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![Blockhouse and Battery in Old Fort, Toronto, 1812, [ca. 1921] Blockhouse and Battery in Old Fort, Toronto, 1812, [ca. 1921]](pics/621228_blockhouse_detail_270.jpg) |
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he
professional core of the defenders of Upper Canada during the War
of 1812 were the British regulars who garrisoned the forts and smaller
posts from Cornwall
to Fort St. Joseph on Lake Huron. They were augmented by "Fencibles
units" which were colonial regulars raised in the various parts
of British North America, the most prominent being the Newfoundland
Fencibles and the Voltigeurs raised in Lower
Canada. The last and largest component of the military
in Upper Canada were the local militia. |
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| John Le Couteur followed a typical
path as an officer during the War of 1812. He was born on Jersey,
a Channel Island, in 1794, the son of General John Le Couteur,
marking him for a military career. The beginnings of formal military
training for prospective officers, still gentry, corresponded
to the start of Le Couteur's military career. He was an early
student of the Royal Military College and graduated with the rank
of ensign in 1810, serving first in the 96th Foot.
In 1812 he was transferred to the 104th Regiment which was already
stationed in Canada with the rank of Lieutenant. As an officer
and a gentleman, Le Couteur was required to pay for his own equipment,
food and uniforms out of his limited pay and whatever allowance
or income he could obtain from his family. He was stationed in
various parts of Upper Canada during the war, and was present
at the Battle of Lundy's lane. Le Couteur survived the war and
returned to England in 1817 with the rank of Captain. footnote
#1 |
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One of the advantages to serving as an officer
was the option of resigning ones commission or selling it to a
lower ranking officer for a profit. In wartime, not surprisingly,
resignation would only be with the permission of a senior officer
otherwise they would face sanctions for desertion. The standard
of living available to officers depended upon their personal wealth,
as pay, although far better than that of a private or sergeant,
was generally inadequate to meet the social obligations and style
that was expected of an officer and a gentleman.
The militia officer corps was drawn from the Upper Canadian equivalent
of the British gentry. Property owners like William
Hamilton Merritt were expected to serve in a leadership
capacity, in his case as a Captain in the Provincial Dragoons
(cavalry). Like regular officers they had to provide
for themselves many articles of equipment and only the wealthier
members of Upper Canadian society were in a position to do so.
As the war progressed and became more intense militia officers
faced a new kind of threat. They were targeted by pro-American
inhabitants for punishment during periods of enemy occupation
and at times they were taken from their homes by raiders and transported
to the United States and imprisonment for the duration of the
war. |
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ordinary private, the Tommy
Aitkins of British tradition (a fictional character), came from a much different
social and economic strata of society. Great Britain had no conscription
in the 18th or 19th century but the difficult economic conditions
faced by the rural and urban populations made enlistment an option
for many who had few prospects. A man who accepted the "King's
Shilling" on enlistment was subject to a long
term of service, generally 20 years or more and could be transferred
for service to any part of the British Empire or one of the theatres
of war with France or the United States, including the backwoods
of Upper Canada. In the field, the standard daily ration issued
to each man consisted of a pound and a half of bread, a pound of
fresh or salt beef and a half gill of rum (2 ounces or 70 ml). In
addition to the monotony of this diet, the caloric intake for men
doing heavy work was inadequate. The estimate of the daily ration
was 2697 calories, while the current recommendation for modern,
sedentary adult males is 3000 calories. footnote
#2 The energy expended in the field would have far exceeded
these levels. |
| Troops in garrison had better access to fresh food and vegetables,
but shortages were a constant problem. The ordinary soldiers were
housed in barracks
that also served as strongpoints in the various forts. The blockhouses
at Fort York and Fort George were the sleeping, eating and living
quarters for the enlisted men. These log structures were loop-holed
to allow defenders to fire out against attackers who had penetrated
the main defences, leaving them drafty and difficult to heat. In
the field, tents were seldom available for troops or officers so,
unless a house or barn was available for temporary shelter while
on campaign, men slept in the open. |
![Blockhouse and Battery in Old Fort, Toronto, 1812, [ca. 1921] Blockhouse and Battery in Old Fort, Toronto, 1812, [ca. 1921]](pics/621228_blockhouse_270.jpg)
Click
to see a larger image (77K)
Blockhouse and Battery in Old Fort, Toronto,
1812, [ca. 1921]
C. W. Jefferys
Pen and ink drawing on paper
Government of Ontario Art Collection, 621228
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| In return for this the private soldier was paid 1
shilling per day (frequently in arrears). In addition he was issued
new clothing on a regular basis to replace worn-out uniforms. Le
Couteur would have paid for his uniforms and rations out of deductions
from his pay. Le Couteur received 4 shillings and 8 pence a day.
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One of the things that separated officers from
the enlisted men most graphically was the nature of punishment
. An officer could be reduced in rank or forced out of the military
or in extremely rare situations, face imprisonment or execution.
Enlisted men faced a long list of corporal punishments for minor
and major infractions of military discipline. The most common
punishment was flogging, the number of strokes depending on the
seriousness of the offence. Deserters faced severe floggings if
recaptured, and in repeat cases execution by firing squad. Similar
penalties applied for offences considered mutiny, such as striking
a superior officer or defying orders.
The ordinary militiaman on duty received much the same pay and
rations as his regular counterparts, but did not face the same
severity of punishments. Most often he was a small farmer with
no military experience or training and little interest in the
military life. The ability to obtain service from the militia
from coercion was limited as desertion into the home community
was always an option for locals. Obtaining parole from further
military service in areas occupied by American forces was also
an option for many residents who did not relish active service,
whatever their broader attitudes toward the war. Although technically
obligatory, service in the militia was more an act of personal
conviction in the Upper Canadian context. |
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standard tactics used by the British infantry at this time was the
line of battle. Men stood in two lines, shoulder to shoulder, and
fired their smooth bore muskets in disciplined volleys. This tactic
was dictated by the inaccuracy of the standard "brown bess"
musket, and the need to achieve concentrated fire against a similar
line of enemy troops. Also, a 19th century battlefield was a confused
place. The muskets and artillery discharged a heavy white smoke
that obscured opponents and messages from a commander to specific
parts of the line could only be transmitted in writing or orally.
It was not unusual for this "fog of war" to take control
of the battlefield from the commanding officers and place it in
the hands of chance and the individual soldiers. Theoretically one
side would give way before the musketry or a final bayonet charge.
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| The fire of the infantry would be supplemented by light field
artillery, these guns were identified by the weight of shot fired,
from 3 pounds to 12 pounds, which were designed to batter defences
or cut through the enemy infantry. At close range the guns could
be loaded with "cannister" which turned them into large
shotguns, spreading dozens of small iron balls or fragments in a
wide path. First Nations warriors were employed as light troops
which sought to turn the flank of an opponent. Of course in the
heavily forested Upper Canada of 1812-1814, the formal tactics were
not always applicable. Militia, First Nations and Regulars would
take advantage of the cover offered by the trees and it was difficult
to maintain the strict lines except in open fields. These tactics
could result in heavy casualties, relative to the number of troops
engaged. |
![Drawing: The Battle of Lundy's Lane, [ca. 1921] Drawing: The Battle of Lundy's Lane, [ca. 1921]](pics/7669_lundies_270.jpg)
Click
to see a larger image (136K)
The Battle of Lundy's Lane, [ca. 1921]
C. W. Jefferys
Pen and ink drawing on paper
Government of Ontario Art Collection, 621234
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- Donald E. Graves editor Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The
War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot.
Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993. [Back]
- George Shepard. Plunder, Profit and Paroles: A Social History
of the War of 1812 in Upper Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1994, p. 109. [Back]
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