing 47:2 131:19

charge 27:5 135:13

chassis 40:4, 6 41:14 159:22, 24 160:2

chassis

38:19 159:2

cheap 65:4

cheaper 63:2

check 27:11 111:12 174:16 189:15

checked 143:4

checking 176:10

chemical 178:16

chest 190:19

certificate 139:7, 10 194:1

certify 194:4

chain 48:2, 10

chair 191:19

challenge 12:8

challenges 44:8 46:7

chance 60:2 167:25 185:3 29:6 31:9 33:23 44:15 45:24 46:2, 12 57:3, 8 58:18 60:23 87:11 89:23 95:4, 13 111:19 115:11, 23 129:18 130:1 131:25 159:24 174:20 179:1 183:13

changed 9:24, 25 31:4 33:6 45:15 46:12, 21, 22 49:5 85:22 89:19 91:10 95:17 111:18 129:21, 23 130:18 135:1 154:17

changes 32:11 71:15 97:24 101:10 111:3 114:12 129:12, 14 149:25

changing 47:2 131:19

charge 27:5 135:13

chassis 40:4, 6 41:14 159:22, 24 160:2

chassis

38:19 159:2

cheap 65:4

cheaper 63:2

check 27:11 111:12 174:16 189:15

checked 143:4

checking 176:10

chemical 178:16

chest 190:19

chief 191:7

China 61:8

choice 62:24

circle 152:17

circular 154:13

Citadis 39:23 65:18

citizen 92:12

city 15:23 18:18 59:11 62:16, 23 63:1, 9, 14, 22 64:1, 6, 8 65:3, 19 87:6 113:8 115:24 140:10 158:24 160:5 185:6

City's 191:7

civil 4:19

claimed 121:15

clarify 41:5 80:14 90:17

class 136:20, 22

classification

27:15 31:10

classified 30:12

clean 55:18 130:8 178:16 179:1, 2

cleaned 157:20

cleaner 174:21, 22

cleaning 158:2 174:18

clear 24:21 80:7 104:14

clearer 10:16

click 54:18

clicking 118:9

climate 61:2

clog 57:4

close 14:21 35:17, 18 60:6

closed 27:18 48:7, 9 120:7 177:13

closer 13:17 128:11

closest 93:23

closing 87:4 91:5

coated 154:21

coating 153:16

co-counsel 3:10

code 152:21

coil 61:14 178:23

coils 178:12

colabbed 92:8

cold 57:2

collaborative

3:9

colleagues

46:17

collided 159:14

colours 190:4

come 7:14 8:22 17:23 20:9 21:23 22:3 23:2 30:4 34:18 38:15 39:20 40:4 43:25 45:23 54:1 56:20 58:13 61:6 76:9 83:17 86:5 90:13 97:24 110:1 111:25 128:10 129:5 134:16 138:2 140:5 141:22 142:2, 15 143:18, 20, 22 144:18, 19 155:24 163:11 169:1 172:5 180:5 185:12 192:7

comes 60:4 62:1 140:10

coming 43:4 58:15 87:6 161:6 173:12 181:12, 23 186:4 189:6

comm 145:24

commence 3:19

commencing

3:1

comments 49:17

COMMISSION

1:6 2:1 3:16

commissioner

100:2, 3

commissioning

91:14 99:20 101:11

Commission's

3:8, 17, 21, 25

commitment 125:9	completion 85:14	Confederation 6:9	continuing 184:21	cost 26:19 59:6 64:19, 22 65:8
committed 81:20	complicated 114:16	confidential 4:1	continuously 183:20	cost-cutting 64:24 65:6
common 30:18	complications 88:3	confirm 9:9	contract 24:17 46:5 113:13	costs 60:7 134:4
comms 145:22	complied 30:1	conflict 64:16 184:17	contractual 52:2	COUNSEL 2:1, 3, 4 3:12, 25 17:23
communicate 100:9 176:3, 5	comply 30:3	connect 8:25 85:24 94:9 108:7 155:2	contributed 49:4	countries 59:20
communicating 62:16	component 88:10 94:12	connected 36:20 48:25 104:7	contributes 110:7	country 30:5, 7 66:1, 2 120:19 168:22
commute 188:15	components 41:16, 17 46:18 69:20 80:7 81:11 88:11 102:13 103:5 107:21 109:22 111:14 141:25 151:20	connecting 118:1	controlled 10:1 77:2 107:16 177:7	couple 12:23 29:16 40:24 66:12 92:15 102:22 114:22 117:12 118:2, 3 162:20 167:5 171:17 173:1
companies 106:21	compressed 99:21	connections 154:3	conveniently 124:21	coupled 33:1 36:4, 7
company 7:9, 11, 18 23:5 47:10 50:4 64:15 65:8 123:23 172:9 174:7 175:5, 7, 14 177:10 194:20	compressor 46:20, 21 89:18, 19, 20	connectors 6:21	conversation 45:7 113:21 119:18 126:2 148:3	coupler 148:3
company's 120:2	computer 13:4 28:5 46:18 53:24 69:20 88:25 111:17 126:12 150:16, 17 176:21	connects 154:5	conversations 63:13 120:10 136:4	coupling 148:4
company-side 172:8	computerized 157:15	conscious 167:20	coolness 74:19	couplings 155:2
compare 104:19 106:14	computers 54:21	consider 93:22 145:10	co-op 55:19, 22 56:13	course 114:9 139:9 140:1
compared 78:16 104:17 106:11	computer-wise 46:14	considered 8:16	core 181:7	court 192:19 194:22
comparison 22:20	concern 65:3 68:20 191:6	consisted 118:1	corner 75:3 167:18	covered 50:16 124:19 137:16 178:24
compartment 163:14	concerned 24:2 25:1 110:11	consistent 114:24 165:17	correct 4:3 15:18 42:16 89:7 108:2 121:1, 3, 9 132:2, 22 133:20 134:24 142:18 147:21 149:15 166:10 194:14	covers 154:13, 14
compatible 46:11	concerning 42:25 43:1 104:5 121:19 134:23	consistently 139:3	corrected 180:12	COVID 115:7, 13 191:12
competed 22:23	concerns 8:11 62:6 107:3	constantly 156:23	correcting 24:4	crack 173:10, 18
compile 21:20	Concluded 193:6	construct 83:12	corrections 3:22, 24 4:8	cracked 172:20 176:14
complain 135:12	condensation 58:19	constructed 10:7 33:9, 11 41:19	correctly 89:6 145:4 149:1 156:2 161:22 163:9 165:12 166:1 181:9	cracking 173:14, 17
complaint 7:23	conditioning 139:5	construction 5:20 6:9 8:3 24:10, 25 34:11 37:17 40:3 44:8, 9 51:5 52:7 64:25 71:19, 20 75:12 88:4 97:21 98:11, 16 117:4 122:5 123:10 124:6 133:5 177:24	corrosion 174:23, 24	cracks 116:17 173:5, 11 174:16 176:12
complete 8:22 12:1 55:24 82:2 84:23 85:6 87:24 119:8 120:18 132:10 156:13 158:10	conditions 64:7 180:16	contact 25:6 166:24 191:7, 10		crashed 150:17
completed 65:15 86:5	conductor 61:14, 16	contacted 16:18 17:10 20:16, 23 21:2, 22		crawl 164:24
completely 31:19 32:12 37:8 57:6 83:14 94:22 98:11 123:22 127:11 159:23		content 59:11		crazy 124:20 160:4 162:12 178:25
		continue 22:15 98:4, 5		create 35:8 52:4 53:5 58:19 135:3 151:7, 8 166:20

created 26:22 29:3 43:9 53:4 88:3 135:21 creates 58:20 crew 73:6 cross-eyed 130:9 Crown 4:20 crucial 54:12 crumple 28:21 crunch 85:4 crush 180:6 crushing 23:8 CSR 194:21 curve 35:8 52:11 53:1 116:25 118:21 135:21 cushion 87:8, 10, 11 customer 190:13 customers 126:5 179:19 customer's 109:6 cutting 167:17 CVS 46:14, 17 CVSs 69:19 cycle 45:4 91:25 187:12 cycled 104:25 cycles 45:8 cycling 44:16 < D > daily 28:17 damage 89:24 damages 109:25 damaging 85:1 109:23 damn 189:19 date 15:10, 11 34:13 122:19, 21 Dated 194:16 dates 12:21 14:22 day 1:13 13:18 17:9 18:13 21:4, 5 22:4 23:16, 21 26:17 27:6 56:25 57:1 58:16, 17 66:7 74:24, 25 76:22 80:1	81:4 110:3 113:22 117:8, 9 120:4 128:22, 23 129:17, 19 133:21 194:16 days 12:1, 2 78:5 80:8 95:17 174:15 dead 103:16 deadline 79:9 144:4 deadlines 12:4 82:15 deal 95:8 163:20 166:21 189:11 dealership 62:23 dealing 144:13 debris 174:17 deceased 190:24 deceived 20:3 deceptions 20:6 decide 175:8 decided 22:6 23:1 24:6 51:24 decision 34:2, 21 64:19 112:25 decisions 22:18 30:9 60:18 93:4 121:2 142:18 160:1 164:4 167:14, 15 declaration 3:8 deem 113:2 deemed 4:14 defects 44:19 defence 62:12 167:16 172:7 deferred 106:10 deficient 131:11 definitely 26:12 29:9 37:23 38:1 49:3 60:21 61:23 72:2 76:8, 20 81:22 94:15 97:12 100:11 104:20 105:14 110:6 125:17 142:17 144:24 145:7 146:6 148:12, 23 151:20 158:12, 22 161:9 186:13	deflect 179:25 180:23 deflector 180:20 degree 52:22, 23 140:13 168:6 degrees 73:1 153:1 delay 39:13 49:12 94:16 95:1, 15 delayed 94:3, 23 179:15, 16 delays 49:14 89:21 110:8 demand 112:12 115:11 demanding 11:14 Dennis 129:20 130:21 department 93:5 depicted 24:15 deploy 58:5, 6 depth 18:23 derailment 155:9, 11 158:25 159:5, 8 160:24 derailments 158:17, 23 160:10 161:3, 23 describe 5:15 63:24 describing 131:19 description 10:2 41:12 90:18 design 62:15, 20 65:14, 16, 23 96:12 177:4 185:2, 3 designated 105:2 designed 37:24 38:8 desk 123:24 detailed 80:20 details 68:13 113:12 159:19 175:24 determined 45:2 102:14 detest 186:7 detonated 102:5	detonation 178:19 developed 31:25 82:24 device 56:24 91:20 94:10 108:7 172:10 diagnosing 118:22 die 67:16 difference 67:2 75:2 101:16 105:17 different 10:3 19:8 22:8 27:15 42:15 50:9 57:9 61:11 77:1 81:15 94:21 103:5 119:13, 14 129:11 132:16 135:6 170:22 difficult 11:16 84:25 106:17 142:17, 19 163:18 difficulty 147:16 diligence 164:11 dime 170:4 diminish 41:22 dings 87:16 direct 83:4 136:2 185:16 direction 138:11 190:15 directly 12:13 13:11 73:25 105:21 109:5 152:20 director 49:24 dirt 129:13 dirty 164:23 disconnect 165:15 187:7 discovered 57:13 discriminated 147:23 discussed 175:11 disguise 84:6 disorganization 158:11	disrupting 170:9 distance 153:6 divide 166:9 divot 170:5 divots 166:19 document 133:10 documents 52:7 134:12 doing 8:20 9:21 11:14 19:15 22:5 27:9, 12 51:17, 19 55:15 59:1 60:12 64:8 65:8 66:19 71:25 72:5 73:3 74:16 77:10 78:22, 23 80:8 82:1 84:2 86:4 87:14 94:17, 18 109:24 110:16 113:4 120:12 121:5 128:9 129:14 131:7 135:15, 20 137:19 138:21 139:11, 18, 20 140:12, 22 141:17 142:23 143:11 144:16 146:1 147:16, 17 148:24 161:13 164:7 165:3, 7, 11 169:4 170:24 171:2, 21 174:25 176:1 185:10 186:1 191:18 dollars 122:20 127:13 doomed 59:19 door 15:1 89:2 103:11, 12 108:8 120:7 135:11 176:19 doors 103:6 177:2, 13 dormant 13:1 doubted 130:16 downfall 178:11 181:1
---	---	---	--	---

<p>downgrade 65:12</p> <p>downloaded 110:25</p> <p>dragged 108:25</p> <p>drastically 114:12 130:16</p> <p>drawings 109:11</p> <p>dripping 187:6</p> <p>drive 56:24 71:2 98:20 106:4 118:7 163:1 170:10 178:17 189:17</p> <p>driven 66:6 75:9 129:12</p> <p>driver 70:4, 21 88:17 103:17, 18 104:1 159:1 177:9, 12</p> <p>drivers 15:24 104:11, 23 105:3 106:7 126:4</p> <p>driving 61:17 89:3 103:19 107:15</p> <p>dropped 92:4</p> <p>dropping 108:19</p> <p>drops 58:17</p> <p>drove 70:4, 25 144:11</p> <p>due 16:21 17:13 44:19 45:3, 4 46:12 50:5 51:25 57:18 72:25 83:18 84:1 85:1, 14 94:5 95:14 131:8 134:18 135:11 141:12 164:10 171:15</p> <p>duration 35:3 95:25</p> <p>dynamic 7:4 8:15 71:1 92:9, 17 101:17 103:1 104:21 117:19 118:12</p> <p>< E ></p> <p>earlier 78:2 173:12 186:15</p>	<p>early 11:17 44:25 45:2 124:11</p> <p>earth 102:15</p> <p>easier 52:8 55:11 80:13</p> <p>easy 57:16 75:22, 24 117:24</p> <p>economy 66:3</p> <p>Eddie 148:7</p> <p>educate 184:3</p> <p>educated 52:16 120:17 140:14 184:2</p> <p>education 76:6 121:15 140:8, 19, 21, 25 143:24 185:12 186:5</p> <p>educational 5:16</p> <p>education-wise 5:18</p> <p>effect 86:11 107:12 111:20 116:6 166:16, 20 183:21 184:4</p> <p>effects 85:16</p> <p>effort 123:17</p> <p>efforts 119:1</p> <p>egos 51:25</p> <p>elaborate 64:21 74:18 137:11</p> <p>electric 178:25</p> <p>electrical 52:22 68:10 69:12, 14 71:6 73:1 88:13 90:5 91:18 119:25 140:13 177:4</p> <p>electrician 67:17</p> <p>electricity 91:19</p> <p>electrocuted 69:16</p> <p>electronics 8:19 43:1 46:16, 25 54:21 93:2</p> <p>elements 61:17, 19</p> <p>eliminate 159:22</p> <p>embedded 29:15</p> <p>emergency 103:21 104:3</p> <p>Emily 2:3 3:2, 6, 15 4:7, 11 5:14 6:2, 8 7:5</p>	<p>8:2, 13 9:11, 20 10:20 11:10 12:11 13:13 14:8, 17 15:4, 13, 18, 25 16:4, 13, 23 17:4, 15, 18, 22 18:4, 11, 20 19:1, 24 24:7, 24 26:3, 8 27:4 28:11 29:5 30:11, 19 31:8, 13, 23 32:17 33:7, 21 34:1, 20 35:15 37:16, 20 38:7, 21 39:1, 13, 17, 22 43:2 44:20, 21 47:4, 14, 21 48:1, 4 49:10, 19 52:3, 6 54:7 55:9 56:10 57:11 58:7, 21 59:13 60:25 62:5 63:25 64:21 65:17 66:8, 22 68:1, 22 69:11 70:1, 13, 18, 23 71:4, 17, 22 73:4, 22 75:11 76:16 80:14, 21 81:17 83:5 84:8 85:3, 6, 16 86:16, 21 88:1, 20 89:10, 13, 16 90:7, 12, 16 91:12 93:14 94:2 95:19 96:1, 6 97:8, 20 98:7 99:7, 19 100:20 101:9, 15 104:15 105:4, 8 106:1, 9 107:2, 11 109:17 110:9, 23 111:20 113:7 114:18 115:6 116:18, 24 119:1, 5, 10 122:3 123:8 124:3 125:20 128:14, 18 131:10, 14, 18, 24 133:4, 9 134:5, 7, 9 135:23 136:10</p>	<p>137:12, 18, 22 138:14, 25 142:21 143:10 145:2 146:13 148:18 149:6, 11, 16, 21 150:2, 11 151:11 155:7, 13 157:9, 17 158:16 160:9 161:21 162:2, 16 164:6 167:20 168:4 169:16, 20, 23 171:6 172:14, 19 174:4 176:19, 23 177:15, 19 178:3 179:5, 10 181:2, 21 185:5 186:15, 23 187:1 191:3 192:14, 22</p> <p>emissions 139:13</p> <p>emit 139:12</p> <p>employed 70:22</p> <p>employee 7:15 8:1 74:14</p> <p>employees 50:3 57:20 168:7</p> <p>employers 114:16</p> <p>encompassed 78:20</p> <p>encountered 38:22 83:6</p> <p>ended 6:17 141:3</p> <p>enemy 161:10</p> <p>engineer 43:25 55:20, 24 100:3 119:24, 25 142:1 163:22 184:12</p> <p>engineering 8:8 43:13 52:22 54:16 55:21 56:16, 23 58:1 73:1 77:18, 21 101:1, 11 130:21 131:17 132:5, 20 140:13 150:23 151:2 159:20,</p>	<p>25 160:15 163:24</p> <p>engineering's 134:21</p> <p>English 176:5</p> <p>enormous 92:19 128:25 153:10</p> <p>enter 3:16</p> <p>entered 3:22 4:1, 5</p> <p>entire 12:18 32:15, 16, 18 34:8 35:4 39:3 40:2 46:2 47:7 50:10 55:21 95:24 120:19 128:21 133:22 135:7 143:5 158:11 159:16 162:9 166:8 173:15 176:18 191:17</p> <p>entirely 172:12</p> <p>entirety 158:14</p> <p>entities 16:8</p> <p>entity 135:6</p> <p>environment 26:9</p> <p>EPU 91:4 191:15</p> <p>equal 10:1</p> <p>equipment 149:22 162:9</p> <p>equipped 137:19</p> <p>erase 31:18</p> <p>error 77:12 114:2, 6 142:4 171:14</p> <p>errors 4:4 171:18</p> <p>escalated 62:7, 8</p> <p>especially 21:17 32:6 71:10 88:7 116:15 126:25 140:3 150:25 165:21 168:16 184:25 192:19</p> <p>essentially 51:19 84:14 141:21</p> <p>establish 4:18</p>
---	---	---	---	---

<p>estimated 181:18 Europe 43:23, 24 44:2 eventually 45:21 157:1 everybody 10:1, 2 120:5, 8 137:1 everybody's 76:9 122:23 everyone's 152:15 evidence 3:7, 17, 23 4:2, 5, 23 5:3, 7 127:19 exact 14:22 15:12 34:16 45:6 78:4 85:12 117:6 122:21 143:23 159:19 exactly 14:23 15:2 62:13, 14 85:11 146:10 170:7 177:3 190:4 exaggeration 170:16 examination 194:11 example 11:20 32:3 98:1 99:10 100:15, 16 138:4 examples 64:11 exciting 11:7 excuse 122:16 exist 56:7 98:21 expand 25:9 expect 172:10 expected 45:5 115:24 expecting 84:10 expenditures 50:6 expensive 175:16 experience 29:13 44:6 78:15 79:17 115:5 117:22 120:18 131:9 140:5, 8, 19 141:10, 13</p>	<p>143:25 167:7, 13 185:15, 18 186:7 187:17 experienced 35:4 39:12 66:9 114:25 132:9 experience-wise 5:19 expertise 75:10 92:6 explain 9:24 20:7 50:18 78:22 82:17 101:3, 16 125:22 152:4 explained 130:17 175:23 explains 78:15 89:9 explode 178:18 exploding 61:16 178:13 exposed 127:2 express 29:9 expressed 22:21 160:17 extension 6:11 extensive 137:4 168:21 extent 91:16 104:8 105:25 170:18 extra 112:8 116:10 extremely 11:3, 14 12:7 54:12 74:15 80:25 125:7 147:16 188:11 eye 129:2, 6 < F > face 188:19 facilitate 34:5, 11 36:7 37:3 86:4 facilities 60:17, 19 facility 16:24 33:19 34:4, 25 35:6, 16, 18 36:2, 12, 14, 20 38:1, 3, 19 39:12 42:15</p>	<p>51:23 58:11 60:5 69:15, 24 72:3 78:1 79:10 116:13 124:13 128:7 141:1 142:15 157:20, 22 158:11, 14 191:12 192:9 fact 18:16 25:3 34:17 38:15 70:4 72:25 132:18 135:14 136:4 148:15 171:15 173:21 184:22 186:6 fail 82:19 failed 57:10 84:18 125:17 155:8 failing 11:1 44:9 fails 53:10 109:25 failure 30:24, 25 31:7 38:4 44:14 45:15, 22 48:18 49:3 83:18 90:6 109:7 151:11 188:25 failures 36:8 46:4, 8 49:11 94:25 144:4 177:15 186:24 fair 15:4 22:11 41:11, 20, 21 75:6, 8 107:2 110:23 127:23 fairly 6:2 Faiveley 43:8 47:9, 10, 12 Fakah 30:23 187:5 fake 121:12 fall 55:6 156:9 162:14 falling 12:4 87:23 151:15 162:3 179:18, 20 falls 190:17 family 188:13 192:12 fans 61:14</p>	<p>fast 46:2 48:22 79:8 92:4 138:3 161:19 faster 45:16 79:18 105:14 fault 28:8 46:3 49:2 64:3 100:24 102:18 172:12 186:12 187:24 faults 114:4 140:7 favours 22:5 favour 120:12 fear 30:1 feature 28:25 89:8 features 88:24 171:16 feel 49:19 128:14 feet 102:22 fell 6:18 151:16 162:6 163:2 fellow 25:20 felt 19:10 23:17 26:2 85:13 Ferrari 62:25 63:2, 3, 7, 8, 10 field 131:5 140:19 147:22 fight 120:8 figure 7:14 58:23 77:15 93:13 136:8 146:2 179:11 figuring 82:25 132:21 134:21 file 27:18 fill 126:15 189:14 final 39:25 93:4 find 24:3 64:9 100:24 109:15 135:2 150:13 finding 176:6, 16 finds 97:16 fine 15:13 57:1 130:18 finger 60:20 166:19 172:13 fingers 156:25</p>	<p>finish 13:9 23:16 82:13 91:5 135:24 finished 6:25 8:15 10:7 126:17 fire 42:14 69:12, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24 70:12 122:16 189:24 190:3 fired 30:3 123:4 fires 70:2 71:6 fit 61:2 83:1 fitting 187:8 fix 22:8 39:9 42:7 55:23 56:12 67:22 85:9 87:9 97:19 101:7 110:2 111:12 114:11 133:1 141:25 174:5 183:4 191:20 fixed 27:18 28:18 87:18 110:3 117:20, 21 150:18 183:11 184:13 fixes 113:4 fixings 8:24 flame 190:6 flange 106:19, 22 160:19, 20, 22 flashlight 174:13 flat 95:7, 8, 14 105:14 170:2, 15, 25 171:5 189:18 flats 169:21 flat's 170:3 fleet 32:15, 16, 18 46:2 175:8, 17 flimsy 180:22 flip 38:19 40:6 float 40:10 floor 19:10 42:18 93:7 143:17 153:13 157:24 flow 150:24 161:19 165:9 fluid 9:2 31:2 91:24 165:11</p>
---	--	--	---	---

182:22, 25
187:23, 24
fluids 163:12
165:3
fluke 71:14
flush 9:1 20:7,
8, 12 21:23
111:11 122:13
137:25
flushing 165:2,
6, 8
fly 161:18
184:23
flying 103:13
190:4
focus 7:4
focussed 19:19
110:19
follow 20:19
21:19 26:21
118:14 130:3
132:5 158:10
followed 7:20
128:22 130:24
following 118:15
follow-up 3:12
food 25:9
fooled 25:7
foolish 100:18
foot 127:17
footprint 158:4
forbid 103:19
forbidden
188:16
force 26:23
89:6 102:17
157:3 165:24
forced 85:14
135:10
forcing 24:20
foregoing 194:5,
13
forget 112:5
forgot 56:18
forklift 159:1
formal 75:14
76:3 142:8
formally 121:16
171:19
forth 76:2
156:23 194:7
forward 175:12
found 21:10
23:1 27:13
28:16, 21 30:24

122:15 168:25
173:12 176:14
179:17 183:22
frame 154:4, 5
France 43:23
Fraser 2:4 14:9,
13 36:11 41:5,
11, 21 44:6, 21
45:17 46:6
51:3, 7 68:15
78:2, 7, 11, 14
88:2 90:10
112:9 121:22
125:22 127:18
132:7 152:3
192:16
freezing 61:21
French 80:18
fricking 128:22
169:3 189:12, 19
Friday 72:8
Friday's 74:24
friend 53:24
73:9 145:23
friend's 73:9
frogs 143:3
front 23:11
81:6 92:1
99:16 126:16
154:22, 24
155:2 159:2, 12,
17 166:12
179:25 188:19
fronts 177:8
frustrated 23:17
54:24
frustrating 184:7
full 39:3, 21
49:6 90:21
102:4, 9 132:12
175:8, 17
179:11 180:16
full-on 104:4
fun 12:8, 10
function 9:1, 5
32:7 58:4 94:11
functioning 9:3,
7 183:18
functions
107:14
funny 106:25
113:20 159:6
162:5
fuses 66:11
68:15

future 19:18
24:5

< G >
gain 141:10
gaining 38:22
game 121:6
gap 116:4
gaps 130:19
gas 139:6, 11
gather 106:16
gear 8:21, 23
50:15 118:8
130:1 132:1
135:1 155:6
gearbox 48:24
129:9, 18, 21
131:20 148:11
152:4, 5, 7
153:22 154:1, 4,
8, 15 155:1, 3,
21 156:15
162:3, 7, 24, 25
gearboxes
48:23 129:23
general 6:16
133:11
generally 29:6
175:25
gentleman 25:6
43:16 75:22
135:5 177:1
gentleman's
125:2
Germany 128:3,
6
give 7:12
14:21 15:11
20:20 21:1
43:25 54:4
62:22 74:12, 23
83:12 91:20
92:2 99:9
120:25 122:20
125:24 126:14
139:10 145:7
152:12 158:21
184:19
given 4:2, 21
15:23 21:11
50:11 68:5
80:22 96:15
129:1 130:23
133:18 148:16

157:8 166:3
192:18, 19
gives 7:15
153:8 186:5
giving 3:3 5:2
54:20 62:18
121:19 139:15
182:10
glue 75:15
gluing 75:16
goal 79:12
good 71:10, 24
79:4 90:8, 10
99:9 122:6
125:3 139:20
140:9, 23
165:15 166:12
173:1
goodness 32:20
GPS 104:7
Grade 76:5
132:4
granted 23:14
grease 111:10
151:25 153:17,
19, 20 154:21
163:7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 21, 25
164:2 174:17
181:13, 15
greasing 151:24
great 117:24
135:18
grey 7:9 146:11
grind 163:17
ground 4:16
38:17 70:7, 8
80:11 102:17,
19 158:5 164:24
grounded 70:9
grounding
102:16
group 26:13, 15
181:7
growing 147:14
guarantee 176:9
guess 49:10
60:16 62:17
63:23 65:25
73:18 80:20
94:23 114:16
131:8 135:15
138:12 142:20
169:9
guideline 33:13

guideway 71:2
143:1
gun 181:13, 15
guy 68:10
113:21 117:8,
23 122:14
128:2 129:20
143:22 160:17
165:5 166:2
167:11 171:23
172:5 182:2
184:2, 10
guys 55:5
67:17 68:19
70:25 72:1, 14
98:25 117:10,
15 123:20
129:2 130:6
142:3 146:21,
23, 24 147:2, 4
152:14 163:20
165:6 166:1
167:5 168:22
172:2 173:1
175:20 181:6
188:2
gym 147:13

< H >
half 6:14 9:13
11:23, 25 78:9,
11 183:9
halfway 5:11
Hall 148:7
hand 77:13
108:3 124:19
handed 13:2
handful 35:10
96:22
handing 126:3
handle 103:17,
20 190:24
hands 180:23
hands-on 118:4
happen 45:16
52:25 65:13
83:19 89:1, 22
97:20 102:5
110:5 129:5
134:20 142:13
150:1 164:1
184:21 185:19
187:20 190:14
happened 7:24
23:21 28:9

30:20 46:20 47:8 48:8 53:2 55:7 59:3 66:13 69:14 70:11 71:14 100:15 120:11 127:3 128:19 155:11, 16, 19 157:5 158:25 159:10 160:4, 24 162:21 168:2 188:5 happening 28:24 36:8 37:22 98:17 101:3 104:13 108:18 113:19 116:16 120:9 123:3 161:3 180:10 184:4 188:12 191:18 193:4 happens 114:11 129:3 137:7, 8 157:2 hard 14:21 23:5 41:22 79:15 84:21 120:15 168:8 176:15 harder 111:21 hardware 179:1 180:6, 11 Harland 2:4 3:10 14:9, 13 36:11 41:5, 11, 21 44:6, 21 45:17 46:6 51:3, 7 68:15 78:2, 7, 11, 14 88:2 90:8, 10 112:9 121:22 125:21, 22 127:18 132:7 152:3 192:14, 16 harness 69:19 81:5 harnesses 10:5 40:8, 12, 20, 21 83:17 118:3 hat 37:24 head 12:22 17:21, 25 101:14 170:7 191:16	headache 14:6 57:25 67:25 headed 190:15 hear 18:4 27:23 92:14 99:3 118:6, 8 159:9 162:24 178:21 182:20 heard 113:11 hearings 3:9, 18, 19 heart 76:22 heat 60:2 130:8 153:16 heating 153:18 heaved 156:16 heaven 103:18 heavy 81:12 hefty 168:15 Held 1:12 13:8 103:20 hellbent 181:8 help 10:22 11:2 13:24 14:1 17:12 35:12 36:11 42:3 43:17 55:8 118:21 123:24 143:20 164:16 167:25 helped 82:21 115:15 157:10, 20 helpful 34:22 124:4 helping 51:10 93:14, 16 helps 13:13 hey 55:3 73:10 93:8 100:7 113:16 115:1 127:3 129:2, 21 142:15 175:21 183:23 184:2 187:5 hidden 31:22 hierarchy 112:9, 18 high 5:18 6:2 74:15 76:6 78:25 95:17 160:22 166:22, 23 168:6, 9 169:10	higher 77:23, 25 113:1 134:10 164:12 168:25 173:7 highly 110:7 high-pressure 109:4 hinder 99:6 hindered 38:4 76:14 hinders 109:18, 20 hindrance 52:19 hire 52:20 76:6 119:2 120:8 138:21 175:8, 10, 13, 15, 17 hired 13:3, 21 96:23 118:11 119:15 123:9, 15 124:15, 22, 23 126:11, 12 127:21 169:11 174:6 hiring 7:11 13:1, 9 18:14 86:9 120:13 126:7 131:3 143:16 174:7 175:5, 22 177:10 hit 114:23 132:24 150:5 hitch 114:13 hits 190:18 hitting 149:4 hold 40:8 103:17 107:24 108:9 154:15 holding 108:12 hole 173:13 holes 154:10, 12 home 191:13 honest 14:3 32:13 137:2 145:1 155:17 157:24 160:13 hook 165:12 hooked 107:8 hooking 118:2 horn 70:10 horrific 98:22 horrifying 84:4 186:13 190:10, 21	hose 109:9 187:9 hoses 94:9 118:2, 3 hour 19:13 25:17 72:12 74:2, 7, 8 75:1, 7 79:10 103:9, 10 125:5, 6 159:15 161:14 184:24 190:17, 20 hours 22:23 49:25 130:1, 15 133:21 139:8 151:2 192:18 HPU 40:9 46:9 95:4 107:16, 22, 23 108:11 185:20, 21 187:23 HPUs 8:24 43:10, 12 44:4 47:11, 19 107:22 HR 8:10 23:20, 22 162:7 hub 155:22 163:7 huge 53:18 57:22 60:12 70:11 99:16 135:16 139:4 144:23 145:15 150:7 humans 164:17 184:23 192:11 humidity 57:2 178:12 hundred 79:5 hundreds 87:15 132:14 hurt 111:4 164:21 Hussein 50:13 56:4 121:25 122:2 123:17 124:1, 10 125:4, 16 134:1 135:9, 12 139:3, 4 hydraulic 6:23 9:2 31:1, 2 40:5 91:24 92:3 182:25 hydraulics 5:22	42:25 < I > idea 46:19 76:4, 8 142:12 146:1 152:12 ideal 38:5 ideas 65:24 174:2 identification 7:19 identified 57:12 identify 189:3 imagine 156:14 immediately 23:12, 14 71:8 95:23 103:23 134:20 immensely 156:17 imminent 191:4 impact 10:25 26:5, 8 35:9 68:22 69:8, 9 116:15 139:22 implement 158:9 implementing 97:17 imply 77:23 importance 108:11 167:2 important 110:18 113:3 193:3 impossible 23:10 improved 55:9 181:3 incapable 149:4 incentive 122:17 incentives 72:21 inch 165:22 inches 35:22 incident 23:21, 24 48:8 151:21 incompetence 84:1 incorrect 151:9 increased 179:6 increments 165:25 166:10 incriminate 4:17 indication 125:24 inform 56:6
---	---	--	---	---

<p>information 9:8 12:23 15:22 20:20 51:11 53:19 54:1, 8, 9 55:1, 4, 25 68:5 82:23 83:3 92:20 97:1 106:16, 18 120:25 121:1 128:25 132:22, 25 133:1, 4, 6 134:1, 10, 23 136:6 141:12 145:6 150:24 157:8 167:6 172:1 181:11 182:10 183:25 184:1 informed 23:3 infuriated 188:11 initial 64:23 initiated 104:4 inject 163:21 injectors 22:9 55:14 134:24 Inquiries 4:12 inquiry 4:13, 22 insanely 184:7 insert 9:2 inside 35:19 36:23 58:19 91:25 102:6, 22 108:4 154:11, 22 157:22 185:19, 23, 25 insight 44:1 inspect 27:9 174:13 inspection 27:12 28:4, 17 60:12 inspections 60:9 install 8:23 10:5 44:14 69:5 installed 53:23 83:10 98:12 154:25 162:25 165:10 177:1 183:19 instance 4:20 10:18 27:12 28:14, 15 30:22 32:3 39:7 43:7, 11 47:9 48:21</p>	<p>50:12 51:10 53:8, 16 54:3 55:14 60:5, 11 74:13, 20 75:21 80:17 81:10, 23 82:11 85:21 87:2 89:2 92:16 94:6 95:1, 12 97:14, 25 103:7, 17 104:20, 22 109:4 110:1 111:16, 25 115:24 118:5 119:14 120:4, 23 122:12 124:14 125:14 126:10, 20 127:6 128:1, 11 129:9, 10, 16 132:12 134:19 136:17 137:24 138:9 139:4 140:10, 15 141:22 142:8, 25 144:9 145:22 147:8, 19 148:10 149:10 150:15, 20 156:19 160:16, 23 162:20 163:6 165:18 166:7 168:11, 18 172:25 178:12 179:20 180:20 182:9 instruction 53:8 76:18 77:14 80:4, 17 121:21 130:20, 25 instructions 8:4 26:22 51:14, 16, 18 53:3, 6, 17 55:19 56:12 76:5 80:19 121:19 130:4, 22, 23 131:10, 15 132:16 135:3 137:16 145:10 146:1 149:17, 20 150:12 instructor 136:23</p>	<p>integrating 83:6 89:20 integration 89:17 intends 3:16 intense 180:24 interested 11:3 17:12 21:8 77:24 interesting 11:6 43:18 67:1 interiors 40:17 interrupt 24:14 interrupted 88:18 intervals 115:17 intervene 3:11 interview 3:4, 7, 10, 13, 15 5:11 143:21, 23 interviewing 144:1 intrigued 11:9 introduce 66:4 introduction 3:3 invested 23:7 involved 6:4 9:22 122:5 132:21 136:3 151:21 193:2 involvement 17:5 iPad 174:9 182:3 isolated 82:9 Israel 43:15 issue 24:9, 19 30:13, 25 38:13 39:6 46:17 57:12 58:23 88:10 90:1 93:21 97:16, 19 98:23 101:3 105:22 131:3 145:15 151:13, 24 158:12 176:13, 21 177:5, 20 191:5 issues 8:12 9:10 19:12 24:25 38:22 44:23 46:20 48:2, 10 54:19 56:12 58:20 61:1 66:9, 20,</p>	<p>22 68:2, 23 83:6 88:5 89:7, 17 92:5 98:8 99:2 101:25 105:9, 18 114:14 116:16 125:12 135:11 145:14 163:5 169:17 178:4 185:8 186:17 187:2 item 183:16 < J > jack 37:12 Jaime 2:10 144:8 182:10 Jason 17:9, 15, 16 19:9 20:16, 19 21:11 Jewitt 2:10 Joanne 2:15 194:3, 21 job 6:16 9:25 10:2, 17 11:13 19:23 20:20, 22 21:9 26:16, 20 27:8 30:1 38:3 54:10, 22 69:10 72:6, 11 73:15 74:19, 20 76:18 79:21 80:22 82:1, 13, 14 90:17 92:20 120:3 126:13 135:7 138:13 151:9 164:20 167:19 168:18, 19 177:2 182:4 jobs 6:1 25:4 61:9 72:23 79:20 129:15 join 19:2, 6, 9 joined 9:19 12:15 18:8 joining 10:21 joke 66:13, 16 jolting 156:23 judging 173:25 July 12:21 jump 14:10 25:15 90:9 191:21 jumped 50:1</p>	<p>June 194:16 junk 83:9 < K > kept 52:14 61:16 99:18 keys 126:3 kids 140:20 kill 190:13 kilometres 27:11 45:12 103:9, 10 105:5, 24 111:10 159:15 161:14 164:12 184:24 190:17, 19 kind 5:25 7:8, 13 25:17 34:19 38:20 40:9 42:20 52:2 54:25 57:3, 16 58:22 63:16, 23 64:1 65:12 75:11 76:14 84:6, 11 85:8 90:1 92:7 98:18, 22 101:11 106:24 110:22 118:9 119:13 121:13 126:14 129:13 130:10 135:13 136:23 142:12 143:5 144:6 146:11 148:7 161:7 162:11 170:12 183:1 185:15 kit 124:18 knew 19:21 33:10, 18 45:1 46:17 47:6 49:18 57:20, 21, 24 71:12 78:21, 22 79:23 117:25 120:9, 22 132:7, 20 133:23 138:9, 20 141:16 142:22 143:19 146:18, 19 158:24 159:10 160:5 169:15</p>
---	--	---	---	--

<p>knowing 58:1 131:20 149:14 189:17</p> <p>knowledge 16:3 39:3, 16, 19, 20 41:24 69:15 118:10 134:18</p> <p>known 18:15 19:2, 4 61:2, 4 83:2</p> <p>knows 18:1 27:22 121:10, 17 141:6 167:14</p> <p>< L ></p> <p>labour 10:18</p> <p>lack 85:14 125:9 131:9 134:18 141:12 151:20</p> <p>lacking 50:22</p> <p>lady 23:22</p> <p>landing 29:2</p> <p>lane 189:14</p> <p>large 147:16 165:23</p> <p>larger 170:14</p> <p>late 134:12</p> <p>lathe 37:4 95:9, 11 110:4 128:2, 7 165:19 166:5, 11 170:18 171:4, 7, 11, 20 180:3 189:19</p> <p>lathed 108:25 110:5 189:21</p> <p>lathing 37:10 95:8 165:17, 21</p> <p>launch 26:16 27:20 28:6, 12 32:11 33:4 114:1 115:1 125:19 127:2 151:6</p> <p>launched 31:5, 6 32:16 56:20 107:7 115:12 188:8, 9</p> <p>launching 28:10 113:15, 16 179:15 181:10</p> <p>Lawrence 2:15 194:3, 21</p> <p>lead 75:24 77:6, 16 81:14,</p>	<p>25 82:11 91:1, 10 105:8 186:23</p> <p>leading 77:2 136:11</p> <p>leads 77:3 121:1, 2</p> <p>lead-up 127:5, 21</p> <p>leak 31:1 187:14, 19</p> <p>leaking 182:22 187:6, 21</p> <p>learn 13:6 80:25 88:14 106:4 140:22, 25 167:8</p> <p>learned 6:21</p> <p>learner 81:19</p> <p>learning 11:7 35:8 52:11 53:1 77:11, 22, 25 79:1 81:14 116:25 118:21 135:21 136:6 181:6</p> <p>leave 15:17 24:6 114:2 123:19 136:7 141:12 189:16</p> <p>leaves 166:17</p> <p>leaving 123:15 136:6 164:15 181:10</p> <p>led 5:23</p> <p>Lefebvre 2:10 17:25 18:5</p> <p>left 14:23, 25 17:8 23:18 37:8 47:2 60:10 109:10 114:6, 22 120:5, 7 123:13, 21 135:11, 17 150:2 157:22 161:22 162:9, 11 181:13 190:11, 23</p> <p>legal 113:12 123:2 142:9, 10 175:24 182:10</p> <p>length 179:11</p> <p>LENNERTON 1:7 2:9 3:5, 14 4:6, 10 5:13, 15, 17 6:5, 12 7:7</p>	<p>8:6, 13, 17 9:16, 23 10:24 11:12 12:15 13:16 14:12, 15, 20 15:6, 15, 21 16:2, 6, 16, 25 17:7, 16, 20 18:1, 7, 9, 12, 22 19:7 20:1 24:12 25:3 26:6, 10 27:7 28:13 29:8 30:16, 21 31:12, 14 32:1, 19 33:7, 10, 25 34:3, 23 35:17 36:15 37:19, 23 38:9, 24 39:2, 15, 18 40:2 41:10, 13 42:5 43:6 44:10, 24 45:20 46:9 47:6, 17, 24 48:3, 6 49:13, 22 51:6, 8 52:5, 9 54:11 55:12 56:15 57:15 58:9, 24 59:16 61:4 62:8 64:2 65:1, 20 66:10, 24 68:4, 18, 25 69:13 70:3, 16, 19, 24 71:7, 20, 23 73:7 74:1 75:14 76:19 78:6, 9, 13, 19 80:15, 16, 24 81:21 83:8 84:13 85:5, 11, 18 86:18, 25 88:8, 22 89:12, 14, 18 90:16, 19 91:16 93:16 94:4 95:21 96:4, 10 97:12, 22 98:10 99:9, 22 100:23 101:13, 18 104:18 105:7, 10 106:3, 13 107:6, 13 109:19 110:12 111:1, 23 112:13 113:11 114:21 115:10</p>	<p>116:22 117:5 119:4, 7, 11 121:24 122:4, 7 123:12 124:9 126:1 127:24 128:17, 20 131:12, 16, 22 132:2, 11 133:7, 12 134:6, 8, 15 136:1, 14 137:15, 21, 24 138:17 139:2 142:25 143:13 145:5 146:16 148:22 149:9, 13, 19, 24 150:4, 15 151:14 152:6 155:10, 15 157:12, 19 158:20 160:11 161:25 162:4, 18 164:10 167:23 168:8 169:19, 22 170:1 171:9 172:16, 22 174:6 176:22, 25 177:17, 23 178:8 179:8, 14 181:5, 24 185:11 186:21, 25 187:3 191:9 192:18, 24 193:1</p> <p>lessen 113:24</p> <p>lessened 53:3</p> <p>lesser 148:9</p> <p>level 6:3 42:6 57:2 58:1 76:5 78:1, 15 113:1 114:20 115:9 118:12 124:16 132:4 142:1, 5 147:15 151:12 160:14 165:24 167:2 181:3</p> <p>levelling 141:23 146:22 184:25</p> <p>levels 157:2</p> <p>leverage 75:4 153:9</p> <p>L'Homme 23:22 162:8</p> <p>liability 4:19</p> <p>liable 99:25</p>	<p>192:4</p> <p>licence 94:1</p> <p>licenced 93:24, 25</p> <p>lie 136:16</p> <p>lied 21:12 23:1, 4 24:3</p> <p>lifetime 45:13</p> <p>LIGHT 1:6 70:11 177:12</p> <p>lights 66:14 177:8</p> <p>liking 123:25</p> <p>limit 66:18</p> <p>limited 98:12, 13</p> <p>lines 83:13 102:17 158:5</p> <p>link 154:3</p> <p>listen 29:11, 12 184:8 189:7</p> <p>listened 128:23</p> <p>listening 11:1</p> <p>literally 27:8 28:21 35:7 40:4 44:17 79:25 81:3 119:19 121:19 123:4 139:16 142:13 143:2 153:12 158:5 163:1 188:15, 24</p> <p>Litigation 2:3, 4</p> <p>litre 187:23</p> <p>live 41:2</p> <p>LLP 2:10</p> <p>LMB 102:11</p> <p>LMC 40:15</p> <p>LOCAL 1:7 15:14 19:8</p> <p>location 33:17 96:24</p> <p>lock 108:22 174:10</p> <p>locked 95:6 187:25</p> <p>locking 180:8</p> <p>long 14:17 45:14 125:1 128:23 129:25 130:3 153:8</p> <p>longer 9:17 15:16, 17 22:7 135:24</p> <p>longest 67:19</p>
--	---	---	--	--

looked 19:17
25:13 26:25
62:17 119:19
122:12 129:24
130:2, 9, 11
139:3 140:1
157:22 159:7
160:6 162:8
looking 36:17
73:13 184:11
185:7, 14
looks 111:7
183:9 185:20
loophole 175:18
loopholes 175:7
loose 129:5
156:22
lose 31:1
162:9 169:9
lost 50:3
155:16 166:25
187:23
lot 5:20 11:7
13:14 17:1
19:9, 17 20:2
22:18 25:11, 12
28:11 30:2
32:9, 10 34:17,
24 42:16, 19
43:12, 22, 23
44:1 46:14
49:9, 15 50:4
52:7 55:15, 16
61:11 63:18
64:15 71:24, 25
72:5, 13, 14
75:19 77:12, 16,
22 79:7, 16, 18
82:21 90:4
91:21 93:6, 19
97:23 98:15
105:5, 20
106:10 114:15
122:24 130:19
133:2 144:7
145:11 147:2,
24 148:11
150:1 151:5
153:8 159:18,
20 163:19
166:1 168:14,
21, 25 169:7
171:12 175:20
lots 48:3

loud 161:17
178:21
love 13:23
192:11
low 59:21
166:23, 24
180:19 187:24
lower 115:6
loyal 23:6
LRT 6:4
lying 23:1

< M >
machine 26:7
105:11 128:6
138:2 165:9, 12
166:5, 8
machinery
20:14 64:15
101:23 172:17
machines 11:3
mad 189:17
made 3:22, 24
4:8 12:8 16:9
18:13 22:10
23:9 25:6
30:14 31:3
32:11 34:2
38:1 42:18
46:5 60:18
61:21 71:16
72:10, 20 73:12
74:2, 7, 9, 10
84:25 90:25
93:4 96:16
99:4 128:6
136:18 142:16
143:15 145:14
159:16, 25
163:3 179:21
182:1 188:7
190:7 194:10
main 65:3 84:8
94:18 107:14
146:13 164:8
178:9 187:5
maintain 128:16
172:17
maintaining
127:21 162:19
maintenance
7:25 12:14
13:3, 21 14:5,
15, 18 18:10
19:19, 25 20:5

21:21 27:10
34:11 45:9, 13
50:8, 12, 14
51:9, 17, 19
52:3, 17 53:2,
25 54:10 55:10
72:16 79:12, 13
83:22 105:12
106:8 109:18
110:25 111:1, 2,
8, 9, 13, 21, 22
112:1, 6, 10, 20,
21, 22 116:12,
21 117:1, 11, 17,
18 119:6, 9, 21
120:1, 16
121:23 122:6,
13 123:10, 21
124:6, 13 126:9
127:20, 23
128:13, 16
129:16 132:24
133:6, 13
134:12, 17
135:8, 24
137:19 138:5,
15 142:3, 24
145:4, 21
151:20 157:10
158:7 164:7, 14
165:1 168:7
171:2 174:4
179:16 181:3,
22 186:17
maintenance's
169:24
maintenance-
type 53:7
major 45:15
71:15 84:7
102:16 158:12
majority 35:6
46:22 64:18
81:1 126:10
making 25:16,
18 26:2 28:14
65:3 74:4, 12
75:7 111:21
123:18 125:9,
12 146:7 164:4
166:24 167:15
181:8
Malaku 75:23
117:24

malfunctioning
189:25
malicious
148:17
man 7:17
73:11 129:21
148:7 158:20
manage 79:21
91:4
managed 124:8
management
13:6 17:14
22:10 25:23
26:14 29:4, 5
37:25 38:12
52:1, 14 54:19
113:1 121:16
174:15
manager 20:4, 5,
22 21:12, 21
22:25 24:2
27:19 31:9
50:14 74:22
91:4 100:25
101:1 119:9, 23
121:13, 23
129:19 130:11
165:5 191:6, 14,
15
managers 27:1,
6 99:24 119:22
160:6 166:12
manipulate 28:1
manner 109:21
mannerisms
22:19 23:24
manoeuvred
173:8
manpower 86:8
man's 103:16
manual 52:4
132:10 135:8, 24
manually 104:4
manufacture
127:10
manufactured
43:10
manufacturer
53:14
manufacturers
48:19
manufacturing
44:19 45:4
127:9

mark 114:23
125:19, 23 147:5
markings 160:20
massive 52:11
57:17 170:15
material 165:23
matter 112:8
167:24
maximum 153:2
Mazda 62:24
63:5, 6, 8
MBT 14:10
McLuckie 2:10
meaning 21:24
138:8
means 108:19
175:12 182:21
187:13
meant 11:23
39:24 74:8
186:18
measure 153:5
measurement
106:19, 21
measures 64:24
65:6 71:13
mechanic 93:23,
24
mechanical
5:21 6:23 7:2
52:21 69:2
90:5 91:2, 19,
20 93:21 94:1
117:22 119:24
163:23 184:11
mechanically
187:16
mechanics
35:25 46:15
53:9
media 144:23
159:3
medical 76:24,
25
meet 12:3
45:11 82:14
115:16
meeting 23:20
101:2 162:7
melt 189:22
melting 188:24
Member 2:3, 4
15:14, 16, 17

members 22:12
25:11 63:14
101:22 192:12
membership
26:4
memorization
79:24
memorized
51:12 79:25
memory 43:13
mentally 144:13
184:8 190:24
mentioned
10:20 14:10
19:1 24:8 78:2
117:23 158:18
186:15
meshed 133:3
messed 82:6
met 144:5, 9
metal 127:7
154:11 157:2
165:21 173:7,
14 179:24
metallic 153:17
metre 165:9
metres 67:15
M-hm 169:19
176:22
mic 18:6
micro 62:13
76:2 80:15, 16,
19 118:14
132:4, 5 133:15
150:16
microphone
144:17
micros 8:7
51:12 53:22
79:25 118:15
122:11 132:12
middle 7:17
66:6 157:23
midnight 151:1
mil 166:8, 13
millimetres
170:6
million 45:8, 10
172:10
million-worth
172:11
Milwaukee
181:15
mimic 58:22

mind 52:17
mindset 118:13
mine 53:24
69:2
minimal 182:4
minimum 44:15
79:14
minus 58:14, 17
59:21
minutes 108:13
120:6 123:5
130:2, 16
145:16, 18
167:22
miraculously
74:25
misappropriation
123:6
miserable
123:18
miserably
125:18
missed 122:4
129:17 130:6
missing 49:9
137:23
mistakes 125:11
mistreated
19:11
mitigated 178:6
mitigations 71:5
mixture 65:24
140:23
modular 39:24
money 54:20
59:6, 9 60:7
63:22 74:3, 23
122:24 168:14
169:6
money-driven
25:5
month 114:11
169:13
months 12:24
13:25 75:2
77:4 162:8, 10
Montreal 43:21
173:2
moral 190:11
Morals 20:2
morning 28:12
58:15 114:19
motivated 11:18

motivating 25:1,
19
motivation
78:17 79:7, 16
motor 48:25
132:14 155:3
156:11, 19
motors 156:10,
11
mounted 108:4
109:9
mouse 54:18
move 33:23
34:12, 21 44:22
85:9 101:5
102:21 119:18
159:2
moved 34:14
35:11 37:7
90:22 123:24
movement
159:16
movements
157:18
moving 41:2
119:17
MSF 35:15
36:13, 15, 16, 24
37:7, 10, 16, 21
38:23, 24 39:1,
14, 24 43:4
49:20 66:9
69:12 71:18
102:11 126:8
137:18 157:18
163:1
multiple 56:4
77:1
multiplier
147:20 148:2
150:5, 6, 9
MVT 12:16, 20
14:12 16:7, 10
18:11, 20 19:2
26:4 37:2
117:1 121:20
131:23 148:14
168:12 175:9, 14
MVTs 22:21
28:3 29:25
36:25 50:25
116:11 121:20
126:11 127:15,
20 128:15
136:10 147:4

149:2 167:8
170:23 175:23
185:23
MVT's 27:8

< N >
named 30:22
75:22
necessarily
15:10 34:16
38:10 49:2
56:23 61:20
94:22 112:17
131:4 170:23
186:4
needed 7:1, 2
13:10 19:22
21:22 34:12
37:6 45:7, 11,
13 48:22 49:7
50:1, 9, 22
56:15, 16 58:21
69:10 71:18
79:23 81:9
84:23 85:7, 8
87:5 88:23
94:12 98:15
115:16, 17, 20
117:20 122:10
125:14, 15
127:16 132:20
134:12 135:14,
16 137:16
138:20, 21, 22
141:15, 24
146:6 147:1
154:19 179:12
181:19
needing 45:8
needs 59:21
109:3 111:18
135:1 180:9
NEESONS
194:20
negative 14:25
35:9
negativity 144:7
neglect 171:3
neglected
155:23
neglecting
170:25
negligence
77:10

never-ending
47:3
new 35:6 47:5,
23 53:5, 12
66:1, 4 85:24
87:9 89:20, 23
95:2, 11 98:6
125:6 130:6, 8
138:2 142:24
180:17 181:13,
15
news 159:7
179:22
Newton-metre
148:5 150:8
153:1
Newton-metres
147:10 150:6
152:11, 22, 24
154:17 156:4
nicer 169:7
nickname 75:24
night 72:8
167:24
nightmare
172:23 176:17,
18
nights 32:12
nipples 152:1
163:8
nit-picking
122:25
nobody's 24:20
nodding 17:25
noise 99:4
non-
typographical
4:7
normally 92:9
96:7
nos 91:21
nose 40:14, 15
70:5
note 17:24
noted 186:17
notes 194:14
notice 44:7
118:24
noticed 25:14
26:11, 13
notified 187:4
nowadays
147:25
number 13:22
22:12, 13 33:5

34:6 45:5, 6 54:4 113:17, 24 115:20 117:7 122:21 124:15 129:19 152:21 158:21 161:10 169:11 170:8 171:23 181:23 numbers 32:21 33:2 54:2 78:4 117:6 numerous 28:19 46:10 nut 50:19, 20 180:8 nuts 50:19 < O > object 5:5 190:19 objected 4:14 objections 194:10 oblige 22:14 observe 20:20 obtain 3:7 33:5 140:24 obtained 53:21 obtaining 132:22 OC 15:20, 24 16:1 18:17 70:21 104:22 106:6 126:4 occasions 56:4 92:15 166:6 186:16 occurred 69:12 161:24 OCS 39:7 66:12 67:2, 3, 4, 13, 16 68:7 70:6, 7, 10, 21 100:14 offered 169:5 office 120:6 officer 191:8 officially 8:1 96:21 oil 107:10 187:6 old 137:25 138:10 older 79:20	OLRT 70:22 71:2 OLRTC 124:5 OLRTC's 172:14 onboard 25:15 ones 7:12 44:5, 13 45:9 47:1 53:4 95:11 127:1 167:9, 12 170:13 173:12 176:14 ongoing 86:17 95:20 open 35:20, 25 42:13 59:22 60:11 61:13, 17 103:12 108:10 174:12 190:6 opened 185:21 opening 6:10 53:10 60:14 154:9 operated 161:1 operating 161:11 operation 88:6 155:14 operational 115:9 operations 6:10 20:4 26:5 58:22 129:19 130:11 operator 70:14 operators 15:20 opinion 15:1 29:12 36:5 55:13 56:23 57:5 59:18 60:22 64:17 86:12 110:7 121:8, 12 133:12 164:14 180:7, 15, 17 181:1 opportunities 123:22 opportunity 4:2 11:5 115:7 opposed 6:11 27:1 112:25 opposite 119:8 120:18 152:16 order 3:19 7:3 31:16 32:11	46:10 48:17 50:21 57:6 75:4 88:24 89:4, 7 98:4 101:4 102:17 115:4, 19 120:3 126:8 127:16 135:21 136:8 152:22 153:2 157:3 163:8 183:2 188:7 189:8 191:23, 24 orders 181:23 organization 158:3 169:2 organized 79:22 original 33:8, 15 88:15 101:10 originally 36:24 45:10 83:16 o-ring 130:4, 7, 10 131:1 132:8 153:20 154:20 OTTAWA 1:6 6:4 35:16 47:16 61:2 outages 66:13 outlet 108:7 outside 49:17 57:17 58:12 59:23 92:7 106:17 123:22 144:23 158:25 160:7 175:6 177:18 overall 73:23 81:1 overflow 109:2 overhead 37:14 67:11 overkill 156:13 overlapped 97:7 overloaded 35:1 overnight 58:14 override 28:5 overshoot 29:1 overtime 21:22, 24 22:20, 24 overtop 160:25 161:4, 8 173:16 overwhelmed 181:22 184:19 overwhelming 46:1 182:1	owned 18:17 43:9 47:10, 11 < P > p.m 1:14 3:1 193:6 P1 27:16 28:6 30:12 31:3, 16 P2 27:16 28:6 31:4 P3 27:16 P4 27:16 pace 11:18 pads 188:24 pages 132:14 paid 11:15 72:25 73:25 79:8, 9, 13 168:12 paint 87:16 158:5 painter 42:7 painting 42:1, 5, 8 paired 149:3 panel 85:21 pantograph 44:4 67:5 100:12, 13, 17, 22 paper 28:22 paperclip 156:25 par 99:18 125:10 parameters 3:4 paraphrase 127:19 parcel 98:19 park 36:18 Parker 187:8 part 6:6 8:22 9:5 10:3 11:11 17:4 18:10, 15, 19 24:23 34:9 37:9 48:14 49:4 51:21, 22 54:2 56:5, 7 61:15 65:11, 12 74:19 91:1 98:18 103:2 106:15 110:18 112:7, 16 116:8 119:16 120:1 126:9 135:6 155:7, 8 170:17	173:17 189:9, 15 190:10, 22 partake 193:4 participants 1:13 2:7 3:25 4:5 participated 141:19 particular 44:7 partly 181:22 parts 40:5 43:3, 24 44:2, 4, 8 46:7 48:11, 16 49:6 51:20 54:5 56:1 69:5 90:23 118:18 127:11 party 72:19 partying 72:8 pass 63:17 103:19 185:18 190:4 passed 183:25 192:8 passes 58:6 passionate 72:1 pattern 152:9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 23 156:1 pay 18:24 19:12, 13 24:9 66:15 68:21 77:23 110:15 paycheque 72:7, 18 164:22 168:15 paying 19:14, 21 PC09 122:11 PCO 90:24 peak 113:9 114:19 penalties 26:17 27:24 28:10 penned 159:22 penny-pinchers 64:17 people 11:22 12:7 13:1, 3, 19 16:11, 18 17:2 19:10, 17 21:25 22:22 23:11 24:3 25:22 26:12 27:5 30:2, 4 35:2, 4, 6, 10 36:10
--	---	---	--	---

<p>39:10 43:23 45:23 46:1 49:17 52:12, 15 61:5, 6, 7, 24 71:24 72:3, 6, 11, 14, 22 73:24, 25 75:7, 8 77:24 78:16 81:2, 3 86:7, 23 87:12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24 91:17 93:5 96:22 116:13 118:11 119:2 121:9 122:5, 8, 25 123:9, 11, 14, 15 126:24 128:21 131:4 133:6 135:17 138:17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 140:5, 7, 21, 24 141:20 142:22, 24 143:11, 17, 19 144:25 146:6 147:25 152:15 153:12 164:19 166:11 169:1, 9, 12, 14, 15 174:7 175:5, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 22 176:1, 8, 15 177:10 181:8 185:5, 20 186:17 190:2 192:11 People's 78:17 192:12 percent 16:7 20:25 35:24 44:14 47:25 50:17 59:17 67:10 95:6 115:15 141:6, 9 151:17 166:2 167:6 171:25 172:24 173:20 186:25 191:12 perfect 96:11 perform 62:7 period 12:6 114:10 179:7, 9 180:16 perjury 5:2 permission 21:1, 11 49:7</p>	<p>permits 3:12 98:15 person 4:21 29:14 43:18 69:16 77:5, 19 81:13 82:10, 19 93:7 94:5, 17, 18 100:21 117:24 123:4 124:22, 23, 24 125:3 136:5, 8 140:11 141:7, 8, 10, 16 144:15 183:6, 21 184:1 personal 36:5 57:5 59:18 60:22 110:7 121:7, 11 145:1 180:14, 17 personally 15:9 26:11 29:24 50:6 51:24 96:18 99:17 106:15 109:12 110:20 145:5 146:4 171:19 177:1 181:17 190:12 person's 183:16 190:20 person-to- person 75:20 perspective 87:13 phase 8:16 34:9 37:17 51:5 71:19 91:15 99:20 106:2 133:5 phonetic 30:23 75:23 135:5 physical 15:9 113:13 147:23 148:11 155:1 173:15 physically 11:14 20:22 44:17 108:9 128:9 143:7 146:25 147:14 148:6, 15 149:4 152:1 153:22 155:20 187:6 189:24</p>	<p>pick 79:18 picked 64:1 picture 159:8 piece 28:22 109:5 153:8 154:11 162:9 173:6, 14, 16 179:23, 24 180:22 pieces 42:3, 17 43:22 pillars 35:21 pin 164:24 pins 102:1 111:11 163:18 pioneer 11:5, 6 pipe 109:8 187:5 pipes 42:21 piping 40:7 place 5:1 23:17 36:16 37:17, 21 40:19 43:20 71:5 98:16 100:22 103:18 114:11 145:3, 12, 13 153:21 158:8 159:2, 3 169:5 194:6 placed 10:14 159:12 places 43:23 plan 33:8 101:10 114:7, 13 planned 34:15 114:9 planning 101:4 113:18 114:4, 9 plans 100:6 plastic 109:5 plate 154:9, 23 platform 177:11 190:18 plausible 174:2 play 114:14 120:11 played 147:13 plethora 157:4 plug 101:22 114:14 plug-and-play 84:11 plugged 67:9</p>	<p>plus 34:11 58:16 59:22 point 5:9 7:13 9:20 10:11, 12, 22 14:2 17:23 23:4, 12 26:18 27:25 32:18 38:4 41:3 45:21 47:11 48:6 53:22 55:17 60:20, 23 67:23 74:15, 20 77:18 78:16, 24 81:23 83:11 84:20 92:10 95:9 104:12 109:10 121:14 123:14 124:17, 25 125:2 129:24 143:14 144:10 145:13 146:5 154:25 171:1 172:13 173:24 175:12 176:7, 10 178:23 184:16, 18 185:16 189:24 pointed 80:2 186:17 points 87:4 91:5 164:8 166:22, 23, 24 pole 70:8 politely 52:16 poorly 147:3 pop 178:21 portion 60:10 126:6 ports 43:21 pose 43:14 posed 26:15 position 6:18 10:10 91:11 120:21 123:21 128:13 135:18 146:15 169:13 positions 35:12 positive 10:25 possibility 96:15 possible 63:11 65:4 96:17 105:22 123:18 169:24 posted 3:20</p>	<p>potential 151:13 187:1 potentially 173:10 190:25 pounds 147:9, 12 power 25:25 37:15 40:19 66:9, 12, 15, 17, 19, 23 67:8, 12 68:2, 6, 23 69:1, 10 81:13 86:23 101:24 102:4, 17, 22 156:13 powerful 156:12 powers 91:19 practice 105:3 precedence 112:11 prepare 8:15 80:22 124:12 129:1 prepared 131:15 preparing 125:18 PRESENT 2:13 31:24 65:25 presented 64:6 presenting 64:4 press 104:3 pressure 28:12 30:10 107:24 108:9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21 151:9 163:15 167:17 173:9 pressures 92:3 pressurized 163:14, 15 pretty 5:24 6:17 7:21 8:8 9:18 12:22 15:23 19:16 25:19 32:23 66:25 74:18 93:19 168:15 173:1 180:24 prevent 153:17 prevented 178:6 preventing 150:11 preventive 111:9 134:17 previously 18:3</p>
---	---	--	--	--

20:11 117:3 primary 7:4 prior 18:14 30:24 119:19 125:25 126:2, 3 priority 112:17 134:21 141:16 private 106:18 problem 15:14 17:22 24:4, 19 28:15 32:4 39:9 56:17, 22 57:22, 24 84:9 99:3 101:8 109:1 114:10 131:5 144:12, 23 147:11 148:21 179:4 180:13 189:13 problems 14:5 17:13 46:14 60:22 84:7 85:1 89:19 105:21 109:13 121:2 127:14 138:19 141:23 171:7 176:20 178:6 180:12, 18 procedural 3:19 procedure 13:9 78:23 145:17 176:7, 18 procedures 145:11, 12, 20 proceedings 4:19, 25 194:5 process 6:9 10:4 16:22 17:10 35:2 56:11 64:25 97:21 101:12 117:9 126:7 131:19 143:16 150:20 155:8 processes 145:3 produced 96:3, 5 producing 51:16 production 6:6, 13, 15, 18 7:8, 9 8:22 9:4, 12 10:4, 17 12:5, 17, 18 13:10 16:15, 18 18:9 19:7 20:12	29:17 30:24 32:25 34:21 35:11 36:16 37:7, 25 42:18 48:13 49:22 50:2 51:9, 12, 16 53:17, 23 55:2 57:16 70:25 71:11 74:22 82:7 90:23 91:6 93:7, 17 95:20 96:3, 9, 20 97:5, 6, 10 102:8 113:22 117:9, 16, 21 118:15 119:22 120:16 122:18 132:23 133:22 135:8, 19, 20 136:6, 21 138:1 141:2, 3 144:3 155:11 158:1 159:5 165:5 180:5 191:14 professional 5:16 194:4 profit 63:21 74:12 program 111:17 programming 90:3 project 6:4, 14 9:13 11:8 13:24 23:8 25:15 26:5 34:8 35:9 44:7 47:16 63:18 73:13 74:14 83:24 90:20 94:3 96:22 98:5 99:21 106:14, 15 108:23 117:11 119:16, 20 120:5 132:19 168:1 projects 47:15 104:17, 19 106:12 promoted 35:13 pronounce 122:1 propel 156:12	proper 17:17 46:13 56:11 102:23 130:13 131:25 148:16 149:7, 22, 23 150:13 properly 9:7 26:21 62:10 71:8 75:18 100:22 102:19 109:10, 14 111:6 115:4 118:16 137:13, 18 142:1 152:12 156:6, 8, 16 158:14 162:19 164:7 165:3 166:4 176:4, 5, 10 178:11 183:19 185:9 190:18 propulsion 102:24 prosecution 5:2 protect 24:1 protection 174:23, 24 protocols 71:9 proud 173:6 prove 186:11 proven 45:21 46:4 65:18, 19 provide 50:5 54:2, 22 56:11 115:7 145:9 provided 47:19 132:4 172:9 providing 147:18 public 3:9, 18, 21 4:12 puck 154:10 pull 35:23 37:13 55:3 80:19 103:25 115:22 174:9 pulling 172:6 pump 108:3, 9 163:24 164:25 purchased 62:19 65:19 purchasing 125:12 purpose 3:3, 6 38:8 191:25	purposes 39:8 71:16 139:13 Pursuant 4:11 push 11:18 99:23 103:11 110:24 144:16 153:13 163:10, 12 177:11 pushed 12:3 15:1 26:17 45:16 144:7 161:2 pushes 163:13 pushing 87:23 104:11 165:11 put 6:24 9:2 10:3, 7 11:21 23:15 35:19 36:23 38:16 40:7, 11, 13, 17, 23 41:10, 15 53:17 62:10 65:11 71:5, 8, 13 81:5, 6 83:11, 13, 20 84:24 87:13 89:22 101:19, 21 102:7, 9 105:23 108:14 109:2, 4, 9 122:8 123:17 126:16 130:4, 7, 8, 13 145:3 148:3, 4 150:9, 16 153:19, 22 154:1, 10, 20, 23 167:16 168:19 173:4, 8, 9 174:10, 23 177:3, 8 184:23 185:1 192:5 194:7 puts 163:15 putting 40:5 42:20 53:12 81:4, 15 126:5 129:11 146:22 148:10 192:10, 12 < Q > qualifications 186:6 qualified 20:15 39:10 72:2	73:2 93:5 108:6 120:14 169:1 185:9, 11, 13 quality 26:7, 9 72:22 73:23 95:17 99:17 177:21 quarrels 25:22 135:10 question 4:15 5:6 13:12 20:2 51:4 90:9 106:24 168:5 171:4 questioned 121:15 questions 3:11, 13 91:9 133:23 168:2 182:12 192:15 quick 81:19 108:7 110:2 135:2 175:2 quickly 20:7 48:12 50:3 67:4 80:25 95:16 127:19 134:19, 22 quit 24:20 169:12 quite 24:10 48:9 116:25 157:24 < R > race 63:4 racetrack 62:25 radio 11:1 49:16 144:11, 15 radios 159:9 RAIL 1:6 66:7 69:14 70:7 104:17, 19 167:1 railcar 66:5 rain 61:22 raise 74:6, 11, 13 raised 22:18 random 174:7 175:4, 22 Randstad 7:10, 18, 22 8:3, 10 9:25 19:12 24:10 72:10
---	---	---	--	---

73:5, 14, 17, 21
74:3, 7, 9
122:15, 22
144:19
rapport 125:4
173:1
rate 45:15
168:9 169:10
rates 48:18
49:4
ratio 44:14
reach 115:19
153:2
reached 114:19
reaction 154:3
reactive 134:19
175:1
read 76:2, 17
132:3
readable 76:5
readily 54:17
ready 8:21
38:19 84:11
128:16 133:18
164:13
real 60:1
139:21 191:6
realistically
58:22 66:5
reality 120:17
realized 122:23
really 8:10
10:25 11:8, 13
13:23 14:22, 24
19:15, 20 23:9
24:6, 18 32:7
37:5 39:12
46:25 48:19
56:3 58:3
59:25 60:15, 20
61:2 67:4
68:20, 21 69:8
73:11 75:5, 6
77:13 81:9
83:3 93:10
96:17 110:15
114:2, 25
117:16 127:2
130:3 136:23
142:13 160:11
161:17 162:4, 5
168:10 170:4
186:11 192:8
realm 88:13

reapplying
108:21
reason 34:16
43:16 58:3
87:8 112:19
178:4 190:23
192:3
reasons 68:10
188:18 190:11
rebuild 185:22
rebuilding 53:11
rebuilt 53:15
recall 47:4
66:8 106:6
115:3
receivable 4:23
receive 75:12
84:10
received 128:15
131:25
receiving 8:4
134:11
RECESS 90:14
recognizing
182:25
recommended
170:9
reconnect 187:7
record 14:9
15:10 17:24
166:18 192:6
recorded 194:11
recreate 51:14
re-creating
96:14
recruited 73:18
recruiting 73:25
122:4
recruitment 73:5
red 42:8
redo 114:9
reduce 65:7
redundant 176:7
reengineer
84:18
reengineering
51:21
referring 6:6, 8
56:1 67:3
reflective 133:10
re-flush 187:10
reframe 107:3
refuse 29:21
172:1

refused 29:6, 25
refusing 22:13
regarded 52:14,
18
Registered
194:3
regular 22:23
92:12 104:1
relate 105:21
related 117:18
relationship
7:22 23:6
relatively 134:22
relaxed 82:16
relay 176:5
relaying 9:7
release 107:22
released 34:10
107:25
re-level 111:14
reliability 88:6
179:6 181:2
relied 39:23
reluctant 50:5
remain 37:8
remanufacturing
51:22
remember 9:15
12:21 14:22
15:2, 5 17:18
18:7 21:3
23:23 25:10
32:20 33:16
36:21 43:16
44:5 45:6 48:1,
8 61:15 69:21
70:20 78:3
117:6 122:20
127:7 129:17
133:13 136:16
143:15 158:22,
24 160:5 165:4
169:12 170:7
175:20 177:6
184:10 188:21
189:23
remote 177:7
remotely 1:13
remove 31:19
37:11 53:17
56:5 83:13
121:9
removed 68:9
removing 129:9

renew 136:21
rep 17:17
repair 42:6
repetitions
78:24
replace 116:3
187:9
replaceable 76:9
replaced 105:16
125:5 156:1
160:3 180:2, 9
replacing 51:20
report 27:14
28:20 29:7
30:15 31:15
97:25 100:25
192:2
reported 31:3
192:6
Reporter 194:4,
22
reporter's
192:19 194:1
reporting 27:16
192:3
reports 28:14
98:1
represent 15:23
16:1, 5, 12, 14
represents
15:20
request 54:15
58:6
requested 17:2
20:10 23:13
43:25 62:19
requesting
124:25
require 80:8
155:4
required 5:4
13:18 41:24, 25
45:23 72:13
74:21 97:11
107:24 108:9
154:20
requirement
52:24
requirements
45:12 59:2, 15
60:16, 19 120:2
requiring 120:2
rescue 92:23
107:18, 19

108:24 109:14,
20, 23 187:25
research 25:12
64:9 160:15
researched 65:2
reservoir 107:9
re-setup 187:11
resign 17:9
resignation
23:15
resigning 19:25
resistance 190:3
resisted 119:8
resolved 179:13
respect 114:3
respond 29:6
89:6
responded
22:16
response 89:7
169:24 170:19
171:5 172:21
responsibility
172:15
responsible
7:16
rest 34:8 167:8
restriction 39:5
result 44:22
49:11 71:5
97:8 149:6
résumé 168:19,
21, 23
RESUMING
90:15
retain 73:4
138:20 185:17
retrofit 10:15,
19 85:9, 12, 19
87:1, 4 90:22
91:14 93:17
109:1 111:17
retrofits 46:10
86:17, 22 88:4
97:10 106:11
107:4 110:10
111:3
retrofitted 97:19
return 23:10
reuse 180:10
Rev 44:22
revamp 101:4
revamped 56:16
57:6
revenge 25:24

revenue 88:7 125:25 138:16 reverse 156:21 review 4:3 Revision 44:12, 13 46:22 85:22 94:7 revisions 154:18 rewarded 92:10 rewrite 28:4 rid 35:5 122:25 178:8 ride 92:11 188:17 ridership 115:6 rides 59:21 180:18 ridiculous 29:10 123:7 136:23 rightfully 24:17 rigid 118:3 ring 153:21 rode 160:21 role 9:21 12:12 14:18 91:6, 13 106:1 roles 7:5 9:24 119:3 roof 10:5 41:7 67:13, 14 178:13 room 22:25 36:10 38:11 114:2, 6 126:12 142:7, 10 rotors 108:21 rough 125:24 roughly 11:23 45:8, 10 52:12 175:23 RPR 194:21 RTG 113:8 RTM 124:5 145:2 181:21 rubber 180:22 rules 7:20 20:13, 18, 19 21:17, 19 22:11, 17 26:22 28:25 29:15 30:6, 14 60:9 180:4 186:19 run 40:19 58:7, 10, 11, 12 64:13 99:11 104:16	131:5 166:19 179:11 180:15 192:9 running 47:18 58:16 106:2 116:19 138:3 runs 67:5 rushed 99:21 < S > sacred 106:20 safe 9:9 174:11 safely 39:9 145:18 safer 67:12 safety 28:25 39:6, 8 57:18 68:10 71:9, 13, 16 88:24 89:8 98:13 126:14 145:12, 14, 15, 17 151:13 171:16 187:1 191:5, 7 sake 45:6 126:2 148:2 salary 24:11 salt 178:14, 15 sand 57:8, 9, 23 58:5 174:9 sander 111:12 sanders 28:15, 16, 23 32:3, 5, 10 55:15 56:13, 22, 25 57:6, 12 111:13 179:20 sanding 22:9 55:14 58:19 134:20 151:15 179:22 190:16 sat 13:4 99:10 126:12 save 63:22 saving 167:19 scary 184:22 scenario 82:17 188:4 scenarios 61:11 174:3 scenes 27:25 schedule 103:2 123:16, 18 169:2 scheduled 111:25	school 5:18 76:6, 24, 25 139:25 140:21 141:2, 4 163:23 schooling 141:3 scope 110:14 scramble 135:2 scrambled 33:2 scrap 157:23 scratch 35:7 42:8 scratched 42:7 Screw 67:23 163:10, 25 173:6, 9, 13 174:1 screws 173:5 seal 154:23 sealed 163:12 searching 168:19 season 62:4 seat 87:7 secretly 65:12 Section 4:11 5:4, 6 54:5 91:1 154:5, 14 161:12 sections 165:20 selection 64:23 sell 11:24 12:2 84:17 191:19 send 48:23 84:22 101:23 183:4 sending 55:25 seniority 13:22 22:1 117:8 124:16 sense 27:3, 4 57:16 62:9 68:16 75:9 81:11 98:13 99:2, 19 109:17 111:5 118:17 145:8 178:3 186:5 sensible 65:9 separate 18:21 166:6 separation 155:18 166:22 September 155:14 161:23 sequence 156:5	serial 93:15 95:20 96:3, 9 101:17 series 155:4 serious 162:6 seriously 60:23 service 13:15 31:24 33:16 57:12, 13 88:7 104:17 106:11 107:4 110:6, 11, 24 113:9 114:19 116:3 125:25 128:12 131:21 132:1 136:11 137:20 138:16 158:17 178:5 185:6 set 13:17 14:6 33:15 45:1 48:9, 15 49:6 50:14 73:11 75:17 77:14 88:15, 16, 22 91:24 95:2, 21, 22 96:20, 25 97:2, 4, 14, 15 124:12 125:18 135:8 159:13, 14 163:9, 18, 25 165:13 166:4 173:5, 6, 9, 13 174:1 188:21 194:6 setback 135:16 sets 132:16 152:11 setting 17:11 126:8 145:16 setup 50:19 severity 173:18 shadow 76:1 shadowed 126:24 shadowing 128:21 shaft 48:24 148:10, 11 152:7 153:23 154:7, 14 155:21 156:8, 15, 21 share 106:21 shared 3:24 4:4 shattered 114:8	shed 36:18 49:8 58:14 59:22 60:5, 11 158:25 159:15 188:23 sheet 127:7 189:15, 16 shift 21:5 shock 157:25 shop 12:8 17:11 41:8 67:7 93:23 shorthand 194:14 shorting 40:21 shortly 31:6 shot 166:14 shoulders 164:5 show 5:25 6:22 76:1 160:21 showed 23:25 24:5 38:18 159:3 167:9 shown 29:14 shrapnel 178:20 shrugged 162:12 shunned 143:14 shut 89:2 sic 14:10 side 9:4 15:21 24:25 35:20, 23, 24 50:20 60:13 82:5 91:20 159:20 160:22 162:10 163:10 168:6 171:10, 13 sides 171:11 sideways 106:23 sig 145:22, 24 signed 24:17 significant 24:9 silly 51:3 similar 152:13 simple 58:2 112:19 simply 94:20 simulate 142:10 single 11:21 33:1 34:5 36:3 43:7 143:4 180:9 single-unit 34:7
--	---	---	---	--

<p>sister 188:14 sister's 73:9 sit 10:4 82:10 102:12 109:3 142:7, 10 160:1 163:16 167:23 173:7 174:8 191:19 site 84:1 98:16 sits 153:21 154:13 158:6 180:21 sitting 49:8 58:14 190:2, 7 191:13 situation 23:25 38:2 76:13 77:8 85:13 94:14 130:21 132:3 142:17, 19 157:5 183:7 188:10 situations 5:20 120:24 138:13 148:13 size 116:16 165:22 170:4, 14 sizes 50:17 skeleton-type 48:13 skill 13:17 73:11 skills 136:12 skip 21:25 skirt 174:12 skirts 35:20, 24 skits 126:15 slide 153:13 slightly 41:24 sling 154:22 slow 161:15 small 25:14 41:16 108:8 139:22 145:15 153:12 170:8 185:3 smaller 90:22 150:9 153:12 166:10 smashed 159:16 163:3 smashing 159:17 smell 188:24</p>	<p>189:1, 5 smooth 124:7 Snap-on 50:13, 15 snow 60:13 180:19, 20, 24 snowball 184:4 snowballing 86:11 183:20 snowplow 180:21 snowstorm 57:17 soaking 147:12 software 95:3 sold 59:20 86:6 solely 64:19 solemn 3:8 solid 41:15 solution 148:21 175:2 178:10 solutions 177:14 179:1, 3 somebody 11:16 19:14 20:14, 21 25:18 70:22 71:1 72:24 76:11 80:9 81:15 87:11 92:22 122:13 128:5 134:2 141:11 142:14 143:7 147:8, 20 150:5 171:22, 25 182:2, 7, 16 183:4, 8 186:8 191:10 192:8 something's 183:8, 15 somewhat 25:7 soon 192:21 sooner 34:14 105:12 soot 178:24 Sorel 43:19 48:21 132:12 173:1, 2, 21 sorry 10:22 13:12 17:21 21:5 23:19 24:13 31:15 32:25 43:9 44:21 88:2 96:1 100:2</p>	<p>103:1 125:20 126:1 134:5 148:18 155:13 157:14 173:7 178:15, 18 191:2 sort 25:9 41:9 42:2 49:12 62:7 68:12 86:10 98:23 103:23 109:11 116:20 119:2 123:5 133:9 137:10 164:8 168:5 176:13, 20 sound 40:21 46:15, 16 92:14 118:6 182:21 187:16 sounds 12:13 13:14 19:3 33:22 54:9 63:25 73:22 74:18 84:9 131:24 143:10 185:8 source 67:8 106:17 South 43:12 spanking 125:6 speak 12:17 19:4 20:25 38:11 48:4 75:6 124:5 136:2 147:3 160:7 161:9 163:5 164:5 167:19 169:16 172:23 177:18 190:8 191:11 speaking 182:9 190:16 speaks 167:3 spec 177:18 speciality 42:12 specialized 41:24, 25 42:25 specialty 42:11 specific 6:17 16:10 30:21 43:25 44:1 54:3, 6 76:12 81:22 88:24 91:13 130:20 147:19 149:10</p>	<p>158:21 167:3 188:10 specifically 5:22 16:6 22:1 37:1 44:11, 25 69:8 82:1, 8 117:18 140:5 157:6 160:7 162:22 164:15 186:22 specifics 88:12 speculation 68:19 sped 80:5 speed 135:22 159:21 speeded 116:20 speeds 103:5 spend 59:9 81:13 145:16 spending 86:10 spent 54:20 81:3 127:12 136:5 Spirit 39:23 65:18 spite 148:14 spoke 23:22 116:24 119:15 144:8 spoken 18:3 151:8 sports 147:14 spot 110:20 170:2, 15 spots 95:7, 8, 14 105:15 170:25 171:5 189:18 spotting 185:8 spray 42:10 130:8 174:21 178:15 sprinkled 117:12 square 170:17 190:18 staff 185:7 staffed 138:15 Stage 6:4, 6 33:24 40:17 42:19 57:19 70:14 84:4 101:19 102:8, 10 183:14</p>	<p>stages 112:14 stairs 163:4 stand 23:11 46:7 92:1 177:11 standard 98:2 standards 180:8 standing 120:23 standpoint 62:18 stands 14:14 start 3:2 5:14 23:2 31:24 40:5 55:11 73:13 96:8 97:1, 17 104:23 108:16 116:25 123:11 126:5, 13 127:4 137:19 started 6:13, 15, 20 9:12, 14 10:8 12:25 22:18 36:22 50:12 57:13, 14 81:25 93:18 96:19, 20, 21 97:3, 5 104:22 117:9 122:25 124:15 128:12 129:17 131:21 132:1 158:7 178:5 179:18 182:4 starting 13:15 35:7 starts 57:4 108:16 156:20 187:21 state 98:24 statement 6:16 22:10 States 33:12 48:7 96:24 static 8:16, 18 9:6, 22 40:19, 25 41:1 42:19, 23 94:13 101:16, 19 102:10 station 38:18 40:6, 11 75:22, 25 81:11 101:20 115:18, 22 117:23, 25</p>
---	---	---	--	--

stationary 102:12	68:4, 18, 25 69:13 70:3, 16, 19, 24 71:7, 20, 23 73:7 74:1 75:14 76:19 78:6, 9, 13, 19 80:16, 24 81:21 83:8 84:13 85:5, 11, 18 86:18, 25 88:8, 22 89:12, 14, 18 90:19 91:16 93:16 94:4 95:21 96:4, 10 97:12, 22 98:10 99:9, 22 100:23 101:13, 18 104:18 105:7, 10 106:3, 13 107:6, 13 109:19 110:12 111:1, 23 112:13 113:11 114:21 115:10 116:22 117:5 119:4, 7, 11 121:24 122:7 123:12 124:9 126:1 127:24 128:17, 20 131:12, 16, 22 132:2, 11 133:7, 12 134:6, 8, 15 136:1, 14 137:15, 21, 24 138:17 139:2 142:25 143:13 145:5 146:16 148:22 149:9, 13, 19, 24 150:4, 15 151:14 152:6 155:10, 15 157:12, 19 158:20 160:11 161:25 162:4, 18 164:10 167:23 168:8 169:19, 22 170:1 171:9 172:16, 22 174:6 176:22, 25 177:17, 23 178:8 179:8, 14 181:5, 24 185:11 186:21,	25 187:3 191:9 193:1 stepping 135:17 Steve 134:2, 5, 10 143:21 162:12 189:14 steward 17:11 stick 12:17 100:6 stickler 20:18 sticks 154:7 stigma 50:24 144:2 stinger 66:23 67:2, 8, 16 stingers 66:25 stinking 188:3 stone 77:14 stood 26:24 47:1 stop 32:21 34:19 69:7 93:13 94:22 98:17 103:22 104:3 115:25 131:7 135:14 180:16 188:2 191:18 stopped 32:22 71:12 125:13 150:17 stopping 175:1 stops 27:17 31:2 storage 59:25 store 178:10 stored 59:21, 24 60:15 story 50:9 straight 99:11, 12 178:1 strayed 62:15 street 66:6 76:17 143:23 streets 175:5 strength 147:15 148:12 153:11 stretch 137:7 stretching 137:6 stringent 59:14 strong 5:21 6:23 10:13 178:18 strongest 148:7	structure 114:5 stuck 168:24 student 55:19, 22 56:13 studio 144:15 stuff 6:21 8:12 13:7 17:2 20:2 25:13, 17 27:8 30:1 31:22 38:18 40:9 42:22 49:9, 15, 16 52:2 55:6 57:3 60:9 61:12 63:16, 23 65:12 68:8 69:4, 5, 6, 24 70:12 72:13, 19 77:21 83:9 86:11 90:3, 5, 6 91:2, 5 93:2 99:15, 16 104:9, 10 105:13, 15 111:24 120:20 123:24 126:14 127:8 129:14 130:9 136:9, 21 138:5 143:3 145:10, 21, 23 155:17 161:7 162:7 163:4, 17 165:3 169:14 171:1 172:17 174:1 179:17, 18, 21 181:6, 17 185:1 stuff's 61:18 sub 112:21 submission 170:12 submitted 12:23 success 82:20 successful 64:13, 14 sucks 169:2 sufficient 45:3 80:23 81:2 137:13 145:3 sufficiently 138:15 suggested 59:17 suggesting 73:23 suggestion 58:25	suitable 35:16 37:21 suited 61:23 120:20 123:25 summarize 164:8 summons 182:11, 13 sunny 66:7 supersedes 140:19 supervisor 30:22 31:8 54:14, 15 133:14 150:22 187:4 supervisors 26:14 27:7 151:5 supervisor's 26:16 supplier 47:5 suppliers 47:22, 23 supply 48:2, 10 supposed 20:13 29:12 33:13 34:10 36:25 37:1 83:16 85:20 86:3, 5, 13 108:3 111:9 113:4 126:7 132:3 134:17 139:6 153:17 161:12 163:15 174:16 178:1 182:19, 23 185:2 186:1 189:3 surface 166:25 surgery 76:22, 25 surrounding 60:10 swapped 45:18 switch 9:21 94:20 161:1, 4, 8 177:15 switched 13:11, 15 94:6 switches 160:25 system 31:4, 16, 20 37:12, 15 67:11 84:3, 7, 10, 18 86:14, 17,
--------------------------	--	--	---	---

22 88:3, 5 89:1,
4, 11 103:22
104:7, 13 139:5
142:9 145:23
148:4 157:16
158:3, 9 165:2,
19 187:6, 11
192:5
systems 83:7
89:17 98:14
111:18 142:11
184:25

< T >

table 10:4
takes 86:8
111:24 114:11
145:17 153:3,
10 182:2
talk 142:2
144:12, 17
150:21 159:8,
20 172:20
191:5, 7 192:17
talked 8:14
49:15 61:12
162:25
talking 46:17
87:16 91:3
120:24 121:18
125:8 136:12
162:1 190:9
talks 160:16
tank 107:9
109:2, 3, 4
task 22:8 82:2
167:3
tasks 87:25
117:18
task-specific
21:24 22:9
taught 55:18
136:22 143:2
teach 137:5, 13
143:8
teaches 140:2
team 8:8 9:8
10:15, 19 12:5,
6, 16, 20 13:20
16:7, 10 18:11,
21 19:2, 25
37:2, 25 42:23
45:23 52:1
53:25 55:21
69:9 72:24

75:24 77:3, 6,
16 81:14, 25
82:11 85:19
87:1, 4, 12, 18
88:9 90:22, 25
91:4, 10, 14
92:17, 21 93:17,
19 94:5 99:24
100:23 101:2,
22 111:5, 7, 8,
15, 18 112:16,
20, 23 113:3, 15
116:12 117:1, 3
122:8 123:16
127:20 128:21
131:17, 23
135:6 138:1
169:14 175:9
189:4 190:25
teams 146:3
tear 87:8
105:11
tease 106:25
tech 71:3
143:2 150:12
technical 169:17
technicality
136:19, 25
technically
18:17 20:15
21:14 30:25
91:10 107:16
Technician 2:16
6:15, 19 10:17
14:16, 19 89:23
108:4, 5 130:17
151:4, 9
technicians
16:15 41:18
62:12 68:7
103:11 122:19
126:11 132:23
137:13 149:23
162:24 189:2
technician's
167:16
technology
39:24 66:4
147:24
techs 68:5
146:14
tee 130:24
telecommunicati
ons 5:21
tells 25:18

temperatures
57:3 59:22
61:24
temporarily
45:18
tend 4:17, 18
term 80:18
terms 24:18
46:7 88:4
terrible 9:18
124:10 160:18
test 7:4 8:18,
19 9:8 41:1, 3
42:19, 23 58:4
67:18 69:4
72:24 88:17, 23
92:10, 17, 18
94:13, 21 95:5
99:24 100:4, 13,
17, 24 101:1, 19
102:13, 15, 16,
21 103:6, 14, 16,
23, 24 104:4, 16,
21 123:16 137:9
tested 58:3
96:16 117:19
testimony 194:9
testing 8:15, 16
9:6, 22 40:19
57:19 58:1
59:1, 4, 14
66:19 69:9
86:1 88:9
90:25 91:13, 17,
18 92:15, 17, 24
93:1, 15 94:3,
19 95:19 96:8
98:9 99:20
100:2, 3, 23
101:10, 17, 22
102:2, 10 118:5
123:20 169:14
190:3
tests 77:1
102:14 103:7
Thales 83:7, 8,
9, 10, 16, 19, 21
84:2, 7, 18 85:7,
15 86:14, 17, 19,
20, 22 87:20
88:3, 5, 11, 16
89:11 104:5, 6
157:16
theirs 24:23

theory 115:10
thick 154:11, 12
thing 5:8 6:1
7:13 12:18
19:20 25:24
27:10 29:21
31:17 35:14
38:6, 20 42:6
47:3, 7 48:13,
14 53:6 54:25
56:24 57:21
59:24 65:22
66:18 67:7
68:12 70:11
71:10 76:20
80:3 89:5
93:23 98:22
100:21 106:25
109:1, 15
110:16, 22
112:5 113:17
114:8 123:2
126:15 127:9
129:22 130:10
133:21, 25
134:17, 19, 20
135:19 136:2
137:4, 11 143:1,
5 144:6 145:15,
24 146:9
147:21 148:8
150:10, 23
151:22 155:25
156:22 157:14
158:1, 2 162:5
164:3, 18
168:19 170:12
171:16 172:3, 5,
7, 8 175:1
178:17 181:14
182:1 184:22,
23 185:4 186:2
187:15, 21, 22
188:3 189:19
191:17, 22
things 7:2 11:5,
19, 21 13:5, 10
26:11, 24 34:17
36:23 37:6
38:16 41:6
42:2, 17, 20, 25
45:15 54:2, 21
55:6 56:1, 2, 19
59:9 62:10
65:7, 15 66:4

67:10 69:7
71:12, 14 74:17
76:14 77:1
78:3 79:1 80:5,
12 81:15 82:18,
25 83:1 86:9,
23, 24 87:3, 5,
15, 17 92:4, 5,
11, 15, 23 93:12
95:16 96:15
98:17, 23 100:1
102:1 105:16
106:20 110:13
111:5, 14
114:15 118:19
125:12, 13
129:7 130:5, 13
138:12 139:1,
17 140:18
141:24 142:1,
12 143:19
148:1, 16
153:25 157:4
159:11, 12, 13
162:21 167:17
168:6 171:17,
18 172:11
177:3 179:22,
25 180:10, 11
181:9, 11
182:24 183:1
185:1, 19 192:20
thing's 189:22
thinks 183:22
187:15, 18
third-party 7:11
Thomas 49:24
thought 14:5
51:15 80:11, 12
119:23 123:8
131:2 139:19
140:8 144:3
191:4
thousand 83:11
184:14
thousands
127:13
throw 91:8
116:11 161:19
throws 187:24
thunder-like
178:21
ticking 108:16
tie 81:6 110:21

<p>ties 42:20 81:4, 16 tie's 110:20 tight 38:2 tighten 81:6 tightened 143:2 tightness 143:4 time 3:11 8:9 9:18 10:10 11:16 13:2, 22 14:22 15:3, 15 16:17 17:14 19:21 22:2 23:23 25:5 27:21 35:3, 10 37:1 39:5 43:9 47:7 49:24 50:10 55:10, 12 58:25 59:11 65:21 66:12 67:20 70:22, 25 80:5 81:14 82:12, 14, 17 85:2, 3 86:20 88:14 90:8, 11 93:20 94:21 95:25 96:16 97:7 99:10 100:16 103:2 104:15 107:14 108:6 110:10, 15 111:24 114:21 115:18, 21, 25 116:10, 14 120:15 123:1, 6, 12 124:11 125:1 126:6, 10 127:6, 17 129:20 130:3 131:23 133:14, 23 134:13 136:5, 25 140:17 149:2 150:25 151:3 154:18 160:17 165:22 170:11 171:10, 12 172:4 176:11 179:10 180:9 181:4 182:5 184:14 192:19, 20 194:6, 7, 10 timeline 161:22</p>	<p>166:3 timely 109:21 timer 108:15 times 28:19 30:2 50:2 58:13 66:17 77:16 79:2, 5 98:18 113:9 114:23 136:20 168:16 171:12 184:14 tiny 87:5 tip 37:24 Tire 177:7 tired 10:25 title 9:25 10:17 17:17 91:9 today 3:2 today's 3:6 told 11:22 12:19 16:21 21:5 22:19 30:2 37:2 38:12 68:20 73:10 83:23 93:11 95:3 113:15 120:8, 14 122:18 130:14 160:7 172:24, 25 173:2 177:21 188:15 189:8 191:15 tomorrow 151:5 ton 72:13 tons 83:23 143:16 tool 49:23 124:18 127:11 toolbox 50:13 124:18 125:3, 5 tooling 41:25 49:20 tools 42:11, 12 50:1, 3, 10, 22 51:4 79:23 81:13 118:20 124:12, 14, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25 125:15 169:3 181:20 toonie 170:14 tooth 118:8 top 12:22 17:20 19:13</p>	<p>46:18 60:10 61:13, 16 67:18 70:8, 10 74:4 114:5 154:4 161:1 170:7 topic 100:10 106:25 119:14 torn 87:10 Toronto 16:20 47:18 83:24 torque 54:2, 22 75:15, 16, 17, 18 80:2 118:19 136:15, 18, 19 137:3, 5, 14 143:1 147:5, 10, 19 148:2, 5 149:5, 14, 15 150:5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 19, 21 151:11, 19, 22 152:10, 12, 24 153:1, 2, 4 154:2, 6, 19 155:5 156:8, 9, 14, 21 torqued 147:2 149:7 152:9 154:17 156:2, 5, 16 torque-marking 153:24 torquing 136:13 137:9 146:25 149:23 152:5, 13 total 27:19 32:24 totally 50:8 170:25 touch 50:25 126:23 138:8 146:20 164:16 189:8 touched 33:21 70:6, 10 166:17 touching 119:13 138:6 146:17 167:1 touchy 191:2 tow 107:25 108:10, 16 188:3 towed 101:6 track 9:10 27:17 28:9 58:13 61:18 66:7 69:22, 25</p>	<p>70:5 92:19, 22, 25 94:14 98:8, 11, 20 99:12, 13 103:3, 4, 13 104:9, 16 107:17 109:21 115:20 118:6, 7 129:4 143:5 145:21 160:13, 21 161:2, 4, 5, 10, 12, 20 163:6 173:23 176:13 177:20, 22, 25 179:11 184:24 185:7, 14 186:24 187:23 188:2, 6 track-related 177:16 tracks 67:7 98:24, 25 99:5, 8, 18 160:18 173:23 177:24 186:19 trailer 132:15 train 6:21 8:9, 18 10:6 11:22, 24, 25 12:2 20:10, 14 26:17 27:9, 13, 17 28:2, 7, 10 29:1 31:2, 5 32:4, 21, 22 33:8, 11, 15 35:16, 19, 20, 21, 23 36:1 37:3, 14, 15 39:23 40:3 41:2, 3 43:1, 3 44:3 48:16 49:6, 8 50:18 51:11, 17, 20 52:12 53:11 55:7, 23 56:5, 8 57:18 58:11 59:19, 20 60:13 61:1 62:13, 19 64:1, 6, 8, 14 65:4 66:5 67:5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 18 68:7 69:3, 5, 20 70:4, 6, 10, 25 71:1, 2 81:18 82:2, 5, 12, 23 83:12, 20 84:3, 15, 21 85:25 86:5 87:7, 10</p>	<p>88:4, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24 89:3, 4, 5 90:24 91:18 92:1, 11, 24 94:9, 11 95:2, 10, 13, 21, 22, 24 96:11, 13, 19, 25 97:2, 4, 14, 15, 18 99:10 101:5 102:3, 7, 9, 21 103:21, 22 104:2, 8 106:4, 6, 20 107:15, 17, 19, 20, 21 108:1, 4, 6, 10, 15, 17, 24 109:14, 20, 22, 23, 24 110:18 111:3, 11, 14, 25 112:2, 3, 15, 20, 22 115:17, 22 116:10, 11 117:20 122:9 126:5 128:7, 8 129:3, 12 130:12 133:1, 2 134:13 138:23 139:17 140:2 141:2, 7, 25 142:15 143:9 146:17, 20 151:7, 15 154:5, 15 155:1, 3, 6, 18, 20, 22 156:8, 20 157:15, 16 159:13, 14, 23 160:24 161:1, 2, 5, 10, 16, 19 162:10 163:2 164:16 165:6, 14 170:2, 10 171:23 174:9, 11 175:13 176:2 178:22 180:17 182:3 183:7 185:3 187:10, 13, 25 188:9, 14, 16, 21, 23, 25 189:20, 23 190:7 191:4 192:11 trained 96:25 122:14 123:4 128:1, 3 131:4 141:9 167:4, 12</p>
---	---	--	---	---

171:19, 22 185:10 trainer 141:6 167:4 training 70:14 75:11, 14, 15, 17, 21 76:3 77:7, 9 80:22 81:22 82:8 104:23 118:12 127:25 128:15 131:25 136:11, 15, 18, 20 137:4, 11 139:15, 16, 21 140:4 141:6, 7, 14, 21 142:5, 8, 15, 23, 24 143:1, 12 171:24 180:5 181:11 trains 6:24 8:14 13:2 18:17, 25 19:22 27:6, 19, 20, 21 28:12, 17 29:13 30:12 32:9, 12, 17 33:14, 18, 23, 24 34:7, 12 35:3, 5 36:6, 19 47:17 49:12 50:25 52:15 56:17, 21 60:24 61:7, 10 62:4, 6 64:12 65:13, 23 71:21, 22 72:9 84:11 88:6 96:4 104:16, 21, 24 105:1, 2, 5 107:5, 7 111:22 112:12 113:5, 9, 15, 23 114:1 115:1, 3, 8, 12, 14, 20 116:19 117:19 126:25 127:4, 21, 22 128:12 129:6 138:18 139:24, 25 141:11 142:22 143:8 156:11 159:17 162:19 164:13 169:18 170:3, 24 177:9 178:16 179:6, 10 180:15 181:3 185:8	186:18, 20 191:20 train's 103:13 105:20 transcribed 3:16 194:12 transcript 3:17, 20, 23 4:3, 4, 9 194:14 transfer 54:17 133:10 transferred 51:13 transformed 53:7 transition 12:12 124:5, 8 128:11 transitioning 120:15 translates 117:17 Transpo 15:20, 24 16:1 18:17 104:22 106:7 126:4 transport 173:3 transported 33:12 trap 108:8 travelled 61:9 trays 40:9 treated 26:20 trial 4:24 77:12 106:2 142:4 tricked 21:16 trickle 141:13 trouble 55:16 83:23 true 194:13 trying 17:1 25:11 34:18 38:14 46:24 62:10 63:17, 21, 22 66:2, 3 82:11, 12 84:5 112:2 128:24 140:22 142:4 153:13 Turkey 43:15 turmoil 29:3 121:5 turn 50:21 63:10 84:16 85:1, 25 102:3 107:19, 20	108:14, 15 144:11 150:8, 18 152:25 165:12 177:11 turned 6:25 8:19 41:4 63:6 69:3 93:20 122:22, 24 170:17 turning 184:10 turnover 168:6, 10 169:10 type 20:11 30:10 31:23 35:13 57:9 77:9 80:3 100:21 113:17 120:20 139:6 146:9 150:10 180:23 186:1 188:18 types 61:10, 11 62:5 typos 4:3 < U > Uh-huh 3:5, 14 unable 33:4 148:15 unaccessible 36:1 unautomated 104:13 unaware 30:6 71:15 121:25 175:25 unbolt 85:23 undeniable 79:11 underneath 59:1 190:6 understand 16:20 30:8 36:12 41:6 42:4 132:8 139:10 157:14 164:3 171:8 185:6 understanding 39:22 96:7 106:10 161:22 175:11 176:20 understood 89:15 105:1 underway 95:20	unexperienced 78:17 unfinished 14:3 unfortunately 25:5 140:18 union 7:13 15:18, 19 16:17, 19 17:5, 6, 7, 17 18:8, 16 19:3, 6, 8 20:13, 24 21:1, 2, 6, 14 22:11 25:7, 8, 9 26:4, 13, 15, 19, 24, 25 34:18 175:6, 11, 21 unionize 25:2 unionized 16:21 unit 11:21 18:21 41:15 units 32:14, 24 33:1, 3 34:5 36:3, 4, 7 156:12 unnecessary 116:19 unqualified 186:4 unsafe 71:12 100:8 unscrew 154:9 updates 46:11 upset 19:16 21:14, 16 29:9 56:8 130:22 upside 40:7 146:22 upstairs 120:6 upwards 123:13 USB 53:21 useless 127:11 uses 175:7 < V > vacation 23:13 validating 95:24 97:15 validation 13:19 88:23 92:21 93:15, 17 94:3, 5, 18 95:19, 23 96:2, 8, 20 97:3, 5, 6, 9 99:11 113:21 135:6 160:17 valuable 75:9	value 54:23 74:14 101:11 147:1, 2 149:5, 8, 14, 15, 23 150:8, 13, 19, 21 151:22 152:25 153:2 154:19 values 54:2 80:2 118:19 151:19 valves 85:23 146:22 variables 58:18 various 42:2 43:3 vast 29:13 vegetable 153:19 vegetable-based 153:20 vegetable-grade 154:21 vehicle 14:16, 18 20:5 21:21 50:14 64:23 65:18, 19 119:9 121:23 vehicles 8:3 68:24 75:13 80:23 85:6 97:10, 21 114:19 178:5 vents 61:13 VERITEXT 194:20 versa 112:4 version 133:18 versus 45:12 105:18 182:25 vibrates 129:4 161:16 vice 112:4 video 159:4 Videoconferenci ng 1:12 view 56:11 59:13 76:16 143:11 144:23 177:21 185:9 Virtual 2:16 visual 159:11 visually 9:6 92:18 99:13 Voices 22:18
--	--	--	---	--

<p>void 115:21 vomited 157:23</p> <p>< W ></p> <p>Wabtec 43:8, 10 45:22 46:3 47:5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20 171:2 189:3, 9</p> <p>wage 79:14</p> <p>wait 116:2 151:3</p> <p>waited 98:6</p> <p>walk 49:23 76:7, 17, 24 82:4 122:9 145:18 146:20 182:5, 18 188:23</p> <p>walked 79:10 84:1 120:7</p> <p>walking 165:4 168:17 183:12 189:2</p> <p>walks 182:17 183:7</p> <p>walls 40:13 41:7, 15 60:6</p> <p>wanted 10:24 11:2 12:9 19:5, 9 21:8 25:8, 14, 25 26:23 38:23 39:4 46:2 49:23 51:14 52:20, 25 53:4 72:18 90:17 91:8 92:11, 13, 14 99:23 100:6 104:23 119:17 121:7, 8 140:7 188:14</p> <p>wanting 53:5 65:25</p> <p>wants 119:12</p> <p>warm 58:11 66:7</p> <p>warning 162:11</p> <p>warranty 51:1 93:18, 19 108:5 111:5, 7, 15, 18 112:1, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 23 113:3, 6 138:8 189:2, 10</p> <p>wash 178:13</p> <p>washed 174:22</p>	<p>washer 154:20 180:6</p> <p>watched 143:22</p> <p>watching 77:6</p> <p>water 178:14, 15, 16 182:25</p> <p>ways 94:13</p> <p>weak 173:24</p> <p>weakest 10:11, 22</p> <p>weakness 164:8</p> <p>wear 105:11, 13</p> <p>weather 180:16</p> <p>website 3:21 73:14, 16</p> <p>weeks 11:23, 25 23:13 78:8, 9, 11 172:6</p> <p>weight 93:6</p> <p>weighted 153:12</p> <p>weird 163:16</p> <p>welded 41:7, 14, 17</p> <p>welding 42:1, 13, 14</p> <p>well-suited 119:5</p> <p>wet 57:23 147:12 182:23</p> <p>wheel 37:4 95:9 106:19, 22 110:4 116:17 128:2, 7 151:16 152:8 155:16, 19, 21, 22, 25 160:19, 20 161:6, 25 162:6, 22 165:17, 19 166:5, 20, 23 167:1 169:20 170:17, 18 171:4, 7, 11, 19 173:3, 4, 15, 25 174:13, 18 180:1, 3</p> <p>wheels 37:11 95:7, 8, 11, 13, 17 105:16 108:22, 24 109:25 111:12 152:13 172:20</p> <p>wheel's 162:13</p> <p>white 42:9</p> <p>whoever's 108:5</p>	<p>whoop-de-doo 181:16</p> <p>willing 20:25 21:15 27:2 29:2</p> <p>willingly 13:8, 25 21:7 22:3 59:8</p> <p>willingness 11:13</p> <p>win 63:3</p> <p>windows 42:22 43:14 159:17</p> <p>windrow 60:13</p> <p>winter 32:8 56:18 58:8, 10 59:14, 20 62:1, 4, 7 64:13 178:9, 11 180:24</p> <p>winter's 56:20</p> <p>wintertime 32:6, 8</p> <p>wire 83:15</p> <p>wires 69:21 83:11 84:21 101:25</p> <p>wiring 10:5 40:8, 11, 20, 21 69:19 81:5 83:17 89:23, 24 118:3</p> <p>withhold 26:1</p> <p>witness 4:13, 17, 22 194:7, 9</p> <p>wonderful 193:4</p> <p>wondering 124:4</p> <p>won't 100:12 113:23 171:13, 14 188:17</p> <p>word 85:12 93:6 128:4 178:18</p> <p>wore 7:19</p> <p>work 5:23 8:5 10:8 14:3 19:22 20:8, 11, 13 23:6 24:20 26:9 27:2 32:6 35:20 36:10 37:4, 14, 21 38:1 41:23 44:18 49:21 50:22 52:24 55:15 57:1 62:2, 6, 11</p>	<p>63:19 64:10 66:2 68:7, 23 69:6 75:12, 25 80:10 83:9 85:17 87:23 88:25 98:3 101:6 102:25 104:6 110:1, 14, 25 112:11 115:7 116:13 117:2 124:1 127:22 129:17 135:1 140:19 142:12 143:8 144:11, 14 147:22 157:10 168:1 169:7 171:13 175:9, 13 178:22 181:23 188:7 189:7 191:23, 24</p> <p>worked 7:18, 22 19:14 22:21, 23 23:5 30:6, 23 36:25 47:15 55:10 61:25 67:20 73:10 74:6 79:15 81:25 86:1 111:6 142:22 143:7 145:24 157:16 166:2 168:21</p> <p>worker 117:24 168:5</p> <p>workers 16:1, 5 18:8 19:4, 5 24:25 26:4 71:18 127:20 174:11</p> <p>working 6:20, 24 7:2 8:2, 14 12:13, 14 18:25 28:16 29:17 33:3 64:7 80:11 86:14 88:19 89:11 91:22, 23 92:2 93:4, 8, 12 95:2 102:13 104:12 112:23 115:3 126:24 135:25 140:11 150:17 171:7 172:6</p>	<p>176:8 182:20 185:4 187:9, 12</p> <p>workplace 13:8</p> <p>works 84:16 90:13 139:18 165:19 170:10 185:24</p> <p>world 11:4 35:4 61:6, 10 64:12 74:16 96:11 120:19 148:7 168:12 170:3</p> <p>worried 18:25 59:5</p> <p>worse 34:25 55:13</p> <p>worst 38:5 62:4 187:19</p> <p>worth 181:20</p> <p>wrap 192:20</p> <p>wrench 50:15 75:18 152:25 153:4, 14</p> <p>wrenches 50:15, 21</p> <p>write 28:22, 23</p> <p>written 55:20</p> <p>wrong 15:19 27:13 29:21, 22 30:10 55:6, 25 64:1 89:5 114:7 121:1, 20 127:4 167:15 182:8 183:3, 8, 25 184:15 186:8, 9 191:16</p> <p>< Y ></p> <p>yard 157:11, 23 158:17</p> <p>yeah 8:17 10:24 13:16 14:12 15:24 27:7 40:14 41:10, 13, 20 44:10, 11 45:20 48:3 49:13 52:9 54:11 59:16 66:10, 16 71:7 73:7 74:1 78:6, 10, 13 79:17 83:8 84:13 85:5, 11, 12, 18 89:12, 15</p>
---	--	---	---	--

90:19 96:5 105:7 107:6 113:11 122:7 124:3 126:1 131:12, 13 133:13 136:14 148:3 149:19 162:2, 4 169:22 172:3 177:17 181:24, 25 186:21 187:3 189:5 year 6:13, 14 9:13, 15 12:25 15:5, 7, 8, 16 56:18 77:20 90:21 124:11 125:8, 19, 23, 24, 25 126:2, 3 128:10 143:25 149:25 150:1 168:12 years 14:21 22:22 29:16 61:8 yelling 23:2 yep 30:16 165:15 yeses 91:21 yesterday 129:22 Young 2:3 3:2, 6, 15 4:7, 11 5:14 6:2, 8 7:5 8:2, 13 9:11, 20 10:20 11:10 12:11 13:13 14:8, 17 15:4, 13, 18, 25 16:4, 13, 23 17:4, 15, 18, 22 18:4, 11, 20 19:1, 24 24:7, 24 26:3, 8 27:4 28:11 29:5 30:11, 19 31:8, 13, 23 32:17 33:7, 21 34:1, 20 35:15 37:16, 20 38:7, 21 39:1, 13, 17, 22 43:2 44:20 47:4, 14, 21 48:1, 4 49:10, 19 52:3, 6 54:7 55:9 56:10	57:11 58:7, 21 59:13 60:25 62:5 63:25 64:21 65:17 66:8, 22 68:1, 22 69:11 70:1, 13, 18, 23 71:4, 17, 22 73:4, 22 75:11 76:16 80:14, 21 81:17 83:5 84:8 85:3, 6, 16 86:16, 21 88:1, 20 89:10, 13, 16 90:7, 12, 16 91:12 93:14 94:2 95:19 96:1, 6 97:8, 20 98:7 99:7, 19 100:20 101:9, 15 104:15 105:4, 8 106:1, 9 107:2, 11 109:17 110:9, 23 111:20 113:7 114:18 115:6 116:18, 24 119:1, 5, 10 122:3 123:8 124:3 125:20 128:14, 18 131:10, 14, 18, 24 133:4, 9 134:5, 7, 9 135:23 136:10 137:12, 18, 22 138:14, 25 142:21 143:10 145:2 146:13 148:18 149:6, 11, 16, 21 150:2, 11 151:11 155:7, 13 157:9, 17 158:16 160:9 161:21 162:2, 16 164:6 167:20 168:4 169:16, 20, 23 171:6 172:14, 19 174:4 176:19, 23 177:15, 19 178:3 179:5, 10 181:2, 21 185:5 186:15, 23	187:1 191:3 192:14, 17, 22 younger 25:19 72:5, 14 147:11 < Z > zero 165:10 zip 42:20 81:4, 6, 15 110:20, 21 Zoom 1:12		
---	---	--	--	--