Ottawa Light Rail Commission

Rock Fortier on Monday, May 16, 2022



77 King Street West, Suite 2020 Toronto, Ontario M5K 1A1

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6	OTTAWA LIGHT RAIL COMMISSION
7	CITY OF OTTAWA - ROCK FORTIER
8	MAY 16, 2022
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12	Held via Zoom Videoconferencing, with all
13	participants attending remotely, on the 16th day of
14	May, 2022, 9:00 a.m. to 11:50 a.m.
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1	COMMISSION COUNSEL:
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3	Christine Mainville, Co-Lead Counsel Member
4	Emily Young, Litigation Counsel Member
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7	PARTICIPANTS:
8	
9	Rock Fortier, City of Ottawa
10	Jesse Garner & Lauren Gruenberger, Singleton
11	Urquhart Reynolds Vogel LLP
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13	
14	ALSO PRESENT:
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16	Joanne Lawrence, Stenographer/Transcriptionist
17	Shahed Abdul-Dayem, Virtual Technician
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¹ -- Upon commencing at 9:07 a.m.

EMILY YOUNG: Good morning,

3 Mr. Fortier. Just before we get into your evidence 4 and some questions, I'll give a brief introduction 5 about the purpose of the interview. The purpose of 6 today's interview is to obtain your evidence under 7 oath or solemn declaration for use at the 8 Commission's public hearings. This will be a 9 collaborative interview such that my cocounsel, 10 Ms. Mainville, may intervene to ask certain 11 questions. If time permits, your counsel may also 12 ask follow-up questions at the end of the 13 interview.

14 The interview is being transcribed, and the Commission intends to enter this transcript 15 16 into evidence at the Commission's public hearings, 17 either at the hearings or by way of procedural 18 order before the hearings start. The transcript 19 will be posted to the Commission's public website, 20 along with any corrections made to it, after it is 21 entered into evidence. The transcript, along with 22 any corrections later made to it, will be shared 23 with the Commission's participants and their 24 counsel on a confidential basis before being 25 entered into evidence. You will be given the

1	opportunity to review your transcript and correct
2	any typos or other errors before the transcript is
3	shared with participants or entered into evidence.
4	Any nontypographical corrections made will be
5	appended to the transcript.
6	Pursuant to Section 33(6) of the Public
7	Inquiries Act (2009):
8	"A witness at an inquiry shall
9	be deemed to have objected to answer
10	any question asked of him upon the
11	ground that his answer may tend to
12	incriminate the witness or may tend
13	to establish his liability to civil
14	proceedings at the instance of the
15	Crown or of any person, and no
16	answer given by a witness at an
17	inquiry shall be used or be
18	receivable in evidence against him
19	in any trial or other proceedings
20	against him thereafter taking place,
21	other than a prosecution for perjury
22	in giving such evidence."
23	As required by Section 33(7) of that act, you are
24	hereby advised that you have the right to object to
25	answer any question under the Canada Evidence Act.

1 And if you need a break at any point throughout the 2 interview, just let us know and we'll take one, but 3 so that you know in advance, we generally take a 4 break around 10:30. Does that sound all okay? 5 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. I'm not too too 6 sure about the legalese and what that entailed 7 there, that section that you said in that I may 8 object at any time. I quess, what does that mean? 9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: I don't want to 10 give you counsel, but it's more in the sense of 11 affording you protections. I don't know, Jesse, if 12 you want to elaborate. 13 JESSE GARDNER: Sure. So, Rock, if at 14 any time there's reason to object to a question, 15 I'll raise an objection. 16 ROCK FORTIER: Sounds good. 17 EMILY YOUNG: Perfect. So first I want 18 to talk a bit about your training and experience, 19 Mr. Fortier, so I'm going to put your CV up on the 20 screen. Can you see it? 21 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. 22 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And can you 23 confirm for us that this is in fact your CV and 24 that it is up to date? 25 I can confirm that, yes. ROCK FORTIER:

1 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Wonderful. So can 2 you tell us a bit about your background and 3 experience as it relates to the work that you did 4 on Stage 1 of the LRT. 5 ROCK FORTIER: So just as it relates to 6 the LRT itself? 7 EMILY YOUNG: What I'm interested in is 8 any experience you have or education that you have that you brought to bear on your work on the LRT. 9 10 And we'll talk more in detail about the actual work 11 on the LRT shortly. 12 ROCK FORTIER: Okay. So I graduated in 13 '87, and my wife was military, so we moved around 14 the country every 3 or 4 years, so I would change 15 jobs and work for different consulting engineers 16 based on where we were located. And some of the 17 work was -- it was all design engineering, so some 18 of the work was structural design - you know, 19 industrial buildings, restaurants, A&Ws and that 20 type of stuff - and so -- and the other type of 21 work is municipal engineering - so municipal 22 infrastructure, water mains, sewers, what have you, 23 roads, and subdivision planning - so, you know, 24 basically working with the municipalities to -- for 25 the developer designing subdivisions.

1	Then when we moved to Ottawa in 2009,
2	my wife retired, and basically I joined the City in
3	the construction services division, and I was a
4	project manager delivering projects for the City,
5	so basically a construction project manager in
6	arterial roads, roundabouts installation, public
7	open houses, that type of stuff. And in 2011, the
8	LRT was looking for project managers, and I applied
9	to join the LRT office, I guess, and work as a
10	project manager for the LRT.
11	EMILY YOUNG: And your education is in
12	civil engineering?
13	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.
14	EMILY YOUNG: Can you explain just
15	briefly for a layperson what design engineering
16	means.
17	ROCK FORTIER: Doing calculations to
18	figure out the sizes of a beam, let's say, in
19	structural engineering terms, the size of
20	foundations as opposed to and then I guess so
21	designing engineering for structurally, would do
22	that type of work, and design engineering for
23	municipalities or for municipal infrastructure
24	is sizing a sewer, sizing a water main, figuring
25	out where to put the hydrants and that type of

1	stuff.
2	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Thank you. Did
3	you have any experience working in rail before you
4	started working on the LRT project?
5	ROCK FORTIER: None.
6	EMILY YOUNG: And had you had any
7	experience working on public-private partnership
8	projects, also known as alternative financing
9	procurement?
10	ROCK FORTIER: No P3 experience, no.
11	EMILY YOUNG: And it sounds like, based
12	on the description you gave earlier, when you first
13	started with the City, from 2009 to 2011, you did
14	not do any work that related to the LRT?
15	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.
16	EMILY YOUNG: And then in 2011, 2012,
17	you started as a senior engineer at the light rail
18	office.
19	ROCK FORTIER: That's right. My
20	official title was senior engineer. I was acting
21	as a project manager, yeah.
22	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And is the light
23	rail office, is that also known as the Rail
24	Implementation Office, or is there a difference
25	between those two?

1 ROCK FORTIER: No, that's the same 2 thing, rail, yeah. 3 EMILY YOUNG: And who was managing you 4 at that time, 2011 to 2012? 5 ROCK FORTIER: Gary Craig. 6 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And what you have 7 in your CV here is that at that time, you were 8 overseeing Capital Transit Partners' work on 9 developing the project-specific output 10 specifications for the civil and environmental 11 components of the Ottawa LRT; is that right? 12 ROCK FORTIER: That's correct, yes. 13 EMILY YOUNG: Can you tell us a bit 14 more about what that involved? 15 ROCK FORTIER: Sure. The civil 16 component into the -- well, the guideway, which is 17 essentially the right-of-way of the train, so in 18 the -- in the road fashion, you say the 19 right-of-way. In a light rail, you say a guideway. 20 So everything that's in there, from retaining walls 21 to the track, the ballasts, any of the switches and 22 that type of stuff. 23 And so also under the civil umbrella, 24 you would have any of the road works that are 25 required to be built by the proponent to -- you

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1	know, like, detours. In Ottawa, we had to build a
2	bridge over one of the stations. We had to build
3	a a number of detours. So you would you
4	would look at the that component, and under the
5	environmental file, one of my colleagues would look
6	at the process, I guess, of following the City
7	guidelines for noise abatement and the process
8	for if they had blasting required and that type
9	of stuff, and I would look at the technical aspect
10	of that. So what the maximum the noise levels
11	we would we would accept, I guess. So we I
12	would look at the technical aspect of the
13	environmental file.
14	EMILY YOUNG: And in terms of
15	overseeing CTP's work, does that mean that CTP was
16	essentially in charge of writing the PSOS?
17	ROCK FORTIER: That's correct, yes. So
18	we were on the 21st floor of the Bell building, and
19	they were on the 24th, and we would have a number
20	of meetings to discuss the PSOS and its
21	development, and we would red flag and discuss
22	amongst us as to if if what they were writing

²³ was in line with City specs.

EMILY YOUNG: And what would -- where
 would you get those City specs? Where did those

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1 come from?

2 ROCK FORTIER: So the Planning 3 Department at the City basically has a lot of 4 quidelines with regards to development of sites, 5 let's say, right, so that the -- they -- they б develop the guidelines for, you know, the blasting 7 specs and what have you, and I was exposed to those 8 at the Construction Services Division because some 9 of the -- of our roadway, we needed to blast rock, 10 So -- so the City has those guidelines in right? 11 place, and we would just merge the two together, 12 make sure we were following the right -- the right 13 quidelines.

EMILY YOUNG: And were those guidelines specific to rail in any way?

16 ROCK FORTIER: No. No. The City, not 17 having any light rail projects on the go, didn't 18 have any guidelines, so we needed to -- because I 19 was using the civil aspect of it, you know, 20 municipal stuff, I would follow the construction 21 specs and the planning specs. Under the track work 22 and that type of stuff, we didn't have any 23 quidelines to follow, so I would depend heavily on 24 CTP's expertise.

EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And then it

1	says we have on your CV that from 2012 to 2021,
2	you worked as a program manager in the same office.
3	ROCK FORTIER: Right. So in 2012, we
4	started hiring more City staff because we were
5	getting overwhelmed with the work, I guess, just
6	very busy, and so I was promoted to program manager
7	and we I had staff that was reporting to me,
8	developing these guidelines.
9	EMILY YOUNG: And what guidelines were
10	you developing?
11	ROCK FORTIER: Again, the civil and
12	environmental file.
13	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And so your work
14	changed in the sense that you now had people
15	reporting to you?
16	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.
17	EMILY YOUNG: Did it change in any
18	other way from your previous role?
19	ROCK FORTIER: No, not really. No.
20	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And so just to
21	drill down a little bit on some of the tasks that
22	you listed here that you did in that role, you said
23	that you were involved in evaluating bids during
24	procurement?
25	ROCK FORTIER: Correct, yeah.
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1	EMILY YOUNG: And what would that have
2	looked like? Was that similar to your work
3	evaluating the PSOS, or how did that differ?
4	ROCK FORTIER: So we, you know, did
5	bids review, so we were basically in a separate
6	room, and so my staff didn't review the bids, I
7	did, with CTP, and we would comment with regards
8	to look at the bids and look at whether or not
9	we felt that the bids were met met the PSOS,
10	basically.
11	EMILY YOUNG: And were you still
12	focussed at that time on the civil and
13	environmental aspects of the project?
14	ROCK FORTIER: Correct. Correct. So
15	the proponents had the opportunity to present their
16	proposal to us, and when the civil file came up, I
17	would attend the presentation. When the station
18	file came up, I would not attend, for instance, so
19	just for an example.
20	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And you mentioned
21	CTP as on the evaluation team. Was there anyone
22	else who was on the evaluation team with you?
23	ROCK FORTIER: No.
24	EMILY YOUNG: And from your
25	perspective, did RTG emerge from that process as

1	the clear winner?
2	ROCK FORTIER: Under the
3	environmental under the civil file, I think all
4	proponents had equal equal bids, I guess.
5	EMILY YOUNG: Were there any particular
6	issues that arose in respect of the civil file
7	throughout procurement?
8	ROCK FORTIER: Throughout procurement?
9	No. We were we were worried a bit as to how to
10	implement the initial detour at Laurier, but we
11	felt that those details could be worked out during
12	the detail design.
13	EMILY YOUNG: Were you involved in
14	preparing the staff report that went to council
15	recommending the selection of RTG?
16	ROCK FORTIER: No.
17	EMILY YOUNG: Who would have been
18	responsible for preparing that report?
19	ROCK FORTIER: I'm assuming Gary, from
20	the technical aspect.
21	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And can you tell
22	us what you mean by "review of fixed facilities
23	milestones"?
24	ROCK FORTIER: So fixed facilities is
25	the term that we would use to to define the

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and the guideway.

1 Define the term for, basically, the stations, the 2 civil works. So when I -- I was asked to review 3 the milestone payment for the maintenance and 4 storage facility, for instance, so that's a fixed 5 facility. I was asked to review the status of the 6 aboveground stations in the eastern stations, so I 7 would -- I would review those -- those milestones, 8 basically just go to the stations, prepare a short 9 internal document and give it to Gary to -- to show 10 him the status of those fixed facilities at the 11 time. 12 EMILY YOUNG: And you've also written 13 here that near -- towards the end of Stage 1, you 14 were tracking deficiencies in most of the 15 infrastructure aspects of the project, including 16 underground stations, the tunnel, the track work,

18 ROCK FORTIER: That's correct, yeah.
19 EMILY YOUNG: When did that work start,
20 that tracking of deficiencies?

ROCK FORTIER: When did it start? I
mean, we -- we had staff visit the station on a
weekly basis, take pictures, and -- and track
deficiencies that they saw. So we would not
necessarily sit down with RTG and discuss those

1 deficiencies because they said at the time that 2 they were still -- it was still a work in progress, 3 so some of the work they describe as -- this is not 4 a deficiency; it is just something we haven't done 5 vet. 6 So we would track it internally so that 7 we would eventually get to it, I guess. So I think 8 we probably started doing that, you know, in 9 construction when we started seeing the finishes 10 being applied to the stations, so, you know, 11 2016 -- late '16 to '17 type of deal. 12 EMILY YOUNG: And who would you be 13 reporting that information to? 14 ROCK FORTIER: We would sit down with 15 Gary and discuss those. 16 EMILY YOUNG: And you had the staff 17 that you were supervising who were going out into 18 the field and taking the photos and assessing the 19 state of stations, for example? 20 ROCK FORTIER: Correct. So every week, 21 staff -- basically we sat down on Monday morning as 22 a group and did a presentation with pictures 23 showing the progress of the stations, so it 24 wouldn't really be a deficiency meeting. It would 25 just be a construction progress update so that the

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1	whole staff would understand how the road work's
2	coming along, how the stations are coming along,
3	and how the tunnel is coming along.
4	EMILY YOUNG: And are you aware whether
5	Mr. Craig would then report that on to others?
6	ROCK FORTIER: No, I'm not aware.
7	EMILY YOUNG: You mention here as well
8	that staff were departing the project during the
9	later stages. What do you mean by that?
10	ROCK FORTIER: So we had a what we
11	called a tunnel lead and a underground station
12	lead, so they were responsible for tracking the
13	progress of the tunnel, basically, or the progress
14	of the underground stations. Initially I had the
15	aboveground stations on the east side of the
16	tunnel, and another program manager had the
17	aboveground stations on the west side of the
18	tunnel. So in 2017, we lost both the the
19	underground station lead and the tunnel lead, so we
20	had to reorganize the office and reorganize our
21	responsibilities accordingly.
22	EMILY YOUNG: Do you know why you lost
23	them?
24	ROCK FORTIER: No. Just staff
25	turnover. They weren't City staff, so

1 They were consultants? EMILY YOUNG: 2 ROCK FORTIER: Correct. 3 EMILY YOUNG: And after the start of 4 service, what did your role look like? 5 ROCK FORTIER: After start of service, 6 it was mainly tracking the deficiencies and closing 7 out some of the -- I quess the claim -- the 8 variation -- variations that we did on the project 9 that we were still negotiating with RTG. 10 EMILY YOUNG: And did those all get 11 resolved? 12 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. I mean, we --13 yes, up until my departure -- I retired in March of 14 2021, and there were still some deficiencies on the 15 fixed facility file that Gary was tracking. 16 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And who stepped 17 into your role when you retired? 18 ROCK FORTIER: Gary and I were the last 19 two standing, so basically I left, and he was by 20 himself. 21 EMILY YOUNG: And was that because 22 construction had essentially wrapped up for 23 Stage 1? 24 That's correct, yeah. THE WITNESS: 25 Okay. So I'll just take EMILY YOUNG:

1 down your CV. And, madam reporter, if we could 2 make that the first exhibit. 3 EXHIBIT 1: CV of Rock Fortier 4 EMILY YOUNG: Could you just clarify 5 for me what the relationship is between the Rail 6 Implementation Office and O-Train Construction, 7 whether they're the same or if there's any 8 difference? 9 ROCK FORTIER: It's -- it's the same. 10 It's the same. 11 EMILY YOUNG: And how did you 12 understand the mandate of the RIO OTC? 13 ROCK FORTIER: Well, RIO basically was 14 its own -- I'm not sure I'm using the right terms 15 here, but its own department, whereas later on in 16 the file, like, we were -- our mandate was to 17 deliver a project to OC Transpo, who was our 18 client. Later on in the file, we became a part of 19 the transportation planning, so we became part of 20 John Manconi's organization. So -- and then they 21 rebranded the office because they -- they did the 22 O-Train construction line 1, line 2, so we would 23 have the LRT line and the O-Train line, I quess, 24 that we called. 25 EMILY YOUNG: And did that shift happen

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1	when there was the reorganization that occurred in
2	2015?
3	ROCK FORTIER: That sounds about right.
4	EMILY YOUNG: Did that change your work
5	in any meaningful way?
б	ROCK FORTIER: It involved more
7	reporting for Gary to John, and they started OC
8	Transpo started tracking more aggressively the
9	opening sequence that needed to be done for opening
10	the on time, basically. So what they would
11	call they had the RAMP, and I'm not sure what
12	the acronym stands for. It's It's
13	EMILY YOUNG: Rail Activation
14	Management Program, perhaps?
15	ROCK FORTIER: Plan
16	EMILY YOUNG: Plan, okay.
17	ROCK FORTIER: maybe program, yeah.
18	So they had RAMP meetings, and every once in a
19	while I would act for Gary when he was on vacation,
20	and I would have to present the status file, I
21	guess, to the RAMP.
22	EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall when RAMP
23	started?
24	ROCK FORTIER: I do not.
25	EMILY YOUNG: Was it John Manconi who

1 would have created it or someone else? 2 ROCK FORTIER: I'm -- I don't know. I 3 quess John was attending, so -- but he had -- he 4 did have a consultant, Joe North, that was leading 5 the program, I quess. 6 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And is Joe North 7 from STV? 8 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, I think so. 9 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And what did you 10 understand the purpose of RAMP to be? 11 ROCK FORTIER: It -- it was the --12 tracking -- tracking to make sure that 13 everything -- because the LRT program is -- has 14 very many facets to be able to open, so we needed 15 to, for instance, make sure that our vehicles were 16 ready; we needed to make sure that the stations 17 were ready, the fare gates were ready, and somebody 18 also needed to make the decision whether or not 19 fare gates was critical to opening on time, you 20 know, because there were talks about, you know, if 21 fare gates are not ready, can we open without fare 22 for 1 or 2 months, something like that. So those 23 high-level discussions were done at the RAMP 24 meetings. 25 EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall who else

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1 was involved in RAMP, aside from Joe Manconi, Joe 2 North, Gary Craig when he was there? 3 ROCK FORTIER: So it's John Manconi, 4 but --5 EMILY YOUNG: Sorry. 6 ROCK FORTIER: So the -- yeah, that's 7 fine. So Richard Holder was there, for instance, 8 right, and he would -- I think he would track the 9 vehicles and the systems aspect of the LRT, so, 10 like, the CCTV cameras and that type of items, you 11 know, like, the emergency phones and what have you. 12 And from the LRT office, I think that's pretty much 13 it. 14 There was also obviously OC Transpo 15 employees there because they were responsible for 16 implementation of the fare gates, and they were 17 tracking -- well, we were tracking the station, so 18 I do know that we had probably eight people around 19 the table, and John had three -- three persons who 20 would fly in from the States every once in a while 21 to -- to come in and look at those meetings and --22 and see how we were tracking compared to -- because 23 they had a vast experience of implementing LRT 24 projects. 25 And when you were EMILY YOUNG:

1 involved in RAMP, you would have been reporting on 2 the status of station construction. Was there 3 anything else that you were also reporting on? 4 ROCK FORTIER: Well, likely the track 5 work, how that was progressing. And, you know, 6 obviously the tunnel. 7 EMILY YOUNG: And do you recall that 8 there was a go/no-go list that was part of RAMP's 9 work? 10 ROCK FORTIER: Now that you mention it, 11 I do recall that there was a qo/no-qo, but I 12 don't -- I didn't attend enough meetings to really 13 understand what that list -- like, it wasn't 14 really -- it's a high-level discussion, obviously, 15 and I wasn't part of any of those negotiations. 16 EMILY YOUNG: And do you remember that 17 it was something that would show, you know, beside 18 a certain critical element green, yellow, red? Is 19 that something you remember? 20 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. So that's --21 that's what -- we would colour code our -- our --22 our stuff that we were tracking, and -- and I quess 23 that's part of the discussion where, you know, did 24 the fare gates really belong on the go/no-go list 25 and that type of stuff, right? So...

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1	EMILY YOUNG: Right. And so if
2	something was considered critical and was on that
3	list, that would mean you can't start service
4	without it.
5	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.
6	EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember whether
7	there were any debates about what should be
8	considered critical and what should not be?
9	ROCK FORTIER: I don't recall. I
10	don't I wasn't part of those discussions, if
11	I'm sure they happened, but I wasn't part of the
12	discussions.
13	EMILY YOUNG: Do you know whether the
14	City made decisions or took any action based on
15	what was being discussed in RAMP and then what the
16	findings of those reporting to RAMP were?
17	ROCK FORTIER: Oh, I so you're
18	asking me if I know. You know, obviously it
19	affected what we were reporting at our level to
20	Gary, so Gary would say, okay, well, I need to
21	track these items more aggressively, or that type
22	of stuff. So I guess it did impact, yeah. So I
23	don't know what else to say to that question.
24	EMILY YOUNG: So Gary Craig would
25	receive instructions at RAMP about what his staff

1	should be looking at most closely.
2	ROCK FORTIER: Right.
3	EMILY YOUNG: And would that generally
4	be based on what the City was worried about?
5	ROCK FORTIER: Yes. Yes.
6	EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember what
7	those things were?
8	ROCK FORTIER: Obviously the vehicles
9	were of interest, right? So and everything that
10	is on there, and then after the we were we
11	had we had leaks in the tunnel, for instance,
12	that were still happening fairly late in the
13	process, so we were asked to look at those areas
14	because it's not too, too bad in the summer months
15	to have the leaks, but in the winter, it turns to
16	ice, so we were asked to track the leaks because
17	they were they were injecting I guess
18	pressure injecting sealant so to stop those
19	leaks, so they asked us to track those, for
20	instance.
21	EMILY YOUNG: And ultimately RTG
22	finished that work, and they filled all the leaks?
23	ROCK FORTIER: Yes, yeah.
24	EMILY YOUNG: And if you or your staff
25	or anyone in your office spotted issues with

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1	progress or had concerns, what tools were available
2	to the City to respond to those concerns?
3	ROCK FORTIER: So we would have a
4	weekly meeting with RTG, so Gary, myself, and the
5	other program manager would attend these weekly
6	meetings, and we had opportunities to discuss our
7	major concerns at that table.
8	EMILY YOUNG: So you would raise your
9	concerns with RTG, discuss them, and then
10	presumably monitor the things that you were
11	concerned about.
12	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.
13	EMILY YOUNG: And these weekly meetings
14	with RTG, did those happen throughout the entirety
15	of construction, or did they start at a certain
16	point in time?
17	ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, I believe that
18	yeah, they started at the it might have been
19	biweekly. I can't recall. But I know that we were
20	actively engaged with them right from the start.
21	EMILY YOUNG: Who would you have been
22	dealing with on the RTG side at those meetings?
23	ROCK FORTIER: So the technical
24	director was Roger Schmidt, so he would lead the
25	technical design type of deal, and on the

1 construction side, it was Tim Stewart that I dealt 2 with. 3 EMILY YOUNG: And on the City side, it 4 would be you, Mr. Craiq, Mr. Holder? Anyone else? 5 Abdol Nouraeyan. ROCK FORTIER: 6 EMILY YOUNG: And just going back to 7 RAMP, do you think that RAMP was effective in 8 achieving its purpose? 9 ROCK FORTIER: Yes, I -- I believe that 10 it's a necessary tool to be able to track, you 11 know, what is absolutely required to open the 12 system. 13 EMILY YOUNG: And would you also have 14 been receiving reliability reports from Alstom at 15 that time? 16 ROCK FORTIER: I -- I did not deal with 17 the vehicles, so... 18 EMILY YOUNG: That was under 19 Mr. Holder's branch? 20 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, correct. 21 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. But you, I assume, 22 would have been aware of some of the challenges 23 that the trains were facing around 2019 when RSA 24 was approaching? 25 ROCK FORTIER: Over a beer or something

1 like that, something may have been mentioned, 2 and -- but let's just say I had enough on our plate 3 to track and -- that -- to delve into details on 4 another branch's duties... 5 EMILY YOUNG: Fair enough. Do you б think, going back to RIO and OTC, that your office 7 had the expertise and the resources that you needed 8 to do your work? 9 So as a City staff, not ROCK FORTIER: 10 having any LRT experience, that's the purpose of 11 hiring subject matter experts who can guide us to 12 write a proper performance spec and to track the 13 implementation of that system. So that was the

purpose of hiring CTP, and so that they could guide
 us down the right path, I guess.

¹⁶ EMILY YOUNG: Were there other subject
 ¹⁷ matter experts aside from CTP that the City office
 ¹⁸ also worked with?

ROCK FORTIER: Yes. So we -- like, we had consultants as -- working as -- almost integrated with City staff. I mentioned the tunnel lead and the underground station lead. And we also had a station lead, I guess, that would work very closely with the architect, CTP's architect, and we had a vehicle and systems lead that was also a

1 non-City staff, I quess, a consultant. So wherever 2 our -- Gary felt that he needed expertise, he 3 reached out to the industry and got that subject 4 matter expertise. 5 EMILY YOUNG: And who were the 6 consultants that were reporting to you? 7 ROCK FORTIER: Like, you mean CTP? 8 CTP or the tunnel lead --EMILY YOUNG: 9 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, so the tunnel lead 10 didn't report to me. He reported right to Gary, 11 When the tunnel lead left, the tunnel was right? 12 basically completed, and he was just at that point 13 tracking deficiencies. And so when he left, 14 because our workload as a group also went down, I 15 took over tracking those deficiencies since I was 16 in the tunnel already tracking the track work. So 17 I didn't have any consultants reporting to me other 18 than basically working with CTP. 19 EMILY YOUNG: And what was the tunnel 20 lead's name? 21 ROCK FORTIER: Robert Freedman. 22 EMILY YOUNG: You mentioned that 23 Mr. Craig would look to consultants in the industry 24 to bolster the City's expertise wherever necessary. 25 Do you think that there were any gaps left, or did

1	he manage to cover everything?
2	ROCK FORTIER: I believe we were
3	adequately covered.
4	EMILY YOUNG: Was there any kind of
5	plan or document that governed your department's
6	work?
7	ROCK FORTIER: Well, like, I mean, of
8	course there being a City department, you need
9	to have plans in place, like emergency management
10	plans and that type of stuff, but I don't think
11	that's what you're hinting at.
12	EMILY YOUNG: Yeah, something more like
13	a project management plan or that sort of thing.
14	ROCK FORTIER: No, I don't I don't
15	know. That would be in Gary's hands, I guess.
16	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And how many
17	people did you have that were reporting to you?
18	ROCK FORTIER: Probably five or six at
19	the most, maybe seven.
20	EMILY YOUNG: You reported to
21	Mr. Craig, and he would then report to Steve
22	Cripps; is that right?
23	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.
24	EMILY YOUNG: And in your work, did you
25	have interactions with other parts of the City like

1 OC Transpo and the Executive Steering Committee for 2 the LRT? 3 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, so not the 4 Executive Steering Committee; however, I did 5 interact with OC Transpo, especially near the end of the project, that -- 2018, '19 type of deal 6 7 where they had substantial challenges implementing 8 the fare gates. 9 And the fare gates, I EMILY YOUNG: 10 understand, are a point of dispute between the City 11 and RTG? 12 ROCK FORTIER: It was, yes. 13 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So going back a 14 bit to procurement, could you describe your role in 15 procurement, to the extent that you haven't told us 16 about it already, in terms of overseeing the PSOS. 17 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. So -- no, I think 18 I've covered it off entirely. I mean, I did 19 mention the commercial briefing that they did to 20 us, presentations and that type of stuff, so... 21 EMILY YOUNG: So it sounds like you did 22 not have any role in reviewing or developing the 23 PSOS for the vehicles. 24 That is correct. ROCK FORTIER: 25 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Do you have a view

1	in general on the degree of prescriptiveness of the
2	City's PSOS?
3	ROCK FORTIER: No. I think
4	Infrastructure Ontario wanted us to be to
5	leave to let the industry decide what is best to
6	implement so that they would have more ability
7	to as the experts in these systems, they would
8	have a better ability to implement what they
9	wanted.
10	EMILY YOUNG: Did the City follow that
11	advice from Infrastructure Ontario?
12	ROCK FORTIER: We did.
13	EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall any
14	proponents raising concerns about the
15	prescriptiveness of the PSOS?
16	ROCK FORTIER: No, I don't recall. I
17	don't they never raised it on my stuff. Yeah.
18	EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall that there
19	were some changes made to station design in
20	response to comments from any proponents?
21	ROCK FORTIER: No, I don't recall.
22	EMILY YOUNG: Okay.
23	ROCK FORTIER: I don't like, I
24	wasn't part of those discussions if they happened.
25	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Would you have any

1 knowledge -- I expect the answer is no, but on the City's requirement for 100 percent low floor 2 3 vehicles? 4 ROCK FORTIER: No. 5 Okay. And any knowledge EMILY YOUNG: 6 of the Canadian content requirement for vehicles? 7 ROCK FORTIER: Well, I knew that they 8 needed to have 25 percent Canadian content, but I 9 don't know anything about how that was reviewed, I 10 quess. 11 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And are you aware 12 of the City ever asking the Province to change or 13 reduce that requirement? 14 ROCK FORTIER: No. 15 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know why CAF was 16 rejected as RTG's preferred vehicle supplier? 17 ROCK FORTIER: No. I don't know the 18 acronym you're using. I don't know. 19 Okay. Do you have any EMILY YOUNG: 20 recollection of how the specs for the rail line 21 itself were developed? 22 ROCK FORTIER: So as I mentioned at the 23 onset, I didn't have any track work experience 24 myself, and I relied heavily on CTP to do it. I 25 think their consultant, the overall project lead, I

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1	guess, for CTP was Paul Beede who had track work
2	and lead civil experience, but the track work
3	design was done I believe out of California.
4	EMILY YOUNG: And do you recall what
5	firm out of California was doing that?
6	ROCK FORTIER: I would I would think
7	it would be under CT STV's umbrella, but I'm not
8	sure. Like the PSOS, sorry. I said the design,
9	but I meant the PSOS.
10	EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall how the
11	speed profile for the system was developed?
12	ROCK FORTIER: The what profile?
13	EMILY YOUNG: The speed profile.
14	ROCK FORTIER: No.
15	EMILY YOUNG: And you mentioned you
16	were involved in some of the commercially
17	confidential meetings and some of the design
18	presentation meetings throughout procurement. Do
19	you remember any particular challenges or big
20	issues that came up in those meetings?
21	ROCK FORTIER: No, other than the one I
22	mentioned with regards to the detour that they were
23	going to implement at the eastern portal, and we
24	thought it would be a challenge to implement the
25	that detour in place.

1 EMILY YOUNG: And was it ultimately a 2 challenge? 3 ROCK FORTIER: It was a challenge, and 4 it involved a lot of meetings with OC Transpo as 5 the reason it's a challenge is because the buses -6 and specifically the articulated buses - needed to 7 navigate two sharp turns and queue up in time, so 8 we needed a lot of City staff to discuss the signal 9 design and the lane design, and we also needed 10 property being leased from Ottawa U and a private 11 developer on the other side. 12 EMILY YOUNG: Was OC Transpo involved 13 in those initial discussions about that detour? 14 ROCK FORTIER: Not during the 15 procurement stage, but they were involved during 16 the design stage. 17 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think it would 18 have been helpful to have them involved earlier? 19 ROCK FORTIER: No, we had an OC Transpo 20 program manager that was -- had the -- a planning 21 aspect, that was integrated in the Rail 22 Implementation Office who was helping reviewing 23 those bids. 24 So you did have somebody EMILY YOUNG: 25

who was bringing an OC Transpo perspective to the

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1	procurement review?
2	ROCK FORTIER: Yes.
3	EMILY YOUNG: And did that person stay
4	on throughout construction in your office?
5	ROCK FORTIER: Yes, I he he left
6	late in the project, so at 2017 maybe type of deal.
7	EMILY YOUNG: What's his name?
8	ROCK FORTIER: It will come to me.
9	I'll ask me before the end of the meeting.
10	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Did you have any
11	involvement in the discussions and the
12	decisionmaking about the geotechnical risk?
13	ROCK FORTIER: The name was Rick
14	Zarzosa.
15	EMILY YOUNG: Oh, that was fast. Thank
16	you.
17	ROCK FORTIER: If you could repeat your
18	question.
19	EMILY YOUNG: Of course. My question
20	was whether you were involved in the discussions
21	and decisionmaking about geotechnical risk.
22	ROCK FORTIER: I wasn't involved in the
23	discussion and the decisionmaking process. I
24	however, I was aware that the proponents had
25	options to accept the risk of, you know, the GBR or

1 GDR, whatever it's called, and so -- but I wasn't 2 involved in the discussions, and I'm not sure what 3 they meant. 4 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know who would 5 have been the central people involved in those 6 discussions? 7 ROCK FORTIER: Gary and the tunnel 8 lead, the -- Robert Freedman. 9 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Do you know 10 whether full risk transfer was a requirement coming 11 from the City? 12 ROCK FORTIER: I think, as I mentioned, 13 the proponent had options to do the full transfer 14 or not. 15 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any 16 challenges the proponents raised during procurement 17 about the geotech risk? 18 ROCK FORTIER: I am not aware, no. 19 EMILY YOUNG: Were you involved in 20 discussions of decisionmaking about what 21 procurement model to use to deliver the project? 22 No, I wasn't involved in ROCK FORTIER: 23 it, no. 24 EMILY YOUNG: Were you aware of those 25 discussions happening?

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1	ROCK FORTIER: Of the type of
2	procurement? Is that what you said?
3	EMILY YOUNG: Yeah, sorry. I might not
4	have been very clear with that question. The type
5	of delivery model: so design, build, maintain; or
6	design, build, finance, maintain, those types of
7	questions.
8	ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, no, I I guess
9	at the initial stages, I was fairly I was just a
10	senior engineer hired to manage the civil files.
11	EMILY YOUNG: Were you involved in
12	discussions and decisionmaking about the liquidated
13	damages that were included in the project
14	agreement?
15	ROCK FORTIER: No.
16	EMILY YOUNG: Did you have any role in
17	working on or reviewing the requirements for
18	testing and commissioning and trial running?
19	ROCK FORTIER: For testing and
20	commissioning. So for the trial running itself?
21	EMILY YOUNG: Yeah. Were you aware of
22	what requirements were included in the PA about
23	trial running?
24	ROCK FORTIER: Well, yeah. I guess
25	they kept telling us that they needed to have I

1 think 10 or 12 days of free -- without any errors, 2 I guess, and everything working perfectly. So I 3 think Richard Holder's team looked at the systems 4 component aspect of that trial running, so I am not 5 involved in it, I guess. 6 When you say "they kept EMILY YOUNG: 7 telling us they would need 12 days," who is "they"? 8 Lorne Gray, basically. ROCK FORTIER: 9 Lorne was the contract manager. 10 EMILY YOUNG: Okav. So in terms of 11 people to speak to about those requirements, that 12 would be more so Lorne Gray and Richard Holder? 13 ROCK FORTIER: I would think so. 14 EMILY YOUNG: And I know that you 15 weren't involved in the review of the PSOS for the 16 vehicle, but throughout procurement, what was your 17 understanding of Alstom's vehicle and whether it 18 was a proven vehicle or not? 19 ROCK FORTIER: I'm not -- I don't want 20 to offer an opinion on that because I'm not a 21 vehicle expert and never been exposed to an LRT 22 vehicle, so I wouldn't know if it's a proven 23 vehicle or not, I quess. 24 Could you describe your EMILY YOUNG: 25 department's role and your role throughout the

1 design phase. 2 ROCK FORTIER: So throughout the design 3 phase, I would look at all the -- just a minute. 4 My dog is barking at me. 5 So during the design phase, we were 6 looking at all the detours that were being planned, 7 so -- and the implementation in the field, right, 8 and so -- but during the design phase, we would 9 closely look at those because our buses needed to 10 be taken off the transitway and put on the road 11 network of the City, so that was part of the civil 12 works in coordination with the traffic planning 13 folks, and then on the civil end, again, in the 14 quideway, we had some retaining walls that were 15 being built. We had the Booth Street Bridge, so 16 that involved a -- guideways -- elevated guideways 17 leading into Hurdman Station for (indiscernible). 18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Let's pause. 19 Mr. Fortier, you are having tech issues. I'm not 20 sure he's able to hear us right now. 21 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, it says my 22 connection is unstable. 23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. I was 24 qoing to suggest --25 ROCK FORTIER: I can hear you.

1	CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. Why don't
2	we finish your answer, and then I was going to
3	suggest we take an early break and we may have time
4	to resolve it.
5	ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, it says my
6	internet connection is unstable. Yeah. So I don't
7	know if you got all that what I had to say
8	there.
9	EMILY YOUNG: No, unfortunately we
10	didn't.
11	ROCK FORTIER: Okay. So we had a
12	quite a bit of elevated guideway and bridge design
13	work to review; we had the track work, you know,
14	the overhead catenary foundation system, and some
15	of the sewer design that they did.
16	CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Mr. Fortier's
17	frozen again. Yeah, let's go off record.
18	OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION
19	RECESS AT 10:10
20	UPON RESUMING AT 10:30
21	EMILY YOUNG: Mr. Fortier, when
22	speaking about some of the issues that you and your
23	office dealt with during design, you were talking
24	about the implementation of detours and things like
25	that that would be needed I think during

1 construction, and my question is whether OC Transpo 2 was involved in this part of your design review. 3 ROCK FORTIER: So we had -- we had 4 staff from OC Transpo embedded in the rail office, 5 so -- at the time. So they were I quess ex-OC 6 Transpo employees, I suppose. 7 EMILY YOUNG: And they would have been 8 bringing the OC Transpo sort of perspective to the 9 work? 10 ROCK FORTIER: Correct. 11 EMILY YOUNG: And did you feel that 12 there was enough planning in the design phase for 13 the overall integration of the system? This is, 14 like, how all the different aspects of the system 15 would work together. 16 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. You got to recall 17 that the design is the responsibility of RTG, and they themselves had lots of internal meetings that 18 19 we were not aware of that -- I mean not part of, so 20 I can't comment as to how the design was developed 21 at their end, I quess. 22 EMILY YOUNG: But from the City's end, 23 was one of the things that you were looking at that 24 broad issue of how is all of this going to 25 integrate and work together?

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1	ROCK FORTIER: It worked a lot better
2	once we were part of John's organization.
3	EMILY YOUNG: Why is that?
4	ROCK FORTIER: The design review was
5	further along, I guess, in the process, and we were
6	getting closer to revenue service, right, so
7	initially, you know, design on the stations and
8	stuff like that, we didn't need OC Transpo input so
9	much, but for instance, once we started discussing
10	the fare gates and, you know, the that type of
11	stuff, it it involves constructing inside the
12	station that is basically still in RTG's hands. So
13	it needed a lot of their coordination.
14	EMILY YOUNG: And who was mainly
15	responsible for that coordination on the City side?
16	ROCK FORTIER: Well, I myself and
17	Abdol did a lot of coordination with OC Transpo
18	with regards to the fare gates and implementation,
19	and OC Transpo had retained a consultant to deliver
20	the fare gate project.
21	EMILY YOUNG: Do you think it would
22	have been helpful to have had that reorganization
23	to bring you within OC Transpo's purview earlier on
24	in the project?
25	ROCK FORTIER: Yes.

1 EMILY YOUNG: Are there any issues or 2 challenges that you think might have been avoided 3 if that had been done? 4 ROCK FORTIER: I think the fare gates 5 is a good example of that. 6 EMILY YOUNG: And can you speak a 7 little bit more about what happened with the fare 8 qates. 9 The acquisition of the ROCK FORTIER: 10 fare gates could have -- could have been better 11 discussed with RTG earlier in the project. 12 EMILY YOUNG: And what was the result 13 of not having done that? 14 ROCK FORTIER: We ended up having to 15 make slight modifications to the stations to 16 protect the fare gates from the elements. 17 EMILY YOUNG: And why do you think that 18 part was missed earlier on in planning? 19 ROCK FORTIER: I can't comment on that. 20 I really don't -- don't really know what -- how 21 come the fare gates were not part of the station 22 packages. I think those discussions were done at 23 another level than mine and early on in the 24 project, in the procurement process. 25 EMILY YOUNG: What level? Do you know

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1 who that would have been? 2 ROCK FORTIER: Well, I'm assuming John 3 Jensen would have been part of those discussions. 4 He was Gary's boss, I guess, and so somebody would 5 have made the decision to include or not, and it 6 would have been made at that level, I think. 7 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware whether 8 there was anything called a concept of operations 9 that was devised during the design phase? 10 ROCK FORTIER: I am not aware, no. 11 EMILY YOUNG: And are the fare gates 12 sort of the only example that you can think of, of 13 an issue where maybe the City hadn't considered the 14 broader system early on enough? 15 ROCK FORTIER: I can't think of another 16 right now, no. 17 EMILY YOUNG: Can you describe your 18 department's role and your role throughout the 19 construction process, what you did to oversee RTG's 20 work? 21 Yeah. ROCK FORTIER: So during the 22 construction, we were monitoring the construction, 23 not as -- not as inspectors necessarily but more as 24 to track the construction progress, and so that 25 kind of led to eventually being able to report on

RAMP the station progress, right, that colour code, but we were also tracking any site changes that the constructor chose to do as it pertains to the PSOS. So sometimes the design -- the final design drawings, construction drawings were given to the constructor, and the constructor chose to not implement those drawings.

8 So, for instance, at Rideau East, we 9 had an architectural wall between the Rideau 10 entrance and the bank because we're embedded in the 11 bank station there, and the design drawing showed a 12 glass wall basically being implemented. The 13 constructor decided that it was too expensive to 14 implement glass, and he just erected a masonry 15 wall, and so -- so that was something we noticed in 16 the field, and when we questioned the constructor, 17 he said that it -- he went back to the PSOS and that the PSOS did not require this wall to be glass 18 19 and that it was his option to implement an 20 alternative. So basically going back to the 21 performance spec and choosing to apply the 22 performance spec. So we were monitoring those 23 types of changes, for instance.

EMILY YOUNG: And when you referred to the design drawings that had a glass wall, those

1 are the drawings that would have been prepared by 2 CTP? 3 ROCK FORTIER: No, by RTG. 4 Oh, okay. So their own EMILY YOUNG: 5 drawings. 6 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. 7 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So you were 8 looking to see whether they were diverging in any 9 way from the design that they had originally come 10 up with. 11 ROCK FORTIER: Correct, because they're 12 responsible for the design, and basically sometimes 13 the constructor chose to deviate from their own 14 design. 15 And would that have been EMILY YOUNG: 16 acceptable to the City in some circumstances and 17 then not in others? 18 ROCK FORTIER: Well, that's the thing 19 that we did too is we checked the performance spec, 20 and if the performance spec required something that 21 they were trying to deviate from, we would bring it 22 up to those weekly or biweekly meetings with RTG. 23 Okay. And did that ever EMILY YOUNG: 24 happen that you recall? 25 ROCK FORTIER: Oh, I'm sure it did, but

1 I can't give you an example, I guess. 2 EMILY YOUNG: And what would happen if 3 there was a dispute about what the PSOS required? 4 ROCK FORTIER: If -- if it was a 5 dispute and we were -- and it was in the 6 performance spec, we would go to our contract 7 manager, Lorne Gray, and inform him that this is 8 our interpretation of what's required and that they 9 were not implementing this in the field, and he 10 would reach out on -- to RTG's contract manager and 11 discuss, and then basically let us know their 12 interpretation, our interpretation, and sometimes 13 it would fix the challenges, I guess. 14 EMILY YOUNG: And if not, would it then 15 be escalated? 16 Then it would be ROCK FORTIER: 17 escalated, and -- at our end, and if -- if it was 18 important enough, then we would issue a variation 19 directive telling them no, you'll implement this, 20 and then -- which would lead them to then in some 21 cases claim -- put a claim to the City for 22 directing them to do this work. 23 And can you remember any EMILY YOUNG: 24 of those variation directives at this point? 25 ROCK FORTIER: No, I can't recall any

1 specific ones. 2 EMILY YOUNG: So you oversaw 3 construction progress throughout that phase. Were 4 you also looking to oversee the quality of 5 construction? 6 ROCK FORTIER: I would say no. No. 7 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know if there was 8 anyone who was doing that? 9 ROCK FORTIER: RTG themselves. They 10 had their quality assurance team. 11 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So you were 12 relying on their quality assurance team. 13 ROCK FORTIER: We did have a discussion 14 on the quality of architectural concrete, and that 15 was discussed between our architect and their 16 construction team. So in some instances, we did 17 feel that, you know, the architectural concrete -18 which is concrete that was exposed to the naked 19 eye, basically - wasn't up to par, so I quess that 20 would be an instance of quality assurance, I 21 suppose. But it was very seldom -- that wasn't our 22 main purpose, looking at -- at the construction. 23 EMILY YOUNG: Do you think it would 24 have been helpful to have a quality assurance team 25 on the City side?

1	ROCK FORTIER: It would have involved a
2	whole bunch of other other staff requirement and
3	another level of inspection altogether, which is
4	not really a design build approach to that was
5	chosen.
6	EMILY YOUNG: Can you speak about how
7	the City handled the second sinkhole, first sort of
8	in the immediate aftermath of the sinkhole?
9	ROCK FORTIER: How we handled it?
10	That's the question?
11	EMILY YOUNG: Yes.
12	ROCK FORTIER: So the site was turned
13	over to our City department, so to RIO, after the
14	police and and fire firefighters left, and we
15	then instructed RTG to fix the the the issue,
16	and they in turn started filling the concrete
17	the sinkhole with concrete up to the underside of
18	where the sanitary sewer starts, and then after
19	that set, we started prioritizing the restoring
20	the services for Cadillac Fairview, Hudson's Bay,
21	and all the customers that were being affected in
22	that area. So prioritizing sometimes, you know, by
23	fixing a short section of the water main, sometimes
24	you would get three customers online as opposed to
25	getting a long section that will only get one

1 customer back online, so that type of prioritizing 2 decisions. 3 How long was RIO in EMILY YOUNG: 4 charge of the site around the sinkhole? 5 ROCK FORTIER: Before turning over to 6 RTG? 7 EMILY YOUNG: Yes. 8 ROCK FORTIER: Is that what you mean? 9 I'd say probably 30 seconds. 10 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So you sort of 11 came onsite, you said this is what needs to happen, 12 and you instructed RTG to do that. 13 ROCK FORTIER: No. No. So how it. 14 happened was I was onsite with the firefighters and 15 the police services, and we were having hourly 16 debriefings, and once police and firefighters 17 decided that they were satisfied nobody had -- the 18 site was secured and that nobody had suffered 19 death, I guess, for lack of better words, then 20 they -- they -- their job is to turn it over to the 21 City department. Typically it's construction 22 services because we're responsible for the road. 23 In this case, they felt that the tunnel 24 had been impacted and that it should be RIO that is 25 being turned over, so I happened to be there with

1	RTG, and the police turned to RTG and said, So are
2	you guys ready to fix the sinkhole? And they said,
3	Yes, you just have to say the word, and they
4	said they turned to me and said, Well, we can't
5	give you the site. We have to give it to the City
6	department. So here here, we're officially
7	turning the site over to RIO, Rock, and I turned it
8	over and said, Okay, well, I'm turning the site
9	over to RTG to fix.
10	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So you basically
11	said, Do what you need to do to fix this.
12	ROCK FORTIER: Yeah.
13	EMILY YOUNG: And do you feel that
14	their response was effective in the short term?
15	ROCK FORTIER: Yes, I think that they
16	basically were very prepared to do so. I think
17	concrete trucks started coming in right away, and
18	so I think they were they had looked at how to
19	fix this in the interim while the police was
20	investigating the area.
21	EMILY YOUNG: And did you continue to
22	monitor that closely as they repaired the damage?
23	ROCK FORTIER: Yes, I was the incident
24	commander onsite, and I had a small team assigned
25	to me that would track their progress and work with

1	them to prioritize the fix, I guess, of the
2	utilities.
3	EMILY YOUNG: And throughout that work,
4	prioritizing the fixes and implementing them, what
5	was the relationship between the City and RTG like?
6	ROCK FORTIER: Very collaborative,
7	I guess.
8	EMILY YOUNG: And can you speak a
9	little bit about the broader effects that the
10	sinkhole had on the project a bit more in the long
11	term.
12	ROCK FORTIER: Well, on the
13	construction itself, basically the tunnel was
14	affected downstairs for, oh, I'd say I'd say
15	probably 200 metres we had fill in the tunnel. It
16	took a long time to clean, and and also it took
17	detailed engineering reports to satisfy the City
18	that it was safe to restart tunnelling operations.
19	EMILY YOUNG: And were these reports
20	that RTG was preparing or that consultants were
21	preparing?
22	ROCK FORTIER: Yes, it was their
23	geotechnical consultants for the tunnel was
24	Dr. Sauer & Partners, and it was their engineers
25	who briefed us on the sequence of operation going

1 forward. 2 EMILY YOUNG: And so you were part of 3 the team that was being briefed and that was 4 receiving and reviewing the reports? 5 No, not really. ROCK FORTIER: We 6 still had the tunnel lead at that point. That 7 was -- I was not at all the briefings or reviewing 8 the reports. 9 EMILY YOUNG: And did the City itself 10 take steps to understand the broader effects of the 11 sinkhole on the project as a whole, on the schedule 12 for the project? 13 The tunnel was not on ROCK FORTIER: 14 the critical path, so I believe they looked at 15 whether or not the critical path was being 16 affected, but again, I was not part of the -- the 17 tunnel team, so I don't know. 18 EMILY YOUNG: So that was mainly the 19 tunnel lead that was looking at that? 20 ROCK FORTIER: Would have been with 21 Gary and discussed with RTG. 22 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of the 23 discussions about the effect the sinkhole might 24 have had on the elements of construction that were 25 on the critical path?

20

1 ROCK FORTIER: No. 2 EMILY YOUNG: And what about effect on 3 the construction of stations, for example, which I 4 understand you were involved to some extent in 5 monitoring that? 6 ROCK FORTIER: Right. So Rideau 7 Station would have been affected because when 8 tunnelling operation resumed, instead of excavating 9 from the west, they started excavating from the 10 east, which is where the Rideau Station is, so they 11 had to just keep a path open so that the excavating 12 material could be hauled out. I don't think it had 13 a major impact on Rideau Station itself, and it was 14 similar at Parliament Station because whatever 15 material they were excavating from the tunnel to 16 clean it up, we needed a path of eqress to bring it 17 to the central portal of material. 18 EMILY YOUNG: So do you think that the 19 later delays that were seen in station construction

21 ROCK FORTIER: Yes, possibly, you could 22 say, you know -- you might have had one or two 23 months, but I'm not sure that you couldn't have 24 accelerated and recovered if you felt that it would 25 impact your critical path.

were affected at all by the sinkhole?

1 Okay. So there might EMILY YOUNG: 2 have been more that RTG could have done to mitigate 3 and to recover from the sinkhole? 4 No. I mean, why would ROCK FORTIER: 5 you incur the expenses if you don't need to, right? 6 So if it's not on the critical path, then why would 7 you incur the expense of accelerating and working 8 overtime to fix something that doesn't need to be 9 accelerated? 10 EMILY YOUNG: Were the stations 11 themselves on the critical path? 12 ROCK FORTIER: No. No. The stations 13 were completed prior to the train running, 14 basically, right? 15 Right. But if they were EMILY YOUNG: 16 completed prior to the train running, were they 17 necessary to have the train run? 18 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. I mean, to open 19 the system, you needed to complete it. But we 20 didn't need to have the stations completed for the 21 train to run. 22 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And would the 23 sinkhole have potentially had an impact on the 24 completion of the guideway and the track? 25 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. I mean, you could

1 say that obviously we can't do the track work 2 and -- in that section until it's completed, but 3 again, the track work in the tunnel was not -- was 4 completed ahead of trial running. 5 EMILY YOUNG: So in your view, was the б trains running the kind of main source of delay? 7 ROCK FORTIER: I quess from -- I can't 8 comment on that because I wasn't part of the 9 discussion as to -- final discussion as to RAMP go 10 or no-go, so I don't know what ended up causing the 11 extra time required. 12 EMILY YOUNG: I quess the reason that I 13 ask is because you're explaining that the track was 14 completed and the stations were completed before 15 trains were running, so I'm just trying to figure 16 out in terms of the schedule and progress what --17 why is that significant and what that means. 18 ROCK FORTIER: Right. So I mean, the 19 way I look at it is the stations were completed, 20 ready for the train to come through, and it -- it 21 wasn't done, I quess. So I --22 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So the trains --23 it's not like the trains were waiting for the 24 stations or the track. Is that what you're saying? 25 Well, for the ROCK FORTIER:

1	underground stations, I guess the in the tunnel,
2	you we needed to hang the catenary system, you
3	know, for powering the trains, and that was done
4	fairly late in the process. So I'm not sure if
5	what was holding it up, I guess, because it's not
6	part of the civil works. Like, it's a systems
7	component.
8	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And in terms of
9	the mitigation efforts that were put in place to
10	try and recover from the sinkhole, what was the
11	City's involvement in those efforts?
12	ROCK FORTIER: I honestly was not part
13	of the discussions, and so I think it was done at a
14	higher level than me.
15	EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of requests
16	from RTG and OLRTC for different types of relief in
17	the aftermath of the sinkhole?
18	ROCK FORTIER: I'm not aware, no.
19	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Things like a
20	claim for a delay event or a relief event.
21	ROCK FORTIER: Not aware.
22	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Do you see that
23	there were any other effects of the sinkhole on the
24	project going forward?
25	ROCK FORTIER: Well, sure. I mean, it

1 had a big impact above ground, right? So not 2 necessarily on RTG itself. It's the city of Ottawa 3 and its population and the businesses that were 4 affected because of the -- all the remediation work 5 that needed to be done even after the fact, and so 6 OC Transpo and keeping buses running and those 7 types of challenges and keeping the businesses 8 satisfied in the area.

9 EMILY YOUNG: And that would have been
10 the City working on those things, I assume.

11 ROCK FORTIER: No. Everything was --12 was responsible -- RTG's responsible for 13 maintaining the detours, and these works that they 14 were doing, we felt that these are the works that 15 you're doing to mitigate the sinkhole, and 16 basically the City's view was that the sinkhole was 17 caused by RTG.

EMILY YOUNG: Do you have any view on the -- how well RTG did things like maintaining the detours and implementing the other mitigations at that time?

ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. I mean, they - they -- they had a good traffic manager, which kept
us in the loop. Unfortunately, sometimes some of
these detours and changes were done at the last

1 minute and catching us off guard and not being able 2 to inform the public ahead of time or the 3 councillor. 4 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any 5 challenges or delays that arose in construction of 6 the MSF, the maintenance services facility? 7 ROCK FORTIER: If I'm aware of what? 8 EMILY YOUNG: Any challenges, issues, 9 or delays that arose in the construction of the 10 MSF. 11 ROCK FORTIER: I am not aware, no. 12 EMILY YOUNG: So would your team have 13 been looking at that aspect of construction? 14 ROCK FORTIER: We would have been 15 tracking its progress, yes. 16 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And so you don't 17 recall any issues that your team encountered or 18 raised on that point? 19 ROCK FORTIER: No. 20 EMILY YOUNG: And what about the 21 ballasts on the quideway? Were there any 22 challenges faced there? 23 ROCK FORTIER: We had an inquiry once 24 as to whether or not the ballast contained an 25 inordinate amount of asbestos because it came from

1 a quarry in Quebec, and so the -- RTG's quality 2 assurance team tested the ballast and informed us 3 that it met the -- all specs. That's about the 4 extent of it. 5 So when you say you had EMILY YOUNG: 6 an inquiry, you mean your team raised that with 7 RTG? 8 No, actually, it wasn't ROCK FORTIER: 9 I don't think it was us. I think it was 11S . 10 somebody on RTG's side of the ... 11 It was something you EMILY YOUNG: 12 were -- obviously became aware of or were 13 following? 14 ROCK FORTIER: Right. 15 Did that lead to any kind EMILY YOUNG: 16 of delay or any other challenge? 17 ROCK FORTIER: No. 18 EMILY YOUNG: And what about with the 19 construction of the track? Were there any issues 20 in that respect? 21 ROCK FORTIER: No. We had what was 22 called an L-KOPIA survey requirement in the PSOS. 23 It's basically a requirement to have them do a full 24 survey of the track work via an expensive GPS 25 system, I think. But again, I'm not an expert on

1 track work, right, so -- I just know that it's an 2 L-KOPIA or equivalent, and RTG said that they were 3 going to do the equivalent instead of the L-KOPIA, 4 so that's about the only thing that I recall. 5 EMILY YOUNG: Did that decision have 6 any implications that you're aware of? 7 ROCK FORTIER: I'm unsure because I 8 know that the -- you know, that they had some track 9 work challenges, but I'm not sure if the two are 10 related. 11 EMILY YOUNG: Can you tell us what you 12 know about the track work challenges that they 13 encountered? 14 ROCK FORTIER: No, to be honest. As --15 I got stuff from the news, and I wasn't really sure 16 exactly what -- I know that the train went off the 17 track, but I don't know what the cause was because 18 I -- I don't even know anymore. 19 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So do you recall 20 any issues coming up related to lubrication of the 21 track? 22 ROCK FORTIER: No. I don't -- I don't 23 have any information on that. 24 EMILY YOUNG: On the type of steel used 25 for the track or the type of track more generally?

1	Are you aware of any issues in that regard?
2	ROCK FORTIER: No. No.
3	EMILY YOUNG: And do you recall any
4	issues coming up in relation to the turns on the
5	guideway and how that interacted with the train
6	times and speeds?
7	ROCK FORTIER: So part of the PSOS had
8	maximum radiuses to achieve or minimum, sorry.
9	So and I knew that basically when we were
10	reviewing the alignment, there were three areas of
11	concern and that one of them was exiting Rideau
12	Station to the east and then the two guideways, I
13	guess, at leading into Hurdman Station were also
14	fairly tight radiuses. But the idea was that they
15	felt that they could I guess have automatic
16	greasers on the trains that would take care of
17	that, of the squealing.
18	EMILY YOUNG: So there was a concern on
19	the City's end about those turns?
20	ROCK FORTIER: Well, it was part of the
21	PSOS, though. They met the PSOS of the minimum
22	radius allowed.
23	EMILY YOUNG: And when you and your
24	team were looking at the construction progress, at
25	the progress of the track, were you mainly focused

1 on what was in the PSOS and are they doing it? 2 ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, yeah. We were 3 tracking for the progress and essentially the --4 the review of the design would have been done 5 during the design exercise, right? And I don't 6 think that we had any changes done to the alignment 7 after the final design drawings were approved on 8 the track work. 9 EMILY YOUNG: Do you have any view or 10 understanding of whether those turns could have had 11 an impact on the issues that later arose with the 12 system? 13 ROCK FORTIER: I'm not in a -- in the 14 position to be able to comment on that. 15 And was the concern that EMILY YOUNG: 16 vou mentioned about the sound that would be created 17 by those relatively, I guess, tight turns? 18 ROCK FORTIER: I'm not sure exactly I 19 understand what you're asking. 20 EMILY YOUNG: Do you know why there was 21 a concern in the first place about minimum radius 22 in the PSOS? 23 ROCK FORTIER: So -- yeah. So 24 that's -- my understanding is the tighter the 25 radius is, the more noise you're going to make, and

1 so that's why RTG -- not RTG, CTP came out with 2 those minimum radiuses. 3 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any 4 challenges encountered in the construction or 5 delivery of the overhead catenary? 6 ROCK FORTIER: Well, I -- I'm aware 7 that the -- during trial running -- not trial 8 running but during testing of the train, we had 9 a -- something happen to the catenary system and 10 the train near Ottawa U, but again, it's not part 11 of my responsibility. That's more of a systems 12 aspect of the component, so... 13 Would you have been EMILY YOUNG: 14 looking at how the catenary would have sort of, 15 like, integrated with the guideway? Would that be 16 within your area? 17 Basically, from a ROCK FORTIER: No. 18 civil end and our end, we were looking at the 19 foundations of the overhead catenary, and we 20 weren't tracking the -- or reviewing the overhead 21 catenary system. So -- so it's a systems component 22 that is in the guideway, so it's -- when it -- the 23 review would have came in, it probably would have been under the guideway umbrella, and I would 24 25 have -- I would have flipped it over to systems to

1 comment on it. 2 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And you mentioned 3 earlier that the overhead catenary was installed 4 quite late in the process. Do you have any 5 sense --6 ROCK FORTIER: In the underground 7 tunnel. 8 EMILY YOUNG: And was that a result of 9 the sinkhole, or were there other causes? 10 ROCK FORTIER: Well, we had tunnel 11 leaks, right, so they wanted to get done that 12 aspect as soon as possible, and it did take a while 13 to finalize the lining of the entire tunnel. 14 EMILY YOUNG: So it was waiting for 15 that to happen? 16 ROCK FORTIER: Correct. 17 EMILY YOUNG: And did it take a while 18 to finalize the lining of the tunnel because of the 19 leak issues or some other reason? 20 ROCK FORTIER: I don't know. Again, I 21 wasn't a tunnel lead, right, so I can't really --22 can't really say because by the time I was 23 monitoring the tunnel, it was completed, so I don't 24 know if they were running late or not. 25 EMILY YOUNG: And by the time that you

1 were overseeing the tunnel, had sort of the delays 2 kind of been dealt with and recovered from? 3 ROCK FORTIER: I -- again, I don't 4 I don't know if we were running late or not. know. 5 So I took over, the tunnel was completed, and I saw 6 the track work and the overhead catenary being 7 implemented in the tunnel. 8 Okay. How did the City EMILY YOUNG: 9 oversee systems integration? 10 ROCK FORTIER: I can't comment on that. 11 That was part of the Richard -- Richard's team. 12 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Did you have any 13 insight into how certain other parts of the system 14 were integrated with the infrastructure that you 15 were monitoring? 16 ROCK FORTIER: Well, so I knew that --17 like, the CCTV camera system inside -- inside the 18 stations, right, so I knew that they needed to be 19 reviewed by somebody to make sure that there wasn't 20 any blind spots, I guess, and, you know, some of 21 the emergency phones in the system needed to be --22 like, you needed a camera on it to make sure that 23 if somebody pushes the emergency button that the 24 MSF basically knows what's happening at that 25 emergency call. So yes, I knew something was

1 happening, but I'm not the one that was reviewing 2 that systems integration -- of that system, I 3 quess. 4 EMILY YOUNG: Are you aware of any 5 challenges in integrating other aspects to your 6 sort of infrastructure area? 7 ROCK FORTIER: No. I -- I'm not aware 8 of those. 9 EMILY YOUNG: Did you have a sense of 10 what the City was doing throughout construction to 11 monitor the integration of the whole system with 12 maintenance and then with OC Transpo operations? 13 ROCK FORTIER: Again, if you're talking 14 about systems, I honestly don't know the -- how it 15 was managed. 16 EMILY YOUNG: I suppose that question 17 is maybe a bit broader. It's just about, you know, 18 what was the City doing throughout construction to 19 think about how is this whole system going to work 20 with operations, with maintenance. 21 ROCK FORTIER: Okay. So at the later 22 stages of the project, when we started the --23 thinking about the maintenance -- the winter 24 maintenance, let's say, so we started looking at, 25 okay, so who's going to maintain what, and where is

1	the demarcation between the City cleaning the snow
2	in the winter and snow and ice removal or sanding
3	operations and that type of stuff, right? So I had
4	meetings with RTM to discuss those and to make sure
5	that we were all on the same page, and also with
6	our properties group because, like, let's say
7	Ottawa U, for instance, where we we are on City
8	land, we are on Ottawa U land, and we are within
9	RTG's umbrella.
10	So we had a lot of discussions with
11	Ottawa U and RTM, and we also had a lot of
12	discussions with OC Transpo because some of the new
13	infrastructure we built to access the stations,
14	like the MUPs, so the multiuse pathways leading to
15	Pimisi Station, for instance, we needed to have a
16	City department responsible for it, and whether
17	that's OC Transpo or Public Works. And so we
18	needed to make sure we tried and foresaw all the
19	issues, so that's the type of discussions I had.
20	EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember about
21	when those kinds of discussions started happening?
22	ROCK FORTIER: Oh, I'd say probably
23	again, we opened in September 2019, I think. So we
24	probably had those discussions in 2019, early 2019,
25	late 2019. So that 2019, the stations are

1 pretty much completed, and we would have -- start 2 thinking about these challenges that were not being 3 maintained properly. 4 EMILY YOUNG: Are those types of things 5 things that could have been accounted for earlier б in the design phase, for example? 7 ROCK FORTIER: RTG themselves had very 8 scant personnel that basically was RTM, so RTM I 9 don't think reviewed all the drawings. It's 10 something that they wanted to focus basically on --11 They knew that they were going to maintain the no. 12 stuff, and they wanted to pay particular 13 attention -- like, if I was doing it, I would pay 14 particular attention to some of the items that are 15 high maintenance, but -- so I can't comment as to 16 what type of discussions were done during the 17 design stage on the high maintenance items. 18 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. But you didn't 19 really have interaction with RTM at that earlier 20 stage on those items? 21 ROCK FORTIER: No, not really. No. 22 Not early in the project, no. 23 EMILY YOUNG: And your view is that it 24 might have been helpful to have that considered 25 earlier with RTM?

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1	ROCK FORTIER: No, I don't think so. I						
2	think I think we we managed well on the civil						
3	aspect. You know, it might have been easier for us						
4	internally between City departments if those						
5	discussions would have happened a bit earlier						
6	because after the fact, after everything's built,						
7	then, you know, it's hard to convince OC Transpo to						
8	take it over if they're not involved in the						
9	decisionmaking process.						
10	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. So, I mean, it						
11	sounds like it could have been helpful to have them						
12	a little bit more involved in the decisionmaking						
13	process in the early stages.						
14	ROCK FORTIER: Well, not RTM so much,						
15	but the City departments for sure.						
16	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And did any						
17	issues, delays, anything arise from these						
18	discussions?						
19	ROCK FORTIER: Not on the civil end,						
20	no.						
21	EMILY YOUNG: So you managed to resolve						
22	everything?						
23	ROCK FORTIER: Yes. I mean, there						
24	was there was those multiuse pathways and some						
25	of the lighting requirements of those multiuse						
1	pathways that weren't accounted for initially						
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2	because we don't the City doesn't have						
3	requirements to light multiuse pathways, but we						
4	felt that it was the correct thing to do to make it						
5	safe for our users to walk at night, and so we						
6	decided to implement lighting on the multiuse						
7	pathways.						
8	EMILY YOUNG: So the lighting wasn't						
9	something that was part of the design that RTG had						
10	to implement.						
11	ROCK FORTIER: That's correct.						
12	EMILY YOUNG: Did you have any						
13	interactions with SEMP or the safety auditor?						
14	ROCK FORTIER: No. No. SEMP is						
15	I've heard the acronym, but I haven't had a						
16	discussion with them.						
17	EMILY YOUNG: And the independent						
18	safety auditor?						
19	ROCK FORTIER: No.						
20	EMILY YOUNG: Were you involved in the						
21	testing and commissioning process?						
22	ROCK FORTIER: No.						
23	EMILY YOUNG: And trial running?						
24	ROCK FORTIER: No.						
25	EMILY YOUNG: Are you are familiar with						

1 the minor deficiencies list that RTG and the City 2 agreed to before substantial completion? 3 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. 4 EMILY YOUNG: What do you know about 5 that list? 6 ROCK FORTIER: I know probably every 7 item that is on the fixed facilities list. 8 EMILY YOUNG: Were you involved in 9 creating the list? 10 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. It was part of our 11 duties as program managers. 12 EMILY YOUNG: Can you explain that 13 process. 14 ROCK FORTIER: Well, it's part of our 15 team's -- as mentioned, when we were visiting fixed 16 facilities, and when we came to -- to a reasonable 17 point that the construction was fairly elevated, 18 we -- we prepared a list and then we sat down with 19 RTG with probably Peter Lauch, with Gary, and 20 agreed to what should be on that list. 21 And how did you determine EMILY YOUNG: 22 whether the deficiencies on the list were minor or 23 not? 24 ROCK FORTIER: We discussed with OC 25 Transpo whether or not they felt that it was a

1 major deficiency or a minor deficiency, and so some 2 of the items we felt might have been minor but OC 3 Transpo was of the opinion that some of the items 4 should be major, so it was in discussion with OC 5 Transpo. 6 EMILY YOUNG: And did OC Transpo have 7 the authority to make the ultimate determination on 8 whether it's minor or not? 9 ROCK FORTIER: Well, sure. I mean, we 10 were part of the same organization, so if -- if stuff got escalated, John would make the final 11 12 decision. 13 EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember what any 14 of the deficiencies that your department thought 15 were minor but OC Transpo thought were major were? 16 ROCK FORTIER: Sure. Some of the stuff 17 was, you know, having all the signage in place, the 18 wayfinding signage. OC Transpo said, you know, 19 people are not going to be familiar with the 20 system; we need all the signage in place, and so 21 some of the items are -- you know, the braille 22 buttons in the elevators, do they need to be in 23 place on Day 1 and that type of stuff. So OC 24 Transpo was pretty adamant that they needed to be 25 in place and they informed us of that, and once

1 they explained the rationale, I guess we agreed to 2 them, so that prompted a more urgent response from 3 RTG. 4 Another item would have been -- so the 5 lanterns basically are a wayfinding element, so б they're supposed to be brightly lit at night, and 7 some of the lanterns, the frame that holds the 8 glass panel in place caused a shadow, let's say, in 9 the lantern, and OC Transpo felt that they needed 10 something -- that they didn't want the public to 11 complain that this lantern looks different than the 12 other lantern, it's got blemishes, and we felt it 13 was minor, and I think that one ended up saying as 14 minor. So those are two examples. 15 EMILY YOUNG: So you convinced OC 16 Transpo on that one. 17 ROCK FORTIER: Well, we were cognizant 18 of not bringing everything -- every disagreement to 19 John, so we worked collaboratively with them to 20 come to a reasonable list. 21 EMILY YOUNG: And basically the 22 consequence of a decision that something could not 23 go on that list is that RTG has to complete it to 24 make substantial completion? 25 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. That's -- yes.

1 Basically that's it. 2 EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall whether 3 there were any items that OC Transpo wanted to put 4 on the list as minor that your group thought were 5 major? 6 ROCK FORTIER: I can't recall any 7 specific example. 8 EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall any items 9 that RTG wanted to put on the list that the City 10 said no to? 11 ROCK FORTIER: Hmm. You're asking me 12 if RTG wants to put deficiencies on their list that 13 we don't have. I don't recall any of those, no. 14 EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall that RTG 15 had applied for substantial completion a bit 16 earlier, in 2019? 17 ROCK FORTIER: Yes, yeah. 18 EMILY YOUNG: And that was rejected. 19 ROCK FORTIER: Correct. It was 20 rejected. 21 EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember there 22 being a minor deficiencies list at that time as 23 well? 24 ROCK FORTIER: I'm sure there was. But 25 I don't know what status it would have been in, I

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1	guess.					
2	EMILY YOUNG: So do you remember					
3	whether any of the items on that first list became					
4	part of the second list?					
5	ROCK FORTIER: Oh. I would assume that					
6	we would have used the same list and compared it					
7	and tracked whether or not the items that failed					
8	the first time were done for the second go-around.					
9	But again, the when we're talking about					
10	deficiency lists, I'm only looking at the fixed					
11	facilities, right?					
12	EMILY YOUNG: Fair enough. Fair					
13	enough. Do you recall that, you know, the City					
14	didn't accept some items in the first iteration but					
15	then later, I guess, changed position and did					
16	accept them as minor deficiencies?					
17	ROCK FORTIER: I don't I don't					
18	recall any example, but I'm fairly certain it would					
19	have happened in discussion with OC Transpo.					
20	EMILY YOUNG: Do you have any sense of					
21	why the City might have changed its mind on some of					
22	those points?					
23	ROCK FORTIER: Again, if I don't have a					
24	concrete example, I would only guess that, you					
25	know, some progress was made and that we felt that					

1	was good enough. Like, the if the signage is an					
2	example, then it might have been that, you know,					
3	they were just missing a last iteration on signage.					
4	I don't know.					
5	EMILY YOUNG: Do you know if there were					
6	any deficiencies that the City didn't recognize as					
7	minor but just sort of waived and said					
8	ROCK FORTIER: No, I don't.					
9	EMILY YOUNG: You don't okay.					
10	ROCK FORTIER: I don't recall those.					
11	EMILY YOUNG: Are you familiar with the					
12	term sheet that RTG and the City entered into					
13	before revenue service availability?					
14	ROCK FORTIER: No. I like, the term					
15	"term sheet" was used in the properties group, but					
16	I'm not sure if that's what you're meaning.					
17	EMILY YOUNG: It was an agreement that					
18	included I guess I would describe it as sort of					
19	relaxation of certain expectations. Like, it					
20	provided that at the start of service that RTG					
21	could put 13 trains into service at peak times					
22	instead of 15 trains. That's one of the major					
23	things on the term sheet, but it would have had					
24	agreement on other issues like that.					
25	ROCK FORTIER: Yeah, okay. So I do					

1 recall, you know, those discussions happening. Ι 2 just don't recall what was put on the term sheet in 3 regards to fixed facilities. 4 EMILY YOUNG: Do you remember who was 5 involved in those discussions? 6 ROCK FORTIER: I'm -- well, I would 7 assume it's RAMP, which Gary is part of. 8 Okay. Do you know EMILY YOUNG: 9 whether the items on the minor deficiencies list 10 were later resolved? 11 ROCK FORTIER: Yes. I mean, the --12 we -- in 2019, after revenue service, that was my 13 main goal was to make sure that this deficiency 14 list is tracked to conclusion, I quess. 15 EMILY YOUNG: And was it tracked to 16 conclusion, as far as the things that you were 17 looking at in your role? 18 ROCK FORTIER: As I said, when I 19 retired, there was maybe 20 items left on Gary's 20 plate. 21 EMILY YOUNG: And my apologies if I 22 already asked you this, but who would have taken 23 over the tracking of those last 20? 24 Gary himself. ROCK FORTIER: 25 Do you have any views on EMILY YOUNG:

1 what caused or contributed to the delays in the 2 arrival at substantial completion and revenue 3 service availability? 4 ROCK FORTIER: No. I mean, I -- you 5 know, I was tracking the stations, and stations 6 were -- were ready to be opened, so it had to fall 7 under the systems -- or the vehicles, I quess. 8 Were the stations ready EMILY YOUNG: 9 to be opened for the original planned RSA date? 10 ROCK FORTIER: Again, there would have 11 been items missing, I think, on that deficiency 12 list, such as probably the signage, and so I don't 13 recall exactly what was missing off the original 14 date, no. 15 EMILY YOUNG: But it sounds like your 16 recollection is that the stations weren't the 17 ultimate source of the delays. 18 ROCK FORTIER: Right. I mean, we still 19 had work happening in the stations - some of the 20 tiles being replaced because they were cracked, you 21 know - because -- and -- but that doesn't mean that 22 we couldn't have roped off that area and treated it 23 as a minor construction site within the station, 24 so... 25 Okay. EMILY YOUNG:

1	ROCK FORTIER: Again					
2	EMILY YOUNG: So you					
3	ROCK FORTIER: Yep, yeah.					
4	EMILY YOUNG: So you don't remember					
5	exactly what the deficiencies were and was missing					
6	in May 2018, which was the first planned revenue					
7	service availability date.					
8	ROCK FORTIER: Right. I would not have					
9	been involved in any discussion with regards to the					
10	ultimate decision of opening or not, and I don't					
11	recall.					
12	EMILY YOUNG: Did your department do					
13	any work in evaluating or assessing RTG's schedules					
14	throughout the project? Can you hear us,					
15	Mr. Fortier?					
16	JESSE GARDNER: Looks like he's frozen.					
17	EMILY YOUNG: Maybe we can just go off					
18	the record for now.					
19	OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION					
20	ROCK FORTIER: So you were asking about					
21	the tracking of the scheduling.					
22	EMILY YOUNG: That's right.					
23	ROCK FORTIER: So at a very high level,					
24	on a monthly basis, I guess RTG would give us a					
25	look at their scheduling and their what they					

1	felt was their critical path and their progress on						
2	it.						
3	EMILY YOUNG: Do you recall having						
4	disagreements with them about that?						
5	ROCK FORTIER: Not disagreements per						
6	se, just questions on it. Ultimately, they are						
7	their construction managers, and they knew how to						
8	best implement their work.						
9	EMILY YOUNG: Were you involved in any						
10	of the City's efforts to assess their schedules for						
11	accuracy towards the end of the project?						
12	ROCK FORTIER: No.						
13	EMILY YOUNG: Did you have any						
14	involvement in Stage 2?						
15	ROCK FORTIER: I never worked for						
16	Stage 2. I was asked to sit down with them and						
17	discuss a lessons learned exercise list that we had						
18	done with them.						
19	EMILY YOUNG: Can you speak a bit about						
20	what the lessons learned that you discussed were.						
21	ROCK FORTIER: Well, there was						
22	throughout the project, we kept stuff that we felt						
23	could be better done during Stage 2, and we gave						
24	them that list. Some of the items are the traffic						
25	management aspect could have been done better, we						

1	felt, on Stage 1, I guess, so some of the language				
2	with regards to coordinating with the City better.				
3	Some of the items on the warranty aspect, the				
4	infrastructure model, Infrastructure Ontario model				
5	basically talks to the warranty period extending				
6	2 years past substantial completion, but on a				
7	project of this magnitude, where you have work				
8	being done for the City ahead of time, so the				
9	substantial completion is achieved a lot earlier				
10	like, in 2015 we had stuff that RTG was turning				
11	over to the City, so it didn't make sense for that				
12	warranty period to extend to 2021, for instance,				
13	right? So				
14	EMILY YOUNG: So would you have				
15	suggested that the 2 years for a certain aspect of				
16	the infrastructure start running as basically when				
17	it was handed over?				
18	ROCK FORTIER: Yes. Yeah.				
19	EMILY YOUNG: So for the example you				
20	gave, something handed over in 2015, warranty until				
21	2017.				
22	ROCK FORTIER: Correct.				
23	EMILY YOUNG: Do you think that that				
24	had any implications on the project, or was that				
25	just a suggestion?				

1	ROCK FORTIER: It was just a suggestion					
2	to better paper it, because that's what we ended up					
3	having to do because it didn't make sense like I					
4	said, Blair Station, landscaping was done in 2016,					
5	so you couldn't really ask them to come back and,					
6	you know, repair trees that were basically dead in					
7	2020, something like that, so					
8	EMILY YOUNG: And you mentioned					
9	something else before you went to the warranty					
10	issue, and now I forget what you said. What was					
11	the item before that?					
12	ROCK FORTIER: Oh, the traffic. The					
13	traffic management.					
14	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. And could any of					
15	these things have been better accounted for in the					
16	initial stages of the project?					
17	ROCK FORTIER: Yeah. I think again,					
18	the Infrastructure Ontario model, which we were					
19	forced to use because if we wanted provincial					
20	funding, it had never been used for an LRT project					
21	is my understanding, and so once you start dealing					
22	with traffic management at a City level, on a					
23	project that's 13 kilometres long, you're going to					
24	have a lot of traffic impact to the residents, and					
25	traffic management done at the City level involves					

1 us notifying the councillors ahead of time, doing 2 public service announcements ahead of time, and 3 some of that stuff we were not able to capture in 4 Stage 1 properly. So we had a lot of last-minute 5 work done by RTG, last minute and ended up 6 having -- getting a phone call from whomever, 7 saying, Hey, what's happening over here, and we 8 sent somebody to the site, and we didn't know the 9 work was happening yet, so I think it's something 10 that was frustrating for some of the residents of 11 Ottawa. 12 EMILY YOUNG: And you mentioned the 13 Infrastructure Ontario template. Do you feel like 14 if you hadn't had to use the template, you would 15 have better been able to deal with those issues? 16 JESSE GARDNER: I think we're frozen 17 again. 18 EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Let's go off the 19 record. 20 -- OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION --21 EMILY YOUNG: So the question was 22 whether you think it would have been easier to deal 23 with some of those issues you've been speaking 24 about, including traffic management, if you weren't 25 required to use Infrastructure Ontario's template

1

25

agreement.

2 ROCK FORTIER: There was a lot of 3 pushback from Infrastructure Ontario about 4 modifying any of their templates. They felt that 5 the model had been proven in the past on multiple 6 projects and that it would suffice for LRT. But 7 for -- for us, being the first in line, I quess, 8 for the LRT, we made substantial -- we finally were 9 able to convince them to make substantial changes 10 to it. We added -- we added clauses to -- for 11 items that would ultimately be built by RTG and 12 become municipal infrastructure, so new municipal 13 infrastructure is an example of work that is done 14 by RTG, and it's not LRT stuff - it's, like, the 15 Booth Street bridge. It's not an LRT 16 infrastructure. It's a City of Ottawa 17 infrastructure. So you -- we had to build the new 18 sewers, new water mains, and new detours along 19 Belfast leading to the MSF. 20 So that was all stuff that needed to be 21 done and was not accounted for in the 22 Infrastructure Ontario model because it's usually 23 meant for, like, a hospital or bridge or something 24 like that where you have a very defined site so

it's easier to manage, but on a 13-kilometre-long

1	project, it was a challenge.
2	EMILY YOUNG: And do you think that
3	the, I guess, relative kind of rigidity of the
4	Infrastructure Ontario model had any effects on the
5	project later on other than the ones you've talked
6	about?
7	ROCK FORTIER: I mean, you try as a
8	team to capture everything that you can, but
9	ultimately you don't, so there was impacts. I
10	can't recall any other examples specifically. But
11	I think I believe now it's being used on other
12	projects in Southern Ontario and Toronto area and
13	that they have built upon the base of the model in
14	Ottawa.
15	EMILY YOUNG: The Commission has been
16	asked to look into the commercial and technical
17	circumstances leading to the breakdowns and
18	derailments on Stage 1. Are there any areas that
19	you feel the Commission should be looking into that
20	we haven't discussed this morning?
21	ROCK FORTIER: No, I'm not aware of
22	any, no.
23	EMILY YOUNG: And the Commissioner has
24	been asked to make recommendations to try to avoid
25	issues like those that have occurred from happening

1 in the future. Are there specific recommendations 2 or any areas of recommendation you suggest be 3 considered? 4 ROCK FORTIER: I think we No. No. 5 passed on everything we could to Stage 2 through 6 that lessons learned exercise. 7 EMILY YOUNG: And just to confirm, Mr. Craig is not available for us to speak to. 8 9 ROCK FORTIER: You're asking me to 10 confirm that? 11 EMILY YOUNG: Yeah, just so that we 12 have it on the record. 13 ROCK FORTIER: Yes, that's correct. 14 Gary passed away. 15 Okay. Thank you. EMILY YOUNG: Are 16 there any questions from counsel or from 17 Ms. Mainville? 18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: No. I just want 19 to make clear, in respect of many of the questions 20 we asked, I take it from your answers Mr. Craig 21 would have been the most appropriate person to 22 speak to about many of these issues if he had been 23 available? 24 ROCK FORTIER: That's correct. 25 I don't have any CHRISTINE MAINVILLE:

1	questions, then.
2	JESSE GARDNER: I don't have any
3	questions. Thank you.
4	EMILY YOUNG: Okay. Then I think we
5	can go off the record.
6	Concluded at 11:50 a.m.
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2						
3	I, JOANNE A. LAWRENCE, Registered					
4	Professional Reporter, certify;					
5	That the foregoing proceedings were					
6	taken before me at the time and place therein set					
7	forth, at which time the witness was put under oath					
8	by me;					
9	That the testimony of the witness					
10	and all objections made at the time of the					
11	examination were recorded stenographically by me					
12	and were thereafter transcribed;					
13	That the foregoing is a true and					
14	correct transcript of my shorthand notes so taken.					
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