

Ottawa Light Rail Commission

Matthew Slade
on Thursday, May 5, 2022



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OTTAWA LIGHT RAIL COMMISSION
OLRT CONSTRUCTORS - MATTHEW SLADE
May 5th, 2022

--- Held via Zoom Videoconferencing, with all
participants attending remotely, on the 5th day
of May, 2022, 2:00 p.m. to 6:05 p.m.

1 COMMISSION COUNSEL:

2 Christine Mainville, Co-Lead Counsel Member

3 Mark Coombes, Litigation Counsel Member

4

5 PARTICIPANTS:

6 Matthew Slade: OLRT Constructors

7 Manu Chowdhury, Paliare Roland Rosenberg

8 Rothstein LLP

9

10

11 ALSO PRESENT:

12 Helen Martineau, Stenographer/Transcriptionist,

13 Elizabeth Deasy, Virtual Technician

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1 --- Upon commencing at 2:00 p.m.

2 MATTHEW SLADE: AFFIRMED.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So Mr. Slade the
4 purpose of today's interview is to obtain your
5 evidence under oath or solemn declaration for
6 use of the Commission's public hearings. This
7 will be a collaborative interview, such that my
8 co-counsel, Mr. Coombes, may intervene to ask
9 certain questions. If time permits, your
10 counsel may also ask follow-up questions at the
11 end of the interview.

12 The interview is being transcribed and
13 the Commission intends to enter the transcript
14 into evidence at the Commission's public
15 hearings, either at the hearings themselves or
16 by way of procedural order before the hearings
17 commence. The transcript will be posted to the
18 Commission's public website, along with any
19 corrections made to it, after it is entered into
20 evidence. The transcript, along with any
21 corrections made, will be shared with the
22 Commission's participants and their counsel on a
23 confidential basis before being entered into
24 evidence.

25 You'll be given the opportunity to

1 review your transcript and correct any typos or
2 other errors before the transcript is shared
3 with the participants or entered into evidence.

4 Any nontypographical corrections made
5 will be appended to the transcript.

6 And finally, pursuant to section 33(6)
7 of the Public Inquiries Act 2009, a witness at
8 an inquiry shall be deemed to have objected to
9 answer any question asked of him upon the ground
10 that his answer may tend to incriminate the
11 witness, or may tend to establish his liability
12 to civil proceedings at the instance of the
13 Crown or any person.

14 And no answer given by a witness at an
15 inquiry shall be used or be receivable in
16 evidence against him in any trial or other
17 proceeding thereafter taking place, other than a
18 prosecution for perjury in giving such evidence.

19 And as required by section 33(7) of
20 the Act, you are advised that you have the right
21 to object to answer any question under section 5
22 of the Canada Evidence Act.

23 Okay?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Great. Could

1 you start by explaining your role in Stage 1 of
2 Ottawa's LRT?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: Sure. So my
4 involvement began in late 2017, remote from the
5 project, from my employer EllisDon. And then I
6 got involved formally in the project early in
7 2018 when I was appointed Assistant Director.
8 And since then I've had various roles -- well, I
9 became Project Director when Rupert Holloway
10 left. And then later on I became an Advisor to
11 Rideau Transit Maintenance, and I'm currently an
12 alternate board member of Rideau Transit
13 Maintenance. So I sit in all the Board
14 meetings.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And is that
16 since -- following RSA that you've been an
17 alternate board member for RTM?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. It's been about
19 the last 12 months.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And then -- when
21 did you start advising RTM? Was that following
22 revenue service?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: About a year after
24 revenue service. It was when -- I suppose I
25 took a role there doing that as a strategic

1 advisor when RTG was asked to prepare a
2 remediation plan.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So sometime in
4 2020?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And when you
7 said you became Project Director for OLRTC --
8 well I don't know if you mentioned OLRTC --

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes, it was OLRTC.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Yes. As
11 Systems' Director and Project Director that was
12 with OLRT Constructors?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And when you
15 became Project Director, you said when
16 Mr. Holloway left, was that January 2019.

17 MATTHEW SLADE: No, it was later than
18 that, it was -- it was -- I think it was around
19 June 2019, from memory.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And actually why
21 don't we bring up your resume because we have it
22 there as July 2019. Do you recognize this as
23 your resume?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So if you go to

1 the second page we have you as changing from
2 Systems' Director, if you go a bit further down,
3 to Project Director in July 2019.

4 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And did you
6 replace anyone when you became Systems'
7 Director?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: There was a change in
9 the organization structure at OLRTC at that
10 time, but there wasn't anyone there prior to me
11 with that job title.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So it says here
13 you became Systems' Director in April 2018, but
14 prior to that you were Rail Director of Systems
15 and Infrastructure, if we go further down to
16 page 3?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: For EllisDon, yes.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: For EllisDon.

19 MATTHEW SLADE: That's who I work for.
20 They're my employer.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So you were then
22 involved in various projects not just --

23 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct. I look after
24 all of their transit work across Canada.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. So that's

1 why you said as of late 2017 you became
2 tangentially involved in the Ottawa project, but
3 only formally involved when you became Systems'
4 Director?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay.

7 MATTHEW SLADE: So I had a role within
8 EllisDon that had Ottawa in my portfolio of
9 work, but I wasn't formally on the project until
10 I was appointed Systems' Director.

11 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so what kind
12 of advice or input were you giving from 2017 --
13 September 2017 to April 2018 in your --

14 MATTHEW SLADE: So I was tasked my
15 boss at the time, Stephen Damp, who was a member
16 of the executive committee for OLRTC, to
17 participate in the executive committee meetings
18 and to run an off-project review of the state of
19 the project on behalf of EllisDon.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And did your
21 input there, because your role was Rail Director
22 Systems and Infrastructure, what did that review
23 relate to? Did it relate to anything in
24 particular on the OLRT project?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Schedule, mainly.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And then you
2 worked prior to that for Alstom?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes, in the United
4 Kingdom.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And there you
6 were Operations Director, Systems and
7 Infrastructure?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Can you tell me
10 a little bit about what that role entailed?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: So within Alstom they
12 have different sort of internal organizations,
13 I'll call them. So whilst here on this project
14 that we're discussing today they're obviously a
15 vehicle supplier, which is a large part of their
16 business. They also have another part of their
17 business which is systems infrastructure,
18 associated with transit, responsible for their
19 works within the U.K. and Ireland that were not
20 vehicle related, so they were related to transit
21 systems. Whether that was fixed infrastructure,
22 whether that was signaling, electrification,
23 power supply and distribution, anything that
24 wasn't a vehicle, essentially, whilst it still
25 interfaced with a vehicle.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay.

2 MATTHEW SLADE: So I had projects from
3 up in Scotland and Glasgow, I had
4 electrification programs. I was -- had a
5 portfolio of work for the systems fit-out of the
6 crossrail project in central London.

7 So anything that Alstom had as an
8 ongoing system project fell in my portfolio for
9 operations.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Focused on
11 operations, right. Okay.

12 And you have a significant amount of
13 other rail experience?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: All of my working
15 career has been in transit, 20 plus years.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And in terms of
17 your educational background, are you and
18 engineer?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: No.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: What's your
21 educational background?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: I'm a building
23 surveyor, which probably doesn't translate to an
24 occupation here in Canada, I would say. It's
25 very close to engineering but it's not

1 engineering.

2 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. Got it.
3 We can file this as the first exhibit.

4 EXHIBIT NO. 1: Curriculum vitae of
5 Matthew Slade.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Having worked
7 for Alstom before, and based on the rest of your
8 experience, do you have a view as to whether the
9 rolling stock model used in the Ottawa project
10 was service proven?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: So I would say that --
12 I'm going to have to try and explain this I
13 think.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Sure.

15 MATTHEW SLADE: So the Citadis
16 vehicle, as a platform, which is what they call
17 it, is generally a proven vehicle. And if
18 you -- I don't know what the statistic is
19 currently, but when I was at Alstom one of their
20 bold claims is that there was 2,000 Citadis
21 vehicles in service around the world. So there
22 are a lot of Citadis vehicles.

23 But that's like saying there are
24 however many million Jeep Wranglers there are on
25 the road. There are lots of them but they're

1 not all the same. So whilst it may look the
2 same the components inside it may be very
3 different.

4 And the Citadis spirit is a
5 first-of-type, so I would classify it as a
6 prototype vehicle for here.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: As a prototype
8 vehicle?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. This was the
10 first time that vehicle had ever been built or
11 put into service.

12 You wouldn't find another -- you will
13 now, there are some other Citadis Spirit being
14 built in North America, but there aren't any
15 other vehicles that are identical to this
16 anywhere else in that fleet of 2,000 vehicles
17 around the world.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So they were the
19 first of the Citadis Spirit line?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so, even
22 though there's always, I take it, a certain
23 degree of customization required for every
24 project, this is a bit more than that? There is
25 a new sub model?

1 MATTHEW SLADE: Essentially, yes.
2 It's -- you know, there are some common
3 components in there. Like I said, it looks the
4 same from the outside, but once you get into the
5 guts of it, you know, the actual bits that make
6 it work and make it go, a lot of those are
7 unique.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you recall
9 what in particular is unique about it or new?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: The list is very, very
11 long. I couldn't obviously list everything. I
12 mean, some of the things that I would say that
13 make it unusual from other Citadis vehicles, for
14 start the voltage that it operates at is
15 1500 volts, whereas the majority of them run at
16 750 volts. As a result of that -- a lot of the
17 traction equipment and electrical equipment,
18 which make up things that make it go, are
19 different.

20 And a number of the other key assembly
21 items are also new and novel to this vehicle and
22 they're not widespread across the Citadis
23 family. And that could be major components such
24 as traction motors, brakes, bogeys, door
25 mechanisms, all manner of components.

1 I would think -- I would think if you,
2 and I don't know how many thousand components
3 there are in a vehicle, but if you -- if you
4 worked it out as a percentage as to how many
5 were unique to the Citadis Spirit I would think
6 it's probably over 50 percent.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. And what
8 informs the voltage, is that the speed at which
9 the trains have to go?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: No. So this is quite
11 unusual. There's not many 1500 volt systems
12 operating. I'm only aware of two in North
13 America, this one and I think Seattle operates
14 at 1500 volts as well.

15 One thousand five hundred volts in
16 Ottawa is primarily because NRCAN, National
17 Research Canada, have -- and now I'm going to
18 get out of my own realm of technical knowledge.
19 They have a system in Ottawa that monitors,
20 essentially, the magnetic field of the earth,
21 and if it had operated at 750 volts it may well
22 have disrupted that measuring equipment.

23 So there was, as far back as I want to
24 say 2012, 2013, NRCAN wrote to the City of
25 Ottawa expressing their concern and the

1 likelihood of interference from the vehicle and
2 the system, and asked the City if they would
3 help them relocate their monitoring equipment to
4 a new location, which the City declined.

5 So there was some to-and-fro between
6 NRCAN and the City, and then a result the
7 solution was to change the voltage of the
8 vehicles.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what kind of
10 implications did that have for the project? Did
11 it make it more complex or risky in any way?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: It changed a large
13 number of components on the vehicle and it
14 changed the design for the traction supply. It
15 didn't change it because it wasn't determined at
16 that point.

17 It was known from the outset that they
18 would operate at 1500 volts, at the point at
19 which design started. But it did mean that the
20 design of the vehicles and the design of the
21 traction power supply system was not what you
22 would deem to be a normal supply for a rail
23 system of this nature.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was there
25 anything about the vehicle requirements, in this

1 case, that made the work more challenging, or
2 anything particular about the vehicle
3 requirements?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: I think from my
5 perspective you may or may not be aware there
6 was a Canadian content clause in the contract,
7 it was maybe 25 percent, something like that.
8 Which in itself I understand, you know, I think
9 it's a good idea to support Canadian industry
10 and everything else. I have no issue with that.
11 But obviously there are then implications on
12 supply chain for components.

13 And when you are supposedly picking a
14 proven vehicle that comes from a family where
15 there's 2,000 vehicles of this type around the
16 world, and then you're looking at maybe changing
17 your supply chain for what is a small fleet of
18 vehicles, because the initial contract was for
19 34 vehicles, to then change the supply chain
20 introduced challenges, I would think.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And were
22 there -- did it lead indeed to certain
23 challenges on this project, to your knowledge,
24 the supply chain?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Well, yes and no. I

1 think we probably weren't aware at the time when
2 it was being designed and assembled that that
3 might cause an issue. But certainly some of the
4 issues that we've had with the vehicle and its
5 reliability, since it's been in service, has
6 been with specific items that were procured
7 locally as a result of that requirement.

8 Whereby if -- and -- and the voltage.
9 And if it had been maybe 750 volts, and with
10 their consistent European or global supply chain
11 you may not have had those issues.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Can you give me
13 an example of what pieces or parts?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: So particularly we had
15 issues with something called a "line inductor"
16 which goes on the roof of the train, and also
17 with the APS, which is the auxiliary power
18 supplies, both of which were sourced in North
19 America, whereas they're normally sourced in
20 Europe. And they're normally designed for
21 750 volts not 1500 volts. Both those components
22 have had, I would say, a fairly significant
23 impact on the reliability of the vehicle and the
24 performance of the vehicle.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Any other

1 implications of the Canadian content? They had
2 to assemble the vehicles in --

3 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. You know,
4 assembly is a big part of it. So going back to
5 Alstom, from my time in Europe, the vehicles are
6 generally assembled in assembly plants,
7 factories, which Alstom generally refers to as
8 "centres of excellence", depending on what model
9 of vehicle is being assembled where.

10 The Citadis vehicles are generally
11 produced in mainland Europe, in France and
12 Spain.

13 So, you know, where they're assembled
14 on a regular basis, daily basis by people day-in
15 day-out and that is their job to assemble
16 trains, so they're highly skilled in doing that.

17 Assembling them in Ottawa obviously
18 resulted in new staff, new facility, a facility
19 that wasn't optimized for assembly but was --
20 designed and optimized for maintenance.

21 And a workforce that were, I guess,
22 taught on-the-job training essentially rather
23 than coming from a skilled manufacturing or
24 assembly background.

25 And I don't want to belittle Ottawa,

1 but Ottawa is a City of government and
2 official-type jobs. There aren't as many manual
3 labour jobs or labour-based jobs as there would
4 be, for instance, as here in Mississauga where I
5 am today.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So there was a
7 challenge in terms of finding the skilled
8 labour?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Are you aware of
11 the vehicle requirements being based on U.S.
12 standards as opposed to European? Do you recall
13 anything about that?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: Not off the top of my
15 head.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: What about
17 Thales' signaling system? Are you able to say
18 whether that was a standard system for them?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: It's generally
20 referred to as the "Seltrac system". It's --
21 I'm not going to say it's common but it's a
22 well-established system, a bit like the Citadis
23 is well established.

24 Obviously it is designed and modified
25 for each system, depending on how many stations

1 you have, how many tracks you have and what
2 vehicles you have. But the overall architecture
3 of the system, the core of the system is fairly
4 common, and it's been in existence for quite
5 some time and it's used extensively around the
6 world.

7 There was nothing there that was
8 wildly unusual.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And did they
10 have to create a new design?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. It was bespoke
12 for Ottawa, like I said, based on the vehicle
13 and the requirements of the stations and the
14 design of the alignment, et cetera. But it
15 wasn't -- I wouldn't say there was any
16 significant deviation from their norm.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you know
18 whether this was the first time that an Alstom
19 LRT was being integrated with Thales' signaling
20 system?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: I am -- I would like
22 to say I'm about 90 percent certain it's the
23 first time Seltrac system has been put into a
24 Citadis vehicle.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And did that

1 create any particular challenges on this
2 project?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: There were some
4 challenges, not insurmountable. I think the
5 biggest challenge was actually on physical
6 space, on where the equipment would physically
7 fit inside the vehicle; and then where the
8 wiring would run to and where the external
9 aerials would be mounted, that kind of thing.

10 But the biggest issue was actual,
11 physical space, which we overcame. It took a
12 while but we overcame with changing the design
13 of brackets and things like that. But it didn't
14 actually change the physical core equipment of
15 the system, it was mainly brackets and the way
16 things bolted into the track.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: As Systems'
18 Director, was that in respect of -- well, were
19 you involved or responsible at all for system
20 integration?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: Depends on how you
22 define "responsible". So when I arrived most of
23 the system integration -- the system integration
24 I guess falls into two categories. You have the
25 design phase, which is the key part where you're

1 figuring everything out on paper and
2 understanding which systems are going to talk to
3 which systems, and how they're going to interact
4 and work out how they're going to relate to one
5 another. And then I guess the latter part is
6 testing and validating that those interfaces
7 work.

8 But in theory, I guess loosely, they
9 both kind of fall -- fell under my remit. There
10 was an Engineering Director on the project when
11 arrived, Roger Schmidt, and he had an
12 Integration Director that worked for him called
13 Jacques Bergeron, and they both loosely reported
14 to me.

15 The design was well under way and when
16 I arrived I wasn't going to interfere with too
17 much of that. That wasn't really my remit
18 coming on board. So they carried on doing what
19 they were doing with regards to that.

20 I probably worked far closer with
21 Jacques than I did with Roger. And when Jacques
22 retired I replaced Jacques with a gentleman by
23 the name of Joseph Marconi, who is still on the
24 project now working for OLRTC. He looks after
25 the vehicles predominantly and the interface of

1 the vehicles with the Thales system.

2 I looked after the Thales subcontract
3 when I came on board. I had Dr. Sharon Oakley,
4 who looked after the Alstom contract. She's
5 still there at OLRTC and still managing that.

6 I had a contract manager that worked
7 for me managing Thales. I had a couple of those
8 because a couple of those came and went.

9 And then I also hired in some external
10 experts to provide support when we had specific
11 issues.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so what
13 we're talking about here is the integration
14 between the rolling stock and the signaling
15 system, correct?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, and all the
17 other systems as well.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. So Roger
19 Schmidt and Jacques Bergeron were for
20 responsible for those -- not responsible but
21 were looking after --

22 MATTHEW SLADE: They were managing it
23 at the design phase.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: At the design
25 phase.

1 MATTHEW SLADE: And Jacques went
2 through to testing commissioning but he was
3 predominantly on the vehicle.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Jacques was?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So -- and Roger
7 Schmidt then worked for OLRTC?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct. He was the
9 Engineering Director responsible for all of the
10 design, whether it was designing stations or --
11 all of the design scope fell under Roger and he
12 had various discipline leads that managed the
13 different scopes.

14 And then the designer had a systems'
15 integration lead as well, Keith Brown.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Keith Brown?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. Who was at SNC
18 and he's now at Mott MacDonald, I believe.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So isn't --
20 what's the division of scope there then as
21 between OLRTC and the RTG engineering joint
22 venture.

23 MATTHEW SLADE: So, yeah, EJV were
24 essentially a subcontractor to OLRTC. So Roger
25 would have managed that subcontract. And then

1 on the -- I don't know who was the lead at the
2 time on the EJV side, but certainly when I was
3 involved Keith Brown was the lead guy
4 responsible for the integration.

5 I know you've obviously received a
6 huge amount of documents from us. One of the
7 documents that should be of interest is
8 something called a "spider diagram" which shows
9 all the interfaces between all the systems. And
10 Keith is the author of that diagram and was
11 responsible for mapping out how all the systems
12 would talk to one another.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So he was
14 with -- Keith was with EJV more specifically?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So was Roger
17 Schmidt with EJV as well or no, he was with --

18 MATTHEW SLADE: No. Roger was OLRTC,
19 he managed a subcontract that was with EJV.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: But in terms of
21 the overall systems integration, did that
22 responsibility lie with EJV more specifically,
23 or OLRTC?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: I think it lay with
25 EJV. I think they were defined in their

1 contract as the system integrator. They were
2 responsible for designing all of the interfaces.
3 And then they were also responsible for writing
4 all the test documents, all the test procedures
5 that we executed to validate and evidence that
6 everything was working as it should be. It
7 basically closes the circle on the design.

8 So they would take the requirements
9 out of the contract; they would design to those
10 requirements; the design would get approved;
11 they would issue construction drawings and then
12 they would issue test reports or test procedures
13 that would then be executed by my testing
14 commissioning team; and then they would sign off
15 on the results that came from the -- my field
16 team of doing the testing commissioning.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And did the EJVB
18 have any involvement in the rolling stock and
19 signaling system integration?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: They did. Keith Brown
21 did specifically, we sat in numerous meetings he
22 and I to look at how the train would behave in
23 different situations with regards to interfaces
24 with other systems.

25 The train doesn't just interface with

1 the signaling system, and the signaling system
2 doesn't just interface with the train. It
3 interfaces with traction power, fire alarms,
4 tunnel ventilation, guideway intrusion, the list
5 is long.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So EJV was
7 looking at those interfaces, but do you know --
8 was there some lack of clarity or dispute, to
9 your knowledge, in terms of who was responsible
10 for the -- specifically the integration between
11 the rolling stock and the signaling system?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: I don't know.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: You don't know?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: No. I don't know if
15 there was a formal dispute in that, no.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So was it your
17 understanding that that specific integration was
18 part of EJV's scope?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so you
21 believed it to be discharged, that
22 responsibility, primarily by Keith Brown?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Are you aware of
25 challenges being encountered on that front of

1 systems -- of the integration between Thales'
2 system and Alstom's train?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: Nothing out of the
4 ordinary. There was -- I think generally my
5 reflection on how that all went was it went -- I
6 think it actually went pretty well. No
7 different -- I wouldn't have expected it to have
8 been any better or any worse than how it was.

9 There was a few issues here and there
10 along the way, as you get when you get complex
11 systems like this. But, yeah, it was nothing
12 out of the ordinary, I wouldn't say, or nothing
13 that wasn't manageable or -- I'm not saying that
14 you can predict specific things but it went
15 probably as I would have expected it to.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And of course
17 you weren't there prior to 2018 so you wouldn't
18 know what, if any, early planning was done on
19 this piece?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: I can't answer that,
21 no.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: To what extent
23 would you have been overseeing the manufacturing
24 of the rolling stock?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Very loosely. That

1 was all delegated to people within my team. I
2 didn't get involved in it very much. The
3 vehicles, when I arrived on the job, were in
4 various different states of assembly. Some
5 vehicles were finished and some were close to
6 being finished and being tested, but most of
7 that I left down to vehicle experts and people
8 within the vehicle team who were -- Jacques was
9 heavily involved with that, Sharon was heavily
10 involved with that. A gentleman who worked for
11 me, Jean-Louis Ozorak was involved with that.
12 Later on he was involved with that more --
13 actually probably post-RSA rather than before
14 RSA.

15 But Alstom were the experts so they
16 would report to us on a weekly basis, and Sharon
17 would produce production progress reports every
18 week, still does.

19 So, yeah, it was just a case of
20 overseeing what was being done. I wasn't
21 actually on the shop floor looking at the
22 assembly and challenging anything that was going
23 on.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: But you would
25 say OLRTC, beyond you, had oversight over that

1 manufacturing?

2 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. It was a
3 subcontract so it was down to OLRTC to, you
4 know, keep an eye on that contract and make sure
5 the contract was executed.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And when you
7 arrived in 2018 what is the new target RSA date,
8 if you recall?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: I was involved in that
10 before I arrived.

11 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay.

12 MATTHEW SLADE: So I was involved --
13 that was part of what I was doing.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Right.

15 MATTHEW SLADE: From January 2018 to
16 March, April time was taking that off-project
17 review that I did, and looking at the schedule
18 and looking at identifying what a revised RSA
19 date would look like.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what did it
21 look like?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: I think it ended up
23 being published as a November 2nd date,
24 something like that.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay.

1 MATTHEW SLADE: So -- but, you know,
2 there's -- we did lots of workshops and
3 scheduling work to get the date. I think we
4 originally, we all at OLRTC, in the end proposed
5 an October date and the City asked for it to be
6 a 2nd of November date.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was that because
8 they didn't think October was realistic?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: What do you
11 think of the November date? Was it a realistic
12 schedule?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: No.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So can you tell
15 me about that and why it was put forward?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: So I think, from
17 memory, and I've been trolling back through some
18 emails. I think at the time when we did that
19 review we did something called a PERT analysis,
20 which is similar to a Monte Carlo simulation,
21 which gives you a probability of your end date.

22 So you build a schedule and then you
23 put it through a system that runs the program
24 several thousand times and gives you probability
25 rates of what the end date is likely to be. And

1 it gives you a spread from the probability of a
2 50 percent chance up to -- it will never give
3 you 100 percent because you can't guarantee
4 anything.

5 And we ran that and it came out with
6 various different dates obviously, and from
7 there we looked at what mitigation measures
8 could we put in place and what we could do to
9 either improve the probability or improve the
10 certainty of achieving a date.

11 And that's when, I guess at a Board
12 level, a decision was made to target an October
13 date, based on conversations that had been had
14 in workshops with the key suppliers, Alstom and
15 Thales.

16 We then ran some workshops with the
17 City. And then at that point there was a view
18 that November was the date that we should be
19 targeting. But I'm pretty sure from the -- when
20 we were running models, I think if you wanted to
21 go somewhere around P90, or 90 percent
22 probability of achieving a date I think it
23 probably had a March 2019 date at that time.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So in terms of
25 probability -- so what would you say was -- was

1 there a chance that you could meet the
2 November 2018 date?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: I think potentially.
4 You know, in a utopian world I think -- you
5 know, none of us have -- none of us can predict
6 what's going to happen. And I think there was a
7 general view that we were -- I would say
8 post-sinkhole, so delays had already been
9 experienced, and what have you.

10 And we had spent, like I said,
11 workshops with Thales and Alstom in our offices
12 with their executives trying to look at the best
13 way of getting to the earliest possible
14 completion date.

15 And you have to -- when you're
16 building these schedules you can put a level of
17 contingency and risk into them, but obviously
18 the executives and the -- we'll say the parent
19 companies, don't want you to be too conservative
20 because, obviously, it's in our interest to be
21 finished as early as possible, especially when
22 we know we're going to be late.

23 So it's a balance. I could have put
24 lots of risk and contingency, and whatever else,
25 for unforeseeable things that were going to

1 happen in 2018 and 2019. And I could have put,
2 you know, I could have maybe put a 2020 date in
3 there, but it could never -- no one would ever
4 have accepted it, but we probably would have
5 beat it. So, you know, it's a fine balance and
6 it's -- that's what project management is about.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So at that point
8 in time it's more about setting -- well, is it
9 fair to say it's about maintaining a certain
10 level of pressure by not setting the date out
11 too far?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. If you tell
13 someone -- it's no different from high school
14 kids and telling them how long they've got to do
15 their homework, right? And you get the good
16 people that start straight away and spread it
17 out over time, and then you get the others that
18 panic and do it on the last day before the
19 deadline.

20 Unfortunately when you're building
21 projects likes this you can't leave everything
22 until the last minute so it is progressive. But
23 you can't predict -- when you're predicting
24 something a year in advance you don't know
25 what's going to happen in that 12-month period.

1 All you can do is plan to the best of your
2 knowledge, with the input from the experts that
3 are around the table, and come up with a -- an
4 answer that satisfies everybody, that it's a
5 level of acceptability, which is what we did.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so it was
7 effectively a schedule with, would you say, with
8 no running room?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And that's an
11 executive-level decision? Or a Board-level
12 decision, as you say, in terms of how much
13 contingency you're going to provide for in the
14 schedule?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so I take it
17 the City had some input into the date, or at
18 least in terms of moving it from October to
19 November?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: That was their
21 decision.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Did they have
23 input before OLRTC presented an October 2018
24 target date?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: So they -- so I guess

1 a generic -- a sort of high-level view as to how
2 it went.

3 So we -- a group of us from outside
4 the project, we chose to do it -- or the Board
5 chose to use people from outside the project so
6 that people who are on the project can continue
7 to be focused on the project. It's quite normal
8 to do that because you don't want to distract
9 people from their day job.

10 So we took a small group of people
11 from outside of the project, from the parent
12 companies, and took data, the existing schedule
13 at the time from January, from the project team.
14 And then we looked at the logic as to the
15 sequence of activities, and we looked at the
16 durations, and we looked at the manpower, number
17 of hours, et cetera, days of the week. And then
18 we did the same with Alstom and we did the same
19 with Thales. And then we put Alstom and Thales
20 in the room together and did a combined one to
21 try and make sure we were all aligned on the
22 schedules. We then ran a Monte Carlo
23 simulation.

24 And then we brought the City into the
25 discussions and presented to them a spread of

1 dates and identified where the risks were and
2 what we call "critical path" within the
3 schedule. And I'm pretty sure we wrote in the
4 end formally to the City with an October date by
5 the -- well, whether it was formally that may or
6 may not have been by letter but certainly by
7 email. And we certainly got correspondence back
8 at the time by, email if not by letter, asking
9 for a November date, which was then what was
10 formally submitted via RTG to the City for
11 acceptance.

12 The City were involved. And they knew
13 we were doing the off-project deep dive into the
14 schedule.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And based on
16 those discussions would they have understood
17 that this was a utopian schedule?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. They knew it
19 had been run through a probability analysis and
20 they knew what the percentages were. So they
21 knew that it was what I would call a "stretch
22 target", right? It was going to be -- all the
23 stars had to align for that to work, right.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Right.

25 MATTHEW SLADE: There wasn't a lot of

1 fact in it because we didn't have that, you
2 know, in our favour.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you know
4 whether there were discussions either before
5 that or at that time about delay events, or
6 renegotiating the liquidated damages or anything
7 to minimize the impact of the delay on OLRTC?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: I wasn't involved in
9 any of those discussions, they may have occurred
10 but at the time I was just looking at schedule
11 so I don't know. They would have been a Board
12 decision, an RTG Board or OLRTC Board. It would
13 have been outside of what I was doing.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And your
15 instructions then, I take it, were to figure out
16 what the earliest possible RSA date could be?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And were you
19 involved in the subsequent scheduling changes in
20 terms of the new -- the further RSA target dates
21 that were devised?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: I was. I mean
23 obviously I was on project by then, but Rupert
24 was the Project Director, but those decisions
25 were -- we went through the same process,

1 workshops, analysis, and to work out what was or
2 wasn't achievable. Again, still taken with a
3 view with not too much contingency.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what was the
5 City's response to the delays to the RSA each
6 time?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: Well, obviously there
8 was tension, I think is a polite way to put it,
9 as a result of media and political pressure.
10 And then we were penalized for not hitting our
11 RSA dates, we were financially penalized as
12 well.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So would you say
14 the pressure kept increasing in terms of meeting
15 RSA?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, there was
17 pressure from all sides. I'm not going to say
18 that I wasn't under pressure from my own
19 organization as well. I mean, everyone wanted
20 to get finished. It was in no one's interest to
21 delay it at all.

22 There was, you know, an alignment that
23 the sooner we had it done the better for
24 everybody's sake, but not at any cost. We
25 weren't cutting any corners or doing anything

1 unsafe, or that wasn't agreed to or acceptable.

2 But, yeah, there was different
3 pressures. There was political pressure from
4 the client, and what have you. And there was
5 some financial pressure there as well, and there
6 was commercial and contractual pressure
7 internally as well.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you have any
9 sense of what the financial pressure was like as
10 a result of the delays on OLRTC?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: I think I would just
12 classify it as significant. I'm not going to
13 give you a precise number. I don't know what
14 the precise number was.

15 All of the parent companies were
16 essentially funding the job. We had -- every
17 month we had what we call "cash calls", where
18 it's a call back to the parent company to ask
19 for injections of cash into the project to be
20 able to pay our subcontractors and be able to
21 carry on working, and those were not
22 insignificant.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And you tell me
24 if you would have not had any involvement in
25 this, but is there anything in that regard that

1 you think the City should have responded to
2 differently?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: I guess hindsight is a
4 wonderful thing. There are lots of different
5 ways to get the outcome that you desire. And
6 this particular contract, this particular client
7 were focused on penalizing, whereas there are
8 other clients and other contractual mechanisms
9 that work on incentivization.

10 Nothing to do with this job but
11 generally I prefer incentivization. It was an
12 industry conversation I was having earlier this
13 week around that, where rather than penalizing
14 someone to achieve an end date wouldn't you be
15 better off to incentivize them, and if they
16 don't meet it they don't get the
17 incentivization? Six of one, half a dozen of
18 the other. But certainly the behaviour in the
19 relationship was very much around penalties.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And I'll ask you
21 more about that. But how do you incentivize in
22 a way that's not penalizing? Because you can
23 incentivize someone by threatening to penalize
24 them?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: You can do it the

1 other way, right? You could turn around and
2 say, Okay, your RSA date is the 2nd of November.
3 If you achieve that there's a commercial bonus
4 associated with that rather than a penalty.

5 You could -- you know, doesn't matter,
6 could be anything. Could be \$1 million, could
7 be \$10 million.

8 Knowing that we've already been
9 penalized with all of our damages that we were
10 paying, the City weren't (sic) funding the
11 project at that time, we were funding it. It
12 would have been a potential mechanism to recover
13 some of those penalties. The scale of it is not
14 necessarily relevant, but incentivizing is no
15 different from giving a dog a treat, or
16 whatever, right? It's rewarding good behaviour
17 rather than penalizing bad behaviour it's just a
18 different method.

19 But we went down a regime of penalties
20 and that was that. That was the term of the
21 contract that we signed up to, but it was --
22 there was no opportunity to revisit that or
23 rethink that, or look at different ways of
24 focusing all of us, including our
25 subcontractors, on how to get to the end date.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And you just
2 made some reference to this, but is that
3 different from how you've seen other projects
4 being managed from the owner side?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. Mainly in
6 Europe, to be fair. I haven't been in Canada
7 that long and most of my contracts here are
8 similar to the one that we had for Ottawa.

9 But certainly incentivization and --
10 is -- I think is regarded more -- as a more
11 acceptable method, certainly back in Europe than
12 it is here.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you have
14 any sense of what drove the City's approach on
15 this? Or who did?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: I guess I can make
17 sweeping generalizations. Behaviours are
18 learned, and the leadership from the top down
19 was clearly -- set the tone in all of the people
20 we were interacting with, at whatever level we
21 were interacting with, kind of followed that
22 tone of behaviour.

23 There were times where there was some
24 collaboration, but most of the time it was -- we
25 were generally being beaten with a stick. I

1 think that just was a reflection of -- again,
2 the pressure that our client was under from
3 their own management within the City.

4 I don't know how to describe it
5 really, but I guess -- it was never -- there was
6 never any consistency around partnership. There
7 was consistency around contractual engagement
8 and the way we were treated.

9 Whilst it was supposed to be a
10 partnership there was only glimpses of that at
11 certain times when it suited people for there to
12 be a partnership arrangement.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And when you
14 said your client had pressure from above, are
15 you referencing, for instance, John Manconi as
16 the General Manager having pressure from the
17 political sphere or --

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, I think so. I
19 think -- I think it flowed down from the Mayor
20 and from Council and Transit Commission, media.
21 Certain individuals in the client side were far
22 easier to deal with. The City Manager was
23 generally understanding and acceptable and more
24 reasonable to have a conversation with.

25 But it was -- you know, even just

1 saying that, just thinking about the
2 communications that we had and the way in which
3 it was done, it was -- having to reach out to
4 that sort of level of individual -- and they'll
5 probably say the same. They'll probably say
6 that the fact that that level of individual had
7 to get engaged with us is -- should never ever
8 have got to that position, but it did.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: You mean the
10 high level executives having to --

11 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. Whether it was
12 the Mayor or our CEOs or -- you know, the level
13 of management time and effort that got put into
14 it, especially when you recognize that RTG is
15 made up of three companies, OLRTC is made up of
16 three companies, you've got CEOs from both
17 Boards.

18 When we'd go and see the Mayor there
19 would be 20 people in the room from CEO level,
20 some of whom might have flown in from Europe. I
21 mean, it was a significant cost and manpower and
22 energy for -- it should never, ever have got to
23 that stage, but it did.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was this prior
25 to RSA?

1 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

2 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So before there
3 were issues in terms of breakdowns and
4 derailments, so during construction.

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, I'm still
6 talking about OLRTC.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Yeah.

8 MATTHEW SLADE: So I'm talking
9 probably in and around July 2019.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So as a result
11 of the delays and the performance of the trains
12 at that point in time, would that have been a
13 factor?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: It would have been a
15 factor. There was -- the trains had a huge
16 amount of retrofits that were required at that
17 time and they were still finishing off the
18 assembly and testing of the last few trains and
19 retrofit was starting. And there was, you know,
20 a huge amount of pressure from all sides to get
21 done. I guess it gets difficult when the end is
22 in sight but it still seems a long way away.

23 But, yeah, we had -- the level of
24 meeting and involvement at those levels to get
25 through those discussions was intense.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what was
2 being conveyed by the Mayor or the City at that
3 point in time?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: I think they had
5 frustration about how it looked on them as
6 individuals partly, but also they were concerned
7 about I guess, rightly or wrongly, what the
8 world, or certainly Canada's view was of Ottawa.

9 They were forever telling us that
10 they're the capital and this is very much in the
11 public eye. And it was in the public eye, I
12 guess, because they put it in the public eye.
13 But -- yeah, it was -- the pressure was immense;
14 it still is.

15 But it certainly -- I've not
16 experienced anything like that before, where the
17 City has been so involved and the project has
18 been so politically driven. I've worked on some
19 big jobs, which are political, but this was to
20 another level.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you know
22 whether RTG or OLRTC was publicly announcing new
23 RSA target dates?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: We would never do it
25 publicly. All of our communications went

1 from -- they went from OLRTC to RTG, RTG to the
2 City, and then the City would generally issue a
3 memo to Council, and at that point it would go
4 into the media.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was the City
6 making the new target dates public as they
7 evolved?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: Most of the time, yes.
9 There was no secrets anywhere and I'm not
10 suggesting there should have been, but, yeah, it
11 was -- you know, we were front-page news
12 throughout July and August every single day when
13 there was what I would regard as far more
14 serious things occurring in the city that were
15 newsworthy, yet we were front-page news every
16 day. It felt like everyday, it probably wasn't
17 every day but it certainly felt like every day.

18 And that just adds pressure as well
19 and it changes morale and behaviour. It was a
20 difficult environment.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So at that point
22 in July is everyone aiming towards to August
23 30th RSA date?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. We were heavy
25 focused on -- so we were focused on getting to

1 substantial completion, which was -- we had a
2 series of milestones in the schedule and in the
3 contract, substantial completion being the key
4 one at that time. Achieving substantial
5 completion meant that we could start trial
6 running. And then RSA came at the end of trial
7 running.

8 So, yeah, I mean, there was pressure,
9 like I said I had pressure from internal within
10 my business and from the Board to achieve
11 milestones, because we generally had financial
12 payments linked to them.

13 And there was pressure from the City
14 to achieve those, such that they looked good in
15 the media and everyone was getting to the end
16 game.

17 All these projects have pressures at
18 the end, I'm not for a minute saying that I
19 wasn't expect any, it's normal. And it was just
20 one step at a time and taking each day at a time
21 and getting to where we needed to get to.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: What's your
23 understanding of the biggest sources of delay on
24 the project?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: I mean, obviously I

1 touched briefly on the sinkhole that occurred
2 before I arrived. That had set back the project
3 significantly. And the scope that I was
4 responsible for essentially, testing
5 commissioning and getting the job across the
6 line, had been impacted by that dramatically
7 because construction was then out of sequence
8 and testing commissioning was out of sequence
9 and was not going to be executed as per the
10 schedule.

11 And then we had -- the vehicles were
12 later than we were expecting them to be and they
13 were less reliable than we were expecting them
14 to be and that added considerable time at the
15 back end as well.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So what was the
17 impact on the testing and commissioning schedule
18 and what did that compression look like, or how
19 was it -- how were you able to make it work?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: So originally, if you
21 go all the way back to probably to the RFP and
22 RFQ stage, and the schedule that was in the
23 contract and what have you, it would have
24 probably shown testing commissioning starting
25 physically at one end of the job, starting at

1 either Blair or Tunney's, and working its way
2 along the line all the way to the end. It's a
3 linear job. You know, tower -- downtown --
4 towers downtown are vertical jobs, railways are
5 generally linear jobs. And so you would start
6 at one end and you would work your way and get
7 to the other end.

8 As a result of the sinkhole, and
9 everything that happened associated with that,
10 we ended up essentially with two jobs. You had
11 a job in the east and a job in the west and you
12 had a hole in the middle, quite frankly,
13 literally, to a certain degree.

14 And you think all of the ability then
15 to test from one end to the other goes out the
16 window. So you have to test half the job, or a
17 third of the job at one end. And we had to
18 figure out how we were going to get physically
19 through the tunnel with a vehicle that was still
20 in a stage of construction far less complete
21 than the rest of the job and out to the west,
22 and how we were going to actually get the west
23 of the job connected to the east of the job.

24 And I don't just mean by rail, all of
25 the communications -- all those systems that are

1 on the job, which are all significant, they all
2 rely on cables and connections.

3 And when you have a gap in the middle
4 we have to find a way of bridging that gap. So
5 we ended up testing predominantly in the east to
6 start and getting to a level of maturity there.

7 And while they were still working on
8 the tunnel we found the earliest opportunity we
9 could to get one train through the tunnel. We
10 put some temporary cables through the tunnel.
11 And then we put a second train through a couple
12 of months later, such that we could test in the
13 west.

14 And it wasn't until such time that the
15 work in the tunnel was -- I would say probably
16 about 85 percent complete that we could start
17 testing in the tunnel, the tunnel is 2.5 to 3
18 kilometres long of track, which is not an
19 insignificant amount of -- it as a quarter of
20 the alignment.

21 And probably the hardest part of
22 testing with the tunnel ventilation systems and
23 some of the integrating systems that are there.
24 And it's the deepest part with the hardest
25 access, so there are construction guys and girls

1 to finish with the physical construction of the
2 station with the architectural finishes and
3 everything else.

4 I think the other thing that was a
5 challenge was then managing people, managing
6 time. It wasn't -- everything was -- had to be
7 adjusted based on the result of the whole of the
8 -- in the tunnel. It did have a significant
9 impact.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And why is it
11 important, particularly important to be able to
12 run the whole line or every part of the track?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: There was a number of
14 reasons for that. So the vehicle -- there are
15 numerous tests that need to be done that run the
16 entire system. Some of -- and when I say --
17 physically the entire length. Some of that was
18 vehicle specific so we do -- when we're testing
19 vehicles we do specific tests at speed and over
20 the entire alignment to validate the behaviour
21 of the vehicle and the way it interfaces with
22 the rails.

23 So we do ride quality comfort tests,
24 which essentially -- so that the travelling
25 public get a smooth ride, so we have to do tests

1 associated with that which you can't do until
2 you have the whole alignment and the whole line
3 speed.

4 We do what we call truck stability
5 tests that affects -- measures the amount of
6 lateral and vertical acceleration on the bogeys
7 of the train.

8 We do end-to-end journey times. We
9 have performance requirements in the contract
10 that says how long it takes to get from one end
11 of the job to the other end of the job. The
12 drivers, the actual -- what we call EROs,
13 electric rail operators. The drivers of the
14 trains have to be trained on the entire
15 alignment, they have to have route
16 familiarization so they know which stations are
17 next, where the signals are, where the
18 crossovers are, it's an extensive amount of
19 testing required.

20 And fail overtests with regards to the
21 traction power, when one traction power
22 substation shuts down does another one pick up?

23 I mean, the amount of tests that
24 require the entire alignment are enormous. To
25 give you a scale of it, I think on the entire

1 job we probably executed around 40,000 tests.
2 And the amount that are required even just in
3 the tunnel, or end-to-end come, into hundreds,
4 if not thousands.

5 So, you know, even if -- if we hadn't
6 had that sinkhole and we hadn't had that gap in
7 the tunnel you probably could have taken a
8 considerable amount of time off that schedule.
9 The trains were still a little bit late, but we
10 probably still could have got a long way ahead
11 with a lot of the testing, even if we only had
12 two trains, or whatever.

13 A lot of the testing of the signaling
14 equipment was done in what they call maturity
15 levels, maturity levels 0, 1, 2 and 3. A
16 maturity level 0 you don't need any trains you
17 can just -- you're essentially testing
18 communications and wires.

19 And when you get to maturity level 3
20 you need 2 or 3 trains. You don't need the
21 entire fleet until you're ready for trial
22 running. So we could have got a long way ahead
23 or finished a lot earlier if we hadn't had the
24 sinkhole.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So when did you

1 have access to the full line for running the
2 trains?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: We put those first two
4 trains through the tunnel -- I'm trying to think
5 when it was now. The first two probably went
6 through in, I want to say April time 2018 we put
7 the first one through, and then a couple of
8 months later probably the second one. And then
9 they started testing out at that end.

10 So the actual full connectivity
11 through the tunnel probably wasn't until spring
12 of 2019, that full line speed. I would have to
13 check. I can't tell you off the top of my head.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so I take it
15 there was far less ability to test the full
16 reliability of the system ahead of revenue
17 service than you normally would have had?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: I think that's fair to
19 say. I mean, reliability testing generally
20 comes afterwards, right? The testing that we're
21 doing is that everything actually works. You're
22 not testing its reliability probably until trial
23 running, or after trial running when you would
24 then start to see reliability growth.

25 And I guess the other hot topic that's

1 part of this is the soft opening that never
2 happened. Well, it did happen but it didn't
3 happen.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And we'll get to
5 talking about that. But wouldn't the fact of --
6 even if you're testing on the full line to --
7 just to pass those tests, wouldn't that
8 contribute to some of the running time that you
9 would gain to sort of debug --

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Right. So we did do
11 that. We made a conscious effort with Thales,
12 like I said. So we had maturity level 0 through
13 to 3 and we made a conscious decision, which was
14 not part of the original plan, we took a
15 conscious decision to get to maturity level 3 as
16 quickly as we could out in the east of the job,
17 sort of Blair end of the job, such that Thales
18 could -- because generally if you're testing --
19 we have five zones on the job, five signaling
20 zones. If you could test zone 5 and debug it
21 all the way up to maturity level 3, any of the
22 bugs you find in those different maturity levels
23 they're going to be replicated in the other
24 zones.

25 So we knew that -- we took an approach

1 to test as intensely as we could in one zone to
2 help Thales with software development, debugging
3 and everything else, such that we knew that we
4 could then rectify or predict what we might see
5 in the other four zones. So we did do that
6 and -- but again, it would have been -- it would
7 have been easier if we had more of the alignment
8 at the time, but we did change our testing
9 approach to make sure -- to increase our
10 certainty as to what the end result was going to
11 be.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Well, let me
13 phrase it this way, and we'll talk about the
14 reliability growth and trial running stage, but
15 just in terms of the earlier testing, or full
16 integration testing, I suppose you would call
17 it, running the full line.

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Uhm-hmm.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Would -- if
20 there had been an ability to do more of that,
21 could that have impacted the ultimate
22 performance of the system or reliability of the
23 system down the road?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: I don't think it would
25 have made a dramatic difference. The things

1 that we were picking up during testing and
2 commissioning were small items here and there
3 and they were very specific to geographic
4 locations. So you might find when the train
5 pulls in to the station you might get views on
6 CCTV cameras and stuff. You might get that and
7 you might go, that camera needs adjusting or
8 certain bits and pieces.

9 Obviously the integration with the
10 tunnel ventilation system couldn't happen until
11 the tunnel section because there isn't any on
12 the rest of it. So there was certain things we
13 couldn't do. But I don't think getting -- I
14 don't think getting access to the entire
15 alignment earlier would have changed the
16 reliability or the performance of the system, it
17 just would have got you to the end date earlier.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So when that was
19 completed would you have then been at the
20 pre-trial running phase?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what does
23 that look like?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: So you can't go into
25 trial running until all of your testing

1 commissioning is complete. The trial running is
2 not part of testing commissioning, it's
3 afterwards. So you test and commission all your
4 systems, you validate that they all work. And
5 you complete all those test procedures, they get
6 sent off to those engineers that design them and
7 they all get validated and signed off.

8 And at that point we could apply for
9 substantial completion. With a positive
10 response on substantial completion we were then
11 able to commence trial running.

12 And trial running, essentially,
13 crudely, is operating the system to a timetable
14 that replicates how the system would operate in
15 revenue service. So it's the same as it runs
16 today but without any passengers. So it's --
17 there's no passengers but it's just essentially
18 exercising the system on a daily basis,
19 mimicking daily service to ensure that it can
20 perform as it should do in revenue service.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what about
22 pre-trial running?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: Pre-trial running was
24 a matter of a few days I think. We didn't spend
25 a huge amount of time in pre-trial running.

1 Whilst we submitted for substantial completion
2 obviously the City and the independent certifier
3 take some time to assess that as to whether or
4 not we had achieved substantial completion. And
5 during that period we undertook what we called
6 "pre-trial running" which was exactly that, it's
7 trial running but without any -- I mean, we --
8 without any pass/fail criteria, it's exactly the
9 same. It was a mock exam, shall we say. Just a
10 couple of extra days on the front of trial
11 running without all of the eyes and the tension
12 and the heavy weight of being scored.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And would you
14 say that the trains seemed ready for trial
15 running, or the system seemed ready?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: I would say that -- I
17 would have to say on paper yes, on the basis
18 that all the systems had passed all necessary
19 tests and the vehicles were all tested and
20 passed all the necessary tests, but their
21 reliability was probably quite a way short of
22 where we were hoping they would be at that
23 point.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what kind of
25 issues were you seeing on the trains at that

1 point?

2 MATTHEW SLADE: It was varied across
3 all of the different systems that built up the
4 train. We had brake system issues, we had
5 computer based issues, we had traction power
6 issues, it was various across key parts of the
7 City -- of the vehicle systems. Yeah, it was
8 numerous bits and pieces here and there
9 depending on what vehicle it was and --

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was the City
11 fully involved at that point in time?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, 100 percent.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: They were aware
14 of all these issues going on?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And why was a
17 decision made to go into trial running at that
18 point in time?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: Well, it was the next
20 step on the schedule. I mean, I can't remember
21 off the top of my head -- I think -- well they
22 had obviously made a public announcement that
23 the independent certifier and the City had
24 awarded substantial completion.

25 They had publicly told the City that,

1 and the media that, essentially that commenced
2 the trial running period. So they had made a
3 public statement to that effect.

4 And they also had essentially given
5 them, the Transit Commission, a high-level view
6 as to what trial running was going to entail.
7 And, therefore, everyone got their calendar out
8 and predicted when the railway was going to
9 open. So there was -- it was out there. And I
10 think the City was not minded to pause or hold
11 or do anything else, it was full steam ahead.

12 From our side as well we didn't tell
13 them not to do it, right?

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was it a
15 City decision in fact or was it not OLRTC that
16 was in charge of when trial running would take
17 place and other steps in the process?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: I think we certainly
19 told the City that it was our intention to start
20 trial running as soon as we got substantial
21 completion. And the City were on board with
22 that, right?

23 We were -- at no point did anyone -- I
24 don't think there was ever a formal letter that
25 says, we will start on such-and-such a date.

1 And I don't think there was ever, you know,
2 anything back saying, Don't. And I don't think
3 there was ever a point where anyone said -- or
4 even questioned whether we were ready, I don't
5 think, from either side. I don't recall that.

6 I don't remember -- I don't recall any
7 emails or sitting in any meeting saying, I'll be
8 ready. We'd been counting down to that with
9 pretty much daily meeting with the City. And it
10 was general consensus that as soon as we got
11 substantial completion we would start trial
12 running.

13
14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So it was more
15 like, as soon as we can get to the next step
16 let's get to it?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. The end goal was
18 to open the railway. The thought of not doing
19 it -- not, not doing anything but, you know, the
20 expectation was everyone keeps going. We had
21 momentum. We were moving in a positive way.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And am I right
23 that at substantial completion is when the minor
24 deficiencies list was devised?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. The minor

1 deficiencies list was a document that was
2 ongoing. But part of the substantial
3 completion, the independent certifier validated
4 the minor deficiency list and then there was
5 a -- under the contract there's a financial
6 penalty associated with those, that you then
7 claim that money back as you close those
8 deficiencies out, the holdback, in essence.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And aside from
10 the independent certifier, did the City have to
11 agree to those items remaining outstanding?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. And, aside from
13 the minor deficiency list, I think we also had
14 a -- like a -- I'm going to call it a "critical
15 RSA list" that we agreed with the City, between
16 RTG and the City and OLRTC, of specific --
17 because the items on the minor deficiency list
18 could be closed out after RSA, but we had a list
19 of items that we took off of there that we all
20 agreed needed to be dealt with before RSA.

21 And I can't tell you how many was on
22 the list off the top of my head, but certainly
23 there was a dozen to twenty critical items that
24 we agreed needed to be addressed before service
25 availability. And that was documented and put

1 into a contractual document at the end between
2 the City and RTG.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And were they
4 all completed before RSA or did some make it to
5 the term sheet?

6 MATTHEW SLADE: Some made it to the
7 term sheet.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So initially the
9 City's expectation is that these needed to be
10 done?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Which one -- do
13 you recall which key items were initially on the
14 critical pre-RSA list that got deferred
15 ultimately?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: The ones that ended up
17 in the term sheet or the ones that got deferred?

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: That ended up in
19 the term sheet.

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Certainly the on-board
21 CCTV, the cab CCTV on the vehicle. I think the
22 number of vehicle -- I don't know if that was on
23 the list at that the time. Certainly that's the
24 one that stands out for me. I can't remember
25 now what they all were.

1 A lot of them got closed off in
2 advance. A lot of them were documentation that
3 got closed, like the bill of sales for the
4 vehicles, the engineering safety assurance case,
5 the occupancy certificate for the building, the
6 fire safety plans.

7 And there were some related to the
8 vehicle, like the on-board CCTV. Vehicle cab
9 doors might have been on there that got deferred
10 to the term sheet. Yeah, I can't recall off the
11 top of my head.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Were there
13 issues with test procedures and test results
14 missing around that point in time, or the City
15 not having them, or they had not been produced?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: Not that I'm aware of.
17 We had sat down regularly with the independent
18 certifier and my testing manager, Steve Nadon,
19 and went through all of the tests. I don't
20 recall any test procedures being outstanding at
21 that point.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Would you have
23 had any interaction with people from Parsons?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you

1 recall them asking for a lot of the
2 documentation about the testing and
3 commissioning?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: No.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you know
6 whether they had insight or were able to gain
7 insight into what had been completed and to what
8 level?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Parsons specifically?

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Uhm-hmm.

11 MATTHEW SLADE: I only dealt with one
12 individual from Parsons. No, no, two
13 individuals I think, and they would have had
14 access to all that information, or they could
15 have asked for it if they -- but I don't
16 remember either of them asking for anything that
17 they thought was missing.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Who are the two?
19 Do you recall?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Mike Palmer and Glen
21 McCurdy.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you recall
23 whether the City ultimately received all of the
24 test results and -- to their satisfaction and
25 the test procedures and requirements?

1 MATTHEW SLADE: They had them all
2 before substantial completion. They wouldn't
3 have signed substantial completion without them.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So this was not
5 something that was reflected on one of the
6 deficiencies lists?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: Not that I'm aware of.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you recall
9 seeing reliability reviews from Alstom? And
10 would the City have had access to those?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And those set
13 out the issues that the trains were
14 encountering, I take it?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Were you part of
17 RAMP? Or I guess you attended RAMP meetings?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: I did.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Can you tell me
20 what the tenor of those discussions were as the
21 parties were approaching trial running and then
22 RSA?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: So they were good
24 meetings generally. It was -- trying to think
25 how often we had them. I think initially they

1 were monthly and then they ended up being
2 weekly, and I think they were probably ad hoc
3 when they were more than weekly.

4 So we had -- we would -- what's
5 effectively still known as the "RAMP room" down
6 at OC Transpo's offices, and there would
7 probably be at least 20 people in the room,
8 maybe more; 20 to 30 people in the room,
9 depending. And they would be -- the RAMP report
10 was owned by OC Transpo and they would report on
11 readiness on a red, amber, green type scoring
12 mechanism against what -- I can't remember how
13 many it was, 40-odd key things that needed to be
14 done for them to be satisfied that they were, as
15 in their term, "ready for rail". And we would
16 go through that.

17 The City would kind of present and
18 then OLRTC, RTG and quite often we took Alstom
19 and Thales with us depending on what we were
20 covering. And sometimes we even took very
21 specialist people out of our more junior team,
22 shall we say, like someone that was a specialist
23 in a particular system if we knew that it was
24 going to come up as a topic. And they might not
25 sit through the whole meeting, they might sit in

1 an adjacent room and get called in to talk at a
2 point in time.

3 But John Manconi ran those meetings,
4 or kind of chaired them with Michael Morgan and
5 the rest of the team, and the City's consultants
6 were in there and myself, Peter Lauch and
7 representatives from my team and the
8 subcontractors. And we would cover everything
9 from training, media, testing, commissioning,
10 vehicle performance, maintenance. The
11 maintainer was in there, RTM were in there as
12 well. Yeah. It would cover off everything with
13 regard to being ready to go into service.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what were
15 the discussions around the level of concern, if
16 there was any, about the performance of the
17 vehicles?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: There was a lot of
19 concern from all parties, including us. And I
20 think it was the kind of why we had Alstom in
21 the room as well. So we had a fair amount of
22 frustrations with our subcontractor.

23 The City would ask for information and
24 we would struggle to get it from Alstom, so it
25 just became easier to take Alstom to the

1 meetings and get them to answer the questions
2 directly, or at least let the City ask them the
3 questions and then see how they would react or
4 how they would respond.

5 And I think -- I mean, to be fair,
6 even Alstom brought some of their own supply
7 chain into some of those meetings. I remember
8 being in meetings where they had the door system
9 supplier and the brake system supplier there to
10 provide answers directly to the City as well.

11 Again, not something I've ever
12 experienced before but it's what the City
13 wanted.

14 They had a huge thirst for knowledge
15 on all this stuff, I guess with regards to
16 getting to a point of certainty.

17 But it also had -- you get to a point
18 where there's a distinct lack of trust, I guess,
19 where the City wouldn't believe whatever we were
20 telling them.

21 But the City often, as well, generally
22 thought they could help with some of those
23 things, so it was a two-way conversation.

24 Some of those meetings were very
25 tense, very heated on some subjects. And

1 sometimes, depending on what it was and what was
2 coming up, certainly I would arrange to have
3 pre-meetings with the City's consultants. If I
4 knew there was a difficult conversation coming
5 up I often found it easier to have a pre-meeting
6 with their consultants to get their -- to gauge
7 their feeling on a topic, and to either get
8 their support to be able to encourage the City
9 to listen to what we were saying, or to
10 understand how the City would respond depending
11 on how we pitched certain things.

12 So I used their consultants as a bit
13 of a sounding board and that worked pretty well.
14 I had a good relationship with them but it
15 was -- the thirst for knowledge was immense,
16 absolutely immense.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was that
18 mostly at the end or was it throughout in terms
19 of the City's oversight of the construction
20 work?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: I would say it was
22 throughout, and I think that was full -- and I
23 don't know when it started because it was
24 probably like that when I arrived. I don't know
25 whether it started with the sinkhole or

1 whatever, but certainly there was a -- I'm going
2 to say a lack of trust from the City's part.

3 And the feeling was that whenever we
4 were suggesting anything or telling them
5 anything they kind of -- the feeling was as
6 though we were doing it for our own advantage
7 rather than -- and to the detriment of the City.

8 They were very, very defensive and
9 didn't necessarily see that we were taking
10 decisions or proposing things for the good of
11 the project. They thought it was for our own
12 benefit, which made it very challenging. It
13 wasn't -- I guess going back to where we were
14 earlier, those meetings were not very
15 collaborative and it didn't feel much like that
16 we were all -- we did all want the same outcome
17 but we weren't always working together to get
18 there.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you think
20 the -- well, do you know of anything that may
21 have contributed to the lack of trust?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: I actually don't. I
23 don't know where that came from. And it was
24 different at different levels. You know, there
25 are certain people in the City where we had

1 really, really good relationships, and there was
2 others where it was clear there was a distrust
3 or -- and I don't know where that came from but
4 it was there before I arrived.

5 And I'd like to say I worked really
6 hard to try and get rid of it and to work
7 collaboratively. And I think -- it sounds a bit
8 arrogant but I probably did that better than
9 other people. I have a lot of people there at
10 the City that I still talk to and have a good
11 relationship with.

12 If we had carried on fighting the way
13 some of those conversations were going we
14 probably still wouldn't be in service now.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Could the lack
16 of trust have had to do with, in part, the
17 schedules and the City not trusting the -- the
18 OLRTC schedule and when RSA would be achieved?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: I mean, possibly. But
20 the -- like I said at the very beginning of
21 this, the City were involved in that scheduling.
22 So they can't say, Oh, it was a complete shock,
23 because it wasn't. I think they were -- they
24 were unhappy obviously. They're the client.
25 They wanted it by a certain date and it wasn't

1 coming by that date. And I can understand there
2 being a displeasure with that. But with regards
3 to that being a reason for trust, that would be
4 unfair, in my opinion, because they were
5 involved in all of that scheduling work that was
6 going on.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And would you
8 say they had a good sense of what was realistic
9 or not in terms of when --

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. There are
11 emails there from John Manconi saying, We don't
12 think your October RSA date is realistic, use a
13 November date. So that was the City's opinion.

14 They had done an assessment and looked
15 at it. They were on the job as much as we were
16 walking around. They can see. And I'm not
17 saying that they're that naive that they didn't
18 know what they were looking at. But they knew,
19 and they knew in those RAMP meetings where we
20 were and where we weren't and what was
21 achievable and what wasn't achievable, maybe not
22 down to the finite detail of some of the stuff.
23 But they had enough advisors and good advisors
24 and consultants giving them advice. They can't
25 say that they weren't prepared, they just can't.

1 It was in the media right? The media knew,
2 everybody else knew. It wasn't a secret.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: We'll take a
4 break here, so let's just go off record.

5 -- RECESSED AT 3:37 P.M. --

6 -- RESUMED AT 3:52 P.M. --

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you recall a
8 period where OLRTC either didn't have a fully
9 integrated schedule that was being produced, or
10 there was some commentary that it was not a
11 fully mitigated schedule, commentary in
12 particularly by the independent certifier?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: No.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you recall
15 there being caveats on the schedule?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: I do from early in
17 2018 when we moved the RSA date. I think at
18 that point there was a caveat on the covering
19 letter with the schedule --

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so what was
21 that about?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: I might get this wrong
23 because my recollection is not perfect, but I
24 think it was about variations from the City with
25 regards to architectural finishes.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was the RSA
2 data basically subject to these potential
3 additional delays?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, I think so. I
5 think any of -- yeah, I would certainly think
6 the end date was caveated based on -- I know we
7 received in -- I want to say in July of 2018, a
8 whole series of variations from the City, or we
9 had them confirmed or finalized around that
10 time.

11 From the top of my head I can't
12 remember what they all were, but the one that
13 sticks is the architectural ceiling in
14 Parliament station, which might actually have
15 been -- now I've said that it might have been
16 one of those items that was on the -- not
17 necessarily on the term sheet but on the RSA
18 list that -- as being one of the things that we
19 identified would struggle to be done by RSA.

20 I don't know whether you've been to
21 the station, it's an impressive ceiling and it
22 was a huge amount of money for a ceiling.

23 And it was -- the whole procurement
24 process, because it was bespoke, was slow. So I
25 think -- that's the only one that sticks in my

1 head at the time as being a caveat, but it might
2 have been linked to all those other variations
3 that were kicking around then; there was a few.
4 They were all either architectural or
5 hardscaping, stuff like that, landscaping around
6 the outside of stations and things like that,
7 from memory. I can't --

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So they didn't
9 necessary preclude the RSA date that was set out
10 in the schedule itself? Or -- well, to the
11 extent that they could have been waived. But if
12 they had been accounted for would they
13 necessarily have pushed back the RSA date?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: I think that's the
15 whole point, (a), those variations hadn't been
16 finalized with the City and we didn't know what
17 impacts they were going to have, because they
18 required subcontracts and they were
19 architectural, artistic subcontracts that we
20 didn't have control over.

21 So it's very much a case of, based on
22 what we know at this point in time that's the
23 date. But there's all this stuff that we know a
24 bit about but isn't -- until we have a contract
25 signed with a supplier that says, We can achieve

1 that date, there was risk to the date. So I
2 think -- that's my recollection.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So it was about
4 items that were outstanding and then -- you were
5 waiting on, at least in terms of information,
6 but not necessarily about past events that there
7 was a commercial dispute about potentially
8 impacting who was responsible for the delay?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, no. I don't
10 think that was -- I don't recall that. I only
11 recall it as being a result of variations that
12 had not yet been finalized that had the
13 potential to impact the end date.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay, got it.
15 Do you recall when the decision was
16 made to reduce the number of vehicles from 15 to
17 13 in terms of what would be used during certain
18 peak hours during service operations?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: I think that was all
20 done as part of the term sheet, as part of the
21 RSA negotiations. I recall there being an item
22 on that list, being two additional trains, or
23 whatever, and there was an agreement to reduce
24 to 13 vehicles, I think. I think that's what my
25 recollection is anyway.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So it wasn't
2 before trial running?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: No.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you
5 recall ever seeing the City's go/no-go list?

6 MATTHEW SLADE: If that's different
7 from what's in the RAMP meeting then I don't
8 recall. I remember having -- I don't know if
9 you call it go/no-go but the RAMP traffic light
10 items were -- I thought -- I would classify as a
11 go/no-go. If there's a separate document they
12 call a "go/no-go" I'm not aware of that.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: But basically
14 the no-go items being items that would prevent
15 them from going into RSA? Or that they would
16 say were critical, from their perspective, to
17 going into revenue service. Is that what you
18 understood this list to be? The one you have in
19 mind at least?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. It was the RAMP
21 report, which essentially said everything that
22 they saw as being a requirement to going into
23 service.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Right.

25 MATTHEW SLADE: But I think we called

1 it the "RAMP report". If there's something
2 specifically called a "go/no-go list" I'm not
3 aware of that.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: A "RAMP report"
5 you called it?

6 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes, from the RAMP
7 meetings we talked about before the break. We
8 used to have the RAMP meetings with the City,
9 and they had a RAMP report, which was a series
10 of probably 40 slides in a slide deck, and they
11 had red, green or amber dots beside them if they
12 were trending for good or not.

13 But I'm not aware of something
14 specifically called a "go/no-go list".

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: No, I think
16 we're talking about the same thing.

17 Do you recall any items on there that
18 made it on to the term sheet or that were not
19 completed?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: No, I can't recall.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: You can't
22 recall?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: No. Too long ago I'm
24 afraid. I'm sure I can go back and read them
25 all and refresh my memory, but off the top of my

1 head, no.

2 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So, for
3 instance, 34 trains in terms of the vehicles --

4 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was that
6 ultimately -- were there ultimately fewer than
7 34, given the reduction from 15 to 13, or did
8 that not impact?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: So I suspect the RAMP
10 report probably always showed 34, I don't think
11 that probably ever changed. The contract
12 requirement was to provide 34 vehicles.

13 Irrespective of how many were in
14 service there was a contract requirement to
15 provide 34 vehicles.

16 And I think we ended up -- the term
17 sheet certainly had two additional vehicles on
18 it, because two of the Stage 1 vehicles were not
19 able to go into revenue service and they are
20 still not in revenue service. We ended up
21 taking two from Stage 2.

22 But I don't recall when they dropped
23 from 15 vehicles to 13 vehicles. I think that
24 must have been part of the term sheet as well.
25 The term sheet probably had 13 vehicles and it

1 probably also had in there a clause about
2 coupled trains. Because all of it -- all the
3 trains are made of two-car consists now.
4 Whereas the original plan was to run single car
5 consists on a weekend, but we still run doubles.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: The original
7 plan was to run singles on the weekend?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: Only on the weekends.
9 Only on Saturdays and Sundays.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And why are two
11 being run instead?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: For reliability
13 reasons.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So I'm just
15 trying to see whether the reduction from 15 to
16 13, in terms of how many trains needed to be
17 made available for certain periods of time,
18 would that have impacted the number of trains
19 being delivered in terms of the 34?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: No.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So did -- were
22 34 vehicles delivered? RTG just didn't need to
23 run as many during peak periods?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So let's talk

1 about any discussions that there were about a
2 soft opening. Were there any?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: There were. There
4 were. It was raised a few times at different
5 stages in the project. The first one was
6 probably fairly early on in -- when I was on
7 project in 2018, probably in the late spring,
8 early summer of 2018 where we talked about the
9 potential of -- it's still classified as a soft
10 opening, in essence a partial opening, maybe
11 opening from Blair to U Ottawa because of the
12 issue with the tunnel.

13 And saying, you know, you could --
14 offering the City, look, you could run six
15 trains on a loop between Blair and U Ottawa and
16 get the system up and running and open, and get
17 the public familiar with it, and get the
18 operators and the staff familiar with it; and
19 that would have given you some reliability
20 growth. But there was no appetite for that
21 whatsoever, which I kind of understand. But
22 it's not uncommon to do that sort of thing.

23 And then later -- later on, I can't
24 remember when, it was probably -- probably in
25 the winter of 2018 into 2019, we had a

1 discussion in one of those -- it was in the RAMP
2 room but I don't know if it was actually in a
3 RAMP meeting. And I related -- I talked to them
4 and recommended to Mr. Manconi that we have a
5 soft opening, which at that time I was
6 recommending, still the whole alignment but
7 reduced hours, such that we would have more
8 maintenance hours available. And that was
9 flatly refused as well.

10 But that conversation was also
11 supported by Tom Prendergast of STV, he was
12 supportive of a soft opening at that time as
13 well. But the City were adamant that they
14 didn't want a soft opening.

15 And we also talked there and then
16 about their desire to cut the buses off so
17 quickly, which we also suggested was not
18 probably the best course to take, but they still
19 decided to do it.

20 And after that it wasn't raised again
21 after that because it was just -- they were
22 adamant to such an extent that it wasn't
23 something that was open to discussion. It
24 just -- it was so badly received by them that it
25 would have been a very brave person, someone

1 much braver than me, to raise it as a potential
2 solution.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Why was it --
4 what part of the response was so --

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Well, just so adamant.
6 It was almost like I was like -- to even have
7 the audacity to raise it as a suggestion. It
8 was so negatively received.

9 And on the basis that it was seen that
10 we were taking advantage, or we were the ones
11 that were going to benefit, "we" being OLRTC
12 from RTG were going to be the ones benefiting
13 from it and that the City would -- it would be
14 perceived that the City were cutting us a break.

15 That seems to be a kind of recurring
16 theme with a lot of the conversations. Even
17 to -- that language is even used sometimes in
18 Transit Commission. Like they say, oh, you
19 know, the Commissioners or the Council will say,
20 you're giving RTG or OLRTC a break. It was very
21 much this attitude that we -- like I said
22 before, this regime of penalties and sternness
23 as to how we were treated.

24 Did they -- anything that you raised,
25 whether it would be of benefit to everybody it

1 was still shut down. But that was shut down
2 with I guess such strength that it was just --
3 it was not something that I was going to table
4 and upset Mr. Manconi with again. That was it.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Did he ask for
6 more details or for a specific plan?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: No. There was no
8 appetite for that whatsoever. I'm pretty sure
9 at the time that I wrote an email to my CEO here
10 giving him my advice and suggesting that that
11 was the best thing to do, in the hope that he
12 might, at the CEO level, be able to have a
13 conversation with someone, but I don't think
14 that that ever occurred.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Which CEO is
16 that? Do you mean at EllisDon?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was there any
19 expectation that there would be no deductions or
20 no financial consequences to --

21 MATTHEW SLADE: It never even got that
22 far of a discussion. It was just -- it was a
23 unanimous "no". It was just -- there was no
24 entertaining any level of conversation about
25 anything on that topic.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And when you say
2 Mr. Prendergast was supportive, what did he
3 express to you, do you recall?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: I can't recall
5 verbatim but he was of the opinion -- he
6 supported it. He agreed that a soft opening
7 would make a lot of sense and that it was in the
8 best industry practice to do something of that
9 nature. And again, and that wasn't something
10 that -- he talked to Tom off-line about stuff.
11 It just came out in conversation and he was
12 supportive of it at the time as well. And we
13 hadn't -- again, we hadn't discussed any details
14 about what it looked like. I had a view in my
15 head as to what it would look like, but we
16 hadn't -- we hadn't had any discussion.

17 I was hoping that that would be the
18 opening point to say, Go away, work on it with
19 Tom and come back with a proposal to the room as
20 to what that could look like, but it was just
21 shut down immediately.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was there --
23 in terms of the discussion about cutting off the
24 buses so quickly, was the plan at that point in
25 time to run parallel bus service for three

1 weeks, or do you recall what it was?

2 MATTHEW SLADE: I think the duration
3 of how long they were -- I think they had
4 already -- they had predetermined -- it wasn't
5 the three weeks that was predetermined, it was
6 the fact that they had, for want of a better
7 term, laid-off -- given notice to 350 drivers
8 that they would be losing their job. And I
9 guess -- so that date at which they were going
10 to be terminated was fixed.

11 The fact that there was a three-week
12 overlap -- the date at which we would go into
13 service wasn't known at that point. It just
14 happen to be that it ended up being three weeks
15 before that. It could have ended up one week
16 before, I guess. You can argue we were lucky
17 with three weeks, or if we had achieved RSA
18 earlier it might have been four weeks or five
19 weeks.

20 But I think the termination date was
21 agreed on based on contracts for OC. I'm not
22 privy to that information because that's
23 OC Transpo. Cutting off those buses was, yeah,
24 a wrong decision.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was it

1 always expected that service operations would
2 begin immediately after or very shortly
3 thereafter the RSA date?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: No. That was a
5 surprise to us. I'm going to get my dates wrong
6 just because I can't remember, but we -- at the
7 point of which we had, I guess, got to the end,
8 or near enough to the end of trial running, "we"
9 being RTG and OLRTC, certainly Peter and I were
10 asked to take councillors, dignitaries, whatever
11 you want to call them, for a train ride along
12 the entire alignment, culminating with an
13 extraordinary Council meeting at the Town Hall.
14 At which point -- which we weren't aware of.
15 Well, we knew they were going to announce the
16 opening date at that meeting but we didn't know
17 what that date was going to be.

18 So it was a complete surprise to us
19 when they announced it. So they announced -- I
20 want to say it was the 14th of September was the
21 date they announced. And I think they announced
22 that at the end of August, I want to say the
23 30th of August, or thereabouts.

24 And that was a complete shock to us
25 because not that long before the City had issued

1 a letter notifying RTG of their -- the service
2 level that they were going to service at, and in
3 that letter it suggested that they would go into
4 service in Q4 of 2019, and obviously October is
5 not -- September, sorry, is not in Q4. So it
6 was a shock and it was quick.

7 Mr. Manconi always said he needed four
8 weeks to get ready for service and there they
9 were announcing a date that was two weeks away.

10 So he had been in the media saying he
11 needed four weeks. He's been at Transit
12 Commission, announced on the media in an
13 interview, and then we were in City Hall and
14 they said, We're going to open on the 14th of
15 September; and we were slightly shocked.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you know
17 why he said he needed four weeks initially?
18 What needed to be done?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: In that four weeks
20 they planned -- I don't know categorically but
21 their plan was to, obviously, continue to run
22 service without passengers, to familiarize their
23 staff, to get what they called their
24 "ambassadors" there. They put a bunch of -- I'm
25 going to call -- they called them "red vests",

1 platform staff, station staff out on the
2 alignment and get them familiar with the system
3 to help with passenger interaction.

4 They had a whole number of things they
5 wanted to get ready, emergency services and
6 special constables, and all that sort of stuff.
7 That was my understanding of what they wanted
8 four weeks for. And then they made this
9 announcement making it only two weeks.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And you don't
11 know what led them to ultimately choose two
12 weeks?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: No. We were unaware
14 of the 14th of September date until we sat in
15 that room.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: In terms of
17 suggesting reduced hours on the whole allotment
18 in, I think you said the 2018, 2019?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: Uhm-hmm.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: You said in
21 order to get more maintenance hours. What was
22 the concern there? Why did you believe more
23 maintenance hours were needed?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: So like I said, soft
25 openings are commonplace. It originates from

1 the restaurant industry actually where they had
2 soft openings, where you generally -- to get
3 everything bedded in and settled in you would
4 provide a more limited access to the service.

5 And normally with transit systems the
6 way you would do that is you would either avoid
7 peak hours, so instead of the trains running
8 from 5 a.m. until midnight you would probably
9 run, say, eight o'clock in the morning, so you
10 miss most of the morning peak, and run until
11 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon so you don't have
12 the huge pressures of commuter hours. And just
13 run for that period. Which means then you also
14 get extended hours outside of that to do, I say
15 maintenance, but you get -- the maintainer and
16 the constructor would get hands-on time to clear
17 up those deficiencies that are on the minor
18 deficiency list, and to ensure that everything
19 is bedding in as you would expect it to and deal
20 with maintenance.

21 So that gives you more hands-on,
22 physical time to the assets, whether that be
23 trains or the physical infrastructure assets.

24 And it gets your staff more familiar
25 with everything. It give you an opportunity to

1 see if any of those systems are wearing or
2 behaving abnormally from how you might expect
3 them to. And it's -- I would say it's generally
4 seen as good practice.

5 And even with, I say, experienced or
6 seasoned transit agencies when they open up new
7 systems they still use soft openings. And in
8 this situation where you had -- everything was
9 new and everybody was new -- even more reason to
10 do it, and we didn't.

11 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was anything
12 planned for originally, or at least earlier on,
13 in terms of a bedding in period or more burn-in
14 time ahead of RSA? Was there any plan for that?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: No. I mean the
16 vehicles had a burn-in requirement based on
17 mileage, kilometrage [sic], which they all
18 covered. And, in fact, when we went into
19 service those vehicles had a high mileage on
20 them when they went into service, probably far
21 higher than a lot of fleets go into service
22 with, which is a good thing.

23 But, no, there wasn't any view -- I
24 guess we didn't know when they were going to go
25 into service. And it was completely in the

1 City's control and gift.

2 So our contract basically ran up until
3 revenue service availability. But service
4 commencement was completely -- the date of which
5 it goes into service is 100 percent the City's
6 decision. We had no control over that. As long
7 as we were contractually done RSA, the time that
8 it took them to go into service commencement was
9 completely in their gift. They could have take
10 a week, they could have taken six months. That
11 was their decision and not a decision that we
12 were party to or involved with.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And in terms of
14 raising a partial opening or reduced hours in
15 2018, 2019, was that informed in part by -- or
16 at least in part by the issues that the trains
17 were encountering?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Part of it was down to
19 that, but the majority of it was just down to
20 good practice, industry best practice.

21 I think expecting it to be perfect
22 straight out of the box was very naive, and
23 that's why agencies have these soft openings.
24 It's -- even the most seasoned. The last one
25 that I commissioned in the U.K., that actually

1 went into service while I was still on the job,
2 was the East London line, which is owned by
3 London Underground, rail for London, now 175
4 years they've been running trains for and they
5 still insisted on a soft opening. So it's --
6 it's not that it's -- there's no bad reason for
7 doing it. It's done for very good reasons. And
8 the decision to not do that, I think, was
9 short-sighted.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Is it fair to
11 say that you could do it one of two ways? You
12 could do more dry running, a longer burn-in
13 period but before any service operations, until
14 the system is debugged or runs pretty smoothly?
15 Or I guess you would call it your reliability
16 growth.

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Or you could
19 start earlier but more progressively. Would you
20 say either of those would work or there's a
21 preferred?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes, both would work.
23 Probably in reality I would probably -- if it
24 was my choice I would do a blend of both,
25 because the other key factor is the travelling

1 public. And it's all very well that you can run
2 these things backwards and forwards, but they do
3 behave differently when they have people on
4 them? Both from -- even if the doors are being
5 used, just opened and closed, opened and closed
6 by the driver, by the operator, versus a member
7 of the public, if they behave differently. The
8 number of people in a vehicle and the weight of
9 the vehicle makes a difference. And just using
10 all the systems that aren't necessarily the
11 vehicle, escalators, elevators, telephones, fare
12 gates, it all needs bedding in. It's not just
13 the vehicles. The whole network needs bedding
14 in.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So you would
16 always -- well, at least as a best practice you
17 would want some soft start to some extent?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And fair to say
20 here there was neither? Neither the soft start
21 or any --

22 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what would
24 you have expected to see in terms of pre-RSA,
25 burn-in period or dry running that there wasn't?

1 MATTHEW SLADE: So I think we probably
2 could have done more pre-RSA to get more bugs
3 out of the vehicle, but then we were also faced
4 with the vehicle supplier telling us that they
5 were -- this was all minor stuff and not really
6 an issue, et cetera, et cetera.

7 But, you know, so, yeah, we could have
8 delayed it but it would have cost us. So we
9 were -- I was under pressure to get the thing
10 open. The City were pressurizing us to get
11 open.

12 So even those conversations would
13 never have been entertained either, whether that
14 was internally through my own organization or
15 through the client. It would have helped,
16 definitely, but it wouldn't have affected -- I
17 don't think it would have changed the way the
18 system performed.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Why not?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Because a lot of the
21 issues that we've had would never have been
22 identified as a result of doing that.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And why is that?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: So some of those
25 issues are -- they either became apparent as a

1 result of time and season, or they became
2 apparent as a result of time and distance, and
3 some of them needed passengers because some of
4 them were, you know, door-related, or whatever.

5 You know, a lot of those inherently
6 you wouldn't -- no amount of testing would have
7 identified that those were potential issues.
8 But then even though -- even the issues, some of
9 them were -- I don't want to say major,
10 significant, but they were -- their significance
11 was compounded by the lack of experience of the
12 people that were operating the system.

13 So it wasn't necessarily the fact that
14 the issue occurred, it was the manner in which
15 the issue was dealt with that fundamentally
16 caused the perception of a poor system. Does
17 that make sense?

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Yes. Is that in
19 respect of the incidence response?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, yeah. Not just
21 in time but the way in which they respond. We
22 still have issues today -- touch wood, not
23 today. But we have issues from the last weeks
24 that are associated with similar issues that we
25 were having back in 2019, 2020, that back then

1 would have had a dramatic impact on the
2 passengers and the ridership because of the way
3 they were dealt with.

4 Whereas now, after two and a bit years
5 or three years of experience, they are dealt
6 with in a completely different way and it
7 doesn't have the same impact. And you would
8 have got -- by having a soft opening you would
9 have had some of that.

10 And I was having the conversation -- I
11 don't remember who I was talking to, someone
12 from the industry, and they -- in essence we
13 almost -- we got our soft opening kind of
14 courtesy of COVID, I guess, where we ended up
15 running less trains, having less ridership.

16 And you don't have to look now -- and
17 that a clear example. The way in which they
18 react now and the way in which the system
19 recovers from an issue is exactly what you would
20 have got -- maybe you might not have got as good
21 as we are now, but you would have got into that
22 a lot quicker with a soft opening.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And do you think
24 there was sufficient planning of that incident
25 response and the interface between the

1 maintainers and the operators?

2 MATTHEW SLADE: Definitely not.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what
4 explains that? Was it a lack of time to fully
5 prepare?

6 MATTHEW SLADE: No. I don't think
7 it's time because they'd known for seven years
8 it was coming. We've been building it for a
9 long time so there was plenty of opportunity to
10 plan. Maybe not to actually ride and know
11 physically until the trains were running
12 backwards and forwards. But there's enough
13 industry knowledge around, with the consultants
14 that the City has and whatever else, to have the
15 ability to know that they have to react.

16 I'm sure they have to react similarly
17 but different with their bus fleet when they
18 have a breakdown or an issue. I'm sure they
19 have a playbook that explains what you do in a
20 certain situation.

21 And they could have had that prepared.
22 They had enough consultants to give advice and
23 support and write that documentation and plan it
24 and practice it. And that's what I was
25 expecting them to do between RSA and service

1 commencement. And I wasn't expecting that to be
2 only two weeks, but I was expecting them to be
3 able to use that time, which was in their gift,
4 to plan all of that and to execute it all and to
5 do drills and to practice.

6 And they did do some of that stuff,
7 but I don't think -- it's difficult when you're
8 not in the real-world environment, which a soft
9 opening still gives you the best of both. But,
10 yeah, I just think they were -- they were
11 overwhelmed with what they ended up with.
12 Which, I'm not going to say it was avoidable,
13 but the impact could have been lessened had they
14 spent more time getting ready.

15 We were -- RTG, OLRTC, we went through
16 substantial completion; we went through trial
17 running; we had the independent safety
18 assessment, the independent certifier that all
19 said, It's ready. It meets the requirements.
20 It's safe.

21 I don't know what measure was done at
22 all, either internally or externally, of
23 OC Transpo to say, Yes, you're ready as an
24 organization. And I think -- and it might have
25 happened, I don't know whether it did or it

1 didn't, certainly didn't have visibility. But
2 if it didn't happen then that's a big gap.

3 Normally when agency -- new agencies
4 are setting up new infrastructure and new
5 railways, if you look elsewhere around the
6 globe, they will have what they call a "shadow
7 operator" who will take the system from that
8 trial running period and they will operate --
9 they're a seasoned team of operators who have
10 done it in other locations. And they will
11 operate and run that railway and help them write
12 those rules of how to deal with issues.

13 And then the actual operator will sit
14 next to them, learn, be mentored, coached and
15 then at a point in time they would -- the shadow
16 operator would start to drop away and the
17 full-time operator would step in, and that's
18 normally about six-month period.

19 Very common if you look at Dubai Metro
20 or Riyadh, places like that where they're
21 opening new railways in cities that don't
22 currently have railways, that's a very common
23 approach.

24 And maybe because they already had the
25 O-Line there was a level of belief that they had

1 the ability to do this, but it's very, very
2 different from railway.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you know if
4 they ever considered a shadow operator?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: I have no idea. They
6 should have done though.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: In terms of
8 practice or failure incidents and incident
9 response time, was there not some of that done
10 during pre-trial running or trial running?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: We did a couple of
12 exercises. We did familiarization with the
13 emergency services about having paramedics
14 remove someone from a train, up the staircase or
15 escalator, out of the tunnel. We did tunnel
16 evacuation drills. We did the emergency
17 response type things, but I don't think they did
18 enough of service disruption type of events,
19 which is what we suffered from in the early
20 days.

21 I don't think they did enough of
22 switches, break failures, or stranded trains,
23 or -- I don't think they did enough of that.
24 And it's not just doing it once or twice, you
25 know, you look at the number of people that you

1 need to run a railway 24/7 and cover shifts.
2 The number of staff that OC Transpo have is
3 enormous. And to get them all to go through
4 that and for it to become second nature, it's
5 like a military exercise. It's not something
6 that you can just learn from a book, or do once
7 and then do it again. It's has to be
8 repeatable.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And who was
10 charged with devising the failure incidents, was
11 that OLRTC or OC Transpo?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: OC Transpo. I mean,
13 OLRTC did do some because they had to
14 demonstrate certain requirements in the
15 contract, that the system could cope with those
16 situations.

17 So I think there was a -- I think
18 there was a requirement that they had to be able
19 to have a 15-minute headway with a switch out of
20 use, or something like that. So we did certain
21 things that we had to do to validate that we met
22 the requirements in the contract, but the bulk
23 of it was stuff that was down in OC Transpo's
24 gift to do and should have been done post-RSA
25 and before service commencement.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Is it fair to
2 say that -- well, did the operators operate on
3 the full track in the winter prior to RSA?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, I think they
5 did.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you know what
7 planning was put into the interface between the
8 operator and RTM and OLRTC for operation
9 planning -- for service operations?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: OLRTC was not involved
11 in that. I mean the maintainer -- RTM, you
12 know, started to attend those RAMP meetings, I
13 can't remember when, probably six months before
14 revenue service, maybe a bit longer, maybe
15 between a year and six months. But the contract
16 with the maintainer, they weren't contracted to
17 do anything until RSA, which is also a
18 shortcoming in that regard.

19 So whilst they were ramping up and
20 getting ready the bulk of the maintenance work
21 is actually subcontracted to Alstom, for the
22 infrastructure as well as the vehicles. And
23 certainly they were not ready for RSA. They
24 weren't ready for trial running.

25 And, I mean, the score cards and the

1 difficulties with trial running I would
2 attribute 95 to 99 percent of it with Alstom's
3 readiness or lack of readiness. And that was a
4 big issue that could have been dealt with
5 differently, but it was a difficult situation, I
6 believe, contractually with RTM and Alstom as a
7 subcontractor.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And how could it
9 have been dealt with differently?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: So having their
11 contract commencement date as RSAD was, you
12 know, if it was set six months in advance or
13 even more, or whatever, and if it had a
14 certain -- if it had performance requirements
15 that were needed to be met in order to support
16 testing and commissioning and trial running,
17 then they might have been in a better position.

18 I think it was -- Alstom were -- are,
19 you know, a global leader in this industry with
20 a great global CV. If you read anything on the
21 Internet, if you read all their brochures this
22 is what they do.

23 But the team that they had in Ottawa
24 were inexperienced and probably not ready for
25 what came at RSA. And I think they were

1 probably aware of that but they didn't address
2 it, and they certainly didn't address it in a
3 timely manner.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: In terms of
5 the -- Alstom maintenance not being contracted
6 to do anything before RSA, are you saying they
7 didn't want to -- did they -- did they not
8 prepare prior to RSA as a result of that? Is
9 that what you're suggesting?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Not the way I would
11 have expected them to. We -- through my testing
12 commissioning team, through Steve Nadon and
13 everybody else, we invited them to come and
14 participate in testing commissioning to get
15 familiar with the equipment, even just
16 geographically where it is either on the
17 alignment or physically where it is in the
18 station above a ceiling where equipment is and
19 where panels are, and, you know, switches to
20 turn things up on-and-off. And they -- we would
21 ask them to come and participate and they
22 wouldn't. It was like they're not -- you'd get
23 a negative response from them saying, it's not
24 in our contract to do that. We're not coming.
25 And they tried desperately to get them

1 involved because we could see that it was going
2 to be a problem and that it was going to fall
3 down as a result of that, but there was no
4 appetite to participate much really. And then
5 when things -- once it was in RSA there was a
6 lack of urgency, there was a lack of resources
7 and a lack of knowledge, still is to this day in
8 some areas.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was there any
10 resistance on Alstom's part, Alstom maintenance,
11 to take ownership of the trains or the
12 maintenance because of the work that remained to
13 be done on them?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: They were -- the
15 trains not so much, because obviously they were
16 still building them, retrofitting them and
17 everything else. And it was, you know, the --
18 what goes on in the train shed is completely
19 100 percent with them, not that anyone else was
20 doing anything.

21 But certainly on the other assets, on
22 the fixed assets, on the infrastructure --
23 there's emails to and fro between myself, RTG,
24 RTM, the RTM Board saying, You need to get these
25 people out and involved and engaged; and they

1 wouldn't.

2 And they ended up -- I think the --
3 some of the fixed assets they only begrudgingly
4 took responsibility for on the first day of
5 trial running, and that they regarded as early
6 compared to their contract. So it was painful,
7 very, very painful.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And how did that
9 inform RTM's position as to whether they were
10 ready for RSA?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: I think, again, RTM
12 were pretty naive at the time. And they just --
13 I guess they just felt that the contract was in
14 place and that, at a point in time, Alstom would
15 turn up the gas and get going and do what they
16 were supposed to do. RTM didn't have the
17 knowledge or the expertise to be able to do
18 that, which is why it was subcontracted out.
19 But the leadership, or lack of leadership at
20 Alstom, just meant it didn't happen.

21 I think that the point of revenue
22 service availability -- I think RTM and Alstom
23 were lacking in leadership and ability and
24 urgency.

25 I worked very hard to get RTM up to

1 speed, as an EllisDon employee and a shareholder
2 in all of that, to try and get the RTM part of
3 it in a better shape, but Alstom was and
4 continues to be a real struggle.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And how would
6 that be managed at -- given that OLRTC and RTM
7 have the same consortium partners, at RSA how
8 would you deal with, Okay, the system may be
9 ready to be transferred from OLRTC's
10 perspective, but if RTM isn't ready there's
11 going to be some penalties and deductions. So
12 how is that tension managed?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: I got heavily involved
14 in that, I guess. So I had -- things weren't
15 going well during trial running, we all know
16 that. And, like I said, a lot of that fell down
17 to the Alstom part of the maintenance contract.

18 I raised the flag with my OLRTC Board
19 members, and then I raised the flag internally
20 within EllisDon to our RTM Board members. And
21 the RTM Board members pretty much were in Ottawa
22 full time throughout trial running. We were
23 meeting with them and with Alstom every single
24 day to try and get them to understand what
25 needed to be done.

1 We had phone calls and meetings with
2 the CEO in Paris to try and get the level of
3 urgency up. The Mayor had him in -- fly in to
4 meet with him. We tried absolutely everything
5 but it was and it still is a struggle.

6 And I think that's -- well, there's a
7 number of reasons for it. We tried everything,
8 and we still do. And I think the executives
9 committees of RTM and OLRTC, I think they worked
10 well together at that time to get it into
11 service. And it took -- both Boards were pretty
12 much there full time, which is not normal.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Both Boards?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: Of OLRTC and RTM. And
15 there's two Board members from each
16 organization, so six executive level people from
17 the companies in Ottawa. It's a huge amount of
18 effort. And a lot of that was the desire to get
19 it done. A lot of it was to help manage the
20 relationship with the City and to provide
21 support to all of us on the ground getting the
22 job done.

23 I don't think the organization was
24 ready.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was there

1 tension between Alstom supply and Alstom
2 maintenance? How did that relationship --

3 MATTHEW SLADE: It wasn't really
4 visible. Alstom is a many-headed beast and you
5 never really knew who you were talking to and
6 which part of the organization, you still have a
7 bit of difficulty. It's just Alstom and you
8 don't know whether they're production, or
9 warranty, or maintenance, and you don't know who
10 they report to. The lines are very blurred.

11 Certainly there was tension between
12 RTM -- probably more so between OLRTC and Alstom
13 maintenance, because we could see that they were
14 the part that was going to prevent us from
15 getting to trial running through their lack of
16 ability to maintain the vehicles and the
17 infrastructure.

18 We had no relationship with them
19 contractually so we had to go OLRTC to RTM, and
20 then back down to Alstom. But most of the time
21 any communication went to Alstom's CEO in Paris,
22 or to Alstom country president in Canada/North
23 America, which ultimately went to production or
24 maintenance, it all fell in the same place.

25 But there were daily meetings, daily

1 phone calls, daily emails. There was a lot of
2 pressure. There was help as well. We looked at
3 all sorts of options as to how we could support
4 or improve the situation, some of which the City
5 didn't like.

6 I put together a team of people within
7 OLRTC that were capable of doing infrastructure
8 maintenance, not vehicle maintenance, and
9 essentially getting them to fulfill the duties
10 of the maintainer such that the infrastructure
11 side of things was done. The City didn't like
12 that at all. They sort of saw that as cheating
13 on the trial running, as cheating on the exam,
14 so to speak, because it was OLRTC that were
15 doing the maintenance rather than RTM; so we got
16 a stiff letter on that. But we -- it was all we
17 could do to get them up to speed and to get them
18 to learn. It's still an issue.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: What was the
20 level of insight that the City had into the lack
21 of preparedness on the maintenance front?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: They had a hundred
23 percent visibility. They had complete
24 visibility. We all sat in meetings together and
25 discussed it. We had the regular -- whether it

1 was the RAMP meetings or whether it was the
2 daily trial running meetings.

3 And then when things weren't going
4 well it was the mandatory meetings that we got
5 invited to, by Mr. Manconi and his team, to go
6 and explain ourselves, as much as anything,
7 which we all went to, and we took the supply
8 chain with us as well.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So do you have
10 any insight into why -- how that informed the
11 City's decision to proceed with opening the
12 service if there was some awareness that
13 maintenance wasn't ready? Do you know how that
14 factored, if at all, into their decision-making?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: None. I'm not -- I
16 don't -- wasn't party to any of their
17 decision-making as to -- like I said, the date
18 was a surprise as to when they were going to go
19 into service, or the decision-making process
20 they went to; or risk analysis of what the
21 outcome might be of going in in a
22 marginally-unprepared state, if they thought it
23 was only marginal, maybe that was the case. But
24 I'm surprised, based on the correspondence and
25 the meetings that we had, that they didn't

1 foresee it as a significant risk.

2 But then I guess they probably saw it
3 as a -- we'll just penalize them, right?
4 There's a penalty regime in place. If it
5 doesn't run it's not the City that's going to
6 take the blame, right? It's the contractor
7 that's going to get the penalties and the pain
8 and be held up in front of the Transit
9 Commission and the media.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Would you say
11 that the maintainers were ready for normal
12 operations just not perhaps the enhanced needs
13 that this system had at opening?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: I think even if the
15 system had run flawlessly I think there was
16 still gaps and shortfalls in both in number of
17 resources and in certain skill sets.

18 But obviously if the system had been
19 faultless it would have been different, but then
20 they still would have been under-resourced and
21 had gaps, definitely.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So in terms of
23 trial running, how did the maintenance scoring
24 work? Was it required to pass?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. It was required

1 to pass, yeah. But there were certain things
2 that were, I guess, you know -- and the reason
3 we had failures on the days that we had failures
4 it wasn't just because of the trains. I mean,
5 there was a -- I'm pretty sure on the scorecard
6 there's a line that says "Maintenance
7 Practices", And I'm sure that that had "fail"
8 next to it quite a bit of the time. I remember
9 there being email correspondence from
10 Mr. Manconi about that being a factor and that
11 that was a key area to improve.

12 But I think some of it was compounded
13 by the way in which the City was participating
14 in trial running. But irrespective of how they
15 behaved or what they did I still don't think
16 Alstom were fully ready.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what were
18 the maintenance -- the failures in terms of the
19 maintenance practice? Was it the response time?
20 What was the issue really?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: Some of it was
22 response time, some of it was the ability to
23 close out work orders. But, again, that is
24 where the City kind of made things more
25 difficult by the manner in which they were

1 raising work orders. And the work orders they
2 were raising was making it almost impossible to
3 do what needed to be done.

4 There was various things but a lot of
5 it was paperwork-driven. They weren't well
6 drilled on their own processes and procedures.
7 And a lot of it was paperwork-related or --
8 rather than actual physical, hands and tools and
9 stuff. A lot of it was their ability to be able
10 to comply with the requirements of the contract
11 with regards to closing out paperwork even when
12 they had done activities. They just weren't
13 ready.

14 But the number of issues being raise
15 by the City were artificially high.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And we can go to
17 the scorecards a bit later, but often there are
18 maintenance failures but the day is a pass. So
19 how does that work?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: Well, it would all
21 depend on how -- on what the failure was. So
22 you might have -- and I can't remember off the
23 top of my head, it's a long time ago. But on
24 some of those scorecards you'll find have got
25 notes on the bottom of them and some of them

1 don't. And some of those notes will explain why
2 even if it comes across as a fail it might have
3 been treated as a pass.

4 So, for instance, take CCTV cameras as
5 an example. I can't remember how many CCTV
6 cameras there are across the job, but there's
7 probably close to a thousand CCTV cameras on the
8 job, for instance. If one CCTV camera is not
9 working and you get scored down with that; and
10 if it's out of service for a prolonged period of
11 time that it impacts the percentage, is it fair
12 and reasonable that you failed your maintenance
13 on the basis that someone hasn't gone and dealt
14 with that CCTV camera? Especially when some of
15 the comments relating to the CCTV camera might
16 be, The glass was dirty on the front of the
17 camera so the image wasn't crystal clear. It's
18 not impacting the service or impacting -- if
19 there's an incident and you need that image then
20 you can argue that it's impacting it, but I
21 think for the purposes of trial running and
22 scoring it wasn't something that was necessarily
23 something that would warrant failing a complete
24 day for.

25 And even some of the things that --

1 and even if they went and fixed it, the way in
2 which they might close the work order, or the
3 language, it might just be around paperwork that
4 was deemed -- it would show it as a fail because
5 you hadn't done it in so many hours.

6 But, again, not necessarily fair to
7 fail a day based on something like that. It
8 would all depend on what was being measured.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And I take it
10 that was fairly subjective, or at least there
11 was some level of discussion around whether
12 something should --

13 MATTHEW SLADE: Huge amount of
14 discussion. So trial running was -- it was
15 not -- there was no unilateral decisions or
16 anything like that. So there was -- there was a
17 team of people that would assess that level of
18 detail, that would assess it in the morning.
19 And that would be a cross-organization group of
20 people. I can't remember how many were in
21 there, maybe 10 or 12 people representing all
22 the organizations from OLRTC, RTM. And the
23 City, both OC Transpo and O-Train construction,
24 would review all that data.

25 And they didn't actually make a

1 decision, but they would provide the data and
2 they would make a recommendation against the
3 criteria to the actual trial running team as to
4 whether or not they deemed it a pass. But they
5 wouldn't know how that would impact the whole
6 day because they weren't party to other parts.
7 So they were just scoring the bits for which
8 they were responsible for, and it came with a
9 recommendation. And they might turn around and
10 say it was a pass and yet the trial running team
11 might turn around and go, hmm, maybe it's a
12 fail; or vice versa. So ultimately it sat with
13 the trial running team. And the trial running
14 team, as you'll see from the signatories again,
15 had representation from all parties, the
16 independent certifier, RTG, OC Transpo, O-Train
17 construction, OLRTC and RTM.

18 And those meetings were all open-table
19 discussions where the data that was on the
20 scorecard was actually written up on a
21 whiteboard on the wall and was discussed. Each
22 line item was populated on to a whiteboard on
23 the wall and discussed as it was populated.

24 No one knew what the outcome of the
25 day was until we got to that very last line and

1 it was all tallied up, and then it was
2 transposed into an electronic form and the
3 whiteboard was wiped clear.

4 Everyone was terrified about the media
5 and the public getting hold of information so it
6 wasn't -- the scorecards were not shared outside
7 of that room.

8 The senior management were told
9 whether it was a pass or fail, but they didn't
10 even get to -- I got emails from my CEO and the
11 Board asking for scorecards and they weren't
12 given. I don't even think John Manconi got
13 them, he was told if it was a pass or fail but
14 he didn't actually get the data or the stuff
15 behind it until we got into -- until we started
16 getting into difficulties when they drilled down
17 a bit more into it.

18 But I thought the whole process was --
19 I thought the process was exceedingly good and I
20 thought it was very well executed and everybody
21 bought into it. And it -- you know, it was -- I
22 thought it was perfectly fair.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And given that
24 there were such struggles with the maintenance
25 but that piece passed, what informs that? The

1 criteria for maintenance were not particularly
2 onerous?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: No, they were onerous.
4 And they probably were more onerous than they
5 needed to be. There was a level of -- I don't
6 know how to put it because a number of those
7 were failures, and it was those maintenance
8 things that actually caused the failures on the
9 day rather than -- they weren't treated lightly.
10 And it was recognized that it was an area that
11 needed improvement. So, you know, there was
12 focus and energy put into improving that
13 throughout the period.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: When it's not
15 just about adding up data, like the number of
16 kilometres run, but there's some level of
17 discussion about whether -- how much something
18 might weigh in the balance or not, what's the
19 level of engagement from the independent
20 certifier?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: A hundred percent
22 engagement. They're in the room the whole time.
23 Those meetings would -- we'd generally
24 try to make them fairly quick and punchy because
25 we were, you know, we all had stuff that we

1 wanted to get on and do as part of the trial
2 running. But some of those were fairly
3 protracted discussions about whether it was a
4 pass or a fail. And that's why the independent
5 certifier was in there, that level of
6 independence, and what have you.

7 But it was a very -- I don't think any
8 of those meetings -- none of them stick out as
9 being contentious, or anyone trying to get a
10 pass when it was a fail, or trying to get a fail
11 when it was pass. I think it was very, very
12 fairly done.

13 And I think everybody that
14 participated in those got an opportunity to have
15 their say. And I don't think anybody that
16 participated would say anything other than that.
17 I'd be surprised if they did.

18 If anybody felt that they were bullied
19 or strong-armed into making something a pass
20 when it wasn't, I'd be amazed, because it
21 certainly wasn't raised during the time.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Let's go off the
23 record.

24 -- RECESSED AT 5:00 P.M. --

25 -- RESUMED AT 5:10 P.M. --

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you know how
2 the 12 consecutive days of trial running was
3 initially interpreted, as it's reflected in the
4 Project Agreement?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Can you ask that
6 again?

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Yes. The 12
8 days for trial running, that's reflected in the
9 Project Agreement, correct?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

11 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: What was -- how
12 was that interpreted and did that interpretation
13 change?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: I don't know how to
15 answer that.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Let's start with
17 how was it applied, ultimately. Like, it needed
18 to be 12 days to pass?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, it's in the
20 trial running procedure. How it was
21 interpreted? Like it was --

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Did it need to
23 be 12 days in a row with a passing grade?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And you prepared

1 the trial running test procedure, correct, with
2 Will Allman?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. I think there
4 was one written a long time before that
5 probably. Before I arrived there was probably
6 one. But, yes, it was then -- as we got nearer
7 to trial running it was -- there was several
8 versions of it before the one I wrote with Will.
9 It went through a number of iterations before it
10 got to there.

11 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So why did you
12 not rely on the first version or the earlier
13 version?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: The very early version
15 had, it actually had errors in it. And I think
16 as we had progressed through the project and
17 people had come and gone we reviewed it.

18 And the City had a consultant on
19 board, I don't know who he worked for, a guy by
20 the name of Russell Davies, who was brought in
21 pretty much to look at that.

22 And he and I spent a lot of time -- we
23 read the original document and we thought it
24 wasn't really -- it had errors in it and it
25 probably didn't achieve what it needed to

1 achieve. It was probably going to be difficult
2 to apply and measure and everything else.

3 So we worked collaboratively to get it
4 to place where, he, representing the City, and I
5 were comfortable with it. And then that ended
6 up, I guess, forming the document that Will and
7 I prepared.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And who is Will
9 Allman?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Will is -- at the time
11 he worked for SNC Lavalin, he doesn't any more.
12 He's self-employed and runs his own consulting
13 business now.

14 He's another expat. He's another
15 Brit. And he came -- SNC made him available to
16 me before trial running to help with a few
17 things at project close-out. Things like, from
18 a management perspective, from managing things
19 like overseeing the training, the handover of
20 materials to RTM, the handover of documentation
21 to RTM.

22 All the sort of stuff that happens at
23 the end of a close-out of a project, which
24 often, unfortunately just the way projects go
25 with people leaving when they see the end in

1 sight, quite often those things are not done
2 particularly well. And Will was a resource that
3 was offered to me by the SNC Board to assist
4 with that stuff.

5 So he came on board predominantly to
6 do all that good stuff to do with hand-over.
7 And as I got to know him I realized he's
8 actually a hugely intelligent individual. And
9 knowing that trial running was going to be an
10 enormous task, and I was still Project Director
11 and doing everything else that involved that, I
12 thought it made sense to bring him in as a
13 pseudo-independent person to run that process,
14 someone that didn't have, this is going to sound
15 wrong, the baggage with the City and with RTM,
16 and everything else, because he was still fairly
17 fresh. He wasn't involved in those meetings at
18 the RTG level or Board level, or whatever, but
19 he was perfectly competent of operating at that
20 level.

21 So I spoke to him about helping run
22 that process and he was more than happy to do
23 it. And I thought it would just -- again, where
24 the City kind of felt that we were trying to --
25 occasionally there wasn't a lot of trust, I

1 thought it would help build that trust by having
2 someone specifically focused with doing that and
3 not involved with all of the other issues that
4 were going on on the job.

5 So that's how Will got voluntold to do
6 that role I guess.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Would you say
8 that the reliability metrics provided for in the
9 test procedure were high enough that the
10 intention was to have -- as a result or as an
11 outcome, a system, that was running very
12 reliably.

13 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. So the metrics
14 that were in -- I'm going to call it the
15 "original version" but it's not the original,
16 original version. That first version, when we
17 started trial running, the metrics were probably
18 higher than you would normally have them, and we
19 did that intentionally. And the primary reason
20 for that was to protect ourselves -- I say
21 "ourselves", our sister organization, RTM, for
22 want of a better phrase, against penalties for
23 when they went into service.

24 So the metrics that are in there
25 reflect the penalty regime that is in the

1 payment mechanism to RTM for performance.
2 Originally it was lower than that. And
3 obviously we didn't necessarily want to go into
4 service knowingly with something that was going
5 to fall short of the reliability targets within
6 the RTM performance metrics for their payment.

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Right. And is
8 that in particular the 98 percent AVKR average?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And so what then
11 changed for that to change?

12 MATTHEW SLADE: As you see from the
13 scorecards we had some good days and some bad
14 days. And, you know, trial running, the way it
15 was written obviously there's no time limit to
16 it, it's however long it takes you to achieve
17 those 12 days. But by that time, with the media
18 and the press and the City, everyone was banking
19 on a particular RSA date.

20 And as we were going through the
21 process it was clear we were going to blow that
22 RSA date, which, for my organization, would have
23 meant another million dollar penalty and a delay
24 to receiving the RSA payment, which was not an
25 insignificant amount of money. And from the

1 City perspective it would, obviously, not look
2 particularly good for them either to have missed
3 another date and to say, We're nearly there and
4 so close yet so far.

5 So I can't remember the exact date,
6 but obviously we had two bad days in the middle.
7 We were -- I would say RTG, RTM and OLRTC were
8 summoned down to OC Transpo's offices where we
9 were told to revisit an RFI and a scoring
10 mechanism from a previous version of the trial
11 running document.

12 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And who at
13 OC Transpo initiated that discussion?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: John Manconi.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So the RFI was
16 one that was agreed upon in 2017, correct?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: 206, I think it was,
18 by number.

19 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So what were
20 the -- well, tell me about the discussions that
21 ensued at that point?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: So I think at that
23 time we were talking -- we were trying to find,
24 collectively, ways to get a pass that would get
25 us to RSA.

1 And there was various different
2 discussions about how to protect the -- how do
3 we get there? And the general view was, you're
4 never going to get to 98 percent and that we'd
5 set ourselves far too high a target. And like I
6 said, we set that for a good reason.

7 And so there was discussions around
8 what sort of pass is good enough that would
9 satisfy everyone, at which point that RFI was
10 raised.

11 And then we were told to go away
12 and -- at the time I didn't even know that
13 existed so that came up as a -- because it
14 predated me, I guess.

15 So we took that away to go look at it,
16 and look at what it meant, and obviously look at
17 our scoring to date and look at how it would --
18 if we worked to that where -- we rescored -- not
19 actually physically going and saying we were
20 going to rescore everything, but just looking at
21 the trends and looking at what it would have
22 done.

23 And so it was suggested that we
24 resubmit the RFI and the City would accept it.
25 And that would make the most sense to the City

1 for all parties, and we agreed to do that.

2 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And who made
3 that suggestion to submit the RFI?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: John Manconi.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was Troy
6 Charter involved in that discussion?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. There was lots
8 of people in the room.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Right.

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Troy Charter was in
11 the room, I'm pretty sure Michael Morgan was in
12 the room. John Manconi was in the room. I
13 suspect Jocelyn Begin was in the room, myself,
14 Peter Lauch, Claude Jacob, Will probably was in
15 the room but he may not have been because I
16 tried to keep him outside of that stuff, for the
17 reasons I just mentioned. So I expect that's
18 who was there. There may have been someone from
19 STV as well, not 100 percent certain.

20 And so, yeah, so we -- we sent a
21 letter to RTG with the RFI, and RTG sent it to
22 the City and the City accepted it. The document
23 was rewritten and reissued and signed off -- I
24 can't remember, I want to say around the 30th of
25 July, somewhere around that date.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was there a
2 reason that RTG was to submit it to the City?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: All correspondence
4 went through RTG.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: But I mean as
6 opposed to -- given that the City had raised it
7 in the first place why it was presented as
8 coming from RTG or the project company?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: For audit purposes.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Because trial
11 running is the responsibility of the project
12 company?

13 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And aside from
15 the AVKR requirement changing, I understand
16 there were other changes resulting from --

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. I think it also
18 changed to 9 consecutive days out of 12, from
19 memory.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Or the best 9 of
21 12 days?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was that in the
24 2017 RFI? Or was that agreed upon separately?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: No, I think it was in

1 there as well. I would have to check but I
2 think it was in there.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was it at the
4 same time that there was a reduction in the
5 number of trains to be run from 15 to 13?

6 MATTHEW SLADE: I can't recall. I
7 seem to -- I remember doing an exercise
8 off-line, just me and Will I think, looking at
9 if you ran 13 instead of 15 do you still achieve
10 your percentage and increase our risk of
11 success? Because running 15 was proving a
12 challenge but running 13 seemed to be more
13 achievable. And I think we ran a small model to
14 see what the impact was.

15 But I can't remember when that changed
16 and I can't remember how it was instigated, off
17 the top of my head. I'd have to go back through
18 emails and see if I could find something. But I
19 genuinely cannot remember at this time how we
20 went from 13 to 15, or the date on which that
21 happened.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: But I take it
23 that meant reducing the scheduled amount of
24 kilometres to be run on any given date?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And then was the
2 decision made at that same time to change the
3 number of trains needed for service operations
4 during peak hours to 13, or was that decision
5 taken at a different time?

6 MATTHEW SLADE: I think that was taken
7 at a different time. I think it was taken
8 later. But, again, I can't recall for a hundred
9 percent certainty when that was.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So it may be
11 that originally the change was just for the
12 purposes of trial running, and then it was
13 ultimately decided that that would also be
14 reflected in the operations?

15 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct. I think
16 that's how it went.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So in terms
18 of -- the original concerns that informed the
19 procedure you had devised about protecting RTM
20 and the subsequent penalties, I take it at that
21 point in time it was more important to reach
22 RSA, given the penalties and -- the penalties
23 that might be incurred by maintenance didn't
24 weigh as much in the balance?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct. We were -- I

1 don't like the term but we were bleeding money
2 on -- from OLRTC, and the cash calls were
3 seriously hurting the parent companies and
4 everything else. So it was a case of, we're
5 better off stopping the bleeding on the OLRTC
6 side, and if it means we have to suffer a bit of
7 bleeding on the RTM side then so be it.

8 I think there was some corporate
9 discussions held at a point in time. Probably I
10 was not present for those, they were done at the
11 Board level. And, yeah, it was a decision made
12 that actually was probably the best thing to do
13 at the time.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So there was an
15 understanding that there could be -- there was
16 an increased chance of performance issues or
17 reliability issues entering into RSA?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: It was done with a
19 full understanding of what the implications
20 were.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: To all involved,
22 including the City?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

24 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: That there would
25 be some added pressure on maintenance?

1 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

2 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Were there any
3 other changes that I haven't touched on already?

4 MATTHEW SLADE: I don't think so. I
5 think those were the only two that I recall.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So if there were
7 events during trial running that could impact
8 whether it was a pass day or not, right? Was it
9 dependent on the nature of the event?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Probably. I mean, it
11 would depend on what it was. And, again, I
12 can't remember what they all were. The
13 scorecards cover most of them, and certainly the
14 footnotes on -- they don't all have footnotes
15 but some of them do, will explain what the issue
16 was and why a decision was made to make it a
17 pass or a fail.

18 But like I said, I think -- I
19 generally think all of those meetings were fair.
20 I don't think there was any pressure to make a
21 day a pass when it wasn't a pass. I think it
22 was all done -- I think the method in which
23 those meetings were run and decisions were made
24 were completely appropriate.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Okay. So there

1 weren't great disputes about whether some event
2 was -- should be a fail but --

3 MATTHEW SLADE: I think there was
4 probably more debates in the morning meetings,
5 which I didn't attend for that -- partly for
6 that reason. You know, the people that attended
7 the afternoon meeting, that were actually on the
8 trial running committee, didn't attend the
9 morning meetings.

10 I think the morning meetings were more
11 contentious about looking at the raw data from
12 the various different things. So from my team
13 Steve Nadon sat in those, from the City it was
14 Matt Peters and a few other people. I can't
15 remember -- from RTM I think Tom Pate
16 participated. They're sort of the next level
17 down from the level that we were all at that
18 were in the main trial running meeting.

19 And those meetings were supposed to be
20 half an hour or so, but some of those meetings
21 may have gone on for two hours or so because of
22 healthy debate about what the number was.

23 And looking -- they would delve into
24 work orders, they would open up the various
25 different data systems that we used to capture

1 all the data and look at what's been entered,
2 why it's been entered. They would review CCTV
3 footage, if they needed, of various things.
4 They would pull what we call "play-back data"
5 out of the signaling system. So they would do
6 the lion's share of the work.

7 And I think the far harder
8 conversations were probably had that those
9 meetings in regards to whether it was a pass or
10 a fail. But, again, all of that -- that always
11 came out as unanimous as well by the end of it.
12 They wouldn't -- there wasn't anyone ever there
13 going, I don't agree with the decision. It was
14 always left where that data flowed up to the
15 next meeting with a consensus on the answer.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So would they
17 quantify or qualify the nature of any given
18 event? Or was that also a determination -- was
19 it a shared determination about how much a
20 particular event should weigh in the balance?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. I think they all
22 reached a consensus.

23 So the outcome of those morning
24 meetings, a pack was distributed by OC Transpo
25 that had all of the back-up data in it that

1 supported their decisions. So that was
2 submitted on a daily basis. So all of the
3 back-up is there, it all exists, it was all
4 documented. It didn't make it -- it doesn't --
5 it's not in that final IC determination on trial
6 running being complete, but it's all there, it's
7 all recorded and available.

8 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Was the IC
9 represented at that meeting, the morning
10 meetings?

11 MATTHEW SLADE: I don't think so, but
12 I could be wrong. I don't think so. I think
13 they only attended the afternoon meeting.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And were they or
15 anyone else informed of the change to the
16 criteria, to the procedure?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: The morning
19 meeting people?

20 MATTHEW SLADE: I don't know if the
21 morning people -- morning meeting people were
22 aware of it. I don't remember. Certainly the
23 afternoon people were but I don't know if the
24 morning people were.

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: It wouldn't have

1 informed their deliberations or their work?

2 MATTHEW SLADE: No, I don't think so.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: So it's fair to
4 say that people from Alstom, and otherwise, they
5 wouldn't have been aware of the change in the
6 criteria?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: No. Alstom weren't
8 involved in it at all, from either of those
9 meetings Alstom weren't represented.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Is there -- I
11 take it -- I understand that Thales didn't
12 participate in trial running.

13 MATTHEW SLADE: They didn't have a
14 formal role but they were involved.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: In terms of
16 responding to things that involved their
17 systems?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: We used them to
19 review -- because of the way their systems
20 worked you have to be trained and competent to
21 pull back recordings and logs from their
22 systems, so we used them for that. So if there
23 was any anomaly from the day, or something
24 happened and we wanted to see how it was
25 responded to, or specific timeframes as to when

1 events happened, it was all recorded in their
2 system. So I would rely on their staff to do
3 what we call "playbacks" and to pull up certain
4 things that might have occurred, because it
5 records everything.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Are you able to
7 speak to how the term sheet then came about?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: I mean, I
9 participated. My memory is not perfect on any
10 of it, but we got to a point where essentially
11 we had completed trial running and we were ready
12 to file for RSA. And the view was you could --
13 RSA was available but under certain conditions,
14 which is then when the term sheet got drafted.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was there
16 any resistance from the City about some of the
17 outstanding items?

18 MATTHEW SLADE: Resistance from them?
19 They wrote the list.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: They wrote the
21 list, they knew what was outstanding?

22 MATTHEW SLADE: If there was any
23 resistance it was probably from my organization
24 rather than their organization. There was
25 negotiations around it. I think -- not

1 necessarily on the items that were on the list,
2 more maybe about the weighting of those items.

3 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: How would those
4 be weighted?

5 MATTHEW SLADE: Financially.

6 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Oh, I see.
7 Because -- yeah, if you were deferring something
8 you wouldn't be penalized for it if the City
9 agreed to it?

10 MATTHEW SLADE: Correct. And some of
11 the numbers that the City wanted to put against
12 those were unpalatable.

13 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And ultimately
14 there were negotiations and you arrived at a
15 consensus?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah.

17 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: If that's not
18 quite right please do explain.

19 MATTHEW SLADE: No, you know, it's
20 probably right.

21 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Were there some
22 retrofits or things that needed to be done for
23 RSA at that time?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: To the vehicles?

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Yes.

1 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. But I can't
2 remember what they were specifically. We had a
3 number of -- I can't remember whether they --
4 some of them -- we had huge retrofits scheduled
5 from Alstom of things that needed to be done,
6 and we categorized them as before trial running,
7 before revenue service availability and after
8 revenue service availability.

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Right.

10 MATTHEW SLADE: So there was some
11 retrofit activities that had to happen prior to
12 passenger service and some that were allowed to
13 happen post-passenger service.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And one of them
15 I think was the brakes?

16 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. I mean we had
17 untold amount of issues with the brakes on the
18 vehicles, that's why I'm a little bit hesitant.
19 It depends on which item you're referring to.
20 But we had -- like the brakes were a big issue
21 on those vehicles. But obviously we wouldn't
22 have gone into service if it wasn't safe to do
23 so. But there was -- the number of retrofits
24 associated with the braking system I found it
25 was quite unusual, and quite difficult to

1 manage.

2 So we went through a number of -- a
3 number of brake retrofits, which is why I was --
4 I can't remember what order they came in or how
5 many there were. We started off with -- we had
6 a brake caliper retrofit program, and then we
7 had an HP, which is the hydraulic pressure unit
8 retrofit. And I think we retrofitted the HP
9 units three or four times. We had a number of
10 issues around that specific component and we
11 ended up -- "we" being OLRTC, ended up getting
12 involved in that because Alstom weren't moving
13 as quick as we needed them to.

14 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And was there
15 then any need to test things again following
16 these retrofits?

17 MATTHEW SLADE: Only certain things
18 required testing again. I don't think the
19 braking required testing. Certainly some --
20 whenever you unplug or replug certain bits of
21 equipment on the train you have to go through a
22 regression test or a redo of a PICO. So, yeah
23 some of the trains didn't -- I can't remember
24 off the top of my head. Some of the retrofits
25 required a level of retest but none of the

1 retests were significant, shall we say. They
2 were all things that you could have done in an
3 evening shift on the test track or something.

4 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And I take it
5 for the brake calipers there wasn't, from your
6 perspective, a need to recertify those?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: No. We went through a
8 process -- pretty sure Jacques Bergeron led the
9 charge on that one. The calipers, they did a
10 whole series of bench testing with the original
11 calipers and then the new calipers. And they
12 demonstrated, through however many cycles on a
13 bench, that the new calipers didn't have any
14 effect on the performance of the braking system,
15 such that there was no physical testing of the
16 vehicle required, and that they could just
17 replace one set of calipers with another set of
18 calipers. And that was all agreed to by Alstom,
19 OLRTC, the City and the City's consultants.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Do you agree
21 that some of the deferred retrofits meant
22 exporting some additional constraints as well on
23 the operations and maintenance of the system?

24 MATTHEW SLADE: Uh...

25 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Even in terms of

1 the need -- or the competing needs for access,
2 so the MSF and the trains?

3 MATTHEW SLADE: Well, yeah. I think
4 the sheer volume of retrofits that were required
5 was going to have -- the MSF is a maintenance
6 facility, it was designed to be a maintenance
7 facility even if we used it as assembly
8 facility.

9 And obviously it was never envisaged
10 that you would go through the quantum of
11 retrofits needed at the same time whilst you
12 were trying to achieve service on a daily basis.
13 So there was definitely a competition for space,
14 a competition for movement of vehicles around
15 the yard, none of which was insignificant.

16 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Is it fair to
17 say also that the track priority, and other MSF
18 priority, was given to the retrofits, train
19 manufacturing people as opposed to maintenance,
20 for the most part?

21 MATTHEW SLADE: No. I wouldn't say
22 that's a fair statement. I think -- so retrofit
23 and maintenance it's both Alstom, and it goes to
24 two different arms of Alstom, whether it's
25 production or maintenance. But they -- the

1 request for moves in the yard were made by
2 Alstom, not by one part or the other part.

3 The moves are controlled by yard
4 control, and they're completely agnostic as to
5 who's making what request for what vehicle to go
6 where. They just, this may sound horrible,
7 they're just moving the trains around as they're
8 asked to. They're not making any priority
9 decisions over what vehicle goes where, when.

10 But obviously once we're in passenger
11 service, passenger service takes priority, it
12 has to because of the penalty regime.

13 And the retrofits were a production
14 issue that shouldn't -- you always go into
15 service with some retrofits, but the quantum
16 that we had and the scale of them was
17 significant.

18 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And in terms of
19 prior to RSA, the track and the trains in
20 particular being used for trial running and
21 other testing by OLRTC, did that impede RTM
22 and/or Alstom's ability to prepare for
23 maintenance.

24 MATTHEW SLADE: No, because they
25 weren't interested in preparing for maintenance.

1 Like, we tried. Like, you can lead a horse to
2 water but you can't make it drink.

3 We tried, I don't know how many times,
4 to get them involved. And I'm sure there's
5 emails and meeting minutes where they just, you
6 know, refused to do it. So there was never any
7 competition for that.

8 I guess there was some competition for
9 track access for testing, continuing to test
10 trains, Stage 2 trains as well as retrofitted
11 trains. But a lot of it was -- the issues we
12 were having with the vehicles prior to revenue
13 service was immense.

14 I brought specialists in from outside
15 to help manage that and oversee it, and help me
16 understand what was going on and why it was in
17 the shape it was in.

18 OLRTC hired an organization called
19 SENER, who are engineering consultants, I guess.
20 I don't know how they advertise themselves. But
21 they have a vehicle -- a specialist vehicle
22 division. And we hired a gentleman by the name
23 of a Mark Turner who is, it sounds awful, but
24 he's another British person. He lives in
25 Barcelona. He is ex-Alstom. He was a bogey

1 specialist by profession.

2 And we flew him over and put him up in
3 Ottawa for probably the best part of a year, I
4 think, to help understand -- because he was so
5 specialized and understood the -- he also
6 understood the Citadis vehicles. We needed
7 someone to get into Alstom's business, for want
8 of a better term, and understand how we could
9 resolve these issues.

10 And so he sat on -- I don't know the
11 term, but we had these tiger (sic) teams that
12 were set up for various different issues
13 associated with the vehicle. And he sat and led
14 most of those with the City's consultants, STV,
15 and asked Alstom to try and get through all of
16 the issues we had. It was a mammoth task.

17 I still use him. He's is a good guy
18 and he understands this stuff better than a lot
19 of people.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Given the --
21 everything that needed to be done in the lead-up
22 to RSA by OLRTC, would you say that it would
23 have impacted its focus on maintenance, to the
24 extent that OLRTC had to maintain prior to RSA?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: I think there was a

1 level of frustration. I don't think it impacted
2 OLRTC on schedule or anything like that. I
3 spent a lot of time managing morale and staff.

4 Like, there was a huge -- there was a
5 huge drive to get it done and everyone -- the
6 level of proudness that the team had when we got
7 to substantial completion and started trial
8 running, to then see that eroded and to see the
9 lack of performance from RTM and Alstom was -- I
10 think it was more of a -- it was more of a
11 mental issue than a schedule issue for my team.

12 The frustration was immense,
13 absolutely immense. And, you know, they sat
14 there and they're like saying, We can do better
15 than this. Let us go do it. We'll get through
16 trial running if you let us go and do it. And
17 there was a huge desire to do that from my team.

18 And they felt -- my team always had a
19 sense of urgency that Alstom still doesn't have.
20 And they -- I guess they lived it for such a
21 long time. It's kind of -- it sounds awful but
22 the railway is like a baby to them, and a lot of
23 them now work for RTM, which I'm proud of and
24 they're proud of. People like Steve Nadon, who
25 I now you've spoken to. He was my testing

1 commissioning manager, he's now the Maintenance
2 Director there.

3 And the team that Mario has now put in
4 place, the majority of them are ex-OLRTC because
5 they care and because they have a sense of
6 urgency. And it's -- you know, they genuinely
7 want to system to perform because they know it
8 can. And that's what's missing from Alstom,
9 predominantly.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Were there
11 issues with spare parts following RSA? And I
12 ask in part because you then were involved with
13 RTM. So I don't know which hat you need to wear
14 to answer that question.

15 MATTHEW SLADE: I wouldn't say per se
16 there was an issue with spare parts. I think
17 Alstom's managements of the inventory and
18 knowing where parts are within the facility,
19 it's a big facility, if you haven't been there.
20 And their ability to find stuff and knowing what
21 they've got, I don't think they've probably
22 catalogued stuff very well.

23 We had a few challenges during vehicle
24 production where they couldn't find components
25 that had been delivered to them, that caused a

1 bit of friction.

2 I still don't think they're
3 particularly good at managing their inventory
4 and knowing -- you know, when they're running
5 low on stuff they don't automatically reorder
6 stuff. I mean, real basic --

7 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Are you
8 referencing Alstom or RTM as well?

9 MATTHEW SLADE: No, Alstom.

10 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Alstom.

11 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah. RTM doesn't
12 carry a lot of spares. RTM's responsibility is
13 the facilities, and a lot of that is
14 subcontracting cleaning. It's not -- the
15 escalators and elevators, the parts are all part
16 of the contracts with Otis and Schindler, or
17 whoever. The majority of the spare parts are an
18 Alstom issue, whether it's infrastructure or
19 vehicles.

20 And I just -- I think they still -- I
21 think there was a misconception as to how
22 quickly it takes to order certain things. And I
23 think they were just not brilliant at managing
24 their inventory, but I'm not aware that anything
25 was missing. A few times OLRTC had to help out

1 because Alstom couldn't find or didn't have what
2 they need. Or they had poor maintenance
3 practices in place such that they needed a
4 higher volume of parts than they originally had.

5 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And you came in
6 on an advisory basis to RTM after about a year
7 of operations, correct?

8 MATTHEW SLADE: Yes. I mean, I had
9 always been in the background. I never left the
10 project. Although my CV says I left the project
11 I never let go of it completely.

12 Whether I was still in a role at OLRTC
13 or providing advice and support to RTG and RTM
14 as an EllisDon, you know, responsible for the
15 transit business, I never fully left. I left
16 for a very brief period, the period that's on my
17 CV when I went to Crosslinx as the Systems
18 Director there.

19 But then we had the need for support
20 back at RTM and that's when I went back in as a
21 strategic advisor.

22 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And what did you
23 see needing improvement? What did you advise
24 them to do to improve the --

25 MATTHEW SLADE: I mean, fundamentally

1 there's a remediation plan, which I'm sure you
2 have somewhere in your thousands of documents to
3 go through, that a few of us were pulled in. It
4 was myself and a guy called Raphael, who is an
5 ACS employee, General Manager of Maintenance at
6 Crosslinx. We went in to pull that document
7 together and identify all the areas that needed
8 addressing.

9 And I guess -- I mean, I got involved
10 because I had a good relationship with the City
11 and I had a lot of knowledge of the job, so it
12 was the right thing to do.

13 And it was a case of trying to get
14 everything back on an even keel. So we prepared
15 that remediation plan with our supply chain,
16 including Alstom and RTG and the City. It was a
17 collaborative kind of document that got agreed
18 to.

19 And then Steven Nadon at the time was
20 still at OLRTC. We seconded him out of OLRTC in
21 to RTG to manage the execution of that work,
22 because RTG is a small organization, it's only
23 three or four people really. And they didn't
24 have someone who was a project manager, per se,
25 who had the time or ability to do that. So we

1 seconded Steve into that role to execute the
2 works that were in the remediation plan. I got
3 heavily involved with that and the shutdowns,
4 and the work that was executed during that
5 period.

6 And then I can't remember when it was
7 specifically, I would have to go back through my
8 calendar, but within my own organization, within
9 EllisDon, it must have been just at the
10 beginning of COVID at the first -- during that
11 March of 2020 it must have been I guess.
12 EllisDon -- I was part of their civil division,
13 which was obviously responsible for constructing
14 and building of the transit work. I
15 transitioned into the -- what we call our
16 services business, which is why I ended up on
17 the Board of the maintenance organization that I
18 now sit in the facility part of the business,
19 still responsible for all of that transit.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Were there any
21 clear gaps just in terms of procedures,
22 protocols that you saw at RTM?

23 MATTHEW SLADE: It wasn't so much
24 procedures and protocols, I think a lot of that
25 stuff was in play. Some of it might have needed

1 a bit of improvement but it wasn't bad.

2 I think the main issue was the fact
3 that a lot of stuff hadn't been done that was
4 supposed to be done. A lot of the maintenance
5 work had not been done as it had been
6 prescribed.

7 So I think -- and I'm talking about
8 infrastructure maintenance, which falls under
9 Alstom. A think lot of issues that were on the
10 remedial plan were a result of lack of or
11 inappropriate maintenance of those assets. And,
12 again, that was predominantly my view, down to
13 lack of resources and lack of knowledge and
14 experience on Alstom's part.

15 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Did the issue
16 with the work order and the City putting quite a
17 bit of pressure on that system, did that subside
18 after trial running?

19 MATTHEW SLADE: I can't remember when
20 it subsided. It was after trial running but I
21 can't remember when.

22 It was at a point in time where at the
23 time the City were able to obviously -- they
24 were running what was called the "Help Desk",
25 and then that transitioned to RTM relatively

1 swiftly, but I can't remember what the timeframe
2 was. But that -- at that point it changed a
3 little bit because they didn't have control of
4 what was going on. But they still -- I think
5 they still to this day still input a huge amount
6 of work orders into the system.

7 And I know you know the way they
8 apportion those work orders to the penalty
9 regime, or the penalty regime to those work
10 orders is still matter of dispute.

11 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Are you aware of
12 negotiations that began with RTG on this
13 issue -- or RTM?

14 MATTHEW SLADE: I'm aware they began,
15 but at that point in time I wasn't involved.
16 But I know it's -- it was a topic of discussion
17 and then it kind of faded away, and now it's
18 back being a topic of discussion, and I know
19 it's all subject to dispute.

20 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And does this
21 approach, or the City's approach to the work
22 orders, does that take away some of the focus of
23 RTM or Alstom on things that impact service
24 reliability?

25 MATTHEW SLADE: Yeah, I think it does.

1 I think -- it's a very, very difficult
2 environment there now as a result of that. I
3 think -- it goes back a bit, I guess, to the
4 conversation we had earlier on about penalty
5 regime versus incentivization, and what have
6 you. So there's -- RTG, RTM and Alstom require
7 money to be able to put trains out to service.
8 And as soon as you penalize them and there's
9 issues that need fixing, and then there's less
10 money to use to fix it, it's a vicious circle.

11 But I think the whole process is -- it
12 hasn't helped with relationships. There's been
13 a lot of tension around it. I think it's got a
14 little bit better. We got to a point where we
15 said, Okay, just stop.

16 But it's more about the relationship
17 as much as anything. Obviously cash is
18 important, but the relationship around that
19 whole process and the way the penalties are
20 being applied to things that -- I mean, you can
21 argue it's subjective and you can say, yes, we
22 signed up to the contract. But I don't think
23 anyone envisaged the contract would be applied
24 the way it's being applied in such a punitive
25 way.

1 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: And I know we're
2 just about out of time. I just wonder if you're
3 able to speak to whether any of the issues that
4 later surfaced, were they related to Thales'
5 signaling system or integration, system
6 integration?

7 MATTHEW SLADE: Are you talking
8 about --

9 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: Breakdowns in
10 particular, or the derailments, although I don't
11 think that the derailments did, correct me if
12 I'm wrong.

13 MATTHEW SLADE: No. So I think we
14 had -- we had some -- you know, after revenue
15 service we went through some software upgrades
16 from Thales; and there will be more to come.
17 It's an evolving system because of Stage 2 and
18 other works that are ongoing.

19 But as a result of some of the
20 performance issues that we saw there was a need
21 to upgrade some of the Thales software. But it
22 wasn't the fact that the Thales system was
23 causing the breakdowns.

24 I'll try and give you an example, if I
25 can. We had -- one of the task force tiger team

1 things that we put together, something that we
2 struggled with a little bit in the early days
3 was what we call EBs, which are emergency
4 brake applications, which then result,
5 generally, in getting flat spots on the train
6 wheels.

7 And we were having probably more
8 emergency brake applications than you would
9 expect to have. So we set up a team of people,
10 including the City and the City's consultants,
11 to look -- and external, third-party consultants
12 that we had on board from JBA and again from the
13 UK. Started looking at the number of EB events,
14 the triggers, the causes, et cetera, et cetera.
15 And whilst the -- some of the EBs were applied
16 via the Thales system, it might have been a
17 result of an input from another system.

18 As an example, we have what we call
19 GIDs, guideway intrusion detection systems, on
20 the end of the platforms, which is there to
21 detect if a member of the public or anyone steps
22 off the platform and onto the guideway, either
23 in front of a train or not in front of a train,
24 it will cause the train -- or trigger a signal
25 in the signaling system, the Thales system,

1 which would then apply the emergency brakes on
2 the train.

3 So it might have been that we had, for
4 instance, a sensitivity issue with the GIDs,
5 which would then trigger an EB on the train. It
6 would manifest itself as an EB triggered by
7 Thales, but the initial trigger point would have
8 been a third party system from -- GIDs is from a
9 company called Molinari.

10 But I wouldn't say that there were
11 specific issues with the Thales system that
12 affected service. There were certain
13 integrations between different systems that
14 were -- that had performance issues, but they
15 weren't necessarily all Thales driven. Some of
16 them -- the Thales is a brain, it takes
17 information, some of it came from the train.
18 The train would say -- there would be an issue
19 with the wiring in the train that might make the
20 Thales system do something. And a lot of the
21 time it gets reported as a signaling issue
22 because in the cab of the train what the driver
23 sees, the same as your dashboard on your car
24 when you see the "check engine" light come up,
25 it comes up on a screen that says "Thales" on

1 it, because it's a Thales screen, which will
2 tell you, you have a fault on the train, or
3 whatever. And the driver's report, via radio to
4 the control room, I have an issue. Or, My
5 Thales screen is telling me this. So it would
6 generally be reported as a Thales issue, even
7 though what it's reporting on is a completely
8 different system.

9 So I think the Thales system has
10 actually been as reliable as I would expect it
11 to. I think it's performed damn well. I don't
12 think we've any true signaling issues. We've
13 had a few issues relating to the maintenance of
14 the Thales system, which is down to Alstom
15 still. But overall I think it's performed as
16 expected. And I think those various task forces
17 that we've set up have identified solutions to
18 issues that have proven that it was not all down
19 to Thales. Some of that -- some of those EBs
20 have gone as a result of software rewrites, some
21 of it as a result of the systems, and partly
22 down to how OC Transpo operates the system.

23 CHRISTINE MAINVILLE: I know we have
24 another session scheduled with you, to the
25 extent we need it. So maybe we'll go off

1 record.

2 --- Completed at 6:05 p.m.

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, HELEN MARTINEAU, CSR, Certified
Shorthand Reporter, certify;

That the foregoing proceedings were
taken before me at the time and date therein set
forth;

That the statements of the presenters
and all comments made at the time of the meeting
were recorded stenographically by me;

That the foregoing is a certified
transcript of my shorthand notes so taken.

Dated this 5th day of May, 2022.



PER: HELEN MARTINEAU
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

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