1 2 3 IPPERWASH PUBLIC INQUIRY 4 5 6 7 ******************** 8 9 10 BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SIDNEY LINDEN, 11 COMMISSIONER 12 13 14 15 16 Held at: Forest Community Centre 17 Kimball Hall 18 Forest, Ontario 19 20 21 ******************** 22 23 24 June 6th, 2006 25

2
  1                        Appearances
  2  Derry Millar      )             Commission Counsel
  3  Susan Vella        )
  4  Donald Worme, Q. C )    (np)
  5  Katherine Hensel  )    (np)
  6  Megan Ferrier     )
  7  
  8  Murray Klippenstein )   (np)     The Estate of Dudley 
  9  Vilko Zbogar       )   (np)     George and George
 10  Andrew Orkin       )  (np)      Family Group
 11  Basil Alexander    )
 12  
 13  Peter Rosenthal  )              Aazhoodena and George
 14  Jackie Esmonde   )              Family Group
 15  Amanda Rogers    )   (np)       Student-at-law
 16  
 17  Anthony Ross     )   (np)       Residents of
 18  Cameron Neil     )   (np)       Aazhoodena (Army Camp)
 19  Kevin Scullion   )
 20  
 21  William Henderson )   (np)       Kettle Point & Stony
 22  Jonathon George  )              Point First Nation
 23  Colleen Johnson  )   (np)
 24  
 25

3
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  Kim Twohig       )   (np)       Government of Ontario
  3  Walter Myrka     )   (np)
  4  Susan Freeborn   )   (np)
  5  Sheri Hebdon     )              Student-at-law
  6  
  7  Janet Clermont   )              Municipality of 
  8  David Nash       )   (np)       Lambton Shores
  9  Nora Simpson     )   (np)       Student-at-law
 10  
 11  Peter Downard    )   (np)       The Honourable Michael
 12  Bill Hourigan    )   (np)       Harris
 13  Jennifer McAleer )
 14   
 15  Ian Smith        )   (np)       Robert Runciman
 16  Alice Mrozek     )   (np)
 17  
 18  Harvey T. Strosberg, Q.C.)
                               (np)   Charles Harnick
 19  Jacqueline Horvat )      (np)
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

4
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd) 
  2  Douglas Sulman, Q.C. )           Marcel Beaubien
  3  Mary Jane Moynahan    )  (np)
  4  Dave Jacklin          )  (np)
  5  Trevor Hinnegan     )      (np)
  6  
  7  Mark Sandler       )            Ontario Provincial 
  8  Andrea Tuck-Jackson )            Ontario Provincial Police
  9  Leslie Kaufman     ) (np)
 10  
 11  Ian Roland       )              Ontario Provincial 
 12  Karen Jones      )              Police Association &
 13  Debra Newell     )              K. Deane
 14  Ian McGilp       )   (np)
 15  Annie Leeks      )   (np)
 16  Jennifer Gleitman )
 17  Robyn Trask      )   (np)
 18  Caroline Swerdlyk )
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

5
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd) 
  2  Julian Falconer  )   (np)       Aboriginal Legal
  3  Brian Eyolfson   )   (np)       Services of Toronto
  4  Kimberly Murray   )   (np)
  5  Julian Roy       )
  6  Clem Nabigon     )   (np)
  7  Linda Chen       )   (np)
  8  Chris Darnay     )   (np)
  9  Sunil Mathai     )   (np)
 10  Adriel Weaver     )   (np)       Student-at-Law
 11  
 12  Al J.C. O'Marra  )   (np)       Office of the Chief
 13  Robert Ash, Q.C. )    (np)       Coroner
 14  William Horton   )   (np)       Chiefs of Ontario
 15  Matthew Horner   )   (np)
 16  Kathleen Lickers )   (np)
 17  
 18  Mark Fredrick    )   (np)       Christopher Hodgson
 19  Craig Mills      )   (np)
 20  Megan Mackey     )   (np)
 21  Peter Lauwers    )   (np)
 22  Erin Tully       )   (np)
 23  Michelle Fernando )
 24  Maanit Zemel     )    (np)
 25  Patrick Greco    )   (np)

6
  1                   APPEARANCES (cont'd)
  2  
  3  David Roebuck    )   (np)       Debbie Hutton
  4  Anna Perschy     )   (np)
  5  Melissa Panjer   )   (np)
  6  Adam Goodman     )
  7  
  8  
  9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 PAGE NO. 3 List of Exhibits 8 4 5 DAVID MICHAEL BOON, Sworn 6 Examination-In-Chief by Ms. Megan Ferrier 10 7 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jackie Esmonde 58 8 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 76 9 Cross-Examination by Mr. Jonathan George 86 10 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Roy 99 11 Cross-Examination by Ms. Jennifer Gleitman 109 12 Re-Direct Examination by Ms. Megan Ferrier 120 13 14 WILLIAM DAVID KLYM, Sworn 15 Examination-In-Chief by Mr. Derry Millar 121 16 Cross-Examination by Mr. Peter Rosenthal 144 17 Cross-Examination by Mr. Kevin Scullion 185 18 Cross-Examination by Mr. Julian Roy 191 19 Cross-Examination by Mr. Ian Roland 204 20 21 DONALD WILLIAM BELL, Sworn 22 Examination-In-Chief by Ms. Susan Vella 211 23 24 25 Certificate of Transcript 335

1 EXHIBITS 2 No. Description Page 3 P-1623 Audio CD of John Slack transmissions. 4 P-1632 Document Number 2005542. Resume of 5 David Michael Boon. 11 6 P-1633 Document Number 1000460. Handwritten 7 notebook entries of David Boon, 8 September 06, 1995. 14 9 P-1634 Handwritten notebook entries of David 10 Boon, September 09 and 12, 1995. 44 11 P-1635 Document Number 1000267. Typed and 12 written statement of P/C David Boon 13 (undated). 46 14 P-1636 Document Number 1004641. Statement 15 of P/C David Boon re. Interview with SIU 16 investigators Bob Muir and Allan Hunter, 17 February 19, 1998. 48 18 P-1637 Document Number 5000081. Interview of 19 David Boon by Detective Armstrong, 20 March 11, 2003. 50 21 P-1638 2-colour photographs of "I Support Ken 22 Deane" T-shirt and CD copy of photos 57 23 P-1639 The Police Intelligence Process Chart. 24 P-1640 Resume of Donald W. Bell 244 25

1 List of Exhibits (cont'd) 2 Exhibit No. Description Page No. 3 P-1641 Handwritten journal and notebook 4 entries of D/Inspector Don Bell, 5 1993-1996 257 6 P-1642 Document Number 2005487. Stoney Point 7 Occupation, CFB Ipperwash, 1993, 8 Intelligence files disclosure, 1993 269 9 P-1643 A Division office, chronology of Kettle 10 Point/Stoney Point Reserve Occupation 11 of Camp Ipperwash, July 15,1992 to 12 April 16,1994 (6 documents) 280 13 P-1644 Document Number 2005493. Stoney Point 14 Occupation, CFB Ipperwash, Intelligence 15 files disclosure (undated). 280 16 P-1645 Document Number 2004320. Report of 17 D/Sgt P.J. Lollar, August 18, 1995. 299 18 P-1646 Coordinated Investigations Team (CIT) 19 Organizational Chart marked by Witness 20 Det/Sgt. Don Bell, June 06, 2006. 327 21 22 23 24 25

1 --- Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m. 2 3 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 4 now in session, the Honourable Mr. Justice Linden 5 presiding. Please be seated. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 7 morning. Good morning. 8 MR. DAVID BOON: Good morning. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 10 morning. 11 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Good morning, 12 Commissioner. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 14 morning. 15 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: The next witness is 16 Sergeant David Boon. 17 18 DAVID MICHAEL BOON, Sworn 19 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 21 Q: Sergeant Boon, if you could please 22 turn to Tab 1 of the black binder in front of you. 23 And is that a copy of your resume, sir? 24 A: Yes, it is. 25 Q: I would ask that that be marked as

1 the next exhibit. 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-1632, Your Honour. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1632: Document Number 2005542. 5 Resume of David Michael Boon. 6 7 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 8 Q: I understand that in February of 1986 9 you joined the Sarnia Police Service as a constable? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And you joined the OPP in September 12 of 1990? 13 A: I did. 14 Q: And you were assigned to the Petrolia 15 Detachment? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: And then in May of 1997 you were 18 promoted to Detective Constable? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And you were part of the Lambton 21 County Crime Unit? 22 A: Yes, I was. 23 Q: Then in January of 2002 you obtained 24 your sergeant competency credit? 25 A: Yes, I did.

1 Q: In October then of 2002 I understand 2 that you were designated second in command of the Lambton 3 County Crime Unit? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And in 2003 you were formally 6 promoted to Sergeant? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: Thank you. I understand also that 9 prior to September of 1995 you'd had no specific training 10 with respect to Aboriginal issues? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And prior to September of 1995 you'd 13 had some experience policing Aboriginal communities? 14 A: Yes, I did. 15 Q: And if you could describe that for 16 us, please? 17 A: Yes, during my time with the Sarnia 18 Police Service they were responsible for policing the 19 Sarnia Reserve so I was involved from time to time on 20 calls for service and investigations on the Sarnia 21 Reserve. 22 Q: And prior to September 6th, of 1995, 23 you had had no involvement with policing at Ipperwash? 24 A: No, I didn't although my duties at 25 Lambton Detachment did take me onto Walpole Island to

1 assist that police service and from time to time on -- on 2 the Kettle Point Reserve as well. 3 Q: Thank you. With respect to the 4 events of the summer of 1995 did you have any knowledge 5 of what was occurring in the Ipperwash area? 6 A: I had some -- some knowledge. 7 Q: And that would have been primarily 8 from media reports? 9 A: Primarily, yes. 10 Q: Okay. In 1995 then, in September, 11 you were a general duty uniformed patrol officer working 12 out of the Petrolia Detachment? 13 A: Yes, I was. 14 Q: And your first involvement in the 15 Ipperwash area was on September 6th -- 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: -- when you were called to the Forest 18 Detachment? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: And at Tab 2 of the binder in front 21 of you are copies of notes. It's Inquiry Document Number 22 1000460 and these should be photocopies of notes, 23 numbered pages 31 through 39 of a police notebook. 24 Are these your notes of September 6th, 25 1995, Sergeant Boon?

1 A: Yes, they are. 2 Q: I would ask that these notes be 3 marked as the next exhibit, please? 4 THE REGISTRAR: P-1633, Your Honour. 5 6 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1633: Document Number 1000460. 7 Handwritten notebook entries 8 of David Boon, September 06, 9 1995. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 12 Q: And in September of 1995 what was 13 your practice with respect to taking notes? 14 A: To make them at the time that events 15 unfold or as soon as practicable thereafter. 16 Q: And why would you make notes? 17 A: I use them to refresh my memory. 18 Q: And to refresh your memory for what? 19 A: To draw my memory back to the 20 important parts of investigations or incidents that I'm 21 involved in. 22 Q: And generally speaking when -- or it 23 may make more sense to do it as we go through but when 24 did you make your notes of September 6th, 1995? 25 A: I can't say exactly but as soon as I

1 could after the events unfolded. 2 Q: And I understand that on September 3 6th you were scheduled to work a regular shift from -- 4 starting at 19:00 hours until 07:00 hours the next 5 morning? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And if you turn to page 32 of either 8 your original notebook or the copy of your notes, 9 whichever is easier for you? 10 A: Yes, I have that. 11 Q: I understand that you were responding 12 to a call with your partner Constable Murphy at 20:50. 13 A: At 20:50 -- 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And then what happened? 17 A: We were advised to disregard that 18 particular call and to attend the Forest Detachment and 19 see Sergeant Korosec for further instructions. 20 Q: And when did you -- excuse me, when 21 did you arrive at the Forest Detachment? 22 A: That was approximately 9:20 p.m. 23 Q: And can you recall what you were told 24 when you arrived there? 25

1 (BRIEF PAUSE) 2 3 A: I know that we received a short 4 briefing on the situation, but I don't recall what was 5 said at the time. 6 Q: Do you recall who gave the briefing? 7 A: It was Sergeant Korosec that we 8 reported to there. 9 Q: Did he say anything about events 10 occurring in Ipperwash Provincial Park? 11 A: He did. 12 Q: Can you recall anything about what he 13 might have said? 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 A: No. Not really. 18 Q: What was your overall sense or 19 impression of the situation? 20 A: That First Nations persons were 21 occupying the Provincial Park. We weren't in the 22 briefing very long before I received a specific 23 instruction. I think, maybe why, I don't remember 24 exactly what was said. 25 Q: And what were the instructions that

1 you received? 2 A: There was a -- a request for officers 3 to attend the intersection of Army Camp Road and Highway 4 21 to set up a roadblock in that intersection in an 5 effort to stem the flow of traffic toward the lake on 6 Army Camp Road from 21 Highway. 7 Q: And did Sergeant Korosec give you 8 your assignment? 9 A: I believe it was Provincial Constable 10 Griffiths that made that request and then it was Sergeant 11 Korosec that assigned us to -- to fulfil that detail. 12 Q: And then after that request was made 13 what time did you arrive at the intersection? 14 A: It was approximately 9:50 p.m. 15 Q: And who were you with? 16 A: I was with Provincial Constable 17 Murphy. 18 Q: And what happened then? 19 A: We attended that intersection and 20 were joined a short time later by Provincial Constables 21 Griffiths and Wilson and there were two (2) other 22 officers from a different district that attended that 23 location as well. 24 Q: Can you recall anything about the two 25 (2) other officers who also attended?

1 A: No. 2 Q: Do you know whether they were members 3 of the Emergency Response Team? 4 A: No, they were not. 5 Q: And in terms of the -- the function 6 that you described with respect to traffic going towards 7 the lake and trying to prevent traffic from doing that, 8 how did you try to accomplish that? 9 A: Well, simply through regular traffic 10 control duties. So if a vehicle indicated that it was 11 going to head in that direction I would put my arm up and 12 attempt to -- to stop it from going in that direction and 13 to divert the direction elsewhere. 14 Had pretty limited success. Most -- most 15 drivers just ignored our instructions and continued on 16 anyway and we did not do anything to impede them if they 17 -- if they continued on except to radio ahead to let 18 other officers know on Army Camp Road that there were 19 vehicles coming through. 20 Q: Okay. And what did you do or note 21 next? 22 A: At this point my -- my attention was 23 mostly drawn to the inner perimeter of the Army Camp 24 situated at that intersection. There were a number of 25 people gathered inside the fence and there was a -- a

1 pickup truck moving back and forth along the inside of 2 the fence with a very large spotlight in the -- in the 3 box area of the pickup truck. 4 It became a bit of a concern with the 5 light shining on our location. We were somewhat blinded 6 looking in that -- in that direction. It was an 7 uncomfortable situation. 8 Q: Hmm hmm. With respect to that 9 situation at page 33 of your notes on the top half, about 10 two-thirds (2/3's) of the way down, it looks as though 11 you've noted: 12 "Obscenities were yelled at us from 13 time to time but no projectiles were 14 noticed." 15 First, is that a correct reading of your 16 notes? 17 A: It is. 18 Q: In terms of your note of "no 19 projectiles"; why did you record that in your notes? 20 A: I'd heard from other officers at 21 different locations that that had occurred. However, at 22 our location it didn't, so I recorded that. 23 Q: And can you recall when you made 24 them, these notes, of being at the intersection of Army 25 Camp Road and Highway 21?

1 A: I can't say with any certainty when I 2 -- when I made these notes. 3 Q: Hmm hmm. Also with respect to being 4 at the intersection were vehicles from the Army Camp 5 passing through or passing by your location? 6 A: So you're asking me if vehicles were 7 coming out of the Army Camp and into the intersection? 8 Q: Yes. If you can recall? 9 A: I can't recall. 10 Q: Also on that evening what kind of 11 weapon were you carrying? 12 A: I had my sidearm. My conversion 13 training was done so I had the current issued sidearm for 14 the OPP. 15 Q: While you were at the intersection 16 can you recall whether at any point, you had it in hand? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 A: I don't recall. 21 Q: And then turning back to your notes 22 what happened then next? 23 A: At approximately 11:20 p.m. a member 24 of the Emergency Response Team attended our location. 25 He'd come from the lake up Army Camp Road to our location

1 and advised us to vacate the intersection immediately and 2 to move up the highway a distance. 3 And so we did in fact get out of the 4 intersection right away and took up a position in 5 Ravenswood a short distance south. 6 Q: And Sergeant Boon, if you could look 7 to your left on the desk beside you there's a photocopy 8 of Exhibit P-1284. And Commissioner there's a copy in 9 the front of your binder as well, if you need one. 10 But, just to make sure that I understand 11 from the intersection of Army Camp Road and Highway 21, 12 you would have moved, as you described, south or left on 13 the piece of paper? 14 A: Left on the page, yes. 15 Q: Towards where Ravenswood line meets 16 Highway 21? 17 A: Yes, from that intersection to the 18 lake it's known as Ipperwash Road. 19 Q: Yes. 20 A: And in the opposite direction, yes, 21 it becomes Ravenwood line. 22 Q: Thank you. Do you recall who it was 23 who asked you to move your position? 24 A: No I don't. 25 Q: And did the individual who asked you

1 to move explain why you were to move? 2 A: No. 3 Q: And was your function at your new 4 position the same as it had been? 5 A: Not in terms of stopping cars on 6 Ipperwash road or moving toward the lake at that 7 location. But, at 11:25 p.m. received instructions to 8 stop all traffic north and south that would be heading 9 towards the intersection of Army Camp Road and Highway 10 21. 11 Q: And can you recall who you received 12 that instruction from? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And what happened next? 15 A: Shortly after arriving at the 16 intersection of Ipperwash Road and Highway 21, I noticed 17 an ambulance coming up Ipperwash Road from the lake 18 towards the intersection where we had now relocated. 19 We cleared a path for the ambulance and it 20 continued through our intersection northbound on 21 21 Highway and then attended the intersection that we had 22 just come from which is Army Camp Road and 21 Highway. 23 Q: And did you know who had called the 24 ambulance? 25 A: No.

1 Q: And then what happened next? 2 A: At approximately 11:28 p.m. there was 3 a request for uniformed personnel to re-attend at Army 4 Camp Road and Highway 21, that they required an officer 5 to accompany the ambulance to the hospital. 6 Q: And do you know who directed you to 7 re-attend or who was asking for a uniformed officer? 8 A: No, I don't. 9 Q: But you next then attended back at 10 the intersection of Army Camp Road and Highway 21? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And what happened when you got back 13 to the intersection? 14 A: When we arrived back at that 15 intersection I noticed a member of the Emergency Response 16 Team in the ditch on the east side of Highway 21 and I 17 recognized him as Provincial Constable Joe Dellemonache. 18 There were ambulance attendants and officers at a vehicle 19 and they were attempting to get an injured party out of 20 the -- the vehicle. 21 Q: You said that you were in a ditch 22 with Officer Joe Dellemonache? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: Did you speak with him? 25 A: Yes.

1 Q: Can you recall what he said or what 2 was said? 3 A: It would be from him that I learned 4 that there was, I believe, a shooting victim in that 5 motor vehicle at that intersection that was being 6 attended to by ambulance attendants. 7 Q: Prior to then had you heard gunfire 8 or been aware of the possibility of gunfire? 9 A: I was aware of the possibility. I 10 can't say with any certainty today that I heard gunfire 11 that night. 12 Q: And why -- why did you take a 13 position in a ditch? 14 A: It was because I had seen a member of 15 the Emergency Response Team in the ditch and I felt there 16 was some danger at that intersection. He appeared to be 17 keeping cover on that vehicle. 18 And it was -- I felt that perhaps I had 19 arrived at the intersection sooner than I had been 20 expected perhaps in light of the fact that they were 21 still attempting to get the -- the victim out of the car 22 and members of the Emergency Response Team still in the - 23 - in the ditch. 24 Q: Did you see any officers interact 25 with the occupants of the car?

1 A: No, I can say that there were 2 officers in the area of the car but I don't recall any 3 interaction between the officers and the occupants. 4 Q: Did you observe any officers with 5 their weapons drawn? 6 A: I remember seeing long guns in the 7 hands of the Emergency Response Team. 8 Q: Do you recall seeing any women at the 9 intersection? 10 A: No. 11 Q: Do you recall any of the occupants of 12 the car saying anything? 13 A: No. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: Do you recall anyone attempting to 18 approach the ambulance with the injured party or to stay 19 with the injured party? 20 A: I don't recall that, no. 21 Q: And what did you do next? 22 A: At approximately 11:37 p.m. I got 23 into the back of the ambulance with the ambulance 24 attendants and the -- the victim and we departed for the 25 Strathroy Hospital.

1 Q: Next I note that in your notes you 2 have the -- the name and I believe -- or I assume it 3 would be the birth date of the injured party. How did 4 you learn that information? 5 A: I learned that by listening to the 6 ambulance attendants interviewing the -- the victim. 7 They were asking him a series of questions and I was 8 gleaning that information from their conversation. 9 Q: And what did you observe of his 10 condition? 11 A: That he was awake and alert answering 12 their questions. He was agitated. 13 Q: Why did he seem agitated or what -- 14 A: He was -- he was restless and his 15 answers were short and -- and loud. 16 Q: And what happened next? 17 A: Just prior to -- excuse me. Just 18 prior to getting into the ambulance I had a conversation 19 with Sergeant Slack and as a result of that conversation 20 I had grounds -- had reasonable probable grounds for the 21 arrest of Nicholas Cottrelle for the offence of mischief. 22 And in the back of the ambulance at 11:43 23 p.m. I arrested Mr. Cottrelle for mischief and advised 24 him of his rights to counsel. 25 Q: Can you recall what Sergeant Slack

1 said about the grounds for the charge? 2 A: No. I don't recall the conversation 3 exactly. Just that I had one and I was satisfied that 4 grounds existed for Mr. Cottrelle's arrest. 5 Q: And if you could continue and 6 describe the ambulance ride? What happened? 7 A: Well, I advised Mr. Cottrelle of his 8 rights to counsel and cautioned him regarding statements 9 using the young persons Caution. He indicated that he 10 understood -- 11 Q: And if I could just stop you there. 12 How did he indicate that he understood? 13 A: I don't recall exactly what he said. 14 Q: Okay. And then? 15 A: I did ask him if he wished to call a 16 lawyer now and he did make a reply. 17 Q: Sorry, he -- what was the last thing 18 you said, I just couldn't hear? 19 A: He did reply to that. 20 Q: And what did he reply? 21 A: He said "well, obviously I can't 22 right now" and in a very loud, sharp tone uttered the 23 word "fuck". Because Mr. Cottrelle was a young offender 24 I also advised him he had the right to have a parent, 25 guardian or other responsible adult with him during any

1 questioning and he replied "yeah" when I asked him if he 2 understood. 3 Q: Can you recall anything from the 4 ambulance ride about -- or can you recall observing 5 anything about Mr. Cottrelle's injuries? 6 A: No, I did not observe any injuries on 7 Mr. Cottrelle. I was aware that the ambulance attendants 8 were wrapping his mid-section, maybe in the area of the 9 waist. 10 Q: Do you recall him saying anything 11 about how he had sustained his injuries or what had 12 happened prior to him being in the ambulance? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And then you arrived at the hospital? 15 A: Yes. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Okay. I think you may have already 20 said this but, at the top of page 35 of your notes, just 21 to finish the ambulance ride and your interactions with 22 Mr. Cottrelle -- 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: -- you note that -- can you describe 25 the last part of what you said to Mr. Cottrelle?

1 A: Yes I advised him -- because he was a 2 young offender I advised him that in addition to his 3 rights he also had the right to have a parent, guardian 4 or other responsible adult present during any 5 questioning. And he did reply "yeah" when I asked him if 6 he understood. 7 Q: Hmm hmm. Okay. And can you recall 8 anything else from the ambulance ride? 9 A: No. 10 Q: And then your arrived at Strathroy 11 Hospital? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And what time was that at? 14 A: That was at approximately seven (7) 15 minutes after midnight. 16 Q: And what happened when you arrived at 17 the hospital? 18 A: I assisted in unloading Mr. Cottrelle 19 from the ambulance. 20 Q: And then after that what happened to 21 Mr. Cottrelle or what did you do? 22 A: He went into a treatment room in the 23 emergency area of the hospital and I returned back to the 24 emergency ramp just outside the hospital. 25 Q: From when you left him in the

1 hospital can you recall anything of his condition at that 2 time? 3 A: No. 4 Q: Do you recall any other officers 5 speaking to Mr. Cottrelle at that time? 6 A: No. 7 Q: And what happened next? 8 A: At approximately ten (10) minutes 9 after midnight an older model Impala pulled up onto the 10 emergency ramp outside the hospital. 11 Q: Prior to then can you recall which 12 other officers were at the hospital? 13 A: I remember Detective Sergeant Trevor 14 Richardson being there; Detective Constable Mark Dew, 15 Detective Sergeant Randy Parent. And I believe that 16 there were a few uniform officers as well, but I don't 17 recall who they were. 18 Q: And can you recall having any 19 conversations with any of them when you arrived there? 20 A: Yes, I remember speaking to Detective 21 Constable Mark Dew and Detective Sergeant Trevor 22 Richardson. 23 Q: And what did you discuss with them? 24 A: I don't recall the conversation. 25 Q: So then you had been describing I

1 think in your notes that you observed a light coloured 2 vehicle pull up to the hospital? 3 A: Yes I did. 4 Q: And if you could tell us what you 5 recall about the car and about what happened when it 6 arrived? 7 A: I remember -- I remember chaos from 8 that point forward for the next few minutes. There was a 9 lot of yelling and screaming. 10 Q: Do you recall what any of the yelling 11 was about? 12 A: No. 13 Q: Hmm hmm. And what did you do next? 14 A: At approximately -- 15 Q: Did you -- before going back to your 16 notes did you approach the car when it arrived or have... 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 A: I don't recall if I approached the 21 car right away. 22 Q: Okay. Were you aware of an injured 23 person in the car? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And what happened with him?

1 A: There was a stretcher brought from 2 the hospital out to the emergency ramp and it was -- I 3 assisted in steadying the stretcher near the back door to 4 allow the injured party to be loaded onto the stretcher 5 and taken into the hospital. 6 Q: And were other officers assisting 7 with the stretcher as well? 8 A: I don't recall that. There were 9 other people assisting, I -- I just can't say if they 10 were officers or hospital personnel. 11 Q: Hmm hmm. And what did you observe 12 about the person when he was removed from the car? 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: He was still -- his eyes were closed. 17 He appeared to be unresponsive. 18 Q: Did you -- at the time when you first 19 saw him when he was removed from the car did you know who 20 he was? 21 A: No. 22 Q: And then what happened next? 23 A: At approximately 12:12 a.m. I 24 assisted in the arrest of a female person at the front of 25 the hospital.

1 Q: Can you describe your involvement in 2 that arrest for us? 3 A: There was a female office attempting 4 to arrest and take control of this particular female and 5 she was having difficulty gaining control and I assisted 6 in getting her under control. 7 Q: Do you recall any other details about 8 the arrest and what happened? 9 A: I remember the three (3) of us 10 falling over some -- some bushes or something in the -- 11 by the Emergency Department. I know at one (1) point all 12 three (3) of us ended up on the ground and it was at that 13 point that we gained control of her and were able to 14 handcuff her. 15 Q: And was she saying anything, the 16 woman under arrest? 17 A: I -- I don't recall. 18 Q: And were you aware of what she was 19 under arrest for? 20 A: No. 21 Q: Did you know anything about the 22 circumstances giving rise to her arrest? 23 A: No. 24 Q: Then what happened? 25 A: At approximately 12:31 a.m. I was

1 asked by Detective Sergeant Richardson to keep watch on 2 the two (2) patients that were being treated in the 3 emergency rooms. 4 Q: And those two (2) patients were 5 Nicholas Cottrelle? 6 A: Yes. And I guess I need to back up 7 because it was shortly after this -- shortly after the -- 8 the 12:12 a.m. that a second ambulance arrived on the 9 emergency ramp. 10 Q: And were you -- were you there when 11 that ambulance arrived? 12 A: I was. 13 Q: And what can you recall about that? 14 A: I just remember another patient being 15 unloaded from the ambulance and taken into the emergency 16 department of the hospital for treatment. 17 Q: And did anyone say anything at that 18 point about how this individual had been injured? 19 A: I don't recall. 20 Q: Did you have any awareness or 21 understanding of what had brought him to the hospital 22 that evening; the circumstances, I mean? 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

1 A: I don't recall. 2 Q: And I think in your notes you were at 3 the point when you noted that Sergeant Richardson 4 requested that you keep watch of the two (2) patients. 5 So the second patient then was this individual who came 6 in the ambulance? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: And did you become aware of who he 9 was? 10 A: Yes, I did. I learned that he was a 11 Cecil Bernard George. 12 Q: And can you recall any conversation 13 you might have had when you learned his identity or what 14 anyone might have said about him to you? 15 A: I learned sometime later that he had 16 been involved in an altercation with officers in the 17 park. But at that time I didn't know that. 18 Q: And what kind of interactions then 19 did you have with the individuals in the hospital? 20 A: At that point I -- I basically went 21 between the two (2) treatment rooms in the hospital in 22 order to maintain security on the two (2) individuals and 23 that went on for sometime. 24 Q: And did they say anything to you? 25 A: No.

1 Q: If we go to your note at, I guess it 2 would be 12:41 a.m. -- 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: -- and if we could -- you've noted: 5 "'You might as well put me in jail now 6 because I'm going there anyway.' 7 Spoken by Cecil George in treatment 8 room. No prompting from the doctor." 9 Can you recall anything about that? 10 A: That was an utterance that he made 11 that I recorded. 12 Q: So he wasn't speaking to you then, he 13 was just -- 14 A: No. 15 Q: And was that the first thing that you 16 heard him say? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: After he said that did he continue 19 speaking or was that the only thing that he said at that 20 time? 21 A: Again, I was going between two (2) 22 treatment rooms; that's the only thing that I recorded. 23 Q: Okay. 24 A: That's all that I recall. 25 Q: And then what -- what happened next?

1 A: I noted that at 1:16 a.m. Nicholas 2 Cottrelle was taken to the X-ray Department in Room 3. 3 Q: Hmm hmm. Yes? 4 A: And that he returned at 1:27 a.m. 5 And then at -- 6 Q: Yes? 7 A: And then at two o'clock a.m. Roseanne 8 Bressette and Jessie George attended and visited with 9 Nicholas Cottrelle and Cecil Bernard George. 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 A: At 2:10 a.m. the grandparents of 14 Nicholas Cottrelle also attended the hospital and they 15 too visited with Nicholas and with Cecil Bernard George. 16 At 2:29 a.m. I turned the security of 17 Nicholas Cottrelle over to Provincial Constable Caroline 18 Kennedy of the London Detachment. And I maintained 19 security on Cecil Bernard George solely from that point 20 on. 21 Q: Yes? 22 A: At 3:17 a.m. Cecil Bernard George was 23 taken to the intensive care unit and I followed and 24 maintained security. At that point I received 25 instructions from Detective Sergeant Parent that no

1 visitors were to be allowed for Cecil Bernard George. 2 Q: Did Detective Sergeant Parent say 3 anything about why he was to have no visitors? 4 A: No. 5 Q: Please continue. 6 A: I noted that Cecil Bernard George was 7 now from time to time sitting up and mumbling words that 8 I couldn't make out. And at 3:30 a.m. I was joined by 9 Provincial Constable Tina Anderson who was assisting me 10 in security of Cecil Bernard George. 11 And we stayed in the room with Mr. George. 12 And the next note that I have is at 8:15 a.m. were Cecil 13 Bernard George sat up and made a statement. 14 Q: And what was that statement? 15 A: He said: 16 "I know I was arrested. I'm ready for 17 the justice system. Why am I here?" 18 And I replied: 19 "You're here because you need hospital 20 care." 21 And he replied: 22 "I'm all right." 23 And he laid back down. 24 Q: And at that point was that the 25 entirety of your conversation, what you've recorded

1 there? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: Approximately half an hour later at 5 8:45 a.m. Mr. George asked: 6 "So where are they going to take me to 7 charge me?" 8 And I replied: 9 "Probably Sarnia." 10 Q: And at around this time did you 11 observe -- or what did you observe, if anything about 12 Mr. George's condition? 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: He was becoming more talkative. I 17 remember that he started off in the Emergency Department 18 with that one (1) utterance and everything after that was 19 kind of a mumble until he began at 8:15, and he began to 20 speak more and was becoming a little bit more talkative. 21 Q: And in terms of his physical 22 conditions did you notice anything? 23 A: I noticed that he had a swollen lip, 24 a fat lip. 25 Q: And then returning to 8:54 Mr. George

1 made another comment to you? 2 A: Yes he did, he asked: 3 "So what's the charge again?" 4 And I replied: 5 "Attempted murder." 6 And at that point because he was becoming 7 more talkative and asking about the charge I read him his 8 rights to counsel again. And he said that he understood 9 and replied by saying: 10 "Yeah." 11 And said he did not wish to call a lawyer 12 at that time. 13 At 8:58 a.m. Dr. Marr came into the room 14 to examine Mr. George. This was the same doctor that had 15 treated him in the Emergency Department. 16 She indicated that further X-rays would be 17 taken and that she would return in the afternoon. And 18 she indicated that if the X-rays were okay and her 19 afternoon examination was okay then she would release Mr. 20 George from the hospital. 21 At 9:05 a.m. I cautioned Mr. George 22 regarding statements and read the supplementary caution 23 to him as well. And he replied: 24 "I wish not to make a statement, I just 25 want to get out here and into the

1 courtroom." 2 And then at 9:14 a.m. Special 3 Investigations Unit investigators Jim Kennedy and Don 4 Andrews attended to speak with Mr. George. At that time 5 we left the hospital room and went into the adjoining 6 hall while they conducted their interview of Mr. George. 7 They departed from there. "They", meaning 8 the SIU investigators, departed from there at 9:40 a.m. 9 At 9:45 a.m. Mr. George was taken to X-ray 10 and I remained with him on the way there and assisted in 11 wheeling the -- the stretcher down the hall. At that 12 time I noted also that reporters were following the -- 13 the stretcher through the hallway of the hospital and 14 taking photos. 15 At 10:14 a.m. I returned to the Intensive 16 Care Unit with Mr. George and I noted that they had 17 completed the ultrasound but the X-ray Department was too 18 busy for them to complete all of the X-rays. And so at 19 11:40 a.m. Mr. George returned to the X-ray Department 20 for X-rays to be completed and at 12:20 p.m. he was back 21 in the Intensive Care Unit. And at that point the neck 22 brace had been removed from Mr. George. 23 At 12:49 p.m. Mr. George uttered: 24 "If someone would have asked me to put 25 my stick down last night I would have.

1 No one asked me to put it down so I 2 didn't." 3 Q: When Mr. George made that statement 4 what did it mean to you or what did you understand him to 5 be saying? 6 A: I don't know. 7 Q: And again was this an isolated 8 comment? Was this the only thing that he said at that 9 point in time? 10 A: It was. I don't recall anything 11 prior to it or after. 12 At 12:57 p.m. I attempted to contact 13 Russell Raikes, a lawyer for Mr. George. And at 12:59 14 Mr. George was allowed a private conversation with Mr. 15 Raikes and that conversation ended at 1:05 p.m. 16 And myself and Provincial Constable 17 Anderson waited outside of the SI -- the Intensive Care 18 Unit while Mr. George was on the phone to his lawyer. 19 And it was Nursing Supervisor Terry Bouchard (phonetic) 20 that advised -- advised me when Mr. George was off the 21 phone so that I could resume my visual security. 22 At 1:54 p.m. I was relieved of the 23 security of Mr. George by Provincial Constable Debbie 24 Gleason. 25 And at 3:00 p.m. I left the hospital with

1 Provincial Constable Murphy and we made our way back to 2 Petrolia. 3 Q: Can you recall after you were 4 relieved at 1:54 p.m. what you were doing until you left 5 the hospital? 6 A: I don't recall. 7 Q: And then you finished your shift at 8 4:30 p.m.? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And I understand then that you were 11 back on duty just after 9:30 p.m. on September 7th? 12 A: Yes, that's correct. 13 Q: And at that time you were on duty at 14 the Petrolia Detachment? 15 A: Yes. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: In your notes on page 39, at 22:15 -- 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: -- and I believe we're still on 22 September 7th, I think it says "briefing"; is that 23 correct? 24 A: That is correct. 25 Q: And can you recall what this briefing

1 was in relation to? 2 A: No, I don't recall. 3 Q: On your overnight shift starting the 4 evening of September 7th did you have any duties in the 5 Ipperwash area or can you... 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 A: I don't recall. 10 Q: Next, Sergeant Boon, if you could 11 turn to Tab 6 of the binder in front of you. We have 12 copies of some additional notes from pages 39, 40, 41 and 13 I assume it's 42, though the page is covered up, from an 14 officer's notebook. 15 Are these your notes of September 9th and 16 12th, 1995? 17 A: They are. 18 Q: I would ask that these notes be 19 marked the next exhibit please? 20 THE REGISTRAR: P-1634, Your Honour. 21 22 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1634: Handwritten notebook entries 23 of David Boon, September 09 24 and 12, 1995. 25

1 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 2 Q: And if you could read for us, I 3 guess, just the first entry for September 9th beginning 4 at the bottom of your page 39? 5 A: Yes. I was requested by Provincial 6 Constable Chris Martin to attend the Forrest Detachment 7 for a debriefing and to complete my statement. 8 Q: What happened at the debriefing that 9 you refer to? 10 A: I don't recall. 11 Q: Was it in relation to the events of 12 the evening of September 6th? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Can you recall who was there? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Can you recall how many officers were 17 there? 18 A: Several. 19 Q: Also you note, "complete statement". 20 If you could turn to Tab 11 of the binder in front of 21 you, Sergeant Boon. This is Inquiry Document 1000267. 22 It's the statement of D. M. Boon and there's a typed 23 version for about -- there are seven (7) typed pages 24 followed by seven (7) handwritten pages. 25 A: Yes.

1 Q: Are the handwritten pages in your 2 handwriting Sergeant Boon? 3 A: Yes they are. 4 Q: Can you recall whether this is the 5 statement that you were working on September 9th? 6 A: Yes I believe it is. 7 Q: I would ask that this statement be 8 marked as the next Exhibit please? 9 THE REGISTRAR: P-1635 Your Honour. 10 11 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1635: Document Number 1000267. 12 Typed and written statement 13 of P/C David Boon (undated). 14 15 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 16 Q: Turning back to Tab 6, Sergeant Boon 17 which were your notes from September 9th and 12th, if you 18 turn to the bottom of page 40 of your notebook which 19 deals with September 12th. 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: You've noted first, I believe, 22 "Ipperwash Detail"; is that correct? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And then at 11:50 I believe that it 25 says:

1 "Forest Community Centre for briefing 2 and instruction on following four (4) 3 shifts". 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: Can you recall anything about the 6 briefing referred to or the instructions? 7 A: No, I don't recall the instructions. 8 Q: What else of relevance, if anything, 9 happened or were you involved with on -- during that 10 shift on September 12th or the following ones in the 11 Ipperwash area? 12 13 (BRIEF PAUSE) 14 15 A: I know that at one (1) point I was 16 partnered up with a Megan Mortiarty, from Prescott 17 Detachment. She was a Provincial Constable from there. 18 And we conducted a general patrol in the Ipperwash area; 19 that was on the evening of the 12th of September. 20 By 1:20 in the morning I had been 21 dispatched to a fatal motor vehicle collision which 22 basically took me again out of -- out of the area into a 23 completely separate investigation. 24 Q: Yes. And did you have any further 25 involvement in the Ipperwash area relevant to the events

1 of September 6th, 1995 that you can recall? 2 A: No. 3 Q: Next if you could turn to Tab 9 of 4 the binder in front of you please. This is Inquiry 5 document 1004641 and it appears to be a transcript of an 6 interview of you by two (2) SIU investigators, held on 7 February 19th, 1998. 8 And if you turn to the final page it 9 appears that you signed this version of the transcript; 10 is that correct? 11 A: That is correct. 12 Q: And were the answers that you gave in 13 this interview true and accurate at the time you gave 14 them? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And you adopt them as true and 17 accurate today? 18 A: I do. 19 Q: I would ask that this transcript be 20 marked as the next Exhibit, please. 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1636 Your Honour. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1636: Document Number 1004641. 24 Statement of P/C David Boon 25 re. Interview with SIU

1 investigators Bob Muir and 2 Allan Hunter, February 19, 3 1998. 4 5 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 6 Q: And if you could turn then to Tab 10 7 of the binder in front of you please. This is Inquiry 8 document Number 5000081 and this appears to be a 9 transcript of an interview of you by Detective Mark 10 Armstrong on March 11th, 2003. 11 Do you recall this interview? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And were the answers that you gave in 14 the interview true and accurate? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And you adopt them as true and 17 accurate today? 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 A: On page 815 of that document -- 22 Q: Yes? 23 A: -- where the officer asks me: 24 "At some point that night did you hear 25 gunfire come -- coming from the area of

1 the beach?" 2 Q: Yes? 3 A: And I replied: 4 "I did." 5 And I can't honestly say today that that's 6 correct. That's the only issue I have with this 7 particular statement. 8 Q: And is that because you did not hear 9 gunfire or you do not now recall hearing gunfire? 10 A: The second is true. I do not now 11 recall having heard gunfire. 12 Q: Okay. Thank you. So but with the 13 exception of that clarification the rest of your answers 14 you now adopt as true and accurate? 15 A: Yes, I do. 16 Q: Thank you. Moving now, Sergeant 17 Boon, to a separate area. It's not in the binder -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We didn't -- 19 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Sorry, I would ask 20 that that document be marked as the next exhibit, please? 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1637, Your Honour. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1637: Document Number 5000081. 24 Interview of David Boon by 25 Detective Armstrong, March

1 11, 2003. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 4 Q: Okay. Did you purchase or see any T- 5 shirts, mugs, pins, or other items which were affiliated 6 in any way with the Ipperwash policing operation or Ken 7 Deane's involvement therein? 8 A: No, I didn't. 9 Q: I understand that you have a Ken 10 Deane Defence Fund pin; is that correct? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And can you tell us the circumstances 13 under which you acquired that pin? 14 A: Yes, it was my understanding that 15 this was a -- a fundraising effort to assist in Ken 16 Deane's appeal of his conviction. 17 Q: Do you recall when you purchased or 18 received the pin? 19 A: No. 20 Q: Did -- well, I should have said, did 21 you purchase the pin? 22 A: I did. 23 Q: Do you recall who you purchased it 24 from? 25 A: No.

1 Q: I understand also that you have an "I 2 Support Ken Deane" T-shirt? 3 A: I do. 4 Q: And I would ask the same question, if 5 you could tell us the circumstances under which you 6 acquired that T-shirt. 7 A: Again it was under identical 8 circumstances to the pin; it was a fundraising effort to 9 assist Ken Deane in his appeal. 10 Q: Did you acquire it at the same time 11 as the pin? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And can you describe for us the T- 14 shirt? 15 A: The back of the T-shirt says, "I 16 Support Ken Deane." The front left breast area is his 17 badge number within the outline of a badge. On the left 18 shoulder is the TRU Team emblem and on the right is the 19 Guy Fawkes emblem. 20 Q: Leaving aside those items did you 21 ever see any other items or objects or T-shirts 22 whatsoever, affiliated with the Ipperwash policing 23 operation or Project Maple? 24 A: No. 25 Q: Did you participate or know that

1 there was an investigation into T-shirts and mugs in 1996 2 and early 1997? 3 A: I was aware. 4 Q: You were aware of the investigation 5 at the time? 6 A: I knew that there was an 7 investigation. 8 Q: Did you participate in it? 9 A: No. 10 Q: In September, going back, were you 11 ever at Pinery Park? 12 A: Was I ever at Pinery Park? 13 Q: Staying at Pinery Park? 14 A: No. 15 Q: No. Even given that, just to cover 16 it off, did you see whether at Pinery Park or elsewhere 17 ever a beer can with a feather or feathers in it and OPP 18 tape wrapped around it? 19 A: No. 20 Q: Did you see a bullseye with an arrow 21 affixed to the side of an OPP cruiser? 22 A: No. 23 Q: Did you on September 4th, 5th -- 24 well, I guess not, or 6th, work with Constable Whitehead 25 and Dyke?

1 A: No. 2 Q: Sergeant Boon, unless there's 3 anything else that you wish to add, those are my 4 questions for you this morning? 5 A: Okay. I have nothing further. 6 Q: Thank you. I'd like to thank you very 7 much for attending and giving your evidence. My Friends 8 may have some questions for you so we'll canvass them 9 now. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Can we 11 canvass the parties please? 12 Ms. Esmonde, how long might you be? 13 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Approximately twenty 14 (20) minutes. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Twenty (20) 16 minutes. 17 And Mr. Scullion...? 18 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: Fifteen (15) to 19 twenty (20) minutes. 20 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Fifteen (15) to 21 twenty (20) minutes for Mr. Scullion. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 23 George...? 24 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: Five (5) to ten 25 (10) minutes.

1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. 2 Roy...? 3 MR. JULIAN ROY: Ten (10) minutes 4 depending on what counsel have to say. 5 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 6 I think we could take a morning break now and start the 7 cross-examination right after. Thank you. 8 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 9 for fifteen (15) minutes. 10 11 --- Upon recessing at 10:10 a.m. 12 --- Upon resuming at 10:30 a.m. 13 14 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 15 resumed. Please be seated. 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 17 Ferrier...? 18 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Commissioner, just 19 before we start the cross-examination, there are a couple 20 of additional questions I have for Sergeant Boon. 21 22 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 23 Q: I asked you earlier some questions 24 about a T-shirt that you have and we referred to it as an 25 "I support Ken Deane" T-shirt.

1 Did you bring that T-shirt with you here 2 today? 3 A: I was asked to bring it today and I 4 did so, yes. 5 Q: And I was wondering if you could show 6 us the T-shirt, please. You already described it for us, 7 but if you could just hold it up. 8 A: That's the front of the T-shirt. 9 10 (BRIEF PAUSE) 11 12 A: The back. 13 Q: And just with respect to -- oh, on 14 the -- 15 A: The left sleeve has the TRU team 16 emblem on it. And the others refer to the Guy Fawkes 17 emblem. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You need to 22 speak into the microphone. 23 THE WITNESS: Yes, the other sleeve -- 24 this is referred to as the Guy Fawkes emblem. 25

1 CONTINUED BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 2 Q: And what does the Guy Fawkes emblem 3 signify? 4 A: I'm not sure. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: Not sure at all. 7 Q: And Commissioner, I would ask that we 8 reserve the next Exhibit number for photographs of the T- 9 shirt. 10 THE REGISTRAR: P-1638 Your Honour. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1638 will be 12 reserved. Thank you. 13 14 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1638: 2-colour photographs of " I 15 Support Ken Deane" T-shirt 16 and CD copy of photos 17 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 19 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Those are my 20 questions. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 22 very much, Ms. Ferrier. 23 Ms. Esmonde...? 24 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Good morning, 25 Sergeant.

1 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 2 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Good morning, Mr. 3 Commissioner. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 5 morning. 6 7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 8 Q: My name is Jackie Esmonde and I'm 9 going to be asking you some questions on behalf of the 10 Aazhoodena and George Family Group. 11 A: Okay. 12 Q: Now, you told us it was Sergeant 13 Slack who directed you to arrest Nicholas Cottrelle? 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: That's right. And you did so; you 16 arrested him for mischief? 17 A: I did. 18 Q: And Sergeant Slack had directed you 19 to arrest him for the offence of mischief? 20 A: That's right. 21 Q: And what type of mischief did you 22 arrest him for? 23 A: I don't know that today. 24 Q: You not -- you don't know today if it 25 was mischief to property or mischief interfere with the

1 lawful enjoyment of property? 2 A: I don't recall that, no. 3 Q: And what actions did -- was Nicholas 4 Cottrelle alleged to have done that constituted the 5 offence of mischief? 6 A: And again today, ten (10) plus years 7 after the fact, I don't recall the specific conversation 8 that I had with Sergeant Slack. But, I do know that as a 9 result of that I was satisfied that there were grounds 10 for the arrest of Nicholas Cottrelle for mischief. 11 Q: You were satisfied, based solely on 12 the conversation that you had with Sergeant Slack? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: It wasn't based on your own 15 observations of any activity carried out by Nicholas 16 Cottrelle? 17 A: That's true. 18 Q: And you are aware that as an 19 arresting officer you need to have reasonable and 20 probable grounds for executing an arrest even if it's at 21 the direction of another officer? 22 A: I would agree. 23 Q: And there's nothing in your notes 24 that can refresh your memory today as to what grounds 25 there were for the arrest of Nicholas Cottrelle?

1 A: And again I don't recall the specific 2 conversation. I don't -- I don't recall the contents of 3 the conversation that I had with Sergeant Slack at that 4 time. 5 Q: I understand that but my question was 6 that there's -- there's nothing in your notes that can 7 help you to refresh your memory about what grounds if any 8 were provided to you from Sergeant Slack. 9 A: Not the specifics of the 10 conversation, no. 11 Q: Well, there's nothing in your notes 12 about the grounds that you relied upon to execute the 13 arrest, correct? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Now we heard from Sergeant Slack 16 yesterday and he told us that looking back now there was 17 probably a better way to proceed instead of issuing 18 instructions to arrest Nicholas Cottrelle. And he 19 suggested that it would have been better to detain him 20 using investigative detention because that would have 21 accomplished the same goals. 22 Now, did -- were you aware of that? Did 23 you watch or read his testimony from yesterday? 24 A: No, I'm not aware of his evidence. 25 Q: Now, given that Sergeant Slack

1 provided that testimony and given your lack of memory or 2 note on the grounds of arrest, would you accept that in 3 fact looking back and reflecting on it that Sergeant 4 Slack did not give you any grounds on which to make the 5 arrest and you simply followed his orders to execute the 6 arrest? 7 A: No, I would say that at that time I 8 was satisfied, at that time, that reasonable probable 9 grounds existed for the offence of mischief. 10 Q: Even though it appears that Sergeant 11 Slack himself does not conclude today that there were 12 reasonable and probable grounds for that arrest? 13 A: I can't comment on his evidence. 14 Q: Now, you told us already that you 15 make notes in order to refresh your memory. 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: And is it not the case that you would 18 in the normal course record the grounds on which you 19 executed an arrest so that you could refresh your memory 20 on that very important point at a later date? 21 A: I certainly try to record all of the 22 necessary things in my notebook to refresh my memory, and 23 in this particular case it isn't there. I just know that 24 at the time, if I made the arrest, I was satisfied that I 25 had grounds to do so.

1 Q: Would you agree with me that there 2 was no urgency to executing that arrest? 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 A: I don't know that I can agree with 7 that because I -- without knowing who he is or the 8 circumstances I'm not sure that I can answer that or 9 agree to that or agree to that. 10 Q: Okay, well you knew his name? 11 A: Well, I learned that in the -- in the 12 ambulance. 13 Q: That's right, before you executed the 14 arrest? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: You knew his name? You knew his date 17 of birth? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: You knew where he lived? He lived at 20 Stoney Point? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: You were taking him to the hospital 23 so he wasn't fleeing anywhere, right? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: And there was time then to enure that

1 an investigation was carried out to ensure that there 2 were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: So based on those factors would you 5 agree with me that there was no urgency to execute any 6 arrest in the ambulance? 7 A: I guess based on the information that 8 I had at the time I felt the arrest was necessary. 9 Q: But you can't assist us today with 10 what that information was? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: Now, you assisted in a second arrest 13 that evening. And do you know today that the female you 14 arrested was Carolyn George (phonetic)? You -- 15 A: No, I did not know that. 16 Q: You never learned the name of the 17 female you arrested? 18 A: If I did I don't remember. 19 MS. KAREN JONES: Mr. Commissioner, just 20 to be clear, this officer's evidence was not that he 21 arrested the female at the hospital. His evidence was 22 that he assisted -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Assisted. 24 MS. KAREN JONES: -- another officer who 25 was arresting the female and I think the questioning

1 should be fair and accurate. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 3 I think that's -- 4 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Yeah, I understand 5 the objection. Do you want me to repeat the question 6 with that clarification? 7 8 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: 9 Q: You've never learned the identity of 10 the female that you assisted in arresting? 11 A: That's correct. I didn't. 12 Q: It's not in your notes. All it says 13 is that you assisted with the arrest of a female, 14 correct? 15 A: Correct. 16 Q: And you've told us that you didn't 17 know anything about the circumstances giving rise to her 18 arrest? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: Or the -- what she was being arrested 21 for? 22 A: I did not know that at the time. 23 Q: Can I ask you to turn to Tab 10 in 24 your materials. This is the statement that you provided 25 as part of the Coroner's investigation on the 11th March,

1 2003 which has been marked as P-1637, Inquiry Document 2 5000081. 3 Now, page 11 -- well, let's start actually 4 on page 10 at the bottom. This is not a portion of the 5 interview that you provided that you have corrected. 6 This is a portion that you've accepted as being true and 7 accurate? 8 A: That's correct. 9 Q: And you'll see the question near the 10 bottom of the page from Armstrong: 11 "What were you arresting her for? 12 BOON: Attempted murder." 13 A: Right. 14 Q: Then: 15 "ARMSTRONG: Based on what? 16 BOON: Based on being told by a 17 Detective Sergeant there were grounds 18 for that offence." 19 Now, this interview was given about three 20 (3) years ago -- 21 A: Okay. 22 Q: -- correct? So it was closer to the 23 events than we are today? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And your memory would have been

1 better at that time than it is today? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And does this then assist in 4 refreshing your memory that you were arresting her for 5 attempted murder based on grounds provided by a Detective 6 Sergeant? 7 A: Well again, I don't recall that 8 conversation with the Detective Sergeant. I do recall 9 assisting in the arrest and today I don't remember what 10 the arrest was for. 11 Q: So -- and the Detective Sergeant 12 would be Detective Sergeant Richardson? 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: I know that I spoke to two (2) 17 Detective Sergeants that evening. One (1) was Trevor 18 Richardson and one (1) was Randy Parent. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 A: I can't be sure. 23 Q: Well, you told us about a -- you had 24 a conversation before -- I believe it was before the car 25 showed up at the hospital; is that right?

1 A: I did speak with officers when I 2 arrived at the hospital, yes. 3 Q: Okay. And that included Detective 4 Sergeant Richardson? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: And I believe it's Detective 7 Constable Dew? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And was Detective Sergeant Parent 10 there as well? 11 A: I can't be sure. I know that at some 12 point in the evening I spoke to Detective Sergeant Parent 13 as well. 14 Q: Okay, but turning back your -- your - 15 - your mind to this specific conversation, I know you 16 don't remember very much about it, but based on the 17 interview you provided to the Coroner -- 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: -- and your memory of having a 20 conversation can we conclude that you were given this 21 information from Detective Sergeant Richardson before the 22 car arrived at the hospital; is that fair? 23 A: I guess what I'm saying is I don't 24 recall that today. I don't remember that conversation 25 with Detective Sergeant Richardson if that was, in fact,

1 the Detective Sergeant that I spoke to. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: Okay. And what -- what were the 6 grounds for the arrest for attempted murder? 7 A: I don't know. My recollection is 8 that I was assisting a female officer in the arrest of 9 who you now tell me was Carolyn George. 10 Q: Carolyn George is the female occupant 11 of the vehicle who was arrested that evening -- 12 A: Okay. 13 Q: -- so it must have been Carolyn 14 George. I think we can safely conclude that. 15 But now as I had indicated to -- as you 16 had agreed earlier, there's nothing in your notes that 17 provides either the name of the female that you assisted 18 in arresting or the grounds or charge, correct? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: And that's in stark contrast, is it 21 not to the detailed notes that follow regarding the 22 security detail that you provided for Nicholas Cottrelle 23 and Cecil Bernard George? 24 A: I would agree there's more detail in 25 my security detail, yes.

1 Q: Yeah, would you agree with me that 2 your note regarding the arrest of the Caroline George are 3 inadequate? 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 A: No I wouldn't agree with that. 8 Q: Well, looking back now, wouldn't you 9 agree that it would be better if you had included the 10 name of the person that you arrested? 11 A: I can tell you that there was such 12 chaos there at the time, the name at that particular 13 point in time was not important to me. I was assisting 14 an officer in securing that person and ensuring everyone 15 else's safety at that Hospital area, at the emergency 16 ramp. 17 Q: I understand at the time that you 18 were assisting in the arrest, your evidence is that it 19 wasn't important to you to know her name. But, certainly 20 when you were making your notes afterwards, when you had 21 time to find out the name of the person you had assisted 22 in arresting, don't you think that would be important 23 information that you should include in your notes? 24 A: Well, I would suggest that it was 25 very difficult at that time, under those circumstances

1 because one (1) duty lead to another and once I had an 2 opportunity to sit down and do my security detail of 3 Cecil Bernard George I had time then to sit down and 4 record and at that time, I didn't know her name. I had 5 simply assisted in the arrest. 6 Q: Well, so is it -- so your evidence is 7 then that you don't think it's important to include the 8 name of persons that you assist in arresting in your 9 notes? 10 A: That's not my evidence. My evidence 11 is that it was very difficult at the time to have all of 12 those particulars because I was moving from one (1) duty 13 to another. 14 Q: Could you not have asked someone for 15 the name of the person you assisted in arresting? 16 A: Well, again I started that security 17 detail on my own moving from treatment room to treatment 18 room and then from place to place. So there was other 19 people were involved in other duties. It's not as simple 20 as you make it sound. 21 Q: All right. But you -- and you never 22 subsequently followed up to find out the name of the 23 person you assisted in arresting so that you could 24 include that in your notes? 25 A: That's true I didn't know the name.

1 Q: And wouldn't that have been 2 important, certainly if -- if the lawfulness of the 3 arrest became an issue at a later time? 4 A: If I had been the arresting officer, 5 it would have been more important. The fact that I 6 assisted in arresting a particular individual is what I 7 felt was important at the time. 8 Q: Were you aware that the woman you 9 assisted in arresting was Dudley George's sister? 10 A: No. 11 Q: You weren't aware at the time; are 12 you aware now? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Yes? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And when did you learn that? 17 A: I don't recall. 18 Q: Was it in September of 1995? 19 A: I don't remember when I learned that. 20 Q: Was it in 1995? 21 A: I don't remember when I learned that. 22 Q: I'm trying to narrow down -- 23 A: And I can't narrow it down for you. 24 Q: -- an approximate time period in 25 which you may have learned that information.

1 A: And I can't narrow it down for you. 2 I don't know. 3 Q: And you're aware today then that one 4 (1) of the other men who was arrested -- one (1) of the 5 other persons who was arrested was Dudley George's 6 brother? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 A: I learned that at some point, yes. 11 Q: You're aware that the woman you 12 assisted in arresting was not charged with any offence, 13 subsequently? 14 A: No I was not aware of that. 15 Q: Have any of your superiors in the OPP 16 ever talked to you about the propriety of the arrest of 17 either Nicholas Cottrelle or Carolyn George? 18 A: No. 19 Q: I take it then you've never been 20 disciplined for your participation in those arrests? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: Now, you were asked just a few 23 moments ago about whether you had ever, I believe seen 24 any T-shirts, mugs, pins, paraphernalia associated with 25 Ken Deane and your initial answer, was "no".

1 Do you remember that? 2 A: I'm not sure that's the question. 3 MS. KAREN JONES: Yeah. Mr. 4 Commissioner, that wasn't the question that he was asked. 5 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Okay. What was the 6 question he was asked? 7 MS. KAREN JONES: Well, it was in 8 relation to Ipperwash, Mr. Commissioner. 9 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: He was also asked if 10 he had seen any paraphernalia relating to Ken Deane. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I think 12 he was. I don't recall the exact question but... 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Commissioner, I did 17 ask the Witness whether he'd seen para -- objects in 18 relation to Ipperwash or in relation to Ken Deane. 19 Based on the Witness' answer and subsequent questions 20 that I asked him I believe he may have misunderstood the 21 question when I asked it, but I did ask it. 22 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Well, that's what 23 I'm following up on. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. JACKIE ESMONDE:

1 Q: You -- you recall your initial answer 2 was no? 3 A: My answer was no to seeing any 4 paraphernalia, mugs, T-shirts, in relation to Ipperwash. 5 Q: Okay. 6 A: I was quite candid on my answer with 7 regards to Ken Deane paraphernalia. 8 Q: Well, you were asked subsequently 9 specific questions about a particular pin and a 10 particular T-shirt but when you were initially asked 11 about whether you had seen objects related to Ken Deane 12 you had said no. 13 A: My answer was in relation to 14 questions regarding Ipperwash memorabilia; that was what 15 I was answering. 16 Q: Okay. So you weren't answering the 17 second part of the question? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: I just wish to be clear given that 20 answer, that I want to make sure the record is very clear 21 about what you've seen and what you haven't seen. 22 Have you seen a T-shirt with the TRU 23 symbol and an anvil with "ERT" on it with a broken arrow 24 -- broken arrow in between? 25 A: Absolutely not.

1 Q: Have you seen a T-shirt with the OPP 2 insignia and a feather laying on its side beneath it? 3 A: Absolutely not. 4 Q: Have you seen a mug with the words, 5 "Team Ipperwash" either with an arrow through the OPP 6 insignia or without? 7 A: Absolutely not. 8 Q: Now, you've told us about having a 9 pin with Ken Deane's badge number on it? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And you still have that pin? 12 A: I believe I do. I did try and locate 13 it this morning and I -- I couldn't find it. 14 Q: I -- You do -- okay. You couldn't 15 find it when you looked for it this morning? 16 A: That's right. 17 Q: Okay. And you've worn that pin? 18 A: It was on a jacket, yes. 19 Q: On a jacket that you wore as part of 20 your uniform? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Have you ever worn it as part of your 23 uniform? 24 A: No. 25 Q: Have you seen other members of the

1 OPP wearing the pin as part of their uniform or on their 2 uniform? 3 A: I don't recall ever having seen it on 4 a uniform. 5 Q: Do you -- have you ever seen a memo 6 from the OPP advising members not to wear the pin on 7 their uniform? 8 A: I don't recall having seen such a 9 memo. 10 Q: Thank you, Sergeant. Thank you, Mr. 11 Commissioner. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 13 Ms. Esmonde. 14 Mr. Scullion...? 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 19 Q: Good morning, Sergeant Boon. 20 A: Good morning. 21 Q: My name's Kevin Scullion, I'm one (1) 22 of the counsel for the Residents of Aazhoodena. 23 And if I could ask you to turn to Tab 2 of 24 your books of documents, your notes, which has been 25 marked as P-1633.

1 Do you have that before you -- 2 A: I do. 3 Q: -- the second page? And you have the 4 original there as well; maybe that will help. 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: About halfway down the page there's 7 an indication about moving your roadblock or a roadblock 8 is requested. 9 Do you see that wording; "being advised by 10 P/C Griffiths"? 11 A: Yes, is this -- is this under the 12 time of 9:20 p.m.? 13 Q: It is. 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: I take it your instructions at that 16 point in time were to change from a checkpoint to an 17 actual roadblock and to prevent vehicles from going north 18 on Army Camp Road. 19 Is that a fair reading of your note? 20 A: That was the wording that was used 21 was "roadblock." 22 Q: Right and then that was your task? 23 A: And that was the purpose, yes. 24 Q: Okay. And do I take it from the 25 bottom notation and from your evidence this morning that

1 you weren't all that successful in being a roadblock 2 although you tried to be? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: And vehicles did pass by you, they 5 simply ignored some of your instructions not to go there 6 or to go a different route; is that fair? 7 A: Yes, sir. 8 Q: Can you help us with how many 9 vehicles passed by your roadblock at the Army Camp Road 10 and Number 21 from 9:50 onwards, a general idea? 11 A: I -- I can -- I can only say there 12 were a number. 13 Q: All right. More than one (1), less 14 than ten (10); is that a fair enough range? 15 A: I think I could agree that it wasn't 16 a -- a large number of vehicles. 17 Q: Okay. And if a vehicle passed by you 18 and went north on Army Camp you simply relayed that 19 message to the other roadblock or checkpoint or to the 20 TOC? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: Okay. Now, you testified at one (1) 23 point in your examination-in-chief, when asked a question 24 about the incident with the ambulance and the vehicle at 25 the corner of Highway 21 and Army Camp Road, you were

1 asked about seeing long guns or guns being drawn on the 2 people in the car. 3 And your response was: 4 "I remember seeing long guns in the 5 hands of the ERT members." 6 Do you recall giving that answer? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Okay. Yesterday, Sergeant Slack was 9 asked a similar question and his response was that the 10 guns were in a ready position. Do I take it that both 11 your answer and the ready position are that the guns are 12 drawn on those in the vehicle? 13 A: If you -- if you're asking me if -- 14 if the firearms were specifically pointed at people in 15 the vehicle, I -- I can't say that. 16 Q: Right. But I take it that you would 17 then agree that the were pointed towards the vehicle but 18 not necessarily at the people in the vehicle? 19 A: I'm not sure I can agree with that 20 either, sir. I -- I remember seeing long guns in the 21 hands of the ERT members but I don't specifically 22 remember them being pointed directly at the vehicle or -- 23 or at a person. 24 Q: They were pointed somewhere? Is that 25 what the "ready position" means?

1 A: Well, the ready position to me means 2 the normal carry position as opposed to them being 3 pointed. 4 Q: Okay. And what do you recall when 5 you saw those long guns? Were they in the position that 6 you've just shown me? Were they -- 7 A: This is -- 8 Q: -- the rifle is across the chest and 9 pointed to the sky or pointed at something? 10 A: I don't remember them specifically 11 pointed at any -- anything. So, the ready position makes 12 sense to me carried this way with the -- with the muzzle 13 to the air. 14 Q: That's what you recall? 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Or do you recall? 19 A: I recall seeing long guns in the 20 hands of the ERT members. Beyond that -- 21 Q: Okay. All right, you can't be any 22 clearer than that? 23 A: No. 24 Q: That's fine. With respect to the 25 ambulance ride, my concern is a little bit different as

1 Nick Cottrelle is one of our clients. And we've heard 2 from Sergeant Slack that he gave you -- or he directed 3 you to arrest Mr. Cottrelle for mischief and he gave you 4 those instructions at one (1) point on the road before 5 you got into the ambulance? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: That's consistent with your 8 recollection? 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: All right. You got on the ambulance 11 with the ambulance attendant and Mr. Cottrelle and then 12 proceeded to travel to the Strathroy Hospital -- 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: -- correct? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: There were questions asked of Mr. 17 Cottrelle by the ambulance attendant about his name, his 18 date of birth and what happened in order that the 19 ambulance attendant could take care of whatever injuries 20 that he had; is that consistent with your memory of what 21 happened? 22 A: I don't remember questions being put 23 to him regarding what had happened. I remember questions 24 about his name, his address, his date of birth, who his 25 family doctor was, but I don't remember them specifically

1 questioning him regarding what had happened. 2 Q: With -- I take it within a few 3 seconds, a minute or two (2), you were aware that -- of 4 his name and that he was a young offender, if he was 5 charged with a -- an offence, correct? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: Why did it take a number of minutes 8 in your notes, and I can refer them to you if you -- if 9 that helps, about six (6) or seven (7) minutes for you to 10 advise him that he was being placed under arrest? 11 A: The ambulance attendants were 12 attending to him and asking him questions, so I allowed 13 them to complete their assessment if you will. And it 14 was at that time that I -- that I made the arrest, gave 15 him his rights to counsel, cautioned him and so on. 16 Q: Right. Do you recall whether or not, 17 you ever advised the ambulance attendants that you were 18 going to be placing Mr. Cottrelle under arrest on that 19 ambulance ride? 20 A: I don't recall if I said anything to 21 them about it. 22 Q: You did testify this morning with 23 certain words regarding Mr. Cottrelle's demeanor in the 24 ambulance. And I had written down that you said he was, 25 "agitated, restless and his answers were short and loud".

1 Do you remember giving that evidence? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Okay. I don't find any of those 4 notes or any of those words in your notes of the 5 ambulance ride. They're not in there, okay? 6 And I can advise you that we've heard 7 evidence from the ambulance attendants that Mr. Cottrelle 8 was polite and cooperative and answered their questions 9 in a calm manner. 10 A: Okay. 11 Q: Does that help you at all in 12 recalling, whether or not, his general demeanor was calm 13 with respect to the questions being asked of him by the 14 ambulance attendants and that the only point where he 15 became a little agitated was when you advised him he 16 could call his lawyer in the ambulance? 17 A: That's not my -- that's not my 18 recollection. 19 Q: Let me turn you to the hospital. 20 When you're guarding over Mr. Cottrelle and Mr. George, 21 are you inside their rooms or outside their rooms? 22 A: I'm at the doorway to the -- to the 23 rooms. 24 Q: And is that inside or is it outside, 25 or is the door open to their rooms?

1 A: The doors are open. 2 Q: All right. Were you there when 3 Officers took Nick Cottrelle's effects, his clothes and 4 otherwise? 5 A: I don't recall. 6 Q: All right. Are you -- do you recall 7 at any point in time, Mr. Cottrelle asking to speak with 8 his lawyer, Ron George? 9 A: No. 10 Q: Were you involved in any way in 11 obtaining a statement from Mr. Cottrelle at the hospital? 12 A: No. 13 Q: Were you involved in any way in 14 efforts to test Mr. Cottrelle's hands for gunshot 15 residue? 16 A: No. 17 Q: None of that took place while you 18 were securing his room? 19 A: I don't recall any of that. 20 Q: Does that mean that it didn't happen 21 under your watch or that you simply don't recall any of 22 that occurring under your watch? 23 A: The second is true, sir. I don't 24 recall any of that occurring while I was there. 25 Q: In your notes you have a comment that

1 there was a direction or instruction received from one 2 (1) of your superiors that Cecil Bernard George would 3 have no visitors at some point in time; do you recall 4 that? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: All right. Do you know the reason 7 why he wasn't entitled to have any visitors? 8 A: No. 9 Q: Did it have anything to do with him 10 having an opportunity to discuss what occurred that 11 evening with other people? 12 A: I don't know the answer to that, sir 13 because I was not told why he couldn't have visitors, 14 just that he couldn't have visitors. 15 Q: You simply received the direction, he 16 can't have visitors, and you followed those orders. 17 A: I did. 18 Q: Those are all my questions, Mr. 19 Commissioner. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 21 Mr. Scullion. 22 Mr. George...? 23 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: Good morning, Mr. 24 Commissioner. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good

1 morning. 2 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: 4 Q: Good morning Sergeant Boon. 5 A: Good morning. 6 Q: My name is Jonathan George and I 7 represent the Kettle and Stoney Point First Nation and 8 I'm appearing also today for the Chiefs of Ontario. 9 There are just a few questions I have for 10 you and they're related solely to your notes, pages 52 to 11 55. So that's where I'll be directing you to. 12 And those are your notes in relation to 13 September the 6th, 1995? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: Now, you indicated that you began the 16 security detail with respect to Mr. George and Mr. 17 Cottrelle at or around 12:31 a.m. Did I get that time 18 right? 19 A: Yes, sir. 20 Q: It appears at 00:31; that's when the 21 request was made by Sergeant Richardson? 22 Now, at the time that request was made by 23 Sergeant Richardson, did you receive any information with 24 respect to circumstances surrounding the arrest of Cecil 25 Bernard George, or what led to Cecil Bernard George

1 coming into the custody of the police, or how he found 2 his way into the ambulance? 3 Did you receive any of that information at 4 that point? 5 A: Not at that time. I was made aware 6 some time later that he had been involved in an 7 altercation with officers in the Park, but at that time, 8 no. 9 Q: Okay. And you didn't inquire any 10 further at that point of Sergeant Richardson? 11 A: No. 12 Q: Okay. Now, it also appears in your 13 notes that within ten (10) minutes of -- of your 14 observations of Mr. George, that you attribute to him the 15 statement: 16 "You might as well put me in jail now 17 because I'm going there anyway." 18 Now, were you in the room at the point 19 that statement was made or were you, as you described to 20 Mr. Scullion, standing at the doorway and looking in the 21 room? 22 A: I was at the doorway, yes. 23 Q: Okay. And it's also not clear from 24 your notes, but you indicate that there was no prompting 25 from the doctor, so I take it that at that point the

1 doctor was treating Mr. George? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Okay. And that the only other person 4 in the room was the doctor, or were there other medical 5 personnel in there as well? 6 A: There -- there would have been other 7 medical personnel, I'm sure. 8 Q: Okay. Did you make any observations 9 with respect to -- during that ten (10) minute period 10 only, with respect to Mr. George's level of 11 consciousness? Was he sleeping? Was he awake? Was he 12 dozing in and out, if you can recall? 13 A: Yeah. I don't -- I don't recall. 14 Q: Okay. Was there any acknowledgement 15 at all by Mr. George of your presence in or near his 16 room? 17 A: No. 18 Q: Okay. And during those initial 19 minutes, you didn't observe any other officers attempt to 20 interact with Mr. George, or did you? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Okay. Now, I want to ask you a 23 little bit about the period in your notes, 12:41 a.m. to 24 2:00 a.m. 25 And 2:00 a.m. is, as I understand it, the

1 point at which people showed up to visit Mr. George? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: Okay. Now, I -- as I look at your 4 notes and reflect on your earlier testimony, it doesn't 5 appear you note any observations during that period of 6 time, 12:41 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. 7 Do you have any independent recollection 8 of what you may have observed during that period of time? 9 And -- and I'm speaking in relation to Mr. George only. 10 A: No, I would have been going between 11 the two (2) treatment rooms -- 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: -- at the time, so no. 14 Q: And -- and I take it for this period 15 of time you can't help us all -- help us out at all with 16 respect to his level of consciousness, whether or not he 17 was sleeping, or what Mr. George was doing during that 18 period of time? 19 A: No. 20 Q: Okay. Can you help us out at all as 21 to whether or not you observed any other officers 22 attempting to communicate with Mr. George during that 23 period of time? 24 A: I don't recall any other officers -- 25 Q: Okay.

1 A: -- trying to communicate with him. 2 Q: Could -- could you overhear any of 3 the interaction between the doctor or any other medical 4 personnel during that period of time, that initial couple 5 of hours, hour and a half? 6 A: I don't recall hearing -- 7 A: Okay. 8 Q: -- any of that. 9 Q: Now, Mr. George is not in the -- 10 again focussing only up until the point the visitors show 11 up at 2:00 a.m., he's not in the ICU at that point, but 12 was taken to the ICU at a later point? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: Okay. And you can recall that 15 specifically, his being taken to that department? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Were -- were you privy to any 18 discussions or did you overhear medical personnel speak 19 as to why he was being transported to the ICU? 20 A: No. 21 Q: Okay. Now again, at 2:00 a.m. 22 Roseanne Bressette and Jessie George attended to visit 23 Cecil Bernard George. 24 You indicate that in your notes and that's 25 at 2:00 a.m.?

1 A: Yes. 2 Q: On page 52. Now, you indicate 3 further that Ms. Bressette claimed to be the wife of 4 Cecil Bernard George. And I take it you accepted that 5 identification? 6 A: I did. 7 Q: Okay. Were you aware also that 8 Jessie George was the sister of Cecil Bernard George; did 9 you -- did that come to you awareness? I don't see it in 10 your notes, I'm just wondering if you recall the -- the 11 relation between Jessie George? 12 A: I don't recall that, no. 13 Q: Okay. And the decision to allow that 14 visit to take place, was that made by you or was that at 15 the direction of Richardson, or did you consult with 16 someone else? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 A: I don't remember having received any 21 specific instruction at that point, so I would have 22 allowed that. 23 Q: Okay. So given your experience and 24 given how a detail like that would have occurred, is it 25 likely that you made the call as to whether or not to

1 allow that visit? 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 A: I believe I did. 6 Q: Okay. But taking it one (1) step 7 further, you have a clear independent recollection of the 8 decision, and I won't rehash this to any great degree, 9 but the decision to not allow visitors, that was not your 10 call? 11 A: That was not my call. 12 Q: Okay. Now, if you could turn, 13 Sergeant Boon, to page 53 of your notes. And I'm 14 referring to the entry under 3:17 a.m., and this is 15 subsequent to Mr. George being in the ICU Unit and after 16 the decision was made to not allow visitors. 17 You indicated earlier in your testimony 18 and noted in your notebook entry that: 19 "Mr. George was sitting up from time to 20 time and mumbling." 21 So I take it, as opposed to that first 22 hour and a half period we already talked about, you have 23 an independent recollection of observing Mr. George 24 during this period of time? 25 A: Yes.

1 Q: Okay. And him sitting up from time 2 to time and mumbling; over what period of time did that 3 occur? I see -- I note in your entry that it's at 3:17 4 a.m., and you describe Ms. Anderson -- PC Anderson 5 arriving to assist you, but can you help us out as to how 6 long you would have observed that; Mr. George rising from 7 time to time and mumbling? Or sitting up from time to 8 time? 9 Sorry, it's been brought to my attention, 10 Sergeant Boon, that it's actually page 36 of your notes? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: I'm referring to page 53 at the -- 13 which is on the right-hand -- 14 A: I'm following it. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: Yes. The time period of which you 17 speak, over an hour, roughly, between 2:30 and 3:30. 18 Q: Okay. So that observation, as far as 19 you can recall it, it took place over about an hour? 20 A: Yes. That's the time when -- it was 21 at 2:29 a.m. that the security of Nicholas Cottrelle was 22 -- was taken away from me so I could focus strictly on 23 Cecil Bernard George -- 24 Q: Okay. 25 A: And I --

1 Q: Mr. George -- sorry. 2 A: And I believe that it was from that 3 time until 3:30 that he would sit up from time to time. 4 Q: Okay. And clearly Mr. George was not 5 coherent at this time, for that period of time? 6 A: If -- if I wrote the word "mumbling" 7 I would say that's true. 8 Q: Sure. So even if you didn't have an 9 independent recollection, when you look at your notes and 10 see that someone was sitting up from time to time and 11 mumbling, it's likely that he wasn't being coherent, 12 right? 13 A: Yes, sir. 14 Q: Okay. And you didn't specifically 15 note it, besides sitting up from time to time, but do you 16 -- did you make any observations as to his level of 17 consciousness for this hour period; whether he was 18 sleeping? 19 A: Well, I didn't make note of it and I 20 -- I don't -- I don't recall anything about his level of 21 consciousness in that time period. 22 Q: Okay. And through this period of 23 time, in terms of your observations of his injuries, 24 apart from that you didn't note him to have a neck brace 25 on for that entire period of time?

1 A: Initially he did have a neck brace 2 on. 3 Q: Okay. And that came off at some 4 point. Wasn't that earlier in the morning, the... 5 6 (BRIEF PAUSE) 7 8 Q: I believe your notes indicate, on 9 page 38, that the neck brace was removed and that was 10 around 12:20. Is that in accordance with your 11 recollection? 12 A: Yes, he'd returned from X-rays. 13 Q: Okay. So the point being simply 14 through the -- through those early morning hours in the 15 evening -- the early morning hours up to that point, he 16 had the brace on? 17 A: Yes, up until the X-rays, I believe, 18 were read, he had it on. 19 Q: Okay. Now, as I listen to your 20 evidence Sergeant Boon, I sort of broke it down into two 21 (2) parts. You were very candid earlier that subsequent 22 to 8:00 a.m. he appeared to be more alert and more 23 talkative. 24 But prior to that he wasn't as fully 25 mentally alert. That's my characterization, do you agree

1 with that? 2 A: With the exception of the statement 3 he made at 12:41, while the doctor was treating him in 4 the emergency room. 5 Q: Okay. But even that, Sergeant Boon, 6 didn't that strike you as an odd statement to make to a 7 doctor, given he hadn't acknowledged your presence? 8 A: I don't know that I made any 9 characterization of it. I just simply recorded it. 10 Q: Looking back on it now, would you 11 agree with my characterization? 12 A: It seemed unusual. 13 Q: Okay. And if we just jump quickly to 14 your entry under 8:15 a.m., I'll be referring you to the 15 8:15 entry and the 8:54 entry. 16 It appears that at 8:15 he asks: 17 "Why am I here?" 18 And you respond to his inquiry, fair? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: Okay. The he asks again at 8:54 21 a.m.: 22 "So what's the charge again?" 23 And you reply to him again, fair? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: Okay. Did -- was it your impression

1 that he was somewhat disoriented? Either from your 2 independent recollection or simply reviewing your notes 3 and reflecting upon it? 4 A: No, I think at that time he appeared 5 to be somewhat inquisitive. He was asking questions and 6 in fact seemed to have some understanding of what was 7 going on. And for that reason, I gave him his rights to 8 counsel and so on again, as well. 9 Q: And you didn't -- just to tie that 10 up, you didn't come to that conclusion from 12:00 a.m. to 11 the point that he woke up around 8:00 a.m.? 12 A: That's true. 13 Q: Okay. And that's, in fact, why you 14 went on to give him his rights and advise him that he had 15 the right to speak to a lawyer. You did that then, as 16 opposed to before, because of the mental alertness of Mr. 17 George, fair? 18 A: Well, I did it when I did it because 19 he was becoming talkative and -- 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: -- I wanted him to understand, you 22 know, the jeopardy that he was in, the charge and that, 23 you know, that he had the right to counsel without delay 24 and so on, and that he certainly wasn't obliged to say 25 anything. So I wanted to caution him regarding

1 statements again because he was becoming somewhat 2 talkative. 3 Q: But he did -- he did make a statement 4 at or around 12:41 about taking me to jail, and that -- 5 you know if it was your assessment that he was alert, 6 that would have been an appropriate opportunity to jump 7 in and provide that caution, wouldn't it have? 8 A: It might have been except that he was 9 still being treated by -- 10 Q: Okay. 11 A: -- by hospital staff. 12 Q: But you have no recollection of, 13 subsequent to that treatment, following up with this -- 14 this advisement? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: Okay. 17 MR. JONATHAN GEORGE: Thank you Sergeant 18 Boon. Those are my questions, Mr. Commissioner. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 20 Mr. George. 21 Mr. Roy...? 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good morning, Mr. 23 Commissioner. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 25 morning.

1 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 3 Q: Good morning, Sergeant Boon. 4 A: Good morning. 5 Q: My name is Julian Roy and I'm one of 6 the counsel for Aboriginal Legal Services Toronto. And I 7 have some questions of you specifically on the T-shirt 8 that you brought with you this morning, and also the pin 9 that you've told us that you purchased. All right? 10 A: Yes sir. 11 Q: Just so you know where I'm going with 12 my questions. 13 A: Okay. 14 Q: Now, is it likely that you heard 15 about the T-shirt and the pin, that they were available 16 for purchase; is it likely that you heard about that from 17 another police officer? 18 A: That's likely. 19 Q: Okay. You don't recall hearing about 20 it from some other third party or anything like that, do 21 you? 22 A: No. 23 Q: Okay. And somebody didn't attend at 24 your house with the T-shirt or the pin, I take it? You 25 don't recall that happening?

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1 A: I don't recall that, no. 2 Q: All right. So it's likely that -- 3 that you heard about the pin and the T-shirt at your work 4 premises; is that right? 5 A: That's likely. 6 Q: Okay. And do you recall if you were 7 directly approached or was there advertisement or a sign- 8 up sheet? 9 A: I don't recall. 10 Q: Did you have the impression in terms 11 of how you heard about the T-shirt and the pin, that they 12 were being distributed in secret somehow? 13 A: No, I don't think I ever had that 14 impression. 15 Q: All right. In fact it would be the 16 opposite. You had the impression that people were 17 supposed to know about these T-shirts and pins being 18 available; is that right? 19 A: I'm not sure that -- that -- I'm not 20 sure that that's true either. I don't recall exactly how 21 I learned about them or who it was that initially told me 22 about them. 23 Q: Okay. You were asked whether or not 24 you saw the pin being worn on a uniform. I want to 25 broaden the question a little bit.

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1 Did you ever see any other police officers 2 wearing the pin on any item of clothing? 3 A: I don't have a specific recollection 4 of seeing that pin being worn. 5 Q: All right. What about the T-shirt? 6 A: I've never seen anyone wear that T- 7 shirt. 8 Q: All right. Did you ever wear the 9 T-shirt? 10 A: I never wore that T-shirt. 11 Q: Now, as I understood your evidence, 12 and I just want clarity on this, as I your evidence, you 13 purchased the T-shirt after Ken Deane was convicted; is 14 that correct? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: All right. And you've also told us 17 that you heard about an investigation concerning T-shirts 18 that were prepared after, that were connected to the 19 Ipperwash incident. Do you recall that? 20 A: I -- I did hear that there was an 21 investigation. 22 Q: All right. The fact that you knew -- 23 and I take it from the fact that you -- you knew about 24 this investigation about these other T-shirts, you were 25 aware that your superiors had some concerns about --

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1 about the distribution of T-shirts? 2 A: I don't know that I knew enough about 3 the investigation or -- or those pieces of memorabilia 4 that -- that I could comment on that. 5 Q: Okay. Do you recall if you heard 6 about the investigation prior to purchasing the I Support 7 Ken Deane T-shirt? 8 A: I don't recall that. 9 Q: Okay. When you heard about the 10 investigation into these other Ipperwash T-shirts, did it 11 give you any concern about having purchased or purchasing 12 the Ken Deane T-shirt? 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 A: No. 17 Q: Now, the -- the T-shirt that you 18 bought, the -- the I Support Ken Deane T-shirt, it has an 19 official OPP TRU badge on one (1) shoulder; is that 20 right? 21 A: Yes. 22 Q: And you understand that to be an 23 official OPP logo, correct? 24 A: Yes, I believe it is. 25 Q: All right. Do you have any -- am I -

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1 - am I right in saying then that the T-shirt associates 2 an official OPP logo with the statement, I support Ken 3 Deane? 4 A: No, I don't know who made the T- 5 shirts up. I don't know what the intent was initially. 6 I know that I bought it as a -- as a fund raiser to 7 assist Ken Deane with his appeal. 8 Q: But you'd agree with me, looking at 9 the T-shirt today, an official OPP logo is associated 10 with the statement, I support Ken Deane? 11 A: I would agree that that appears to be 12 -- and again, I was never a member of the TRU team so I'm 13 only so familiar with it, but it appears to be -- and 14 again there's nothing to indicate police or OPP anywhere 15 on it, but that appears to be the -- the symbol that is 16 utilized by our TRU Team. 17 Q: Okay. Do you see any problem from 18 the point of view of public perception in having an 19 official OPP logo being associated with the statement "I 20 support Ken Deane" who, by this time, has been convicted 21 of a criminal offence? 22 A: Well, again, I don't think it's fair 23 to comment -- it's not fair for me to comment on that 24 because I'm not -- I can't be 100 percent sure that that 25 is the official OPP TRU Team emblem. It appears like

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  1  that to me but, again, it doesn't say OPP TRU underneath. 
  2  It doesn't say that -- the initials T-R-U are not there. 
  3  So I -- I don't think it's fair for me to -- 
  4                 Q:   All right.  In terms of your
  5  obligations as a sworn peace officer, you have -- you
  6  carry some very serious responsibilities, correct? 
  7                 A:   Yes. 
  8                 Q:   And you have very serious
  9  responsibilities while you're on duty, correct? 
 10                 A:   Yes. 
 11                 Q:   But you also have some very serious
 12  responsibilities while you're off duty; is that correct? 
 13                 A:   Yes. 
 14                 Q:   Yes.  And what I'm suggesting to you
 15  is you have a responsibility, as part of your
 16  obligations, not to do anything in your private life that
 17  brings discredit to the OPP as a force; is that correct? 
 18                 A:   I think that's fair. 
 19                 Q:   And looking at it from that point of
 20  view, do you see any problem from the point of view of
 21  public perception of a peace officer walking around or
 22  purchasing a T-shirt that has "I support" somebody who is
 23  a convicted criminal?
 24                 Do you see any problem with that from the
 25  point of view of public perception?

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1 A: No. 2 Q: Okay. And nothing in your training 3 would have told you that there's any problem with that 4 from the point of view of public perception? 5 A: No. Ken Deane had the right to 6 appeal like anybody else would. 7 Q: Sure. 8 A: And for me to purchase these to 9 assist him in his -- in his appeal that was my only 10 intent. 11 Q: And Ken Deane's appeals were 12 exhausted many years ago to your knowledge, correct? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: All right. And you still maintain 15 this T-shirt -- possession of this T-shirt, correct? 16 A: I still have it. Yes. 17 Q: Yes. And do you agree with me that 18 there's a world of difference between supporting Ken 19 Deane through your association in terms of funding his 20 defence and having a T-shirt for display that says, "I 21 support Ken Deane"? 22 Do you see a difference between those two 23 (2)? 24 A: Well, I can only just say that I did 25 not display the T-shirt and I think I've been clear as to

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1 why I purchased it. 2 Q: Now, you don't have any direct 3 knowledge in terms of what Ken Deane's actions were on 4 September 6th, 1995, do you? 5 A: No, I don't. 6 Q: You never saw Ken Deane in terms of 7 what he did on the evening of September 6th, 1995? 8 A: No, I didn't. 9 Q: And did you have any discussions with 10 other officers who had seen what Ken Deane had done? 11 A: No. 12 Q: Were you a personal friend of Ken 13 Deane? 14 A: No. 15 Q: Okay. So how was it that you -- how 16 was it then that you bought a T-shirt that said "I 17 support Ken Deane" when you know nothing about what he 18 did that day and you're not a friend of his? 19 A: I was simply assisting in -- in his 20 appeal fund. I knew that -- that the -- his resources 21 from the Association would have been exhausted and yeah, 22 I was -- I was helping. 23 Q: Okay. And that's what police 24 officers do for one another, they help one another out, 25 right?

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not sure 2 about that question. That's too -- 3 4 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 5 Q: It's an important ethic or principle 6 within police forces that they support one another, 7 correct? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: In general? 9 I would just like to -- 10 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes, I'm starting 11 general and I might go to the specific but... 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'd 13 appreciate if you could focus your -- 14 MR. JULIAN ROY: Well, it's just -- it's 15 just -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- question. 17 That's fine. Just carry on, Mr. Roy. 18 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- I find -- I want to 19 explore this -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Please carry 21 on, Mr. Roy. 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: All right. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You 24 indicated you'd be about ten (10) minutes. You've used 25 that up and I'm just wondering what you're -- where

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1 you're going. So carry on. 2 MR. JULIAN ROY: Okay. I just have a few 3 more questions. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: All right. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 7 Q: You're -- you buy a T-shirt that says 8 "I support Ken Deane" without any factual information, to 9 your knowledge, that would suggest what Ken Deane's 10 conduct was one way or the other, correct? 11 A: That's right. My knowledge was that 12 he was appealing and he had the right to appeal and this 13 was to assist him in doing so. 14 Q: Okay. And my question is: How -- 15 why is it that you would support somebody when you don't 16 know if they did the right thing or the wrong thing? 17 A: Because he had the right to appeal 18 like anyone else and so I was assisting him in that. 19 Q: Okay. Without any information one 20 (1) way or the other? 21 A: That's correct. 22 Q: All right. Those are my questions. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 24 Thank you Mr. Roy. 25 Do you have any questions?

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  1                 MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN:   Good morning,
  2  Commissioner.  I anticipate I'll be about ten (10) or
  3  fifteen (15) minutes.   Not -- not very long.
  4  
  5  CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN:  
  6                 Q:   Sergeant Boon, in relation to your
  7  duties on the night of September the 6th, I take -- and
  8  My Friend Mr. Scullion asked you some questions about
  9  this.
 10                 I take it that when you were at the
 11  checkpoint at Highway 21 and, the road is escaping me --
 12  sorry --
 13                 A:   Army Camp Road.
 14                 Q:   -- and Army Camp Road, thank you,
 15  that the purpose of stopping or attempting to stop the
 16  vehicles was out of concern for public safety, correct?
 17                 A:   That is correct.
 18                 Q:   And I take it similarly that when the
 19  checkpoint was moved at 23:20 hours again the reason for
 20  your presence there was a concern for public safety?
 21                 A:   Yes, it was.
 22                 Q:   In -- if I could take you please to
 23  your notes which have been made Exhibit P-1633.  At page
 24  33 of your notes you have certain observations of
 25  activity going on at the Army Base.

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1 Do you see that, at the top of page 33? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: And although you note that there were 4 people on the other side of the Army Base yelling at you, 5 I take it, that at no time did you witness any officers 6 responding to that behaviour? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: So you didn't, for example, hear any 9 officers yelling back? 10 A: Absolutely not. 11 Q: And you didn't hear any cursing or 12 improper language? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And you didn't hear any taunting? 15 A: No. 16 Q: Similarly, when you are at the 17 checkpoint and the car with the -- the injured person 18 attends at that location, I take it you did not see any 19 police officers yelling at the occupants of the car? 20 A: I did not. 21 Q: And you did not hear any racial slurs 22 made on the part of police officers? 23 A: I did not. 24 Q: And I take it you did not see people 25 laying prone on the ground?

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1 A: No I did not. 2 Q: If I can take your attention to page 3 34 of your notes. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You're using 5 the number at the bottom, the correct number? 6 MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN: I'm using the 7 Officer's number -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes -- 9 MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN: -- Justice 10 Linden. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- which is 12 51. 13 MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN: And it's page -- 14 it's page 51. Thank you. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 16 17 CONTINUED BY MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN: 18 Q: I just want to make sure that your 19 evidence is clear in relation to your interaction with 20 Mr. Cottrelle. 21 My understanding of your evidence is that 22 when Mr. Cottrelle is initially placed in the ambulance, 23 you defer to the ambulance personnel to allow them to 24 perform their medical assessment, correct? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And it's once that process has been 2 completed that you proceed to interact with Mr. 3 Cottrelle, right? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And at 23:43 you indicate that you 6 arrest him and caution him, right? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: You provide him his rights to 9 counsel, right? 10 A: I do. 11 Q: And Mr. Cottrelle indicates to you 12 that he understands what you have just told him, right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And although you're in an ambulance, 15 I take it that if Mr. Cottrelle had indicated to you that 16 he wished to speak to counsel, you would have facilitated 17 that request at the earlier opportunity, right? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: If you flip to page 35 of your notes, 20 Commissioner, it's page 52. You then proceed to give Mr. 21 Cottrelle the young person's caution, right? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: And that includes telling him that he 24 has the right to a parent or guardian being present in 25 the event that he's going to make a statement, right?

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: Am I correct in my understanding that 3 that young person's caution does not necessarily mean 4 that the person has to -- that the parent or guardian has 5 to be there at the moment of arrest? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And am I also correct in my 8 understanding of your evidence that you, at no point 9 prior to Mr. Cottrelle going in the ambulance, had any 10 contact with Mr. Cottrelle's parent or guardian, right? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And similarly, when you get to the 13 hospital later on, you at no point have any contact with 14 a parent or guardian of Mr. Cottrelle, right? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: But am I correct that had Mr. 17 Cottrelle indicated to you that he wanted to have a 18 parent or guardian present, that you would have 19 facilitated that request? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: You have given evidence today that 22 when you were at the hospital in Strathroy you spoke with 23 two (2) detective sergeants, correct? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And my understanding of your evidence

114

1 is that you're not clear of who you spoke with when, 2 right? 3 Which detective sergeant, I mean? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: And I'm going to suggest to you, you 6 have -- you have in your notes that you spoke with 7 Detective Sergeant Parent, but I'm going to suggest to 8 you that, in fact, when you first arrive there you speak 9 with Detective Sergeant Bell? 10 A: Okay. That -- I don't recall that 11 but that's possible. 12 Q: Okay. Because I'm going to suggest 13 to you that Parent arrived only later to replace Trevor 14 Richardson. 15 A: Okay. 16 Q: Does that accord with your 17 recollection? 18 A: Well, my notes assist me a little 19 bit. I -- I know that at 3:17 I had a specific 20 conversation with Detective Sergeant Parent and that he 21 advised me no visitors in or out for Cecil Bernard 22 George. 23 Q: But other than that it's a little 24 unclear? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: Okay. In relation to the Impala that 2 attends at the Strathroy Hospital, I take it that when 3 that vehicle arrives at the hospital you have no idea as 4 to who's in the vehicle, right? 5 A: I did not know at that time. 6 Q: And you don't know -- just so your 7 evidence is clear, you don't know who any of the 8 occupants were? 9 A: No. 10 Q: And in relation to the arrest of 11 Carolyn George, you were not the arresting officer, 12 correct? 13 A: I was not. 14 Q: You've given evidence that as you 15 were standing in the Emergency Department this -- the 16 events are quite chaotic, right? 17 A: Yes, they are. 18 Q: You had to react quickly to what was 19 going on? 20 A: Yes. 21 Q: And as you were standing there 22 another officer is attempting to arrest this individual, 23 right? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: You play no part in any discussions

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1 with anyone, with any superior officer regarding the 2 grounds for the arrest, right? 3 A: Right. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, Ms. 5 Esmonde...? 6 MS. JACKIE ESMONDE: Well, there was 7 evidence in the Coroner's statement that there was such a 8 discussion that took place at some point. So just to be 9 clear on your question, there is evidence that such 10 occurred and he -- he did agree that he made that 11 statement in the Coroner's interview. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 13 14 CONTINUED BY MS. JENNIFER GLEITMAN: 15 Q: Insofar as your recollection today is 16 concerned, so it's clear for the Commissioner, do you 17 have a present recollection of having discussions with a 18 superior officer regarding the grounds for arrest? 19 A: No, I don't. 20 Q: You become involved in this arrest 21 when it becomes apparent to you that the other officer is 22 experiencing difficulties? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: And as I understand your evidence, 25 immediately following your involvement in this arrest,

117

1 you become involved in other police duties; is that 2 correct? 3 A: That's correct. 4 5 (BRIEF PAUSE) 6 7 Q: If you could turn, please, to page 38 8 of your notes? Commissioner, this is page 55 for you. 9 And I believe at 12 -- it's 12:57 you 10 indicate that you attempted to contact counsel on behalf 11 of Mr. George, correct? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: And I take it that you did that at 14 Mr. George's request? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: And Mr. George would have provided 17 you with the name of his counsel? 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: And you were asked some questions by 20 counsel of Mr. George, regarding Cecil Bernard George's 21 level of coherency at various times throughout your 22 dealing with him. 23 Do you remember those questions? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: And I take it that as a police

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1 officer it was not your function to assess Mr. George's 2 level of consciousness, correct? 3 A: That is correct. 4 Q: And in relation to the period of time 5 when you hear Mr. George initially mumbling, at that 6 point in time am I clear that you're not speaking 7 directly with Mr. George, right? 8 A: That's correct, I'm not speaking to 9 him. 10 Q: And I take it that you would have 11 relied on the other medical personnel to take notes and 12 make assessments of his medical condition, right? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: In relation to the T-shirt which you 15 have in front of you, you've never wore that T-shirt, 16 correct? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: Am I correct in my understanding that 19 until you went to look for the T-shirt for the purposes 20 of this Inquiry, the T-shirt was just sitting in the 21 drawer? 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: And you were asked some questions 24 about the TRU logo that appears on one (1) of the 25 shoulders of that T-shirt.

119

1 And is it -- I'm going to suggest to you 2 that that TRU logo is particular to the TRU team and is 3 not an official OPP logo; are you able to comment on 4 that? 5 A: No. 6 Q: You're not able to say either way? 7 A: No. 8 Q: Okay. And final question: In 9 relation to your understanding of the events that took 10 place between the OPP officers and the First Nations 11 people on September 6th, 1995, you made a comment in your 12 evidence that it was your understanding that these events 13 took place inside the park. And I'm going to suggest to 14 you that everything took place outside of the park. 15 A: Okay. 16 Q: Do you have any knowledge in that 17 regard? 18 A: No. 19 Q: No. Okay. Thank you. Those are all 20 my questions. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 22 very much. 23 Ms. Ferrier...? 24 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Commissioner, I just 25 have one (1) quick question and it's a point of

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1 clarification just to make sure that we all understand. 2 3 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. MEGAN FERRIER: 4 Q: But, Sergeant Boon, because on the 5 night of September 6th you were just on a regular shift, 6 am I correct in understanding that you would have been 7 wearing your regular blue uniform? 8 A: I was. It was the standard working 9 uniform for OPP members. 10 Q: So -- so you were not wearing a 11 tactical uniform or anything? 12 A: No, I was not. 13 MS. MEGAN FERRIER: Okay. Thank you. At 14 this point, Commissioner, I'd just like to, again, thank 15 Sergeant Boon for attending today and providing his 16 evidence to the Commission. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you 18 very much, Sergeant Boon, for coming and giving us your 19 testimony. Thank you. 20 21 (WITNESS STANDS DOWN) 22 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We're ready 24 to call a witness. Shall we take a short break and let 25 them --

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1 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Sure. Perhaps if -- 2 just give me five (5) minutes to set up and then we'll 3 start with our next witness. It's -- 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's do 5 that. Let's take a short break. 6 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess. 7 8 --- Upon recessing at 11:40 a.m. 9 --- Upon resuming at 11:46 a.m. 10 11 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 12 resumed, please be seated. 13 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, the next 14 witness is Detective Sergeant Bill Klym. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good day, 16 sir. 17 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Good morning, Mr. 18 Klym. 19 THE WITNESS: Good morning. 20 21 WILLIAM DAVID KLYM, Sworn 22 23 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, sir. 24 25 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. DERRY MILLAR:

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1 Q: Sergeant Klym, you could pull that 2 mike up a little closer to you if it's -- if it's 3 uncomfortable. 4 I understand you joined the Ontario 5 Provincial Police in 1987? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And you are the -- a member of the 8 Tactics and Rescue Unit from 1994 to 1997? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And in September 1995 you were 11 stationed in London and were a member of the London TRU 12 Team? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And I'm not going to go into any 15 background, but just to put it in context for people who 16 may be watching I'm going to ask a couple of questions, 17 Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. DERRY MILLAR: 21 Q: But before I do that, you're 22 currently a Detective Sergeant with the Niagra Falls OPP 23 Detachment? 24 A: In charge of the Casino and Deployed 25 Field Intelligence Unit.

123

1 Q: Thank you. And on September 5th, 2 1995, as you indicated a moment ago, you were called out 3 to the Ipperwash area as part of the London TRU Team? 4 A: That's correct. 5 Q: And on the evening of September 6th, 6 1995 you were partnered with Constable Mark Beauchesne? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And you were part of an ALPHA team? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And during the confrontation on 11 September 6th, 1995 you fired your weapon, your long -- 12 your long gun? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And if I could turn now to the 15 question of T-shirts. I understand that you own a number 16 of T-shirts relating to operations other than Ipperwash; 17 is that correct? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: And how many T-shirts do you own, 20 sir? 21 A: Probably eight (8) to ten (10) right 22 now. 23 Q: And when you say right now, do I take 24 it from that you had more in the past? 25 A: They come and go, depending on the

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1 wear and tear and what not. 2 Q: And why do you acquire -- why did you 3 acquire the T-shirts? 4 A: T-shirts are usually acquired as a 5 result of a successful operation, just to signify joint 6 force operations, sometimes they're unit T-shirts, 7 depending on whose producing them. 8 Q: And when did you decide to create a 9 T-shirt with respect to the events at Ipperwash 10 Provincial Park? 11 A: I believe it was sometime in the 12 later part of September of that year. 13 Q: Pardon me? 14 A: The later part of September of that 15 year. 16 Q: Of 1995? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And the T-shirt you created is a T- 19 shirt -- there's a logo, there's a photograph in front of 20 you, Sergeant, it's a copy of Exhibit P-1494, and the 21 actual T-shirt P-1497. 22 The T-shirt that you created was the T- 23 shirt with this logo on it? 24 A: That's correct. 25 Q: And why did you decide to create a T-

125

1 shirt? 2 A: The T-shirt was designed in 3 recognition of the cooperative effort that took place 4 that night between the London TRU team and the various 5 ERT Teams that were involved in the skirmish on that 6 particular day. 7 Q: And why did you feel it appropriate 8 to create a T-shirt with respect to the working of the 9 TRU team and the ERT teams? 10 A: Up until 1993, when the ERT Program 11 was created, the Tactics and Response Unit, the TRU team, 12 was responsible for various functions such as barricaded 13 gunman calls, hostage rescue, VIP security, dog -- canine 14 tracking, various functions within the OPP of a high risk 15 nature. 16 Upon the establishment of the ERT program 17 in '93, some of those tasks were taken from the TRU 18 program and put in the program of the ERT team which did 19 containment, canine backup, a little bit of VIP and high 20 risk security on prisoners and what not. 21 So some of the work was taken from what 22 had been traditionally a TRU function and, as such, there 23 was a certain amount of tension and a certain amount of 24 apprehension between the two (2) programs. 25 At the time the T-shirt was done, it was

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1 meant to recognize the cooperative effort and basically 2 the -- the breaking of the issues and the calming of the, 3 you know, the apprehensions and the tensions between 4 those two (2) units. 5 The ERT Program had a place that was, you 6 know, very important within the OPP function as well as 7 TRU team, and so we saw it as a cooperative effort that 8 both places having standing. 9 Q: And prior to creating this shirt -- 10 T-shirt, had you created other T-shirts? 11 A: Not in a police function. 12 Q: When you say, "not in a police 13 function" -- 14 A: Like nothing to do with police work. 15 Q: Okay. 16 A: Yeah. 17 Q: But had you created T-shirts for 18 other functions? 19 A: I had -- I had assisted with a 20 martial arts club in doing T-shirts, but that was more of 21 an embroidery thing, not this stuff -- the line -- the 22 design was embroidered on a shirt as opposed to being 23 silk screened or... 24 Q: But the question really -- the 25 question was, prior to creating this T-shirt you had --

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1 A: Yes. 2 Q: -- been involved in -- 3 A: Yes, yes. 4 Q: -- creating other T-shirts? 5 A: Yes, somewhat. 6 Q: And how did you go about creating the 7 T-shirt that has the logo on it, marked P-1494? 8 A: I believe I went to a -- a shirt 9 distributor some place where they manufacture or produce 10 the shirts at a T-shirt shop and it was my idea to show 11 something that showed the -- the effort between the two 12 (2). 13 The ERT program itself did not have a logo 14 per se that the -- or a -- an emblem like the -- the TRU 15 Team had so I must have come up with a number of ideas of 16 one (1), that I have no artistic ability myself so I 17 couldn't have drawn anything or whatnot and I probably 18 would have talked the person through or thrown out ideas 19 in -- in various forms. 20 Q: Now, you're saying you probably did, 21 do you have any recollection today, sir, of what actually 22 happened? 23 A: I mean, this was eleven (11) years 24 ago. I don't have a specific recollection of saying this 25 is exactly what -- what I have in mind but obviously I

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1 was the one responsible for it and I took the initiative. 2 No one else was kind of stepping up. 3 Everyone liked the -- I believe liked the 4 idea of demonstrating something that was symbolic of our 5 -- our efforts together but nobody had took the 6 initiative so I stepped forward and did that. 7 Q: And when you say -- had you discussed 8 the creation of a T-shirt commemorating the relationship 9 between the ERT Team and the TRU Team prior to going to 10 the T-shirt shop? 11 A: Yes, I believe there was informal 12 discussions with a loose group of which now eleven (11) 13 years later I can't even tell you who was involved. 14 Q: And had you asked people if they 15 wanted to buy a T-shirt prior to having the T-shirts 16 made? 17 A: I believe I would have somehow 18 canvassed people. I wouldn't have put my own money out 19 for something like that, I would have made sure that 20 there was someone putting up some money ahead of time so 21 it wouldn't have been my money. 22 Q: So you weren't going to be stuck with 23 the cost of the T-shirts -- 24 A: Exactly. 25 Q: -- so you wanted -- you wanted to

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1 know if people wanted a T-shirt and did you ask them to 2 pay for it or give you some amount of money before you 3 created them or simply a commitment? 4 A: I probably would have looked for some 5 kind of financial deposit or something but again I don't 6 recall. 7 Q: Okay. And where did you have the T- 8 shirt made, sir? 9 A: I'm not certain whether it would have 10 been in Woodstock where I lived at the time or whether it 11 was London where -- where our offices were. It would 12 have been one (1) of the two (2) but I can't specifically 13 recall. 14 Q: And whose idea was the use of the TRU 15 symbol? 16 A: I would say that it was my idea or 17 the -- the group. Given the fact that I was the one that 18 took the initiative I would say that it would be my 19 responsibility. 20 Q: And the anvil, how did that come 21 about? 22 A: As I explained earlier the -- the ERT 23 program was in its infancy and there had not been an 24 official logo that had been adopted or created with 25 respect to the ERT program that there is now. I think in

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1 an -- in an -- some design I was attempting to show the 2 two (2) units coming together in a -- in a function and 3 that would have been my choice to use the anvil as well. 4 Q: And were you provided with the 5 samples of designs by the T-shirt shop that you looked 6 at? 7 A: I believe I would have been, yes. 8 Q: And -- now, we see on the logo that 9 there is a broken arrow. 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: And whose idea was the use of a 12 broken arrow, sir? 13 A: I believe again in shouldering the 14 responsibility here with the fact that I took the 15 initiative here this would have been my -- my concept 16 involved here. 17 Q: And why did you use the concept of a 18 broken arrow, sir? 19 A: In -- in retrospect it was a poor 20 choice of symbology obviously and I deeply regret any 21 hurt that has been taken by the George family or by the 22 First Nations community in general. 23 The symbol was not meant to signify the 24 death of Dudley George or a breaking of the First Nations 25 community but, in fact was in somehow trying to show the

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1 cooperative efforts of the two (2) significant programs 2 involved that night being TRU and ERT. 3 And for the first time operating in a 4 crowd management function together. 5 Q: And I take it that you heard as a 6 result of the Inquiry that people have -- it has caused 7 offence to people with respect to the use of the broken 8 arrow? 9 A: That's correct. 10 Q: And the -- with respect to the T- 11 shirt, after you had a logo designed did you show that 12 logo to people before the T-shirts were actually made? 13 A: I can't recall if it would have been 14 widely viewed or whether it would have been just to a 15 couple of people. I wouldn't have known everyone 16 involved -- in personally involved in the purchase 17 probably. So it may have been to a select few people 18 that -- but I can't -- 19 Q: It may have been -- 20 A: -- at this time I can't recall. 21 Q: But, do you recall if you showed the 22 logo to someone before you had the T-shirt made, or not? 23 A: Oh I believe I did, yeah. 24 Q: Okay. And how many T-shirts did you 25 sell?

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1 A: With eleven (11) years hindsight, I 2 believe it was somewhere in the twenty (20) to thirty 3 (30) range, but I can't be, you know, exactly specific to 4 a number. 5 Q: And did you -- who did you sell them 6 to? 7 A: The T-shirts were made available to 8 only those members that were involved that evening. So 9 it would have been only members of the ERT teams that 10 were involved plus the London TRU Team. 11 It was not widely distributed, it was not 12 for public or other police consumption. It was -- it was 13 meant to signify something to the people who it meant 14 something to that evening. And therefore, it would have 15 been limited to those -- that small group of people. 16 Q: And did you discuss the T-shirt or 17 the logo with any Commissioned Officer prior to the T- 18 shirt being created? 19 A: No, I did not. 20 Q: And after the T-shirt was created? 21 A: No, I did not. 22 Q: And did you show the T-shirt to any 23 Commissioned Officer? 24 A: No, I did not. 25 Q: And were -- other than the T-shirt

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1 shop where you had it made, were any non-police officers 2 involved in the production of the T-shirt? 3 A: No. 4 Q: And did you sell the T-shirts to any 5 non-police officers? 6 A: No, as I stated before it was meant 7 for -- specifically the police officers that were part 8 of the ERT Team and the TRU Team that evening. It was 9 not available to anyone but those people, as far as I 10 recall. 11 Q: And did you sell a T-shirt to any 12 other members of the TRU team that attended at Ipperwash 13 with you on September 5th and 6th? 14 A: I don't believe so. As I said it 15 wouldn't have had any significance to those people. 16 Q: No, to other -- you didn't understand 17 my question. 18 Did you sell the T-shirt to any other 19 members of the TRU team -- the London TRU team that 20 attended with you on the evening of September -- 21 A: I believe so, yes -- 22 Q: -- 4th or 6th? 23 A: -- sorry. 24 Q: And what about Kenneth Deane? 25 A: I can't recall if I sold one (1) to

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1 Ken Deane, or not. 2 Q: What about Constable O'Halloran? 3 A: Again I can't -- couldn't speak to 4 specifics. The only ones I can obviously speak to now 5 are people who have already provided evidence that you 6 know, I can say based on what they've stated. But, I 7 can't recall who specifically would have had them. 8 Q: You can't today remember who you sold 9 them to? 10 A: No. 11 Q: And did you wear this T-shirt? 12 A: No I did not. 13 Q: Did you see anyone else wear the T- 14 shirt? 15 A: I never saw anyone wear the T-shirt 16 ever. 17 Q: And did you see any other T-shirts or 18 memorabilia relating to Ipperwash? 19 A: No I did not. 20 Q: And in front of you, you'll find a 21 copy of Exhibit P-458. 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: It's actually -- should be P-438 24 (sic). And there's a T-shirt that has on it a Ipperwash 25 ERT/TRU with a feather lying on its side.

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1 Did you see at any time prior to the 2 Inquiry starting, a T-shirt with that logo on it, sir? 3 A: No I did not. This is the first time 4 I've seen this. 5 Q: The first time you've seen it? 6 A: Yeah. 7 Q: And did you see a -- a mug with a OPP 8 crest on it and the words, Team Ipperwash or a crest with 9 an OPP crest, shoulder flash with an arrow through it? 10 A: No I did not. 11 Q: Were you aware that there was a T- 12 shirt, Exhibit P-438 (sic) that had ERT and TRU on it? 13 A: I became aware of it after, yes. 14 Q: After the fact -- 15 A: Yes -- yes -- 16 Q: -- but not at the time? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And so when you created your -- the 19 T-shirt that you created, you were not aware of the other 20 T-shirt? 21 A: No. 22 Q: And how did you become aware of the 23 other T-shirt? 24 A: Just I believe word of mouth, 25 throughout the OPP.

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1 Q: And did you see -- I understand that 2 after September 7th you didn't -- you didn't stay at the 3 Pinery Provincial Park, you stayed in Sarnia? 4 A: I believe that's the timeline. 5 Q: Did you ever see a beer can with a 6 feather or feathers and OPP tape? 7 A: No, I did not. 8 Q: Did you see a bull's eye with an 9 arrow affixed to it on the side of an OPP cruiser? 10 A: No, I did not. 11 Q: Or were you -- did you hear about the 12 beer can and the feather or the bull's eye? 13 A: No, I did not. 14 Q: Back at the time? 15 A: No, just recently in the -- reading 16 stuff and -- 17 Q: Getting ready for the Inquiry? 18 A: -- getting ready for the Inquiry, 19 right. 20 Q: And what about cartoons, did you see 21 or hear about any cartoons at Pinery Park in September 22 1995? 23 A: No I did not. 24 Q: Now, did you participate in the 25 investigation into the mugs and T-shirts?

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1 A: No, I was never interviewed or was 2 involved in that. 3 Q: And did you become aware that there 4 was an investigation into a T-shirt? 5 A: Sometime '96 or something -- 6 somewhere along the line, I believe. 7 Q: And did you advise the Professional 8 Standard Branch back then when you heard about the 9 investigation about the T-shirt you've created? 10 A: No, I did not. 11 Q: And why not, sir? 12 A: As far as I recall it wasn't into the 13 specific shirt that we were -- or that I was responsible 14 for. And I didn't see a connection between the two (2). 15 The one (1) was very specific in-house to the people that 16 were -- and it was only of significance to the people 17 that were involved in the ERT and TRU program. 18 Q: And do you still have your T-shirt? 19 A: No, I do not. 20 Q: And when did you -- what did you do 21 with your T-shirt? 22 A: I disposed of my T-shirt several 23 years ago, I don't recall exactly when but it would have 24 been probably some time after the conviction of Ken 25 Deane.

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1 Q: And why did you dispose of your T- 2 shirt? 3 A: The T-shirt no longer held the 4 significance that it did. I was no longer part of the 5 TRU program and what not. And the shirt you know, didn't 6 hold the same meaning to me. 7 Q: And the -- why did you come forward 8 now with respect to the T-shirt? 9 A: Several weeks ago I awoke to find a 10 paper which saw this logo which I hadn't seen in ten (10) 11 years or eleven (11) years and I realized from reading 12 the information that it had become an issue and that 13 there was concern over the intentions and the impressions 14 that were being made, you know, specifically of the broke 15 arrow and what not. 16 And I felt I wanted to come forward and 17 clear the record and take responsibility for what actions 18 I had taken. And not prolong any -- you know any PSB 19 investigation or Police Service Act investigation or any 20 other investigation that would assist in helping this 21 matter move forward. 22 Q: And as I understand it you were in 23 Windsor for the funeral of the officer killed in Windsor 24 when you saw the newspaper? 25 A: Yes. Yes, I was.

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1 Q: And you then as I understand it spoke 2 to members of your association? 3 A: I -- I attempted to call or I 4 contacted the legal branch of the OPPA that -- that 5 afternoon, 6 didn't -- 7 Q: That was a Friday, I believe? 8 A: That was a Friday. I didn't hear 9 back from them. I contacted the -- the person -- I was 10 disturbed by this and -- and what was taking place and I 11 attempted to contact legal counsel again over the -- the 12 weekend and I was advised I should contact them on Monday 13 morning when they returned. 14 Nobody from the legal branch was on call 15 that weekend and on that Monday morning I drove up to our 16 association building and spoke to legal counsel and they 17 in turn directed me to Mr. Roland for the OPPA Ipperwash 18 Inquiry. 19 Q: And I understand that a Professional 20 Standards Branch investigation has been started with 21 respect to your T-shirt? 22 A: Yes, that's correct. 23 Q: And you've been interviewed? 24 A: Yes, I have. 25 Q: And today do you believe that it was

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1 appropriate to create the T-shirt? 2 A: Absolutely not. 3 Q: And can you tell the Commissioner 4 today why you think it was inappropriate, sir? 5 A: I -- I believe it was inappropriate 6 in the -- the symbology which culturally perhaps was of 7 major significance to the First Nations community and 8 that there's many different interpretations that could be 9 taken in a very negative manner with respect to that. 10 That wasn't my intention but I understand 11 that that is what could be taken from it and for that I 12 apologize. 13 Q: And the -- were you aware of a pin 14 with a TRU logo and Kenneth Deane's badge number on it? 15 I think it's Exhibit P-1606. 16 A: Yes, I'm aware of it. 17 Q: And I've just put a coloured copy of 18 P-6 -- it's actually P-1608 is the coloured copy. 19 And did you purchase one (1) of these 20 pins, sir? 21 A: Yes, I did. 22 Q: And I believe the cost was ten (10) 23 dollars? 24 A: I believe that was what I paid. 25 Q: And why did you purchase the pin,

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1 sir? 2 A: The -- the pin was purchased in 3 support of Ken Deane's appeal for -- to reimburse or 4 create funds toward that end. 5 Q: And do you still have the pin, sir? 6 A: Yes, I do. 7 Q: And did you -- do you wear your pin - 8 - that pin on your uniform? 9 A: No, I do not. 10 Q: Have you ever worn the pin? 11 A: I've worn the pin, yes. 12 Q: And when you've worn the pin it 13 wasn't on a uniform? 14 A: No, it was not. 15 Q: And when you wore the pin what 16 functions did you wear it at, sir? 17 A: I wore it at his funeral. 18 Q: At his funeral? And were you aware 19 of a direction that the pin should not be worn on a 20 uniform? 21 A: I was aware of some -- some direction 22 in that way, yes. 23 Q: And have you seen a -- we've heard 24 about a, I Support Ken Deane T-shirt, have you seen one? 25 Were you aware of that T-shirt?

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1 A: Not until today. 2 Q: Not until -- 3 A: I mean I was -- I was aware that 4 there could be something but I've never seen that T-shirt 5 until today. 6 Q: The first time you saw the T-shirt 7 was the photograph that was up on the screen today? 8 A: Yeah. 9 Q: And is there anything else you wish 10 to add, Sergeant Klym? 11 A: No, just to reiterate the -- the 12 intention of the T-shirt was to show the significant 13 ordeal that the TRU members and the ERT members 14 experienced that evening and to -- to show a mending and 15 a cooperative effort for the work that was done that 16 evening. 17 It was never intended to signify the -- 18 the death of Dudley George or to -- a -- a defeating of 19 the First Nations people. 20 I understand that that's how people have 21 interpreted it and for that I apologize. 22 Q: Thank you very much, Mr. -- Sergeant 23 Klym, for coming forward and giving your evidence today 24 and those are my questions, Commissioner, I suggest 25 perhaps we could canvass My Friends.

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1 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. People 2 have questions for Officer Klym? 3 Mr. Rosenthal, how long? 4 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: About a half an 5 hour. 6 MR. DERRY MILLER: Mr. Rosenthal about 7 thirty (30) minutes? 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 9 Scullion...? 10 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I may have ten (10) 11 minutes, depending on -- 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You may 13 have -- 14 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I may have ten (10) 15 minutes, depending on Mr. Rosenthal's questions. 16 MR. DERRY MILLER: Mr. Scullion may have 17 ten (10) minutes, depending on Mr. Rosenthal. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And Mr. 19 Roy...? 20 MR. JULIAN ROY: Approximately twenty 21 (20) minutes, sir. 22 MR. DERRY MILLER: Mr. Roy approximately 23 twenty (20) minutes. And that adds up to an hour. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 25 not sure we can get it before lunch. Do you want to --

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1 MR. DERRY MILLER: I'm in your hands, 2 sir. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think we 4 should break for lunch and come back and do it after. 5 MR. DERRY MILLER: Fine. Thank you very 6 much, sir. 7 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry stands 8 adjourned until 1:15. 9 10 --- Upon recessing at 12:15 p.m. 11 --- Upon resuming at 1:17 p.m. 12 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 14 afternoon, Mr. Rosenthal. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Good afternoon, Mr. 16 Commissioner. 17 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Shall I begin, sir? 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, sir, by 19 all means. 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 21 22 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 23 Q: Good afternoon, Officer. 24 A: Good afternoon. 25 Q: My name is Peter Rosenthal, I'm one

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1 of the counsel for a group of Stoney Point people under 2 the name Aazhoodena and George Family Group. 3 Now first, with respect to the pin that 4 had Mr. Deane's badge number on it, you told us that you 5 wore it to his funeral. You wore it at other times, I 6 gather, in between the conviction of Ken Deane and before 7 his appeal, in particular. 8 A: I don't recall actually wearing it 9 other than at his funeral. I recall buying one in 10 support of it but I don't recall a specific occasion 11 where I would have worn it otherwise. 12 Q: You don't recall specific occasion. 13 We can take it you must have worn it sometime before his 14 funeral; is that fair? 15 A: Again, I -- I don't recall a specific 16 time when I would have. Not that I -- that there was any 17 significance in not wearing it. It was something that I 18 purchased in support of the -- the fund. 19 Q: That's not me, Mr. Commissioner. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I know it's 21 not. It's distracting but -- that's better. 22 23 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 24 Q: You did see a fellow officers wearing 25 that pin from time to time, is that correct; before the

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1 funeral? 2 A: I -- I don't recall ever seeing 3 anyone wearing the pin before that, no. 4 Q: And you never -- did you ever see any 5 officer wearing a T-shirt that said, I support Ken Deane? 6 A: No. As I stated earlier, today was 7 the first time I'd seen that shirt. 8 Q: Now you -- at the beginning of your 9 examination by Mr. Millar, you explained you had eight 10 (8) to ten (10) or so other commemorative T-shirts; is 11 that correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: And you said the -- the number comes 14 and goes, depending upon wear and tear. Do you recall 15 that? 16 A: Something to that matter, yes. 17 Q: Yes. So in other words, when the 18 shirts starts to look too worn, you get rid of it? 19 A: Perhaps, yes. 20 Q: And that's why the number might 21 fluctuate. It might go down as well as going up, right? 22 A: Possibly. 23 Q: So these shirts are not -- you don't 24 keep them just in a special drawer as souvenir shirts, 25 you -- you use them as ordinary T-shirts?

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  1                 A:   I keep them separate from, like,
  2  workout clothes or something like that.  But it's not
  3  something I make a specific habit of keeping them as --
  4  they're worn shirts, a nd undershirts and -- and the
  5  whatnot.
  6                 Q:   So in particular, the one that you
  7  designed, that you have the logo in front of you, about,
  8  you undoubtedly wore on some occasions, right?
  9                 A:   Never in a public way, no.
 10                 Q:   Never in a public way.  I see.
 11                 A:   Yeah.
 12                 Q:   Where did you wear it?
 13                 A:   It would have been possibly
 14  underneath as an undershirt.
 15                 Q:   As an undershirt?
 16                 A:   Yes.  
 17                 Q:   The only time you ever used it as an
 18  undershirt -- was an undershirt, sir?
 19                 A:   That's correct.  I didn't wear it
 20  where it was publicly displayed, no.
 21                 Q:   Now, sir, I would suggest to you it
 22  doesn't seem reasonable to think that a person would
 23  design a shirt with an intricate logo on it and then wear
 24  it only as an undershirt.
 25                 A:   I can only tell you that's how I did

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1 it. 2 Q: I see. Now, and you never saw any 3 other officer wearing that shirt; is that correct? 4 That's your evidence? 5 A: After the shirt was distributed I 6 never saw anyone wear it again, no. 7 Q: At any time, you never saw another 8 officer wearing that shirt, ever? 9 A: No, I did not. 10 Q: I see. Now you were in Windsor on 11 May 12, 2006 when the Globe article appeared with your 12 logo on the front page, right? 13 A: Whatever that Friday morning would 14 have been, yes. 15 Q: Yes. And someone drew it to your 16 attention, did they? Did they -- 17 A: No, I -- when I went to the door to 18 get the newspaper that's provided at the hotel, I noticed 19 then it was on the cover. 20 Q: I see. And you learned from the 21 resulting article that the OPP position, as had been 22 expressed at this Inquiry, was that they were shocked and 23 appalled by the existence of that T-shirt with that logo, 24 right? 25 A: Yes, I read that. Yes.

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1 Q: You read that? And you must have 2 been then quite concerned as the designer of that T-shirt 3 as to what was going to happen to you, right? 4 A: I was concerned with the 5 misinterpretation of the logo. 6 Q: Yes. But you must have been 7 concerned. You knew there would be some investigation, 8 right? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: And you knew that if there had been a 11 public position expressed by the OPP that they were 12 shocked and appalled at that logo, that you, the designer 13 of that logo, might face some serious problems; isn't 14 that fair? 15 A: There was a possibility that that 16 would occur, yes. 17 Q: Yes. And that's why the first thing 18 you did was call up the OPPA and ask for legal 19 assistance? 20 A: I sought legal counsel like anyone 21 would in a circumstance like that. 22 Q: Yes. And then you decided that since 23 they would inevitably find out that you were the designer 24 of the T-shirt anyway, you would acknowledge it, right? 25 A: I did what I thought was appropriate

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  1  given the circumstances and the misconceptions that were
  2  existing with respect to the logo.
  3                 Q:   Well, you knew that you had
  4  distributed this T-shirt to a number of officers and at
  5  least some of them would remember that it was you, right?
  6                 A:   Quite frankly, I'm not sure.  I can't
  7  speak to that.  I -- I can only speak to what I recall.
  8                 Q:   Well, yes, but let -- let me put it
  9  to you this way.  
 10                 You would have realized that it was very
 11  likely that you would have been identified as the person
 12  responsible for producing this T-shirt, right?  
 13                 You realized that, didn't you?
 14                 A:   Not necessarily.
 15                 Q:   You didn't realize it?
 16                 A:   No, I -- my concern at the time that
 17  it was coming forward was with the fact that it was being
 18  misinterpreted and that the logo was being deemed to be
 19  offensive and not in the manner in which I had originally
 20  designed it.
 21                 Q:   Now, sir, you've told us that you are
 22  not artistically inclined and therefore you couldn't
 23  design this logo yourself, right?
 24                 A:   Correct.
 25                 Q:   Where did you get the TRU symbol

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1 that's shown on this logo? 2 A: I must have had something that had 3 the -- the TRU logo, one (1) of our shirts or -- or 4 something like that. 5 Q: So you would have handed in to the 6 designer one (1) of your TRU shirts? 7 A: No. They probably would have 8 stencilled from what I had provided to them. 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: I -- 11 Q: -- and you would have provided to 12 them a TRU shirt. 13 A: Or a likeness thereof that was 14 traced. It's not a difficult design to trace. 15 Q: Well you didn't trace it, did you? 16 A: Not that I recall. 17 Q: No, you didn't trace it, you provided 18 to them some official TRU uniform for them to copy, 19 right? 20 A: The -- the logo is on other things 21 other than a shirt. It's on an emblem which is worn on 22 the official uniform, plus there's patches that were, you 23 know -- stickers that were made years ago as well. 24 So it's not necessarily coming directly 25 from a shirt.

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1 Q: Sir, I put it to you, you must have 2 some memory of your involvement in designing this T- 3 shirt. Do you claim you have no memory whatsoever of any 4 aspect of the actual enterprise of designing this T- 5 shirt, sir? 6 A: Sir, it's eleven (11) years ago. I - 7 - I, quite frankly, don't recall. 8 Q: No memory? You don't remember what 9 city it was in? 10 A: No. No, I do not. I've -- I've 11 narrowed it down to the possibility that it took place in 12 either Woodstock or London, but I -- I can't speak to 13 that. 14 Q: Now, sir, were you accompanied by any 15 other officer when you attended at the shop for the 16 design of this T-shirt? 17 A: Not that I recall. 18 Q: Not that you recall, but you might 19 have been? 20 A: Possibly. 21 Q: Did any -- was there -- there was no 22 other officer involved with you in this enterprise; it 23 was William Klym enterprise? 24 A: It wasn't an enterprise, sir, it was 25 -- it was a task that I took on myself.

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1 Q: A task? 2 A: A task. 3 Q: Sorry? 4 A: A task. 5 Q: Task. T-A-S-K? 6 A: T-A-S-K, yes. 7 Q: Yes, task. I'm sorry if my 8 pronunciation is different from yours -- 9 A: I thought you said test. 10 Q: -- but we agree. It was a task that 11 you took on and it was the task of making a commemorative 12 T-shirt that would symbolize the co-operation between ERT 13 and TRU on that evening, right? 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: And you informed your fellow officers 16 you were taking on that task, right? 17 A: Correct. 18 Q: And in particular, you informed most 19 or all the members of the TRU team, and perhaps some of 20 the ERT members as well, right? 21 A: Quite possibly. 22 Q: And you informed them you were taking 23 on that task and you would be collecting money from 24 individuals who wanted to buy the T-shirts and you would 25 arrange for the production of them, right?

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1 A: That's a possibility, yes. I'm not 2 sure of the exact -- 3 Q: That's a possibility? 4 A: I don't know whether I had other 5 people collect the money on my behalf or what. That's -- 6 again, I'm not able to recall, it's eleven (11) years 7 ago. 8 Q: How much did you charge for those 9 T-shirts? 10 A: I don't even recall the amount. I've 11 seen in previous evidence that it was twenty dollars 12 ($20) which probably seems likely. But I don't have a 13 personal recollection of how much. 14 Q: In which evidence that it was twenty 15 dollars ($20) did you see, sir? 16 A: I believe it was in Dennis LeBlanc's 17 evidence. 18 Q: I see. So if he said that he paid 19 you twenty dollars ($20) for it, you would accept that? 20 A: If he said -- I don't know that he 21 actually paid myself, I don't recall the actual 22 distribution of individual shirts or whatnot. I'm saying 23 that the twenty dollar ($20) mark seems likely, if he put 24 that forward, because I have no independent recollection 25 of what the cost would have been.

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1 Q: Well I put it to you, sir, that you 2 had other officers assisting you in distributing the T- 3 shirt; is that not correct? 4 A: It's -- it's possible, sir, but I -- 5 I was responsible for the obtaining of the shirt and 6 whatnot. I did that myself and therefore I very well 7 probably provided those shirts to individuals that then 8 passed them on down. I -- I can't speak to it 9 conclusively. 10 Q: Now you gave some sort of replica of 11 the TRU symbol into the person who designed the shirt, 12 right? 13 A: I believe, yes. 14 Q: And did the same person who designed 15 the shirt, who ultimately produced the shirt, in one 16 shop? 17 A: I believe I would have gone to one 18 place where they would have provided all those services, 19 yes. 20 Q: And so you provided them with the -- 21 some form of TRU logo. And the anvil was your idea as 22 well? 23 A: Yes. Lacking any other symbol that 24 had -- or crest that existed for ERT, I believe I 25 produced that, yes.

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1 Q: And where did you get the anvil from? 2 A: The -- the anvil was -- was the 3 concept. I wouldn't have done the actual artwork. 4 Again, I don't have any artistic ability so I would have 5 conceptualized perhaps the -- the anvil. 6 Q: So you -- you told the designer, 7 please have an anvil at the bottom -- have a TRU symbol 8 at top and have an anvil at the bottom? 9 A: Quite possibly. 10 Q: And then an arrow in between? 11 A: Correct. 12 Q: Did the designer assist you in 13 suggesting how the arrow should be, and so on? Or you -- 14 you told the designer? 15 A: I -- that I don't recall. 16 Q: What did you have to pay for the 17 production of these T-shirts, sir? 18 A: There's -- it's been eleven (11) 19 years, I don't recall. 20 Q: Do you have a ballpark figure, sir? 21 A: No, I don't. 22 Q: How much profit did you make on this 23 enterprise? 24 A: There wouldn't have been any profit 25 made on it, sir. The shirt was made as an item to

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1 reflect what went on that evening, as I expressed 2 earlier, and the cost would have been -- to cover the 3 cost of what it cost to produce. 4 Q: Did you keep any receipts, sir? 5 A: No, I did not. 6 Q: You didn't keep any receipts? 7 A: No, I did not. 8 Q: And you say there were twenty (20) to 9 thirty (30) T-shirts sold; is that correct? 10 A: As far as I recall. 11 Q: Yes. And did you -- when you placed 12 the order, did you already have all the T-shirts 13 assigned, or did you order a number expecting to sell 14 most of them? 15 A: I -- I wouldn't have purchased any on 16 consignment. I would have had an idea, a rough idea of 17 who was actually -- the numbers that were going to 18 purchase them. 19 If I hadn't had the money already myself, 20 again, I -- I don't recall -- 21 Q: You would have had a rough idea that 22 you might be able to sell twenty (20) or thirty (30) of 23 them; is that your evidence? 24 A: Based on probably a canvas or 25 something that would have gone on.

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1 Q: And you would have bought at least 2 that many? You would have bought a few extras, right? 3 A: Not any extras, no. 4 Q: No extras. So you didn't -- this 5 worked exactly right. You bought exactly the number that 6 you ended up selling; is that your evidence, sir? 7 A: That's what I believe, yes. 8 Q: You believe that, but you don't 9 remember anything about any of this? 10 A: I can't recall specifics about that, 11 no, I'm sorry. 12 Q: You don't recall if you had any T- 13 shirts left over? 14 A: I had no T-shirts left over. 15 Q: No. Now, sir, you're familiar, from 16 criminal investigations and so on, with people who just 17 stonewall an investigation by not remembering very much. 18 You've had that experience, sir? 19 MR. IAN ROLAND: That's not fair to the 20 Witness. The Witness is giving his best recollection. 21 My Friend -- 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well -- 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- doesn't have to -- 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 25 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- give these kinds of

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1 pejorative interpretations to it. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I agree, Mr. 3 Roland. I think the Witness is trying his best to answer 4 your questions and I -- 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, with great 6 respect, Mr. Commissioner, I disagree with that 7 interpretation. That's a matter of argument. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's right 9 you -- 10 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: And I do have the 11 right to pursue. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- can make 13 your argument when the time comes, but I believe the 14 Witness has tried to answer the questions that he's been 15 asked. 16 MR. DERRY MILLAR: And it's up to the 17 Commissioner to decide -- 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- what are proper 20 questions -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. And -- 22 MR. DERRY MILLAR: -- and not Mr. 23 Rosenthal. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and -- 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Absolutely. Those

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1 are both true. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 3 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But on the other 4 hand, Mr. Commissioner, with great respect, it's 5 premature, in my respectful submission, to make any 6 conclusion about the truth of this Witness -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I -- 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- before the 9 examination is done. 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I haven't 11 done that. 12 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, no, sir, thank 13 you. Yes. And in particular, for him to not recall 14 anything about this event -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- where -- where 17 it was and so on, will -- it would be my submission, 18 ultimately, that's not credible. But I'm -- I'm not 19 making that -- 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, he has 21 remembered some things and he has done his best to answer 22 your questions. 23 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, thank you. 24 And I'm just continuing -- 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He hasn't

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1 said, I don't remember anything about anything. 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, he doesn't 3 remember anything about anything. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, he 5 hasn't said that. 6 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, with great 7 respect, let me enumerate again then, sir. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 10 Q: You don't remember what city you did 11 this ordering in; is that correct? 12 A: Correct. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He -- 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: You don't remember 15 if any other officers -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Excuse me, 17 Mr. Rosenthal, he did say he thought it was either 18 Woodstock where he lived or London where he worked. 19 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That was his 21 evidence. 22 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Not that he 24 didn't remember the city, it was either one (1) or the 25 other, as I recall.

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1 2 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 3 Q: Yes. And you don't recall if any 4 other officers assisted you in making this purchase, 5 right? 6 A: I believe I didn't do it -- I did it 7 alone, I don't believe I had someone there. But I can't 8 specifically recall the trip to it, so therefore I can't 9 say if someone else was with me. 10 Q: And you don't recall what if any 11 other officers you had assisting you in distributing 12 these T-shirts? 13 A: No, I do not. 14 Q: Although it's likely that there were 15 some; is that fair? 16 A: That -- that's fair, yes. 17 Q: Yes. And you don't recall how the 18 TRU -- what TRU symbol was given to the designer; is that 19 your evidence? 20 A: That's true. I don't recall that. 21 Q: And you don't recall what anvil 22 symbol was given to the designer? 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: Sorry. He didn't say he 24 gave any anvil symbol to the designer at all. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well, let's have

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1 his answer, Mr. Commissioner. 2 MR. IAN ROLAND: No. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, okay, 4 I don't remember what he said about -- 5 MR. IAN ROLAND: What he -- what he puts 6 it that he can't recall something he didn't testify. He 7 didn't testify about any anvil symbol being given to the 8 designer. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 11 Q: What is your evidence about the anvil 12 symbol, sir? 13 A: Sir, I -- as I've stated earlier, I 14 believe that the concept of the anvil may have been 15 produced by me in terms of put forward to the -- the 16 company. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: I didn't provide any artwork with 19 respect to an anvil or anything alike. 20 Q: So you just suggested to the designer 21 please design an anvil for me at the bottom of this logo? 22 A: Something to that nature, yes. 23 Q: And then with respect to an arrow, 24 you suggested to the designer that the designer design an 25 arrow and show it being broken by the TRU symbol against

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1 the anvil; is that correct? 2 A: That's correct. That's correct. 3 Q: And then the designer designed it? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: And showed it to you before it was 6 produced on any T-shirts? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: And you approved it? 9 A: I must have because the shirt was 10 produced. 11 Q: Well, did you approve it or not, sir? 12 A: I -- I'm assuming so, the shirt was 13 produced, sir. 14 Q: And then you asked the designer to 15 make a certain number of these shirts for you? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: And you don't recall how many? 18 A: Not a specific number, no, I've -- 19 I've stated already between twenty (20) and thirty (30), 20 I believe, but -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: On more than 22 one (1) occasion so far, so. 23 24 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 25 Q: Yes. You said between twenty (20)

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1 and thirty (30). And was that the exact number that you 2 sold then, sir? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He said 4 approximately twenty (20) to thirty (30). 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: No, no, no, but 6 whatever -- sorry. I -- I didn't phrase that well, that 7 wasn't what I meant, Mr. Commissioner. 8 9 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 10 Q: Were the number produced, whatever 11 number it may have been, exactly the number you sold? 12 You had just one (1) for yourself and none left over and 13 there didn't have to be any second orders; is that your 14 evidence sir? 15 A: As I recall, yes. 16 Q: Thank you. Now, you told us that -- 17 well, now you don't recall any individual that you sold a 18 T-shirt to, sir, not one (1)? 19 A: No, sir, I don't. 20 Q: I see. And you were asked about Ken 21 Deane. You don't even recall if you sold a T-shirt to 22 Ken Deane who was a central figure in this whole event? 23 A: No, sir, I don't. 24 Q: Can't recall? 25 A: No, I can't.

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1 Q: How about to your partner TRU 2 member Beauchesne, did you sell him one? 3 A: I -- I understand that I did, based 4 on his evidence. Up until now I didn't -- 5 Q: I see. 6 A: -- I didn't have an independent 7 recollection of that. 8 Q: What about Mark Dew, did you sell one 9 (1) to him? 10 A: I don't believe so. 11 Q: To Mr. Hebblethwaite? 12 A: Again, I don't -- I don't have 13 specific recollections of any one. 14 Q: How about to TRU leader Skinner, did 15 you sell one (1) to him? 16 A: Sir, I don't recall any one 17 specifically that the shirt was sold to. 18 Q: I see. You can't take your mind back 19 and recall any individual to whom you sold this T-shirt? 20 A: No, I cannot, sir. 21 Q: Thank you. Now Mr. Hebblethwaite 22 testified that the obvious interpretation of that logo is 23 that between TRU and ERT they broke the First Nations 24 people. 25 Would you agree that's the obvious

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1 interpretation of that logo that you designed, sir? 2 A: I would agree that that's one (1) 3 interpretation that can be taken from that, yes. 4 Q: I see. And what other 5 interpretations could be taken by the broken arrow in the 6 position that it is, sir? 7 A: Sir, the intention of my design was 8 to show the cooperative effort between the two (2) units. 9 The unintentional breaking of the arrow or the misgiving 10 that has been taken at this forum with respect to the 11 broken arrow I can appreciate where people would take 12 that as a symbol in that regard, but that's not how I 13 intended it. 14 Q: I would suggest to you, sir, that 15 from your evidence we can conclude that what you were 16 showing was cooperation between TRU and ERT in breaking 17 the First Nations people. 18 A: That wasn't -- 19 Q: That's the cooperation you were 20 demonstrating. 21 A: I was not demonstrating that, sir. 22 Q: Well, what does the broken arrow mean 23 other than breaking the First Nations people, sir? 24 A: The broken arrow was to symbolize the 25 occupiers that violently clashed with the ERT and TRU

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1 members that were on ground that evening. 2 Q: They violently clashed with them? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: By the time you produced this T- 5 shirt, you knew that one of the First Nations people had 6 been killed by the OPP officers, isn't that right? 7 A: That would be correct. 8 Q: And you knew that no OPP officers had 9 been seriously injured, right? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And you knew that a second of the 12 First Nations people had been badly beaten by the OPP 13 officers, right? 14 A: No, I did not. 15 Q: You didn't know that. Do you know 16 that now? 17 A: I know that based on the evidence 18 that has been produced. 19 Q: But you didn't know that at the time 20 you produced the T-shirt? 21 A: No, I did not. 22 Q: But you knew that one (1) First 23 Nation person had been killed, no officers had been 24 seriously inured, right? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: And I would put again to you and I 2 won't belabour this any after this, Mr. Commissioner, but 3 given that, I would put it to you, sir, that your logo 4 demonstrates cooperation between the police in breaking 5 that First Nations group of people. 6 A: As I've stated earlier, sir, I can 7 understand how people can take that interpretation from 8 it, and in retrospect there's probably more appropriate 9 symbology that could have been used in that, but in -- my 10 intention was not that. 11 Q: Sir, I don't believe you've indicated 12 an explanation in your mind for the broken arrow. You 13 say that other people could interpret it the way I 14 suggested but you haven't told us what you interpreted 15 the broken arrow. 16 Why did you tell the designer to show a 17 broken arrow between those two (2) paws of the police? 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think he 19 gave an explanation. It may not be one that you expect, 20 but he gave an explanation. 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I don't under -- I 22 didn't understand it as the broken arrow. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He did say 24 something. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: The brokeness of

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1 it. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, he 3 explained. I don't remember. I don't want to repeat his 4 words because I don't want to misstate them. 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But -- well, 6 perhaps then -- 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He did give 8 an explanation for what he intended the broken arrow to 9 be. 10 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes. No, he said - 11 - he said it meant it to show the cooperation between the 12 police. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No. 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: But the broken 15 arrow I would suggest to you, sir, you had to be 16 symbolizing by that when you told them him to show a 17 broken arrow, it had to mean breaking the people. 18 What else could it have meant in your 19 mind? 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I think he 21 said something about it, symbolized the violent 22 confrontation. 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: My -- My Friend should 24 listen to the evidence. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes.

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1 MR. IAN ROLAND: But he said it 2 symbolized -- 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: The violent 4 confrontation. 5 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- the violent 6 confrontation. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: It symbolized it. Now 9 can you -- you understand that? He said that. He gave 10 that evidence. 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. 12 Roland. I understand that. That is not an adequate 13 response. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well -- 15 excuse me, excuse me. 16 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: And I should like 17 to pursue it, Mr. Commissioner. 18 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 19 20 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: It symbolized the 22 violent confrontation but it shows the part that's broken 23 is, not either of the police symbols, but the broken part 24 is the First Nations people. 25 And I would put it to you, it shows as a

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1 result of a -- if you want to characterize it as the 2 cooperation or you want to characterize it as the violent 3 confrontation, it shows the breaking of the First Nations 4 people. 5 Now do you agree with that, sir, or can 6 you give me another interpretation of why that arrow is 7 broken. 8 A: Sir, as I've explained earlier, the 9 breaking of the arrow was a poor choice of symbol. The-- 10 Q: I'm not asking you about the choice. 11 Mr. Commissioner -- 12 A: -- the intent -- 13 Q: -- I deserve an answer. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let him 15 finish. Perhaps, you could finish the answer. Go ahead. 16 THE WITNESS: The intent, sir, of the 17 shirt was to demonstrate the cooperation between the two 18 (2) units working in harmony in a very violent and 19 difficult situation. It was, in retrospect, a poor 20 choice of symbology and -- 21 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Mr. Commissioner -- 22 THE WITNESS: -- it was not intended -- 23 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- he's told us it 24 was a poor choice. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Now, I've

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1 heard this same explanation several times -- 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Yes, and it's a 3 poor choice. 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, it -- 5 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: It's not an 6 explanation as to what it meant to him at the time. 7 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It does, Mr. 8 Rosenthal. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Sorry? 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I've heard 11 the same answer, what it meant to him, several times and 12 I don't need to hear it again. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With great respect, 14 Mr. Commissioner, to say it's a poor choice just means 15 that he -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, he's 17 explained it. 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- needs to explain 19 it again. 20 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He's hasn't 21 only said that, he's explained what it meant to him, what 22 he did. He's explained it. The question you're asking 23 him he's provided us with an answer and that's the answer 24 we're going to have to deal with. 25 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Mr. Commissioner,

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1 my last question to him that he responded it was a poor 2 choice to, was very specific about the brokeness of the 3 arrow and suggested a very specific meaning to the 4 brokeness of the arrow and he just responded "it was a 5 poor choice". That's not responsive to the question. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Because he 7 had previously explained what he meant by the broken 8 arrow. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With great 10 respect -- 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: He had 12 previously explained it. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With great 14 respect -- 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's on the 16 record and you can check it when you will. He's 17 explained what he meant. 18 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: The fact that he 19 answered my last question, "it was a poor choice", 20 verifies in my submission, my earlier suggestions, 21 countered by Mr. Roland inappropriately in my view, that 22 he did not give that answer. The transcript will reveal 23 it, of course, but I would like him to answer the 24 question specifically. 25 The brokeness of the arrow, didn't that

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1 indicate breaking the First Nations people and if not, 2 poor choice or otherwise, what did it indicate if it's 3 not that? 4 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 5 Rosenthal, you've asked those questions, you've received 6 answers, and I'm asking you to move on. 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I -- of course -- 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 9 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: -- accept your 10 ruling. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 15 Q: Now, you disposed of your T-shirt 16 several years ago, sir? 17 A: Yes, I did. Yes, I did. 18 Q: You -- you used the word 'several'; 19 three (3) -- four (4) years ago do you mean by that? 20 A: Probably some time after the 21 conviction of Ken Deane, but I don't have a specific 22 recollection of when it was, whether it... 23 Q: You mean after the first conviction 24 of Ken Deane -- Ken Deane at trial? 25 MR. IAN ROLAND: There was only one (1)

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1 conviction. I don't know what My Friend's referring to. 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Well -- 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: There was one (1) 4 conviction of Ken Deane. It was appealed twice, but 5 there was only a single conviction so -- 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You said, 7 "the first conviction" -- 8 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- when he said it's the 9 first conviction the point is -- 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: -- and I 11 think the suggestion is there may be other convictions. 12 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- there is no other 13 convictions. 14 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I'm not suggesting 15 other convictions. I meant the conviction at trial. 16 THE WITNESS: I believe so. I don't have 17 a specific date so I -- 18 19 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 20 Q: But, sir, that was more than several 21 -- several years ago. He was convicted at trial ten (10) 22 years ago, right? 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: My Friend isn't being 24 fair to the Witness. The Witness said in-chief several 25 years ago, after -- some time after the conviction of Ken

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1 Deane. He's already given that evidence. 2 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Now, he said -- 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: My Friend -- My Friend 4 is -- is now suggesting that he's giving some 5 inconsistent evidence. He gave that in-chief. 6 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Let's back 7 up. Back up and ask your question. 8 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Mr. Commissioner, I 9 believe Mr. Roland is inappropriate. I'm just trying to 10 get an idea of this. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 13 Q: You said several years ago, maybe in 14 the year 2000 roughly, sir, 2003? What did you mean by 15 several years ago? 16 A: Sir, I can't put a number on it. It 17 was some time after the conviction and I can't put a 18 specific year to it, I'm sorry. 19 Q: And you described it as several years 20 ago, right, whatever you meant by that? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: And you can't assist us any more than 23 that, right? 24 A: No, I cannot. 25 Q: Does that -- okay. That's fine.

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1 Now, at the time you disposed of the T-shirt, where did 2 you dispose of it? 3 A: I don't specifically recall how I 4 would have disposed of it, sir, it would have gone in the 5 bin of shirts that I use for rags or whatnot. It wasn't 6 anything specific. 7 Q: Oh, so you didn't get it out of your 8 possession, you put it in with some rags or something? 9 A: In standard practice I -- as shirts 10 get worn they become rags for maybe cleaning the car or 11 whatnot. That's -- 12 Q: So, the shirt was getting to look 13 worn out and therefore you might have used it as a rag? 14 A: As I explained earlier when the 15 significance of the shirt was not the same I stopped 16 using it or having it around. 17 Q: Partially because it was worn out; is 18 that what you just said, sir? 19 A: Sir, I was giving you practice of 20 what happens with my shirts, I wasn't specific to that 21 individual shirt. 22 Q: But was the shirt worn out when you 23 disposed of it or not? 24 A: I don't believe so. 25 Q: You don't think it was worn out? It

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1 could have been used further but you decided not to? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: It was somewhat worn but not worn 4 out? 5 A: I believe so. 6 Q: And did you have more than one (1) 7 shirt at the time when you disposed of it, or just the 8 one (1)? 9 A: One (1) shirt of this? 10 Q: Yeah. 11 A: I only had one (1) shirt. 12 Q: Only had one (1). 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Do you have 14 much more, Mr. Rosenthal on this -- 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: A little bit more, 16 not very much. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: You indicted 18 a half hour and you've used that and I'm just wondering 19 if there's much more along this same line? 20 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: With respect, Mr. 21 Commissioner, there was some interruptions and -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: That's fine. 23 No, I know that. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL:

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1 Q: So it was somewhat worn. Didn't you 2 tell me earlier, sir, that you didn't wear it at all? 3 Did I misunderstand you? 4 A: I never wore it in a public way, is 5 what I described. 6 Q: Now, you wore it only as an 7 undershirt, that's right. I'm sorry. 8 Now, when you disposed of it several years 9 ago, whatever -- whenever that was, at that time when you 10 looked at the logo, did you realize then it was 11 inappropriate? 12 A: Sir, I don't recall specifically 13 looking at the logo and thinking anything with respect to 14 it. I -- I disposed of the shirt. The significance of 15 the shirt was not -- excuse me, was not the same at that 16 point. 17 Q: The significance was not the same at 18 that point, you've told us that. So you must have looked 19 at the logo and -- and thought it doesn't mean that much 20 to me any more, right, or what? 21 What do you mean it wasn't of the same 22 significance anymore? 23 A: The significance was not there for 24 me, given the conviction of Ken Deane and that was why it 25 didn't have any significance. I didn't look specific at

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1 the logo and decide that. 2 Q: So you didn't realize -- you didn't 3 have any thought that the logo was inappropriate at that 4 time when you disposed of it? 5 A: I specifically didn't think about the 6 logo itself, sir. 7 Q: I see. When did you first begin to 8 think that the logo was -- was inappropriate then, sir; 9 when you saw it in The Globe and Mail? 10 11 (BRIEF PAUSE) 12 13 Q: Sorry? 14 A: Could you rephrase the question in 15 terms of -- 16 Q: When did you first begin to think 17 that the logo you had designed might be inappropriate? 18 Was it when you saw it in The Globe and Mail on May 12 of 19 this year? 20 A: I realized that other people were 21 interpreting it that way when I saw that. 22 Q: I see. 23 A: My intention, as I've described 24 earlier, was not to be offensive in the manner in which 25 it's taken. It was as earlier described.

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1 Q: Now, you were aware that there was 2 investigation of another T-shirt, right? 3 A: Yes. I've become aware of that. 4 Q: And at the time that there was the 5 investigation of the other T-shirt, you were aware that 6 you had produced a, at least related, kind of T-shirt, 7 right? 8 A: I believe so, yes. 9 Q: And did -- did you inform anyone that 10 you had produced this related T-shirt at that time? 11 A: No, I did not. 12 Q: I see. Excuse me, sir. 13 14 (BRIEF PAUSE) 15 16 Q: Now, sir, we have a redacted report 17 of that investigation. It's part of P-1051, Tab 17 18 thereof, and I've shown you page 16 of that document. 19 And the second paragraph on that page begins with a 20 redacted name evidently and then says: 21 "...was shown two (2) designs; one (1) 22 with an arrow, one (1) with a feather. 23 He stated that the one with the arrow 24 was offensive but he was not personally 25 offended by the feather."

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1 Now, sir, were you aware that the T-shirt 2 with the arrow had been mentioned in the course of this 3 investigation at all? 4 MR. IAN ROLAND: Sir, it's not a fair 5 question. We don't know, as Mr. Rosenthal knows, that 6 this is the same T-shirt. We don't know that. 7 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: I -- I agree. 8 That's correct. 9 MR. IAN ROLAND: Well, when he says, the 10 T-shirt -- 11 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Would you agree 12 that -- 13 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- he should say, a T- 14 shirt. 15 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Absolutely. 16 Correct. 17 18 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 19 Q: Were you aware that a -- there had 20 been a discussion in the course of this investigation of 21 a design of a T-shirt, one (1) of which had an arrow? 22 Were you aware of that, sir? 23 A: Could -- what -- in what relation, or 24 what timeframe are we talking here? I became aware of it 25 when I saw the T-shirt design on the cover of the paper,

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1 and then I came forward. 2 Q: I'm going back now to the time of the 3 investigation. I don't recall exactly when it was, back 4 in 1997 or something, the investigation of which I've 5 given you one (1) piece. 6 And you told us that you were aware that 7 there was an investigation of a T-shirt -- of a different 8 T-shirt. Okay, just to set that straight. 9 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, and I-- 10 MR. DERRY MILLAR: The date of the 11 document that My Friend's referring to, it's dated 12 January 8th, 1996. 13 MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 14 15 CONTINUED BY MR. PETER ROSENTHAL: 16 Q: Now, going back ten (10) years, to 17 when there was an investigation of a T-shirt, which you 18 were aware of, and you were aware that it was a different 19 T-shirt from the one that you had designed, was the 20 subject of that investigation, right? 21 A: Correct. 22 Q: Are we together on that, sir? 23 A: Correct. Yes, I said. 24 Q: Thank you. And were you aware that 25 in the course of that investigation, at least to some

185

1 extent, evidently, by -- according to this paragraph, 2 there was a consideration of another design, one (1) with 3 an arrow, in the course of that investigation; were you 4 aware of that at all, sir? 5 A: No, I was not. 6 Q: Thank you. 7 Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 9 Mr. Rosenthal. 10 Do you have any questions, Mr. Scullion? 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I do, Mr. 15 Commissioner. 16 17 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KEVIN SCULLION: 18 Q: Good afternoon, officer. 19 A: Good afternoon. 20 Q: My name is Kevin Scullion, I'm one 21 (1) of the counsel for the residents of Aazhoodena. You 22 may know them better as the Stoney Point Group. It 23 involved a number of the protesters who were involved in 24 this confrontation on September 6th. 25 You testified earlier that you recognized

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1 that the symbol on this shirt may have been 2 inappropriate, and certain interpretations by First 3 Nation members and others make it a very inappropriate 4 emblem to have on a shirt. 5 And my question for you, earlier today you 6 apologized to the family of Dudley George, the Estate of 7 Dudley George and members of First Nation communities. 8 Does that apology extend to those who were protesting in 9 that park the night of September 6th? 10 A: The apology was extended, I hope, 11 throughout. When I expressed it, it was to all First 12 Nations people who may find offence by it. So if that 13 answers your question, then, yes. 14 Q: Okay. I've heard your explanations 15 for the symbol and the fact it related a cooperative 16 effort as between TRU and ERT. You earlier testified, 17 though, that part of it was a breaking of the issues, 18 sort of calming the tensions between ERT and TRU that 19 existed prior to this evening. 20 Can you help me in understanding, in your 21 view, what those issues were as between ERT and TRU that 22 this particular incident helped to calm? 23 A: As I explained earlier, in 1993, when 24 the ERT program was in its fledgling state, many of the 25 tasks which had traditionally been assigned to TRU were

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1 somewhat downloaded or shifted to the ERT program. 2 In that taking place there was a 3 misconception of taking someone's work or their -- the 4 work that had traditionally been theirs, and so there was 5 tension over the fact that when we would be deployed to, 6 say, a barricaded gunman situation, by the time TRU had 7 arrived, that the situation -- because containment had 8 been set up with ERT, the situation may have already been 9 resolved prior to our arrival. So that's one (1) 10 example. 11 Other examples exist in the K-9 backup 12 that, you know, where an element of individuals would 13 accompany a K-9 officer on a dog track which had 14 traditionally been in the place of TRU members. 15 So there was a misconception over the 16 responsibilities and roles that each individual team took 17 part in. 18 Q: Okay. But in terms of assignments of 19 issues or situation to either ERT or to TRU; that's 20 something that upper management would do, correct? 21 A: In terms of how it -- decisions would 22 be made. But the tension would lie with the individuals 23 who would be actually carrying that out. 24 Q: I appreciate that there may have been 25 tension between those that were previously doing the job

188

1 and those that were assigned the job that might not have 2 the training. 3 I'm suggesting to you or seeing what your 4 evidence is in regards to whether or not there was a 5 tension between the members of TRU and those in upper 6 management that were assigning away the activities 7 ordinarily done by TRU? 8 A: Not in my mind. No. 9 Q: There was no issue in that regard? 10 It was simply between members of ERT and members of TRU? 11 A: No. Not at all. 12 Q: All right. And in your mind and your 13 view, somehow this tension was eased following what 14 occurred the night of September the 6th? 15 A: Yes. Through -- throughout that 16 experience we were able to see the individual definition 17 of what our tasks were and that our purpose could be done 18 jointly and that there were individual tasks within that 19 which provided the cooperative effort in order to get the 20 job done. 21 That there wasn't a -- a definitive one 22 taking the other one's role because each had distinct 23 roles and -- and a circumstance like -- 24 Q: All right. 25 A: -- like Crowd Management.

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1 Q: All right. So hearing your 2 explanation of what the issues were, how does the arrow 3 represent those issues? How does that come into play? 4 A: As -- as I've said earlier, it 5 represented the individuals that clashed with the 6 violence and the -- the struggle that went on that 7 evening. That was what the -- the arrow and the breaking 8 was -- was to represent. 9 Q: You testified in response to 10 questions from Mr. Rosenthal, that you don't know who 11 these shirts, twenty (20) or thirty (30) of them, were 12 sold to. But you also testified in examination-in-chief 13 very clearly, that you never spoke with anybody, any 14 commissioned officers about this T-shirt design of 15 distribution. 16 Do you remember giving that evidence? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Why would you not speak with any of 19 the commissioned officers about this T-shirt if it 20 represented a coming together of the ERT and the TRU 21 teams? Why would it be important not to share that with 22 the commissioned officers? 23 A: It wasn't a case of not sharing it. 24 It was -- the shirt was meant to be significant to the 25 people that were on ground that night whose -- whose

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1 lives were threatened in -- in a dangerous and harrowing 2 experience. 3 It wouldn't have had any involvement or 4 wouldn't have meant anything to the individuals that 5 you're speaking of, like the commissioned officers, 6 because they did not take part in that. They weren't 7 involved in the struggle at that time. 8 Q: Right. But my issue goes a bit 9 further. You never told any of the commissioned officers 10 about the existence, the design, the distribution and the 11 existence of these T-shirts. 12 Was that by design or was it simply 13 coincidence? 14 A: It -- it was -- it was not be design. 15 It was not by coincidence. It was just the way it was. 16 Q: And you've never been asked about 17 this shirt by any of the commissioned officers all the 18 way up until you saw it in the paper? 19 A: Absolutely not. 20 Q: All right. And I take it then that 21 with respect to this earlier investigation where you knew 22 that they were investigating a certain design of a 23 certain shirt, you were never asked by way of a general 24 request of all OPP members or a specific request of all 25 those that were involved that evening with any

191

1 information or to provide any information that you had 2 regarding T-shirts that were being distributed in regards 3 to that event? 4 A: No, I was not. 5 Q: And if you had been asked in that 6 way, you would have come forward with this design and 7 this T-shirt and shown them what was out there? 8 A: Likely, yes. 9 Q: Likely, or you would have? 10 A: Yes, yes. 11 Q: Okay. Thanks. Those are all my 12 questions. 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 14 Mr. Scullion. 15 Good afternoon, Mr. Roy. 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: Good afternoon, Mr. 17 Commissioner. 18 19 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 20 Q: Good afternoon, sir. 21 A: Good afternoon. 22 Q: My name is Julian Roy and I'm counsel 23 to Aboriginal Legal Services Toronto and I have a few 24 questions that follow up on some of the question My 25 Friends had for you about your involvement in this T-

192

1 shirt, all right? 2 A: All right. 3 Q: You told us that -- that twenty (20) 4 to thirty (30) officers would have received the T-shirt 5 that you've described, correct? 6 A: That -- that's what I recall. 7 Q: Did any one of those twenty (20) to 8 thirty (30) officers ever come back to you and raise any 9 concern about the design of this T-shirt? 10 A: Not to my recollection. 11 Q: All right. And if somebody -- if any 12 one, single one of those twenty (20) to thirty (30) 13 officers had ever raised a concern about the 14 appropriateness of that symbol, you would probably 15 remember that, right? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: Because you might have done something 18 about it, right? 19 A: Perhaps, yes. 20 Q: So we can be very confident that that 21 never happened, right? 22 A: To -- to my recollection, no. 23 Q: Now you've told us about being aware 24 of another investigation about a different T-shirt or T- 25 shirts, correct?

193
  1                 A:   Correct.
  2                 Q:   And you told us you didn't come
  3  forward because that investigation was about a different
  4  T-shirt, right?
  5                 A:   Correct.
  6                 Q:   You satisfied yourself that they were
  7  not interested in your T-shirt, right?
  8                 A:   The fact that it was a localized
  9  shirt, it was personal property that was that of the
 10  members that were on ground that night.  It was not
 11  anything that was in the public venue.  It was specific
 12  to those people.
 13                 Q:   Which T-shirt are you talking about
 14  now?
 15                 A:   About the T-shirt that I designed.
 16                 Q:   All right.  So you didn't become --
 17  come forward because you viewed it as your private
 18  property in a private matter between the -- you and the
 19  other twenty (20) or thirty (30) officers?
 20                 A:   Yes.
 21                 Q:   So it had nothing to do with the fact
 22  that the investigation was about a different T-shirt?
 23                 A:   I didn't view it that way, no.
 24                 Q:   Okay.  Does your employer, the OPP,
 25  have any business being concerned about how you conduct

194

1 yourself in your private affairs when you're not on 2 duty -- 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: That's -- 4 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- in your view? 5 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- that's not a fair 6 question. There is -- there's a whole area of 7 jurisprudence around that and My Friend knows that -- 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: Yes, I do. 9 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- and there are some 10 matters that an employer has a legitimate interest in and 11 there's many matters an employer doesn't in private. So 12 it's not -- 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Perhaps you 14 could be a little more specific in -- 15 MR. JULIAN ROY: I'm asking -- I can 16 clarify the question. 17 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, just be 18 a little more -- 19 MR. JULIAN ROY: I'm trying to get at 20 this Witness' understanding of -- 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 22 MR. JULIAN ROY: -- what his obligations 23 are and not about -- I'm not asking him for a legal 24 interpretation of what -- what -- his obligations are. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Try to be a

195
  1  little more specific in your question.
  2                 MR. JULIAN ROY:   I can try to be.
  3  
  4  CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY:
  5                 Q:   What I'm asking for, Officer, is do
  6  you  -- in terms of what you understand does your
  7  employer, the OPP, have any business with private matters
  8  and how you conduct yourself in your private time when
  9  you're not on duty?
 10                 A:   I'm not sure --
 11                 MR. IAN ROLAND:   It's the same question.
 12                 MR. JULIAN ROY:   No, it's his perception.
 13                 MR. IAN ROLAND:   He just asked the same
 14  question.
 15                 MR. JULIAN ROY:   I'm asking for his
 16  perception.
 17                 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN:   It's the
 18  same question.   It's basically the same question.  Can
 19  you not be a little more --
 20                 MR. JULIAN ROY:   Well, it's his
 21  perception; that's what I'm asking for.  Given his last
 22  answer where    he -- 
 23                 MR. IAN ROLAND:   The Witness --
 24                 MR. JULIAN ROY:   -- he was of the view
 25  that  -- that he was not obligated to come forward about

196

1 the T-shirt because it's a private matter I'm exploring 2 that. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes, I think 4 it's a legitimate area to explore, I just think the 5 question is a little to vague in general. I think if you 6 asked the question a little more specifically he might 7 be able to answer it. 8 MR. JULIAN ROY: All right. Let me go 9 about it a different way. 10 11 CONTINUED BY MR. JULIAN ROY: 12 Q: The -- what was different about the 13 T-shirts that your employer were investigating? What was 14 the difference -- 15 A: I -- I didn't -- 16 Q: -- between those T-shirts compared to 17 the T-shirt that you produced? 18 A: I didn't know of specifics of the 19 shirt because I didn't have one. I didn't see one as 20 I've stated earlier. 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: So I just took that it was not the 23 shirt that we had, that I had designed. 24 Q: And how did you satisfy yourself that 25 it was a different shirt?

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1 A: I had heard of the feather being 2 mentioned. 3 Q: Okay. So you took steps to find out 4 some of the details about the other shirt? 5 A: I -- I didn't take steps to do 6 anything. I didn't need to do anything in my mind. 7 Q: But you heard that there was another 8 shirt involving a feather, right? 9 A: That's what I heard through the 10 grapevine. 11 Q: Yeah. And you quite reasonably 12 concluded that they weren't talking about your shirt 13 because your shirt didn't have a feather, right? 14 A: Correct. 15 Q: Okay. You've told us that you didn't 16 think that your -- the OPP had any concern about your 17 shirt because it was a private matter. 18 What was your understanding as to why they 19 were interested in this other shirt with the feather? 20 A: I didn't have an understanding of it 21 because I -- I wasn't approached. It wasn't something 22 that was an area of a concern for me. 23 Q: Okay. Didn't it occur to you that -- 24 that given that your employer, the OPP, was interested in 25 this other shirt that officers had produced with a

198

1 feather that they might also be interested in your shirt 2 as well? 3 A: No, I did not. 4 Q: Was there anything stopping you in 5 terms of -- you weren't out of the country or something 6 like that when this investigation was going on? There 7 wasn't anything stopping you from coming forward with 8 your shirt was there? 9 A: Not that I'm aware of, no. 10 Q: No. I want to ask you a little bit 11 more about the actual symbol that you designed and 12 approved for the shirt and it's -- with respect to the 13 symbol that you chose to represent ERT. 14 You've told us that ERT had no readily 15 available symbol for you to put on the shirt, correct? 16 A: Nothing that had been produced at 17 that point, no. 18 Q: So you had to think of something 19 yourself, right? 20 A: Conceptualize, yes. 21 Q: Yeah. And of all the things to 22 conceptualize to represent ERT why on earth would you 23 pick an anvil as opposed to any of the other thousands of 24 things that you could have picked to represent ERT? 25 A: I -- I can't speak to exactly why the

199

1 anvil was chosen. 2 Q: Well, it's -- well, you've told us 3 that you conceptualized an anvil for the designer of the 4 shirt, correct? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Okay. You're not a blacksmith or 7 something are you? 8 A: No, I'm not. 9 Q: No. You don't have any particular 10 interest in anvils do you? 11 A: No, I do not, sir. 12 Q: Okay. So why just out of the blue do 13 you pick an anvil to represent ERT? 14 A: For something to work in conjunction 15 with the design of the TRU symbol, I suppose. 16 Q: Okay. And it works in conjunction 17 with the TRU symbol in that the TRU symbol is banging 18 something against an anvil, right? 19 A: It can be interpreted that way, yes. 20 Q: Well, how did you interpret it, sir? 21 A: I interpret it as I've expressed 22 previously, sir, that it was the cooperative effort 23 between the two (2). And I've explained that it was a 24 poor choice of symbols. 25 Q: Does an anvil -- anvil represent

200

1 cooperation and collegiality to you? 2 A: I can't specifically state that? 3 Q: No. Was -- that perhaps could 4 represent the opposite of collegiality and cooperation, 5 right? 6 A: I don't know where you're going 7 with -- 8 Q: Okay. An anvil is something hard 9 that you pound something else against, right? That's the 10 only thing it could symbolize, right? 11 A: Perhaps. 12 Q: It is. It's more than perhaps, isn't 13 it? 14 A: I've described, you know, at great 15 length as to what I -- what I intended by it, sir. 16 Q: I have your answer. Now, you said 17 the arrow represented the occupiers; is that right? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: Did you see any of the occupiers with 20 arrows? 21 A: No, I did not. 22 Q: So how could an arrow represent the 23 occupiers then? 24 A: As I expressed earlier, sir, it was a 25 -- a poor choice of symbols.

201

1 Q: Okay. But you approved that choice, 2 and I want to know from you how on earth, if the 3 occupiers didn't have arrows, how on earth could an arrow 4 represent the occupiers? 5 A: The arrow represented the occupiers 6 that clashed with us violently. The arrow was a weapon 7 and it was, you know, used to symbolize those people that 8 struggled with -- with us that evening. 9 Q: And "those people" are First Nations 10 people, right? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: That's what the arrow represented, 13 right? 14 A: In retrospect, that is what it was 15 taken -- 16 Q: Not in retrospect, sir, with respect. 17 At the time the arrow represented First Nations people? 18 A: That can be one (1) interpretation, 19 sir. 20 Q: And that was your interpretation at 21 the time? 22 A: No, it was not, sir. 23 Q: I have your answer. Were you 24 concerned that in distributing this T-shirt that it may 25 be seen by First Nations people?

202

1 A: No, I was not. 2 Q: And why weren't you concerned about 3 that? 4 A: Because of the traditional use of a 5 shirt to symbolize a successful operation or something 6 that has taken place, a joint forces operation, the shirt 7 was as a personal belonging, not something that's readily 8 displayed to public view. 9 It doesn't have a meaning to anyone else 10 other than the individuals who purchase it. 11 Q: Okay. So it would be something for - 12 - to be kept within the police, right? 13 A: Something to be kept to the person. 14 Q: Beg your pardon? 15 A: To -- to be kept specific to the 16 person for their own personal use. 17 Q: Well, did you give any direction or - 18 - or instructions to the people that you were giving the 19 shirt to as to how they were to use it? 20 A: I wasn't in a position to be giving 21 anyone any direction. 22 Q: Okay. And you -- you weren't 23 tracking these twenty (20) to thirty (30) shirts, were 24 you? 25 A: I don't understand what you mean by

203

1 "tracking." 2 Q: Well, you didn't take any steps to 3 find out how these twenty (20) to thirty (30) shirts were 4 used, were you -- did you? 5 A: No, not that I recall. No. 6 Q: When you wore the T-shirt as an 7 undershirt, did you ever wear it as an undershirt on the 8 job? 9 A: No, I did not. 10 Q: And how is it that you can recall 11 that specifically, sir? 12 A: I wasn't working as -- in a uniform 13 function after that point. So I wouldn't have had that 14 as a -- a shirt that I would have worn under body armour. 15 And while I was on TRU team I was provided with shirts. 16 MR. JULIAN ROY: All right. 17 Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner. 18 Thank you, sir. Those are my questions. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 20 Mr. Roy. 21 Does anybody have any questions on behalf 22 of the OPP? 23 MR. IAN ROLAND: A couple of questions. 24 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Mr. 25 Roland...?

204

1 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. IAN ROLAND: 2 Q: Detective Sergeant Klym, you were 3 asked by Mr. Roy about the symbolism of the anvil. Did - 4 - do you understand anvil to be used -- used to forge 5 things, to create things, something that didn't exist 6 before? 7 A: Exactly, yes. 8 Q: And did you see this coming together 9 of -- of the -- of the ERT and TRU as forging a new 10 relationship? 11 A: Completely. 12 Q: With respect to the shirt, it has on 13 it the words, "Project Maple" -- 14 OBJ MR. JULIAN ROY: Mr. Commissioner, I have 15 an objection to that last line of questioning; that's 16 something that ought to have been elicited in chief 17 through -- by My Friend. 18 That's a completely new explanation that 19 didn't come out through Mr. Millar's examination, and if 20 My Friend intended to elicit it he ought to have done it 21 in chief before the rest of us cross-examined. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm not 23 sure -- 24 MR. JULIAN ROY: In my wildest 25 imagination I couldn't have imagined that answer, and it

205

1 ought to have come out and given us an opportunity to 2 cross-examine on it. 3 MR. DERRY MILLAR: One of the things that 4 I think we all have to be careful of and mindful of, is 5 if -- I wish I did, in examination-in-chief, try to find 6 out what it meant, and I didn't ask that question. 7 And My Friend -- I -- I tend to agree with 8 Mr. Roy on this point and we have to -- if there's going 9 to be a new explanation I think that the sooner it comes 10 out the better so that people can cross-examine on it. 11 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: It's a 12 delicate position to be in when you're counsel on behalf 13 of the witness to be cross-examining, Mr. Roland. And to 14 be cross-examining in the traditional sense and 15 suggesting answers, and answers that you're suggesting 16 are not answers that were available for cross- 17 examination, seems a little unfair. 18 So I understand that this is the only 19 opportunity you have to examine or cross-examine, 20 whatever you want to call it, but it -- 21 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Well that's -- but 22 that's not correct, sir. If there is -- if -- 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: No, he has 24 an opportunity to do it at the front end if he chooses -- 25 MR. DERRY MILLAR: At the front end, if

206

1 he's going to bring out something new. 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I'm aware of 3 that. But in this case, this is the only -- he's -- he's 4 chosen to only examine now. So I'm saying, I don't think 5 it's fair to be cross-examining in the traditional way 6 and suggesting answers to questions at this stage. 7 Yes, Mr. Scullion...? 8 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: I just want to put 9 in my two (2) cents as well, that this is an issue that 10 came up with our clients who testified a little while 11 ago. 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 13 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: And the solution 14 that was reached was the one that Mr. Rosenthal keeps 15 referring to with Mr. Simon -- 16 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 17 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: -- which is, 18 anything new -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 20 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: -- should be dealt 21 with at the outset so that -- 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 23 aware of that. 24 MR. KEVIN SCULLION: And I just note that 25 the OPPA, and I will criticize, has done this a number of

207

1 times in the recent weeks. And for something new to come 2 up, this is unexpected and unfair to the rest. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: We're not 4 disagreeing. I think we're saying the same thing, we're 5 just saying it a little differently. I think Mr. Roland 6 and anybody who is examining on behalf of the witness who 7 is testifying, needs to keep that in mind. 8 If you're going to be eliciting new 9 information it should be done at the front end, rather 10 than under the guise of examination or cross-examination 11 at the end, as it isn't fair to counsel who don't have an 12 opportunity to cross-examine. 13 Now, I think we should just move on. 14 There is nothing more we can do. 15 MR. IAN ROLAND: I -- just so that you 16 understand my position, Mr. Commissioner, I completely 17 dispute the characterization that there's anything new 18 about this at all. And I completely disagree with My 19 Friend -- My Friend who says Mr. -- who says that all -- 20 Mr. Millar says that this is something that he didn't 21 elicit. 22 It's exactly what he elicited. He 23 elicited about the fact that these two (2) groups came 24 together for the first time in a cooperative way, and 25 they symbolized that. And I simply carried that on,

208

1 that -- 2 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: But -- 3 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- analogy on with this 4 officer in the context of the very questions Mr. Roy 5 asked about the symbolism of an anvil. So that this is 6 new -- to characterize this as a new area, I say is 7 completely fanciful. 8 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Well, I'm 9 not sure about that. And in any event, it's done, and 10 I'm asking you to carry on. You did -- you did suggest 11 an interpretation to the witness that didn't come from 12 the witness except in his agreement with your suggestion. 13 MR. IAN ROLAND: Yes. 14 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: And in that 15 sense it was something new. So let's move on. 16 MR. IAN ROLAND: Well, you'll have to put 17 -- you'll have to put whatever value you -- you do on 18 that as -- as the trier of fact on these -- 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 20 MR. IAN ROLAND: -- matters, Mr. 21 Commissioner, and I'm sure you will. 22 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 23 Mr. Roland. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MR. IAN ROLAND:

209
  1                 Q:   The last very small area was -- was
  2  the use of the word "Project Maple" and I ask this in the
  3  context of Mr. Roy saying that this is some -- and asking
  4  about this being a private matter or in the context of
  5  the -- the T-shirt being private.  
  6                 And I ask the witness:  With the use of
  7  "Project Maple," did that indicate anything, sort of,
  8  private within the police or the -- within the officers
  9  who got the T-shirt? 
 10                 A:   It was specific to the individuals
 11  that were on ground that night. 
 12                 MR. IAN ROLAND:   Okay.  Thank you.   
 13                 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN:   Thank you.  
 14                 Yes, Mr. Millar...? 
 15                 MR. DERRY MILLAR:   Commissioner, I don't
 16  have any further questions.  I'd like to thank Detective
 17  Sergeant Klym for attending and giving his evidence
 18  today.
 19                 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN:   I'd like to
 20  thank you as well for coming and giving us your evidence. 
 21  And that's it, you're finished.
 22  
 23                    (WITNESS STANDS DOWN)
 24  
 25                 MR. DERRY MILLAR:   And perhaps we could

210

1 take five (5) minutes so that we can get ready for our 2 next witness? 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 4 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 5 for five (5) minutes. 6 7 --- Upon recessing at 2:16 p.m. 8 --- Upon resuming at 2:24 p.m. 9 10 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 11 resumed. Please be seated. 12 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Commissioner, just 13 before Ms. Vella continues with the next witness, there 14 was a matter I wanted to just alert everyone to. 15 During the examination-in-chief of Mr. 16 Klym, I referred to the photographs of the T-shirt and 17 mug as being Exhibit P-438, and it really is P-458, and I 18 just wanted to make that clear. 19 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 20 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Good afternoon. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good 22 afternoon, Ms. Vella. 23 MS. SUSAN VELLA: The Commission calls as 24 its next witness Don Bell. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Good

211

1 afternoon. 2 3 DONALD WILLIAM BELL, Sworn 4 5 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF MS. SUSAN VELLA: 6 Q: Good afternoon. 7 A: Good afternoon. 8 Q: I understand that you joined the 9 Ontario Provincial Police in 1984 and were posted to the 10 Peterborough Detachment until 1993? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: And during that posting you served in 13 various capacities relating to general law enforcement 14 duties? 15 A: That's correct. 16 Q: And during that period you were also 17 seconded twice to the No. 8 District Crime Unit? 18 A: That's correct. 19 Q: In 1993 you were promoted to 20 Detective Sergeant and transferred to the London Joint 21 Forces Operation where you served as the Unit Commander? 22 A: Yes. 23 Q: In 1998 you became the Operations 24 Coordinator of the Biker Enforcement Unit? 25 A: Yes.

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1 Q: In 2001 you became the Unit Commander 2 of the Biker Enforcement Unit? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: And you were promoted at that time to 5 Detective Inspector? 6 A: That's correct. 7 Q: And that is the rank that you hold 8 today? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: I would like to focus for the moment 11 on your training in the intelligence field. 12 What formal training did you have as of 13 September 1995? 14 A: Formal training would have consisted 15 of the CISO, the Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario 16 Intelligence Officer's Course, which I believe was a two 17 (2) week course. And I'm not 100 percent sure of the 18 dates but I believe that would have been in 1994. 19 Q: All right. And did you have any 20 other formal training? 21 A: With regards to intelligence? No. 22 Q: Was there any other formal training 23 available at that time? 24 A: Specific to intelligence there were 25 training in the areas of informant development, informant

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1 control, analysis and things of that nature, but as to 2 specific duties of an intelligence officer, that was the 3 primary source. Now there may have been similar courses 4 offered through Canadian Police College but the premise 5 would be the same. 6 Q: All right. And what did you learn in 7 relation to the process, the intelligence process? 8 A: Basically, at the course we -- we 9 were taught the -- what the intelligence process consists 10 of, being planning -- in the first days, being planning, 11 then moving onto the collection, evaluation, collation, 12 analysis, dissemination, re-evaluation. 13 Q: All right. 14 A: So went through those areas of the 15 process and explained them and how to integrate them. 16 Q: All right. And is part of the 17 training, does that include assessment or how you assess 18 the degree of reliability of data? 19 A: I -- my independent recollection 20 doesn't refer to that but I'm sure that would have been a 21 component because there are reliability factors that play 22 a significant role in the intelligence process. 23 Q: All right. Did you have any 24 practical field experience by 1995? We know you did, 25 perhaps you can expand on your field experience as an

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1 intelligence officer. 2 A: Up until 1995? 3 Q: Correct. 4 A: Well certainly in my tenure in the -- 5 in the crime unit in Peterborough, we -- we gathered 6 intelligence in the area of drug enforcement, which was 7 my primary responsibility within the crime unit. 8 That, to a degree, would have been seen as 9 information, I assume, versus intelligence, because the 10 evaluation analysis would have been limited. 11 However, when I went to the London JFO we 12 took on a more formalized approach, whereby in our 13 investigations into mandated groups or dossier files, we 14 would put a process in place where we would utilize the 15 intelligence cycle. 16 Q: The intelligence cycle which are the 17 various steps that you -- you talked about -- 18 A: Yes. 19 Q: -- collecting, collation, evaluation, 20 assessment -- or analysis, dissemination, reporting and 21 re-evaluation? 22 A: Correct. And, you know, suffice it 23 to say, the process wouldn't be followed to its fullest 24 extent in all cases, but certainly we would in -- the 25 collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, would be

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1 done to some -- to some sort of formal degree. 2 Although within the Joint Forces Operation 3 we did not have a -- an actual analyst, per se. 4 Q: All right. So that meant that that 5 task reli -- fell to the intelligence officers within 6 that unit? 7 A: That's correct. 8 Q: Now the London JFO, does that stand 9 for Joint Forces Operation? 10 A: That's correct. 11 Q: And you -- you joined that -- that 12 unit in 1993? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: Can you tell us -- describe in a 15 general way what the overall purpose of the London Joint 16 Forces Operation was during the -- the general timeframe 17 of '93 to '95? 18 A: The London Joint Forces Operation was 19 comprised of the OPP, the RCMP and the London City 20 Police. We were mandated to gather intelligence on 21 criminal organizations within the mandated area, which 22 encompassed six (6) counties in the area, including 23 Huron, which was resulting in our involvement with 24 Ipperwash. 25 Q: All right. And was this a relatively

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1 new organizational device amongst the policing community? 2 A: No. The London JFO had been around 3 for some time. And there was -- within the Ontario 4 Provincial Police, I believe at that time there were six 5 (6) deployed units similar in nature throughout the 6 Province. 7 Q: And where did the London JFO fit into 8 the overall OPP intelligence organizational structure? 9 A: At that time the -- I believe the 10 intelligence, which is now the Intelligence Bureau, I 11 believe at that time was Intelligence Section, in -- 12 within the Intelligence Section there was an area 13 identified as Field Units. 14 And we fell under the Field Unit category 15 whereby we reported up a chain. Immediate supervisor 16 within the London JFO was the London City Staff Sergeant 17 which reported up through a Joint Management Team 18 consisting of a senior officer from each of the 19 participating agencies, being the OPP, RCMP and London 20 City Police. 21 The JMT representative for the OPP was the 22 director of the Intelligence Section. The director of 23 the Intelligence Section reported up to a superintendent, 24 which I believe later changed to a chief superintendent 25 of investigation support, who then in turn reported to a

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1 deputy commissioner of operations. 2 Q: All right. I understand that there 3 was also, within the OPP at the time, a -- a general 4 headquarters for the Intelligence Section? 5 A: That's correct. The -- 6 Q: And how -- I'm sorry -- 7 A: I'm sorry. The Intelligence Section 8 was housed within general headquarters. At first that 9 was housed in the Toronto area and then we later moved to 10 general headquarters in Orillia. 11 Q: What was the relationship between the 12 JFO -- the London JFO then and the specific headquarters, 13 Intelligence Headquarters, within the general 14 headquarters? 15 A: Well we fell under the field unit. 16 Within the Intelligence Section command, as I said there 17 was a field unit area, there was a -- in and around '95 I 18 believe was when the casinos came into play. There was a 19 casino section, there was an analytical component. 20 So it was divided up into various 21 sections. And we fell within the field unit area and 22 reported up through the chain. 23 Q: All right. Did the London JFO also 24 interact with the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada 25 at that time?

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1 A: It was more of a reporting 2 relationship with the Criminal Intelligence Service of 3 Ontario. London City Police, as -- is the OPP and RCMP 4 are members of CISO. And CISO is a bureau that forms part 5 of the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada. So there 6 was an indirect relationship there. 7 Q: All right. So essentially what 8 you've described is that there were a number of 9 organizational structures within -- either within which 10 the OPP participated or under the mandate of the OPP. 11 The JFO was one (1) of those units if you will. It had 12 direct relationship, reporting relationship to your 13 headquarters for the OPP. 14 And was that in Orillia -- 15 A: Yes -- 16 Q: -- at the time? But, also there was 17 an inter-relationship amongst other intelligence policing 18 organizations within Ontario? 19 A: That's correct. And I should have 20 stated earlier that part of our mandate within the JFO 21 was to maintain a liaison or a relationship with other 22 law enforcement agencies and other groups that would 23 assist in the intelligence function. 24 Q: All right. I understand that in the 25 '93 to '95 time period the -- there were different

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1 philosophical approaches to intelligence within the 2 police -- the broader policing community. I just wonder 3 if you could describe what approach or philosophy the OPP 4 intelligence program reflected in the '93 to '95 5 timeframe? 6 A: Well, within the London JFO 7 specifically, we would be categorized as a tactical unit, 8 which mean -- meant that we were mainly project driver or 9 investigative. We were focussing on investigations 10 towards identified groups within the London area. 11 So we were focussing on criminal 12 organizations within our mandated area towards building 13 up a prosecution which would result in criminal 14 prosecutions. 15 Q: All right. And you said it's project 16 driven. Does that mean that you would, from time to 17 time, devote the resources when a particular incident or 18 a broad operation would come to your attention? 19 A: In some cases, but more specifically 20 and more often than not, what we would do is -- there 21 were dossiers CISO -- CISE down through CISO had mandated 22 areas and dossiers were created on each one (1) of those 23 mandated areas. 24 Those areas were specific to what were 25 identified organized crime groups. At the time, I

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1 believe, they were outlaw motorcycle gangs, organized 2 crime within the First Nations community, official 3 organized crime, Eastern organ -- Eastern European 4 organized crime and organized crime within the Asian 5 community; I don't know if I said that already. There 6 were five (5). 7 So traditionally what we would do is what 8 we'd refer to as work ups within those groups. And 9 prioritize where we were going. So for instance, if 10 there as an Asian organized crime group within the City 11 of London, based on our intelligence we would focus on 12 that particular group and develop and investigation 13 towards successful prosecution in the Courts. 14 Q: Okay. Now you said that you were 15 essentially a tactical unit and you've described what 16 that is. What would that be in contrast to? 17 A: That would be in contrast to a 18 strategic unit. Strategic intelligence I can best 19 describe as a management tool. It looks at trends and 20 indicators whereby you look at long range goals and 21 objectives and use it to assist management in predicting 22 trends so they can set proper direction down the road. 23 Q: Can you give us an example, just to 24 contrast the strategic -- 25 A: Certainly.

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1 Q: -- versus tactical? 2 A: In the early 1990's it was -- 3 strategic reports -- they were numerous strategic reports 4 based on intelligence coming from the Province of Quebec 5 and observations within Province that the Hell's Angels, 6 a notorious criminal organization in Quebec were going to 7 be setting up in our Province. 8 At that time we did not have any specific 9 Hell's Angels gangs in our Province and strategic reports 10 indicated that that was coming. Suffice it to say they 11 were right and they did come. 12 Q: And that's contrasted with a tactical 13 intelligence which deals with once an incident arises? 14 A: Or we could take that to a step using 15 the same example that the Hell's Angels arrive, we've 16 identified them, we've seen the strategic reports so when 17 they're coming we -- well, a prime example in my current 18 capacity we set forth, we develop a joint forces 19 operation to combat the criminal activity and start 20 investigating that particular organized crime group. 21 So based on the strategic report when the 22 Hell's Angels arrived we were able to set our -- our 23 operational priorities and go forward from there. 24 Q: All right. Now, what -- what 25 database or software programs did the OPP Intelligence

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1 Program have at its disposal in the material timeframe of 2 '93 to -- to August '95? 3 A: Now, would you like me to answer that 4 in the context of the London JFO? 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: Okay. Because within the London JFO 7 we have some specific databanks because of our 8 partnership. 9 Q: Yes. 10 A: Within the London JFO because of the 11 three (3) partnerships with OPP, RCMP, and London City, 12 the London City Police databank was a system known as 13 Versadex and that housed all of the occurrences and 14 police information related to the London City Police. 15 The RCMP had the NCDB which I believe 16 stands for the National Crime Database or databank which 17 housed their documents nationally. 18 The OPP at that time were using a records 19 management system known as OMPPAC which stands for the 20 Ontario Municipal Provincial Police Automated 21 Cooperative. 22 We also had access to OCIIS which is 23 another databank, intelligence databank, which stands for 24 the Ontario Criminal Intelligence Information System 25 which was the predecessor to ACIIS which is the Automated

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1 Criminal Intelligence Information System. And I'm not 2 sure, ACIIS would have been coming in right around '95 so 3 timeframe, I'm not sure if we'd actually entered into 4 that phase. 5 Q: Did -- did you have -- did your 6 database capabilities include search engines? 7 A: Yes, they did. 8 Q: All right. What level of resources 9 did the OPP have devoted to -- to its intelligence units 10 as distinct from other -- its other constituent elements? 11 A: As far as -- 12 Q: Internal -- 13 A: -- overall number within the 14 intelligence -- 15 Q: Well, proportionate. 16 A: This would be an approximation. And 17 I believe that we had in the vicinity of eighty (80) to a 18 hundred (100) officers for the organization which would 19 be similar, very similar to our other commodity groups 20 such as drug enforcement and anti-rackets and things of 21 that nature. 22 Q: All right. So eighty (80) to a 23 hundred (100) intelligence officers throughout the 24 province attached to the various intelligence related 25 units?

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1 A: That would be my suggestion. 2 Q: All right. And in your view was the 3 OPP's intelligence program adequately resourced relative 4 to the challenges that the OPP was facing between 1993 5 and '95 from an operational standpoint? 6 A: Well, certainly you have to work 7 under the parameters that are given to you but suffice it 8 to say I think you would always welcome additional 9 resources. 10 Q: Fair enough. Now, in terms of the 11 London JFO did it have the primary responsibility for 12 Ipperwash-related intelligence activities between 1993 13 and September '91 or September 1st of '91 -- '95, excuse 14 me? 15 A: Yes, Huron County fell within our 16 mandated area but I believe there was also some overlap 17 with the Windsor Field Unit. So we were the lead but 18 Windsor did partake in the intelligence exercise. 19 Q: Okay. And can you describe the 20 organizational composition of the London JFO relative to 21 the Ipperwash-related operations? 22 A: With -- 23 Q: Which person -- how many -- 24 A: Which officers? Sorry. 25 Q: Yes, the number of officers and --

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1 and who they were? 2 A: With -- I might be able to put it 3 into context if I explain the -- how the office was set 4 up if I may? 5 Q: Certainly. 6 A: Within the London JFO I've mentioned 7 the identified groups and within that, the JFO, we had 8 the London City Staff Sergeant which was the person that 9 oversaw or supervised the day-to-day operations of the 10 unit. 11 Each organization had an NCO or a 12 frontline supervisor of which I formed that -- filled 13 that capacity for the OPP. 14 So I was a sergeant and the OPP had two 15 (2) detective constables which changed from time to time. 16 Primarily, during this time period and the initial days 17 it was Jim Pinnegar and Neil Morse and then it later 18 turned into -- around -- towards the spring of '95, 19 Darryl Whitehead I believed replaced Neil Morse. 20 The RCMP were represented by a corporal. 21 Initially it was Mike Lutes then it would be -- it was 22 Les Moore and they had a constable as well, Mike Keegan. 23 And the London City Police had -- oh 24 sorry, they also had a second constable, Mark Birs. The 25 London City Police NCO was Detective Sergeant Dan

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1 Tangredi. They had Detective Constable Bill McKaig, 2 Detective Constable -- or Specialist Constable Bob 3 Murray. 4 We also had two (2) clerical assistants. 5 Dawn Pineo was an OPP member and Cathy Jones was the City 6 clerical person. Within the JFO each one of those 7 officers was assigned specific dossiers. Particularly to 8 the First Nations issue, Neil Morse and Mike Keegan were 9 assigned that file. Later it was Mike Keegan and Darryl 10 Whitehead. 11 Pertaining to the Ipperwash initiative, 12 because of the significance of it to the OPP and our 13 organization, that was when I became involved as the 14 third member involved in the investigative team for lack 15 of a better term. 16 Q: Okay, good. Now did you have or did 17 the JFO have any ties with the Federal Military 18 Intelligence Organization or obviously beyond the RCMP? 19 A: Yes, we did. 20 Q: And can you just tell us what the 21 general nature of that relationship was? 22 A: We had a general information sharing, 23 intelligence sharing relationship. We would meet and 24 share intelligence back and forth. 25 Certainly the information that went back

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1 and forth it would -- fell within the guidelines of the 2 information that we're allowed to share. Reports that 3 were generated in the intelligence community as you 4 eluded to, do have certain classifications and of those 5 classifications there are -- are some reports that would 6 not be able to be shared. 7 Q: All right. And that was a 8 relationship specifically with respect to Ipperwa -- Camp 9 Ipperwash between '93 and '95? 10 A: Our dealing with the Military at that 11 time I believe were primarily with Ipperwash. But 12 certainly the relationship between OPP and intelligence 13 was further reaching than that. 14 Q: All right. Who was in charge of 15 directing the intelligence initiatives relative to the 16 Ipperwash operations between 1993 and August of 1995? 17 A: Directing the intelligence op -- 18 Q: Yes. 19 A: For the -- Inspector, now Deputy 20 Commissioner Carson was in charge, the Incident Commander 21 for Ipper -- the incident surrounding Ipperwash and we 22 reported directly to him. 23 Q: All right. And does that mean that 24 he would direct you when he wanted a particular task 25 done?

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1 A: Our task was very specific. Our 2 primary function was to identify those that were 3 occupying CFB Ipperwash. 4 Q: All right. And was it a task beyond 5 mere identification? 6 A: Well certainly we were to determine - 7 - in the initial stages we were trying to determine 8 demographics, you know like men, women, children and 9 certainly to determine the potential for whether or not - 10 - potential for aggression, potential that it was 11 passive, to get a read on the community within the -- the 12 Base. 13 Q: Do you also work up backgrounds if 14 you will, or profiles on those individual occupiers who 15 you identified? 16 A: Yes. 17 Q: All right. And who would be in 18 charge of determining how the tasks would be carried out? 19 A: Inspector Carson would ask or tell me 20 what he wanted me to do and then I would pass that onto 21 Neil or -- or Mike or assume the responsibility myself. 22 Q: All right. Now were there full time 23 intelligence officers dedicated to Ipperwash related 24 operations from 1990 --right through from 1993 to August 25 of '95?

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1 A: The officers that I eluded to before, 2 the dossier officers Keegan and Morse, that they were 3 fully -- their full time function was First Nations 4 issues. 5 But that did not preclude them for doing 6 investigations or gathering intelligence on the other 7 First Nations territories within our span of 8 responsibility. 9 Q: All right. So Ipperwash was one (1) 10 amongst several other initiatives or dossiers that fell 11 within your unit? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And -- could you explain for us the 14 typical relationship between an Incident Commander and 15 the Intelligence Officer during the course of significant 16 policing operations? 17 A: Well, I can only speak to this 18 specific operation because that was the only one (1) I 19 had to deal with during my tenure. 20 Q: Fair enough. 21 A: I think the relationship that I had 22 with Inspector Carson was -- was a very good and open 23 relationship. I certainly knew his position on 24 intelligence as it pertained to the occupation of CFB 25 Ipperwash and where he saw our responsibility and what he

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  1  expected from us.
  2                 Q:   And perhaps you can elaborate then on
  3  what your understanding of his position was with respect
  4  to the intelligence function for CFB Ipperwash?
  5                 A:   It was my understanding that
  6  Inspector Carson would not utilize intelligence
  7  information solely to conduct operational measures.  He
  8  saw us -- our primarily function to assist in
  9  identification, as I said earlier, of the people on the
 10  Base and to help with the -- establishing you know, the
 11  identity of the community within that had been
 12  established.
 13                 Inspector Carson -- sorry, Carson, because
 14  of his experience and his background in the area in 1
 15  District and Forest and Chatham had a great deal of
 16  contacts that he had developed within the policing
 17  community and within the community at large.
 18                 The Officers and the friendships and bonds
 19  were both prof -- as a professional and both a social
 20  basis, allowed him to get a very good read on the
 21  situation.  It was a situation where I don't think
 22  anybody was in a better position to assess the
 23  information that was being processed to him.
 24                 As such, it was my opinion that -- and my
 25  belief that he took -- made himself more or less the

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1 central repository for the information and processed the 2 information that he saw fit to determine where he was 3 going with his tactical priorities. 4 Q: All right. Now, does this reflect an 5 approach that some may call or characterize regional 6 intelligence? 7 A: Regional intelligence formed one (1) 8 aspect of what was being fed to Inspector Carson as an 9 incident commander. There were several avenues of 10 intelligence. And some of these avenues of intelligence 11 would be more -- better characterized as information 12 because they hadn't been processed through the cycle, as 13 I described earlier. 14 Inspector Carson had available to him 15 military intelligence. He had available to him his 16 regional intelligence through his DIC, District 17 Intelligence Coordinator or Regional Intelligence 18 Coordinator, which regardless of name is the same job. 19 He had the London JFO providing 20 intelligence. He had information that was being provided 21 in many cases, through our JFO but, from our general 22 headquarters intelligence staff, as well. 23 So he had all that information being 24 processed to him at which time he had to decipher it and 25 just determine what he was going to act on.

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1 Q: All right. So then as the central 2 repository then, the info -- essentially the information 3 which you collected and I take collated would be 4 transferred to him and he would conduct the analysis and 5 decide, you know, how to disseminate and how to evaluate 6 it? 7 A: The Ipperwash -- the days leading up 8 to 1995 the years actually, 1993/'94 -- were very 9 interesting from an intelligence aspect. And in fact, if 10 you're looking at what we had -- if you're looking at the 11 information that you have before you, before you do a 12 formal intelligence analysis, one has to look at what 13 you're dealing with, in my opinion in the initial stages. 14 And in my opinion, in the initial stages 15 what we were dealing with in many cases was fact. It was 16 fact that really didn't need a lot of analysis. 17 Because for instance, because of the 18 experience of the Officers on the ground, who I utilized 19 and the Unit -- the JFO often utilized to identify people 20 within the CFB Ipperwash, that was -- that was fact. 21 They pointed out to me that Don Bell was living at Bio 22 Lake, I can assure you that was Don Bell. So there 23 wasn't an awful lot of analysis that had to be done 24 there. 25 With regards to the information that we

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1 provided in our binders, again that was fact. Once we 2 identified Don Bell as living in that location then we 3 went through the various intelligence data banks, the 4 various criminal data banks et cetera, conducted our 5 checks and presented the Incident Commander with the 6 facts based on that person. 7 Q: Hmm hmm. So then your work then in 8 the Intelligence Unit of the -- the JFO relative to 9 Ipperwash during the days leading up to the Park 10 occupation then did not really focus on or highlight, for 11 example, or detect patterns of activity, things like 12 that, things that might assist the Incident Commander 13 with predicting what actions might be taken the next day? 14 A: Certainly what we saw between 1993 15 and 1995 led to various levels of intrigue or response 16 from the JFO. I'd like to -- I often refer to it as 17 "spikes," and in 1993 we had two (2) spikes. 18 We had in May 6th, I believe, when the 19 First Nations people occupied. 20 Q: Hmm hmm. 21 A: And then I believe it was August 22 23rd/ 24th when the helicopter was shot at. In between 23 those periods there was basically a lull. 24 From the London JFO perspective we 25 continued to update our binders and maintain our

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1 profiles, et cetera, and maintain communication with the 2 Incident Commander. However, it was more or less, in our 3 world, a conclusion that the Base was going to be 4 returned to the First Nations. The stumbling block, from 5 what we were hearing, was the environmental clean-up. 6 So within the absence of the spike and 7 having regard for the fact that we work within the City 8 of London and are overseen by a London staff sergeant -- 9 Q: Hmm hmm. 10 A: -- most of our activities revolved 11 around the hub and what came into the City of London. 12 Our First Nations priorities, in many instances during 13 that timeframe, circulated around cigarette smuggling and 14 the like, for territories outside of Ipperwash. 15 So basically, the analysis that was 16 associated to Ipperwash wasn't being conducted, because, 17 as I say, we thought we were dealing with fact. And we 18 thought that, from a strategic standpoint, that we -- the 19 future had been predicted to a degree in that it was 20 going to be given back to the First Nations people once 21 the environmental assessment had been done to clean up 22 the property. 23 Q: So at this stage in time, '93 and '94 24 and part of '95, was the Ipperwash Provincial Park on the 25 radar screen?

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1 A: Ipperwash Provincial Park, and going 2 by my memory, came up a couple of times. I believe there 3 was a situation where a booth was set up and admission 4 was being charged for people to go onto the beach, and 5 things of that nature. 6 It didn't really formally become part of 7 the radar, for lack of a better term, until, I believe it 8 was around August the 10th of '95. 9 Q: Okay. And we'll get to that in a 10 little bit. Now, spikes, just for the record, when you 11 use the term, "spike" do you mean an incident out of the 12 ordinary from the general pattern, or something like 13 that? 14 A: Exactly, or -- or a heightened -- or 15 an escalation or a heightened event that would draw 16 police attention or public attention. 17 Q: All right. All right. Now, before we 18 -- we review your specific involvement with respect to 19 Ipperwash, I'd like to talk a little bit about -- a 20 little bit more about the concept of intelligence. 21 Now, my first question is: Is all raw 22 data that comes to your attention considered intelligence 23 in the policing world? 24 A: Is all raw data considered 25 intelligence?

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1 Q: Yes. 2 A: No. 3 Q: All right. Can you describe the 4 process, and you started to do that already I think, but 5 in a little more detail, the process by which raw data 6 becomes intelligence. 7 And I'm just wondering, would it assist 8 you if we put up on the screen the intelligence cycle, 9 which is what you -- you started to describe? Would that 10 be of assistance or...? 11 A: Sure. Please. 12 Q: Okay. Thank you. And you have -- if 13 you need it you have a laser pointer. You may not need 14 it. This will just allow everyone to follow I think a 15 little bit more ably. 16 17 (BRIEF PAUSE) 18 19 Q: Thank you. And, Commissioner, you 20 should have a copy. That's right. All right. We'll 21 just put that on the screen. 22 And you'll see, just describing for you, 23 that we'll -- we'll get it to fit on the screen but it's 24 a circle essentially. And perhaps you can explain the 25 phases and what each phase entails in the intelligence

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1 process. 2 A: Planning -- planning and direction 3 would be identifying more or less your -- the direction 4 where you're going, you're -- the incidents, per se. So 5 in this -- in this case -- I'll have to stay focussed on 6 using this. 7 In this case, for instance we'll use 8 Project Maple, the focal point would be -- from our 9 perspective, would be identifying the people at CFB 10 Ipperwash. 11 Q: And that task or direction comes or 12 came from the Incident Commander? 13 A: Yes, in this case. 14 Q: Phase 2 then? 15 A: Phase 2 involves the collection of 16 the data and how we go about determining actually who is 17 on CFB Ipperwash. And we do that through, in this case, 18 through personal observation, through local sources, 19 police or civilian. 20 In other investigations outside of this 21 you may look at other covert means, but they weren't 22 utilized in this case. 23 Q: So that's essentially -- the 24 collection is the identification process? 25 A: Collection is the means in which you

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1 come up with the information -- 2 Q: Yeah. 3 A: -- to -- towards your goals and 4 objectives. 5 Q: So collecting the raw data? 6 A: Exactly. 7 Q: Okay. And then onto Stage 3. 8 A: Collation is uniting, putting pieces 9 of the puzzle together. So you take the -- the raw data, 10 and now you're starting to put the puzzle together; so 11 you get two (2) pieces of raw data that are the same, 12 three (3) pieces of raw data that are the same. 13 So you -- for instance, you get 14 information that there are firearms. So you start to 15 develop -- collate the firearms information. 16 You get information that there are people 17 that are -- are passive. You put that piece together. 18 You get information that people are coming 19 from outside of the occupied area from other First 20 Nations territories, et cetera. You collate and put that 21 together. 22 Q: And so -- and leadership groupings, 23 for example? 24 A: Leadership groupings, categories. 25 Q: Okay. Thank you. All right. And

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1 then the fourth stage? 2 A: Evaluation. More or less there 3 you're looking at verifying your source information, 4 taking a look at the validity of the information, to 5 seeing, in fact, that you have believed reliable 6 information, confirmed reliable information, unknown 7 reliability or doubtful reliability. 8 Q: And what you've just described then 9 are the different -- the -- essentially the degree of 10 trustworthiness, if you will, and reliability of -- of a 11 piece of raw data that you've collated with other raw 12 data. 13 A: Exactly. 14 Q: Okay. And the significance to the 15 different degradations of reliability are -- is what? 16 A: Well certainly if you're providing it 17 up the -- to the Incident Commander, information that he 18 would be most interested in would be confirmed 19 reliability. 20 We wouldn't even provide doubtful 21 reliability. Very rarely would we provide unknown 22 reliability. He wants to act on information that is 23 basically fact. 24 Q: All right. Thank you. And then the 25 fifth stage?

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1 A: Analysis. When we look at the 2 information we take a look at organizing it into a -- a 3 pattern where we can look and see if there's any 4 priorities that can be set. 5 For instance, in our -- if you -- in your 6 evalua -- in the first 4 stages, if you see there's a 7 tendency for violence and guns, you may want to take a 8 look at prioritizing your focus -- your focal point on 9 developing informative information or like to get further 10 information down the road on the guns, the firearms, et 11 cetera, so you could maybe -- so you could perhaps look 12 at a tactical intervention down the road. 13 Q: And would part of analysis include, 14 in appropriate cases, identifying, if you will, 15 relationships which the police could benefit from in 16 terms of developing contacts with the group of subjects 17 involved? 18 A: Yes. Your analysis looks at the 19 overall picture. You'd be looking at subjects involved, 20 you'd be looking at their associations outside the First 21 Nations community, you'd be looking at their 22 associations, if there is international or national 23 components. 24 You look at the whole broad picture in 25 order to determine where you're going as far as

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1 direction. 2 Q: And so in some respects you're 3 basically connecting the dots, if you will, to see where 4 it may take you or the Incident Commander in terms of 5 informing a strategy or a tactical decision? 6 A: You look at the linkages to assist 7 you down the road. 8 Q: All right. And then the sixth phase 9 in this process? 10 A: That's when you -- you pass the 11 information on. In that case your reporting and 12 dissemination would be to Inspector Carson and through 13 the various other people that had a play in the -- like 14 in this case, in London we -- RJMT would see, you know, 15 the information that we put forward and things of that 16 nature as well. 17 Q: And just so that I understand in 18 terms of looking, and I appreciate that not all the 19 phases always get completed, but ideally you would have 20 made a reliability determination with respect to the raw 21 data which you've now collated, you would run some degree 22 of analysis through that reliable information and then 23 you pass that up directly to the Incident Commander? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: All right. And then is it typical

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1 that -- that you, as the leader of the intelligence unit, 2 would have a direct reporting relationship with the 3 Incident Commander? 4 A: Yes. 5 Q: All right. And you did so in the -- 6 when you were part of the London JFO with Inspector 7 Carson? 8 A: Yes. Traditionally, intelligence 9 reports directly to the -- to the decision maker. 10 Q: All right. And then the seventh 11 phase. 12 A: Seven (7) is reevaluation. Once the 13 information's been processed and you've taken your 14 direction, you have to determine, in fact, if what you 15 determine was accurate. 16 And on occasions you'll find out that the 17 information wasn't accurate and then you have to step 18 back and re-assess what you've done. 19 Q: So it's kind of double checking your 20 facts, so to speak, and your process? 21 A: Yes, certainly, because, as you can 22 see, this is not an exact science and a lot of it is 23 based on human opinion and objectivity. So there are 24 occasions when you have to step back and reassess. 25 Q: All right. I wonder if we just

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1 might, so the record is clear make the diagram which is 2 called the Police Intelligence Process, which is what 3 we've been talking to, the next Exhibit? 4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P-1639 Your 5 Honour. 6 7 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1639: The Police Intelligence 8 Process Chart. 9 10 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I'm sorry I missed 11 that? 12 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: 1639. 13 THE REGISTRAR: 1639. 14 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 15 16 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 17 Q: And I was just being reminded that I 18 neglected to mark your curriculum vitae -- perhaps if you 19 go to tab 1 of your binder, sorry. 20 And is this -- does this accurately 21 reflect your career history and accomplishments as a 22 police officer? 23 A: Yes. 24 MS. SUSAN VELLA: I'd like to make that 25 the next Exhibit then, please?

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1 THE REGISTRAR: 1640 Your Honour. 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1640: Resume of Donald W. Bell. 5 6 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 7 Q: All right. Now you indicated -- I 8 was going to ask you whether all intelligence is treated 9 equally, if you will, in terms of precipitating police 10 actions. And I think you hinted at what the response 11 was, but perhaps I'll just ask you directly. 12 A: No. 13 Q: And what -- how do you determine what 14 intelligence is trustworthy enough to act upon it? 15 A: Well certainly the evaluation stage 16 plays a tremendous part of what you decide you're going 17 to act on or not. So, more of less, if you have 18 information and you're not completely comfortable with 19 the fact that it's confirmed, reliable information, you 20 generally don't act on it. 21 Q: And you started to describe some of 22 the -- or at least list some of the categories which 23 represent the degrees of reliability, and I wonder if you 24 would just take a moment now to explain each of the 25 categories and what they mean in the intelligence world?

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1 A: Okay. Reliable information is 2 information that's provided that has been verified and 3 validated, and what I would refer to, more or less, to be 4 taken as fact. 5 Q: And is that reliability confirmed? 6 A: Confirmed reliability. 7 Q: All right. And is there a category, 8 if you will, that's superior to that, that has to do with 9 the Courts? 10 A: Court confirmed reliable would fall 11 into that context. And basically what that is, is that 12 you're comfortable enough for that information to go 13 forward before the Courts. 14 Q: In other words, you think you can 15 prove the fact in question? 16 A: Exactly. 17 Q: What's the second category then? 18 A: Believed reliable. 19 Q: And what does that mean? 20 A: Separating that from confirmed 21 reliability, is there may be a question at hand with 22 regards to the source. For instance, you may have the 23 source -- may have verified the source, however, you're a 24 little unsure of the validity of the information because 25 the source may have come to you from somebody else, for

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1 instance, and you haven't worked with this individual. 2 Traditionally, you like to ensure that you 3 have information in -- that has been utilized over a 4 period of time, either by yourself or somebody else, to 5 assess you in making your -- to assist you in making your 6 assessment as to the reliability factors. 7 So, for instance, a person -- individual 8 may have come forward to you indicating that the 9 hamburger chain sells hamburger, but this person has 10 never told you about the hamburger chain selling 11 hamburgers before. 12 So you may have a question mark as to, in 13 fact, the type of hamburger that's being sold. 14 Q: Maybe I can just ask you, what are 15 the indicators of reliability that you look to when 16 ranking the information? 17 A: I'm not sure if I understand. 18 Q: Well, what -- what are the markers, 19 if you will, that would place information as reliable 20 confirmed versus believed reliability? 21 A: Those are things that your using in 22 the collection phase. You may have source information, 23 you could have police officer observation. You could 24 have independent public citizen's recollection. You may 25 have surveillance and the like set up.

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1 So you can put all of the factors -- you 2 try to use as many indicators as possible to assess you 3 in your credibility. 4 Q: All right. And what is the third 5 category of reliability? 6 A: Unknown reliability. 7 Q: And what does that mean? 8 A: That's where information comes 9 forward and you're not -- the sources are not proven and 10 you're not quite sure as to where it plays out in the 11 scheme of things as far as how valid it is. 12 Q: All right. And is there a further -- 13 a fourth category? 14 A: Doubtful. 15 Q: Doubtful. And that means...? 16 A: That basically you don't believe it. 17 Q: You don't believe it. All right. 18 And is it fair to say that when you're considering what 19 category to put the information into, you're looking at, 20 for example, the trustworthiness of the person disclosing 21 it or the -- the source? In other words -- 22 A: That's correct. That's correct. 23 Q: For example, whether or not they have 24 a bias in the situation or -- or are neutral? 25 A: That would be one (1) way of -- one

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1 (1) of the mechanisms you'd use to assess the -- the 2 source. 3 Q: And whether you have a history with 4 that person in the past that's proven trustworthy? 5 A: Either yourself or the individual 6 passing that information on to you. 7 Q: Do you also look at whether or not 8 this is information, if you will, that's consistent with 9 other information that you have already verified or 10 whether it represents a departure? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: All right. So these are the types of 13 things that you would look at? Are -- is there anything 14 else particularly that you can think of? 15 A: One (1) of the principle areas you're 16 looking at, and particularly when you're dealing with 17 human sources, is their ability to tell the truth and if 18 they have anything in the past that would indicate that, 19 for instance, if you queried them and they had a record 20 of deceit or perjury or obstruct or things of that 21 nature, it would definitely effect your -- your 22 assessment as to their reliability. 23 Q: All right. I guess the other thing 24 you'd look at is whether or not there is any -- any 25 independent proof, if you will, or indicators that would

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1 corroborate the accuracy or dispute the accuracy of the 2 information? 3 A: Corroboration plays a significant 4 component and quite often as time moves on. And 5 certainly in '93 through '95 we had developed quite a bit 6 of information that had come forward with regards to 7 various items. 8 Q: Now, you indicated that you would not 9 place information or intelligence of doubtful reliability 10 before an Incident Commander and that it's unlikely that 11 you would place information of an unknown reliability 12 before an Incident Commander, so -- and why is that? 13 A: Doubtful reliability is virtually 14 worthless to them and, you know, it could end up muddying 15 the picture for them and casting doubt when in fact 16 there's no -- there's no meat to it. 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: Unknown reliability, we did pass that 19 up on occasion on -- in situations where we felt that it 20 was -- the information was pertaining to some 21 intelligence that we'd received in the past ,and that the 22 problem was we just didn't know the source and we were 23 comfortable with putting a 'believed' or -- or 24 'confirmed' on it. 25 Q: But in those cases you would want or

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1 you would ensure the Incident Commander would know the 2 degree of your assessment of the reliability? 3 A: They were clearly marked when we 4 marked it up -- passed it up. 5 Q: All right. Who are the typical data 6 gatherers in an intelligence component of a policing 7 operation? 8 A: The constables. 9 Q: When you say, "the constables," are 10 these the constables on the ground, so to speak? 11 A: The intelligence officers. They -- 12 you know they're responsible to go out and dig up the 13 information required to do the collection phase, and -- 14 and that includes, you know, both their personal 15 observation, going out and meeting people within the 16 community, developing CI's and -- and the like. 17 Q: All right. And so it wouldn't 18 necessarily be a function of an intelligence officer to 19 go out and collect that information? 20 A: Would it be specific to them? 21 Q: Right. 22 A: No. And, in fact, you know, all 23 police officers would be encouraged to -- to talk to 24 people and gather information, and then hopefully they 25 would pass it on through the appropriate areas that we

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1 could turn it into intelligence. 2 Q: All right. And indeed, in -- in 3 limited -- when there are limited resources it might make 4 sense to have your constables go out and gather raw data 5 to allow those who have the specialized facilities in 6 intelligence to do the subsequent phases in the 7 intelligence cycle? 8 A: Certainly. And, as well, if you have 9 people -- if you have a situation or an incident whereby 10 you've got localized people that are more familiar with 11 the area than -- than the people that you're bringing in 12 from outside, it's a lot easier to gather information 13 when you're perceived as a friend than as an outsider. 14 Q: All right. 15 16 (BRIEF PAUSE) 17 18 Q: Now, is it typical to have a 19 strategic intelligence component to a specific policing 20 operation? 21 A: No. 22 Q: Why not? 23 A: Strategic, as I said, usually a -- I 24 best described as a management tool used to identify 25 trends in the future. And when an operation's ongoing

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1 more or less, you're there. 2 Now, if you have a long range operation 3 you may want to -- you know, if you perceive it going a 4 long range, you may want to look at having a strategic 5 report to assist you in projections down the road. 6 However, in an incident such as this it 7 may have been difficult having regard for the perception 8 that the Park was going to be -- or sorry, the Base was 9 going to be returned. 10 Q: Okay. And what is the function of an 11 analyst within an intelligence unit? 12 A: Generally the analyst take all the 13 pieces of the puzzle and attempt to sort them out. 14 They'll do that through various means; generally 15 utilizing charts. We quite often refer to it as circles 16 and squares and a -- as a sort of a slang term. 17 They'll put the -- they'll take a specific 18 incident. For instance, they may have -- well we'll 19 use Ipperwash as an example. 20 We identified the occupied area as -- by 21 camps. So for instance Camp 'A' was related to a 22 specific family. So we'd have a chart based on Camp 'A' 23 and who was associated to that. 24 You may have a chart as to those that are 25 passive in nature. You may have a chart that -- those

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1 that you may consider to be somewhat -- have violent 2 tendencies and -- and things of that nature. 3 Then they take a look at the overall 4 picture and once they've got done all their charting, 5 they'll use -- it will be utilized by the Incident 6 Commander to set the tactical priorities, in some 7 instances. 8 Q: Now, Ipperwash then became a dossier 9 within the London JFO in 1993? 10 A: It became a -- an active file or -- 11 if the First Nations issue was the dossier -- 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: -- and Ipperwash became a file within 14 that dossier. 15 Q: And what was the precipitating event 16 for that -- for opening the sub file if you will? 17 A: The -- when the First Nations went on 18 -- on I believe May 6th, the cutting of the gate. 19 Q: 1993? 20 A: Of the fence. Yes. 21 Q: All right. And you indicated that 22 you had two (2) intelligence officers essentially 23 assigned to the file when it was first opened? 24 A: Yes. 25 Q: All right. And the specific tasks

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1 that were assigned was basically to create the profiles 2 and identify the -- the occupiers and sort them into 3 camps? 4 A: That's the way it fell out because 5 when we were gathering our information on those that were 6 occupying the Base, they set themselves up basically by 7 the families and we referred to them as camps. 8 Q: Okay. Now did you keep -- create 9 notes in relation to your intelligence activities 10 relative to the Ipperwash operation commencing in 1993? 11 A: Yes. 12 Q: And can you tell us just briefly what 13 your note taking practices in relation to Ipperwash was? 14 A: My note taking practices are the same 15 regardless of the incident. 16 Q: Fair enough. 17 A: Basically as you can appreciate, in 18 the intelligence world, we're quite often dealing with 19 confidential informants and covert activities. And as I 20 indicated earlier, we're also involved in project driven 21 investigations. 22 As such, it was necessary to maintain two 23 (2) types of note taking. One, and you'll see -- if I 24 can -- 25 Q: Certainly.

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1 A: -- be -- I refer to this as a daily 2 journal which is the traditional memo book of police 3 officers. And this was basically used to keep my day-to- 4 day activities. And for instances outside of projects 5 where I would see going towards a criminal prosecution. 6 The more common use of notes was the 7 binders which you see before you here. And these binders 8 were utilized as informant -- to keep my informant notes 9 in there as well as the projects -- project driven 10 investigations. 11 In -- excuse me, the projects, there will 12 be a separate binder for each project. For instance in 13 this case, Project Maple had its own binder. And the 14 informants were also kept in those binders as well to 15 avoid any potential compromise should you be in a 16 situation such as a forum as this -- and a -- a mistake 17 is made in the identify of the informant is revealed. 18 Q: All right. And we have replicated 19 your notes and I wonder -- I think -- I hope -- do you 20 have a binder? No, you don't. 21 There should be a binder of his notes put 22 before him. 23 24 (BRIEF PAUSE) 25

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1 Q: Yes, thank you. And we have this as 2 a separate volume, Commissioner. 3 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: I don't 4 think I have one. 5 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Could you provide one 6 to the Commissioner as well, please? 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you. 11 12 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 13 Q: Now, first of all I want to, just in 14 a general way, this binder or this volume is divided into 15 tabs, would you kindly just identify what is behind each 16 Tab and whether they came from your daily journal as 17 you've expressed or as the -- from the Project Maple 18 binder? 19 A: Okay. Tab 1 would be my daily journal 20 notes and it's from the 13th of April to the 12th of 21 September 1993. 22 Q: All right. 23 A: Tab 2 would be from my binder notes 24 and they're the -- excuse me -- the notes relating to 25 Ipperwash for the year of 1993.

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1 Q: All right. And they commence, just 2 for the record, May 21, 1993 and go to October 1993? 3 A: That's correct. 4 Q: Thank you. 5 A: Tab 3 are my daily journal notes from 6 March of 1994 until the 9th of August, 1995. 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: Tab 4 are my binder notes for 1994 9 and basically there's one (1) entry. 10 Q: May 21st, '94? 11 A: That's correct. 12 Q: Okay. 13 A: Tab 5, my daily journal notes dated 14 the 9th of August, '95 to the 9th of January, '96? 15 Q: Yes. 16 A: Tab 6 is my Project Maple binder 17 notes and they start on the 30th of June 1995 and go to 18 28th of February, '96. 19 Q: Okay. Thank you. I'd like to make 20 the whole volume if you will, the next Exhibit please? 21 THE REGISTRAR: P-1641, Your Honour. 22 23 --- EXHIBIT No. P-1641: Handwritten journal and 24 notebook entries of 25 D/Inspector Don Bell, 1993-

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1 1996. 2 3 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 4 Q: And where necessary, perhaps we can 5 refer to the Tabs so that we know from the record, what 6 source you're referring to. 7 But, just as a general observation it 8 would appear that your binder notes, and the Project 9 Maple notes, in particular, are by far the more detailed? 10 A: Yes. 11 Q: All right. And why would that be? 12 A: Those traditionally are my -- the 13 investigative notes where I -- if I'm dealing with an 14 individual person or taking -- making observation myself, 15 I put it in the binder notes. 16 And that's simply because with regards to 17 the project if I have them in my journal notes, I'd be 18 concerned with compromising the intelligence in the 19 Project Maple notes should they be found by somebody 20 else. 21 Q: All right. Thank you. And did you - 22 - did you make any alterations, additions or omissions to 23 the notes since you initially created each entry? 24 A: No. 25 Q: All right. And did you create these

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1 notes as soon after the event as poss -- as practicable? 2 A: Yes. 3 Q: All right. Let's then go 4 specifically to May 21, 1993. And you said that's when 5 the sub-file was opened and you were tasked by the 6 Incident Commander Carson with respect to the 7 intelligence component of this operation. 8 Can you tell us first, was this the first 9 time any Ipperwash intelligence project came to the 10 attention of the London JFO? 11 A: To the best of my knowledge right up 12 to -- I started in the London JFO in the -- I believe 13 the 12th or 13th of April, '93, so this is the first 14 occasions that I had dealings with Ipperwash. And to the 15 best of my recollection anything else would have fallen 16 within the dossier area. I don't think was anything per 17 -- specifically pertaining to the occupation of the Base. 18 Q: All right. 19 20 (BRIEF PAUSE) 21 22 Q: And tell us what your primary tasks 23 were for intell -- from the intelligence perspective at 24 this time? 25 A: Our primary -- primary tasks were to

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1 create the -- for lack of a better term, the 2 identification binder which contained the profiles of 3 those individuals that were occupying CFB Ipperwash. 4 Q: And what type of information did you 5 learn of value with respect to the identities of the 6 individuals at the Army Camp? 7 A: From our intelligence gathering we 8 were able to identify those that are -- as I said earlier 9 we identified specific camps that were -- where the 10 occupiers were staying on the Base and I believe we had 11 up to 'K' -- 'A' to 'K' identified. 12 Q: In terms of family groupings? 13 A: Family groupings. 14 Q: All right. And what was the 15 significant of collating the information according to 16 family groupings? 17 A: The -- the significance was that it 18 appeared as though the families were returning to the 19 areas that they felt they were properly entitled to them 20 and the -- from our perspective it was -- there wasn't 21 really an correlation on our part; that's exactly where 22 they were located. 23 Q: All right. And was there any other 24 particular type of information that you were tasked to 25 obtain relative to the -- the groupings, if you will, of

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1 the family groupings, aside from their identity? 2 A: Certainly, as you alluded to earlier, 3 we more or less created a profile or a biographical 4 profile of the individuals that were identified, in that 5 we would locate -- we identified their -- their address, 6 whatever -- for lack of a better term, their home 7 address, which in most cases was at Kettle and Stony 8 Point prior to moving onto the Base. And we identified 9 vehicles associated. We identified criminal records. We 10 identified in remarks areas based on criminal record 11 checks, et cetera; whether or not the individual was 12 violent. 13 In the initial stages we didn't have the 14 profile binder broken into violent and non-violent 15 categories. But at the end, as the time moved on, we did 16 have a division in there where we noted that there was a 17 violent component. But in fact there was a -- a passive 18 component so we thought it was important to recognize 19 that there's, you know, there's a passive as well. 20 Q: What was your criteria for 21 categorizing somebody with a violent component? 22 A: Traditionally it was done on the CPIC 23 checks. 24 Q: So the basis of criminal records? 25 A: Yes, and if they had a criminal

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1 record for violent type of offences or if they had been 2 flagged violent on the system then that would generally 3 put them in that category. 4 Q: And did you also as part of the -- 5 the process, attempt to determine whether there were any 6 firearms in the possession of the people that you 7 identified? 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: The -- in our intelligence gathering 12 certainly that played a role. There was a fair amount 13 of information that was being bantered about indicating 14 that there firearms on the Base. Certainly there was 15 reported incidents of gunfire being heard from the 16 vicinity of the Base, et cetera. Certainly the -- there 17 was the incident surrounding the shooting at the 18 helicopter, et cetera. 19 So certainly we were trying to determine 20 whether or not there were firearms on the Base. 21 Q: Okay. Did -- was part of your task 22 to learn whether any of the persons in -- on the Army 23 Camp Base had any links to Aboriginal organizations which 24 were believed to have -- have any militancy, if you will, 25 tendencies according to your definition?

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1 A: Certainly when we were doing our 2 background checks we were looking for if there was any 3 connections to militant groups. And, in fact, there were 4 a couple of occasions where we saw -- I recorded plates 5 that had come from the United States that had such 6 affiliations. 7 Q: All right. And was it part of your 8 process between '93 and 90' -- early -- sorry, August '95 9 to rate the risk that -- that any weaponry that you 10 thought might be in -- in the possession of some of these 11 people would be used to inflict lethal force on others? 12 A: Certainly having regard for the 13 nature of the occupation and as I alluded to earlier we 14 felt that this was going to be negotiated and that the 15 land in fact was going to be returned. 16 However, what we had to be very alive to 17 was the fact that any sort of weapon can be lethal and we 18 made sure, and Inspector Carson was very cognizant of the 19 fact, that there was the availability of weapons and 20 there was the potential. 21 However, we at no time anticipated that 22 we'd be reaching a stage where we'd be beyond that of 23 negotiation. 24 Q: All right. So does that mean you 25 didn't enter into any type of risk assessment in this

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1 respect? 2 A: The information that was coming 3 forward -- it's well known that within the -- this whole 4 community and I can say this with some -- I grew up not 5 too far away from here that -- that hunting plays a 6 fairly significant role in the community. 7 So we did anticipate that in fact there 8 would be the availability of hunting-type rifles. 9 Certainly we were receiving information that were outside 10 that scope. We were receiving information that were 11 regard to assault rifles, AK-47's, and the like. 12 Again as you can appreciate, the 13 corroboration of that information was very difficult. 14 And if you -- we -- we go through later on you'll see 15 that many cases, this information only reached the 16 category of believed reliable. 17 Certainly we had to be aware that there is 18 the possibility that those more sophisticated weapons 19 were in there. And if those sophisticated weapons were 20 in there then one would anticipate that they were there 21 in the event of an altercation with either the police or 22 some other outside component. 23 Q: And what were your primary sources of 24 information if you will, with respect to any information 25 concerning any kinds of firearms, be the hunting rifles

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1 or other? 2 A: The hunting rifles in most cases were 3 localized information, visual observation. I myself have 4 seen people walking with -- with rifles and that, when 5 I've been driving through this area. 6 The information regarding to more 7 sophisticated weaponry was generally coming from various 8 sources outside; whether it be outside this particular 9 area or whether it be from CI's that were coming into the 10 area. 11 Q: CI's meaning? 12 A: Sorry, Confidential Informants. 13 Q: Thank you. Perhaps this would be an 14 appropriate time to -- to take the afternoon break. 15 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Take a break 16 now. 17 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry will recess 18 for fifteen (15) minutes. 19 20 --- Upon recessing at 3:28 p.m. 21 --- Upon resuming at 3:44 p.m. 22 23 THE REGISTRAR: This Inquiry is now 24 resumed. Please be seated. 25 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you.

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1 Yes? 2 MS. SUSAN VELLA: Thank you. 3 4 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 5 Q: Now, in terms of the -- the mechanics 6 if you will, of how you and your team at the London JFO 7 discharged its tasks, I wonder if you could go to Tab 2 8 of your binder, not your notes, but your binder of 9 documents. 10 Sorry, we have a lot of paper work in 11 front of you already. 12 This is Inquiry Document Number 2005487. 13 It's entitled, Stoney Point Occupation 1993. And then 14 there are obviously some redactions, but if you go to the 15 page entitled Stoney Point First Nations, and then "Chief 16 as of August 24, 1993". 17 A: If -- 18 Q: Fifth page in. Sorry, I don't have 19 any page numbers for you. 20 A: Sorry, what's it say? 21 Q: The top says "Stoney Point First 22 Nations" and then it says "Chief, Council Members". 23 A: Okay. Yes. 24 Q: "As of August 24 '93." And can you 25 just tell us what this document was the result of?

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1 A: I'm just going to go back a couple of 2 pages. The -- I believe the front page of the black -- 3 the two (2) blackened areas aren't redacted. I believe 4 this was contained in a black binder. 5 Q: Okay, a black binder. Thank you. 6 A: And they had a white sticky across 7 it. 8 Q: Right. Okay. And then the London 9 JFO with title page submitted by Detective Sergeant D.W. 10 Bell, Constable Keegan and Constable Morse. 11 Those were the two (2) intelligence 12 officers under your direction at the time for this 13 project. 14 A: That's correct. 15 Q: All right. And so perhaps you can 16 just tell us what this document is. 17 A: This is what I was referring to 18 earlier as the profile binder and contain the identities 19 of the people that we'd observed in -- occupying CFB 20 Ipperwash in 1993, I believe it was. Yes, 1993. 21 The first page indicates the -- who the -- 22 we had identified as the Chief of the Stoney Point First 23 Nations and it indicated was an Acting -- 24 Q: Or the Acting Chief at least. 25 A: Acting. And the council members that

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1 we've identified. 2 Q: All right. And just for the record, 3 some names are redacted, that's with respect to privacy 4 obligations is it -- 5 A: That's -- that's correct. 6 Q: -- that we didn't have consents for 7 to release their personal information. But there are 8 some names that are not redacted? 9 A: Correct. 10 Q: All right. And as you proceed into 11 this binder, I note that you have a category called, 12 "Camp B?" A: The first page I had after the Chiefs 13 was the identified A through K camps. 14 Q: Yes, thank you. Yes, 'A' to 'K'. 15 A: And then Camp B with nine (9) 16 individuals -- sorry, as you go onto the next page, 17 sixteen (16) individuals associated to that Camp. 18 Q: And this is the family grouping, is 19 it? Or is this some other grouping? 20 A: To the best of my recollection the 21 majority of the camps were based on families. 22 Q: All right. That was the main 23 criteria for grouping a particular collection? 24 A: Well, once we had ascertained the 25 people -- and the camps were a focal point in a

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1 particular area of the Base or a grouping of residents or 2 tents or the like -- these individuals, once we had 3 identified who they were, we learned family -- that they 4 were connected by family ties as a result of discussions 5 with people in the area, whether it be -- you know, First 6 Nations Liaison Officer out of Forest, or through further 7 follow-up with informants, et cetera. 8 Q: All right. And then following the 9 list of people within Camp B, for example, there are then 10 photographs and profiles of the people so identified; is 11 that fair? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And these are the types of binders 14 that you and your team were working up over the course of 15 '93 through the summer of '95? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: All right. Thank you. I'd like to 18 make this the next Exhibit, please? 19 THE REGISTRAR: P-1642 Your Honour. 20 21 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1642: Document Number 2005487. 22 Stoney Point Occupation, CFB 23 Ipperwash, 1993, Intelligence 24 files disclosure, 1993. 25

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1 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 2 Q: And were these binders in turn shared 3 with or distributed to the Incident Commander? 4 A: That's correct. And -- 5 Q: All right. 6 A: -- they were also distributed to 7 other people, as well. 8 Q: And what other people would have 9 received these? 10 A: There was a meeting, I believe, in 11 July of '93. If I refer to my notes I'd be able to tell 12 you who specifically received them. 13 Q: Sure. That would be just fine. And 14 you're looking at the Volume of notes in what Tab? 15 A: I'll just need a second and I'll 16 assist you there. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Would you be looking for your binder 21 notes or your journal notes? 22 A: I'm looking in Tab 2 in the binder 23 notes. 24 Q: Right. Thank you. And there's an 25 entry May 21, 1993?

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1 A: I have 14th July. 2 Q: Thank you. 3 A: 14th July, '93, looks like page 59 in 4 the top right corner. 5 Q: Thank you. It says: 6 "Distribution of Stoney Point ID 7 books." 8 A: Would you like me to proceed? 9 Q: Yes. Thank you. 10 A: What it indicates, as you said, is 11 the distribution of the Stoney Point ID binder books. It 12 indicates Garnett Mathews, No. 1 DHQ. Garnett Mathews 13 was a Detective Staff Sergeant in charge of crime for 1 14 District, which is Chatham and surrounding area, which 15 Forest and Ipperwash fell into. 16 Q: And that's OPP? 17 A: Yes, that's correct. Bryan East was 18 a captain with the Military. I believe he was in SIU, 19 but I can't say for sure. But he was definitely a 20 captain in the Military. 21 Major Heck was Major Karl Heck, he was a 22 Major in the Special Investigation Unit of the Military. 23 Q: Was he also part of the intelligence 24 platoon, if you will? 25 A: He was in -- in the intelligence

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1 network. He was part of the -- one of the persons that I 2 would be talking with on a fairly regular basis. 3 Q: All right. 4 A: Inspector Carson, being Inspector 5 John Carson Incident Commander. 6 Q: Mike Beacock was the Acting Staff 7 Sergeant in charge of Forest Detachment, Unit Commander - 8 - or Detachment Commander. 9 Pete Lollar was a Detective Sergeant 10 assigned to Intelligence Section, OPP General 11 Headquarters. He had the First Nations portfolio at 12 headquarters. 13 Real Couture, I'm not sure of his rank, 14 but he was also with the DND. 15 Q: Special Ops? 16 A: I'm not sure what that notation -- 17 that may refer to Real Couture's position in the 18 Military. And I believe Lloyd is in fact Lloyd 19 Stone. I believe Lloyd was his first name, if memory 20 serves after reading that it's probably Lloyd Stone. 21 Q: And I'm sorry, what's that say, SIU 22 at Ipperwash? 23 A: Special Investigation Unit at 24 Ipperwash. He was working in the area for the Military. 25 Q: The Military. All right. Thank you.

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1 And if you would look at Tab 34 of your binder. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: And it's Inquiry Document Number 6 2005493, entitled, Stoney Point Occupation CFB Ipperwash. 7 Perhaps you can just identify this 8 document and if you know when it was created? 9 A: Again, this is a supplementary, for 10 lack of a better term, profile binder, as the evolution 11 of the binder went on over time. 12 Q: Yes. 13 A: I believe this binder was prepared by 14 Darryl Whitehead. And when he took over for Neil Morris 15 I believe this was one (1) of the newer versions of the 16 binder that was produced. 17 Q: Would this be in 1995, likely, prior 18 to the takeover of the Park? 19 A: Yes, I believe this would be in '95. 20 Q: All right. And again, you have 21 profiles and photographs with respect to those occupiers 22 whom you had identified? 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: All right. 25 A: I'd also like to draw to your

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1 attention that this is the binder I referred to earlier 2 where we had divided it into two (2) sections as to 3 violent and non violent. 4 Q: All right. And can you just show us 5 where that division is delineated in this document? 6 7 (BRIEF PAUSE) 8 9 A: I may have some difficulty doing that 10 because I'm not sure if this has been re -- 11 Q: All right. 12 A: -- has been recreated in its -- in 13 its entirety. 14 A: I do see in the preface it indicates 15 the two (2) categories, two (2) sections: A) violent, B) 16 non violent. And it says: 17 "These categories are based solely on 18 information provided from CPIC and are 19 to be used only as a guide." 20 A: That's correct -- 21 Q: All right. So -- 22 A: -- because certainly we didn't want 23 to create a false illusion that if our assessment says 24 somebody was not violent, that any individual drop their 25 guard. As you are aware, in a police situation it's

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1 always important to maintain your personal safety, and on 2 occasion officers will take somewhat of a less -- they'll 3 drop their guard, for lack of a better term. 4 Q: And was the assumption that if 5 someone had a criminal record of a certain nature, that 6 they had therefore a propensity to be violent in the 7 future; was that the rationale? 8 A: The basis for the violence category 9 was taking a look at their criminal record to see if they 10 had convictions for violent type offences, and that, yes, 11 you're correct, if there was a propensity or they 12 demonstrated in the past, they may so in the future. 13 Q: All right. And so if we were to 14 review these profiles and if there is a criminal record 15 with respect to a violent crime, then we can assume that 16 those people fell within category 'A' and if it didn't, 17 that they didn't have any such record, then they fell 18 into category 'B'; is that fair? 19 A: That's correct. 20 Q: And what was the -- what was the 21 point of making this distinction in terms of the overall 22 policing operation? How was this to help the Incident 23 Commander? 24 A: Well, certainly we've talked, you 25 know, previously regarding the occupation and the

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1 occupiers, that I think it was important to note that 2 traditionally in policing we look at or investigate 3 people that are involved in criminal activity. 4 I think it's important to know from an 5 intelligence function, and from an occupation standpoint, 6 that not everybody on CFB Ipperwash is a criminal, and in 7 fact that if they do have a criminal record, they may not 8 have shown a tendency towards violence. 9 So I think it's -- it was incumbent upon 10 us to make sure that the Incident Commander was aware 11 that everybody in there isn't necessarily a bad guy. 12 Q: All right. And -- and what -- why 13 was the -- the converse important for the Incident 14 Commander? 15 A: To identify the potential for 16 violence? 17 Q: Yes. 18 A: Certainly, again, you have to provide 19 the Incident Commander with all the basis -- all the 20 indicators that he needs to make an appropriate decision 21 when it comes to taking tactical -- or making tactical 22 priorities. 23 I think it's crucial that when you have a 24 potential for violence that the Incident Commander is 25 aware of it so he can take the necessary steps when

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1 planning tactics, for instance, to execute arrests or, in 2 fact, that the people have to be removed. 3 Q: All right. And I wonder -- you 4 should have on your desk a yellow folder. And, 5 Commissioner, you should have a yellow folder. 6 And perhaps you could look inside it. 7 Now, these are documents they're entitled, 8 "Chronologically," and they were distributed 9 electronically a while ago in relation to our Notice of 10 Documents. 11 Now, first of all, perhaps you could just 12 look at these, it appears to be a series of chronologies 13 that commenced July 15, '92 with one (1) entry and then 14 the next entry is May 6, '93. 15 And if you go to the very last chronology, 16 the end date is April 16, '94. Can you first of all 17 identify these documents? Is this a product of the 18 London JFO work? 19 A: No, no it's not. 20 Q: Where did this come from? 21 A: I'm aware of these documents as a 22 result of my preparations for the Inquiry. And it's my 23 belief that these were prepared by Bill Watkins of the 24 OPP in West Region. 25 Q: All right. And how is it that you

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1 would not be familiar with this kind of a work up, with 2 respect to the chronology of the various happenings in 3 relation to the occupation of Camp Ipperwash in '93 to 4 April '94, when it was nonetheless generated by someone 5 else within the OPP? 6 A: Perhaps I -- I should clarify. I 7 don't believe I was ever presented these documents to 8 read or review. However, I was certainly aware that Bill 9 Watkins was performing a function that was described as 10 an analyst in the initial stages in 1993 and obviously 11 through '94. 12 So I was aware that he had been assigned 13 and did play a role in the occupation from a policing 14 standpoint. As I say, that was defined or categorized as 15 analyst. 16 Q: All right. How did his role interact 17 with your role in terms of the intelligence function? 18 A: Back in '93, when the duties were 19 being outlined by Inspector Carson, Bill Watkins was 20 identified at that time as the analyst. It was 21 determined at that time, and I believe he was housed 22 right out of Forest Detachment, that information would be 23 fed in to Bill Watkins. 24 And when we were on the ground we would 25 attend at Forest and provide him with information as to

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  1  things that we were doing.
  2                 I would say that, in my opinion, the role
  3  -- the definition or terming Bill to be an analyst is
  4  somewhat inaccurate, in that, as you can see from the
  5  documents, Bill, although I believe he had analytical
  6  training, was more or less performing the function of a
  7  scribe.
  8                 He was taking down what I would refer to
  9  as information versus intelligence, in that there was no
 10  analysis being conducted on the information provided.  So
 11  I would see this information as more or less a time line
 12  as to the events that had taken place for the dates that
 13  are outlined on the document.
 14                 Q:   All right.  And is this information
 15  that you would have relied upon in performing your
 16  intelligence role?
 17                 A:   No.  
 18                 Q:   All right.  And do you know whether
 19  or not Constable Watkins continued this -- to perform
 20  this function as analyst for Ipperwash after April of
 21  '94?
 22                 A:   It's my understanding again, simply
 23  through my preparation, that no he did not.
 24                 MS. SUSAN VELLA:   All right.  I'd like to
 25  make this series of documents entitled, "Chronology of

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1 Kettle Point Stoney Point Reserve Occupation of Camp 2 Ipperwash," of which there are six (6) documents, the 3 next Exhibit. 4 THE REGISTRAR: P-1643, Your Honour. 5 6 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1643: A Division office, chronology 7 of Kettle Point/Stoney Point 8 Reserve Occupation of Camp 9 Ipperwash, July 15,1992 to 10 April 16,1994 (6 documents). 11 12 MS. SUSAN VELLA: And also I'd like to 13 make the document at Tab 34, this is inquiry document 14 2005493, the next Exhibit. 15 THE REGISTRAR: P-1644, Your Honour. 16 17 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1644: Document Number 2005493. 18 Stoney Point Occupation, CFB 19 Ipperwash, Intelligence files 20 disclosure (undated). 21 22 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 23 Q: Now, returning to the document at Tab 24 34, just one (1) -- one (1) further question. It's 25 Exhibit P-1644. And if you would turn into the document

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1 to the profile of Anthony O'Brien Dudley George please. 2 And there's a photograph, the eleventh page in. 3 4 (BRIEF PAUSE) 5 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: And you had indicated that you 8 believed this -- that this document was compiled prior to 9 the occupation of the Park? 10 A: I believe so, yes. 11 Q: And I note that there's a handwritten 12 note beside his photograph that reads, "Deceased, 13 September '95". 14 Can you identify that handwriting or when 15 it was put on this document? 16 A: I can't identify the handwriting. I 17 would assume that this document came -- would be out of 18 the London JFO. So I -- what I -- this would more than 19 likely be one (1) of a few people's handwriting. It's 20 definitely not mine. 21 Q: Okay. 22 A: There's a good chance it could be 23 Darryl Whitehead's or one (1) of the clerical staff. 24 Q: The fact that this document was 25 generated by the London JFO as noted by its title page,

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1 does that tell you that this document was therefore gen - 2 - generated prior to the Park occupation? 3 A: There would be inserts as the -- as 4 we were on the ground after the occupation. This was a 5 living document, so it was an ongoing piece of work. 6 Q: Okay. 7 A: So there could be some information 8 that is in here, some profiles that were compiled during 9 September of '95. 10 Q: Okay, fair enough. So it was a work 11 in progress? 12 A: That's correct. 13 Q: And it was the one (1) that the 14 Incident Commander would have been working with as at the 15 occupation of the Park? 16 A: That's correct. 17 Q: Okay. Thank you. Now, you've 18 indicated that -- that you shared these binders or at 19 least these binders were shared with certain personnel 20 from the Military, the Camp Ipperwash Military, in 21 particular, or at least the Military personnel involved 22 with Camp Ipperwash? 23 A: Yes, that's correct. 24 Q: And you also indicated that you would 25 receive and share information with the Military in

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1 relation -- in the nature of intelligence; is that fair? 2 A: That's correct. 3 Q: Now, did you receive any information 4 to the effect that certain occupiers, including Dudley 5 George had ever aimed firearms at military personnel? 6 A: I'm not -- I did receive information 7 that firearms had been pointed at military personnel. I 8 can't recall specifically if Dudley George was named as 9 one (1) of those parties. 10 Q: All right. And what, if anything, 11 did you do with that information? 12 A: Any of the information that we 13 received would have been passed on, up through the 14 Incident Commander. 15 Q: To the Incident Commander. Did you 16 conduct any independent reliability assessments of this 17 type of information received from the Military? 18 A: No, we wouldn't have done it -- 19 excuse me -- we wouldn't have conducted a assessment on 20 that information. The information received was quite 21 specific. I believe it was, if my memory serves, it was 22 Cadets out on manoeuvres and they'd been faced with First 23 Nations people that pointed firearms at them. 24 Q: All right. Do you recall whether you 25 received any specific information to the effect that any

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1 of the occupiers had reportedly shot out the lights of a 2 military vehicle? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And what, if anything did you do with 5 that information? 6 A: Again the information that was 7 received from the Military as was the case with all 8 information coming from sources outside the JFO, would be 9 passed up to the Incident Commander. 10 Q: All right. Had you received any 11 information from the Military to the effect that vehicles 12 had been used to run into or bump military vehicles by 13 the occupiers? 14 A: Yes. 15 Q: And again that would be passed along 16 to Inspector Carson? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: Did you perform any risk assessment, 19 or did this inform any risk assessment with respect to 20 the possibility of this type of behaviour continuing into 21 the future for the Incident Commander? 22 A: Did we do a threat assessment? 23 Q: Yes. 24 A: No. 25 Q: And why wouldn't you have done a

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1 threat assessment? 2 A: Well, at that time the information 3 was quite specific and in fact that we were aware -- we 4 were aware of several things with regards to the -- the 5 occupation. 6 We were aware that -- we had a pretty -- a 7 very good idea of who the actual occupants were. We had 8 a very good idea as to the level of the threat of 9 violence and the potential for the threat of violence. 10 We also knew that there was availability of weapons 11 including firearms. We knew that in the past that 12 vehicles had been used as weapons. 13 And all that as I said before got fed to 14 the central computer and that's one (1) of the ways I'd 15 refer that to Inspector Carson. You know, that was part 16 of the things that went into his assessment and when he 17 was, you know, forming his tactical priorities. 18 As I said he received all the information 19 with regards to the occupation from the various 20 intelligence sources and then he used it to formulate his 21 own degree of priority. 22 Q: Did Inspector Carson ask you to do 23 anything to pursue this information that you received 24 from the Military? 25 A: No. The only thing that was clear is

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1 that we continued to ensure that Inspector Carson 2 received all information, all intelligence from all 3 sources. 4 Q: All right. Was it part of your task 5 in this operation to identify people for the Incident 6 Commander who might serve as either future negotiators or 7 facilitators of communications between the police and the 8 occupiers? 9 A: No, and I think the rationale behind 10 that would be is the local officers within the Forest 11 Detachment and the relationship that Inspector Carson had 12 with people in the area would be better suited to 13 determine that type of proactive activity. 14 15 (BRIEF PAUSE) 16 17 Q: Who was Peter Warren? 18 A: Pardon me? 19 Q: Who was Peter Warren? 20 A: Peter Warren was I believe a 21 Detective Constable in Intelligence Section in Orillia. 22 Q: Did he have any role with respect to 23 the intelligence operation relative to Ipperwash between 24 1993 and September 6th of '95? 25 A: There was a specific incident and I

287

1 do have a record of that in my notes that would be 2 probably beneficial to refresh. 3 Q: Certainly. 4 A: And I believe -- I believe that'll be 5 in Tab 2 as well in the binder notes. 6 Q: Yes. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: So Exhibit 1641 Tab 2. 11 12 (BRIEF PAUSE) 13 14 A: And I could be in error there, it may 15 be Tab 6. 16 Q: Okay. 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: Perhaps you would look at June 22nd, 21 1993? 22 A: Thank you. 23 Q: Back to Tab 2 I think. 24 25 (BRIEF PAUSE)

288

1 A: The date again, please? 2 Q: June 22nd. And if you look it's page 3 40 of that tab. 4 A: Yes, thank you. 5 Q: Thank you. 6 A: On the 22nd of June '93 at 7 approximately 2:15 in the afternoon I had a phone 8 conversation with Inspector Carson. Apparently -- well, 9 not apparently, Inspector Carson advised me that Peter 10 Warren from Intelligence Section had called and spoke to 11 a Wayne Silverman who's an officer within Forest 12 Detachment and he had spoken to him with regards to AK- 13 47s which are a type of a firearm or assault rifle. 14 And Inspector Carson wasn't happy that the 15 -- the fact Peter Warren had called him directly and 16 spoken to constables regarding this information, because 17 obviously we didn't know -- hadn't been analysed, the 18 validity, the reliability attached to it. 19 He had asked me to ensure that any 20 inquiries go through, either -- preferably himself, if 21 not him, either myself or Staff Ser -- Acting Staff 22 Sergeant Beacock. 23 I advised Inspector Carson that I would 24 contact Peter Lollar who I believed to be Pete Warren's 25 NCO Sergeant Supervisor in Orillia Headquarters.

289

1 Subsequent to that on the 24th of June 2 1993 I had further conversation with Inspector Carson at 3 about 3:15 in the afternoon. 4 And again, the conversation revolved 5 around Inspector Carson's concerns over the information 6 he had passed directly onto the officers on the grounds 7 with regards to the AK-47's. 8 I advised -- or Inspector Carson had 9 advised me that he had spoke to Chief Superintendent 10 Coles regarding the incident and that he had had Chief 11 Superintendent Coles in fact place a telephone call to 12 Detective Inspector Lawrenson (phonetic) to rectify the 13 situation. 14 Detective Inspector Lawrenson was one of 15 two (2) Inspectors within Intelligence Section at that 16 time so he would be equivalent of second in charge of the 17 sanction. 18 I advised Inspector Carson that the 19 problem should already be rectified and that I had spoken 20 to Loller as I had told him the previous date on the 22nd 21 and that it established the lines of communication to be 22 from Intelligence Section to contact Inspector Carson. 23 If Inspector Carson was unavailable, they 24 were to contact myself and then lastly if neither one of 25 us were available, to contact Acting Staff Sergeant Mike

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1 Beacock. But again I emphasized to try to talk to 2 Inspector Carson if at all possible. 3 Inspector Carson felt these calls to 4 Forest, it says by Carson, but in fact it should say by 5 Warren, were creating unnecessary problems and he felt 6 that Intelligence Branch's role was to gather 7 information, not to tell them how to handle the incident. 8 He felt there was no problems. In fact he 9 said he was pleased with the information being provided 10 by the -- the JFO. And then I continue -- went on to say 11 that I talked to Mike Beacock regularly and was telling 12 him any info -- any information we get as well as 13 advising my branch. 14 So I was making sure that both ends has a 15 conduit of information so nobody should be left out of 16 the loop per se. I advised Inspector Carson that I can 17 appreciate his concerns, however I explained to him that 18 I could have just as easily have made that mistake as 19 Peter Warren did. 20 And we clarified that and went on to talk 21 about, you know, further follow up at Ipperwash. 22 Q: Now was Inspector Carson's concern 23 with respect to the controls or lack there over -- over 24 the dissemination of information legitimate? 25 A: Well, you know, certainly I shared

291

1 his same concerns in that the information was passed on - 2 - we didn't know if there had been any evaluation done. 3 We didn't know if it was raw data, if it was information, 4 if it was intelligence. 5 And certainly we have a heightened 6 situation with regards to the occupation. And tensions 7 are somewhat, you know, they're -- they're a little 8 higher than normal. So you certainly don't want to 9 create any unnecessary angst at the local level if in 10 fact it's not justified. 11 Q: All right. Thank you. When did you 12 first receive information that the Ipperwash Provincial 13 Park was a potential takeover target? 14 A: With regards to takeovers, I eluded 15 to you earlier, we'd had some minor indicators with 16 regards to the booth with -- that had been set up for 17 charging admission and the like. But I believe it was 18 August the 10th of '95 at a meeting which would be in Tab 19 6, I believe, of my notes. 20 Q: If you would go to Tab 6 and page 14, 21 this is -- this is a copy of the scribe notes, Exhibit P- 22 426 and if you would go to page 14 -- no sorry, I have 23 the wrong -- the wrong note, sorry. 24 Go to the -- go to your Project Maple 25 notes. Excuse me, wrong binder. I've got too many

292

1 binders happening here. 2 A: Okay. 3 Q: Go to your binder of notes at Tab 6, 4 page 14. And for the record, it's Exhibit P-1641. 5 Is that the correct reference? 6 A: Yes. 7 Q: All right. And perhaps you can tell 8 us then the context of -- of this discussion. 9 A: Yes. On the 10th of August 1995 I 10 was -- at approximately ten o'clock in the morning I was 11 at the RCMP 'O' Division headquarters which is located in 12 London, Ontario to attend a meeting which was held in the 13 Commanding Officers boardroom. 14 There were representatives at the meeting 15 from the RCMP, DND, CSIS and two (2) representatives from 16 London JFO. And it was a discussion regarding the 17 intelligence at CFB Ipperwash and the Stoney Point First 18 Nations occupation. 19 Q: Okay, and what was the information 20 that was communicated? 21 A: It was a general information sharing 22 session and during the -- during the meeting I've noted 23 that there's concerns referenced Provincial Park, being 24 Ipperwash Provincial Park in that the Stoney's may take 25 the Park after Labour Day weekend.

293

1 Q: And how -- who was the source of that 2 information? 3 A: I don't have a clear recollection 4 but, it would be one (1) of the Officers that are 5 attending there. It was not the JFO, was not the source. 6 I -- for some reason, I believe it was the RCMP. 7 Q: Okay. And was there any discussion 8 with respect to the possible motivation behind this 9 anticipated or possible action? 10 A: I don't believe there was any 11 indication at that time, as to what the motivation was. 12 Q: All right. Would that be important 13 to your job, to your function as an Intelligence Officer 14 in this project? 15 A: The motivation again would have been 16 something that we would be interested in. Certainly I 17 was -- at that time I would take it that that would have 18 been an extension of the occupation of CFB Ipperwash and 19 that information had been received from time to time that 20 there was a -- that Ipperwash was -- the Base being one 21 (1) part of several phase plan involving several land 22 occupations. 23 So I take it that's -- in my mind I would 24 assume that that's how I would have taken it at that 25 time.

294

1 Q: In other words that the land, which 2 was a subject of a claim by the occupiers extended to the 3 Park? 4 A: That would be my interpretation at 5 that time. 6 Q: All right. And how reliable or at 7 least how much weight did you put on this information in 8 terms of reliability? 9 A: Well, as it had been relatively new 10 information to me, having regard for what we've had over 11 the course of the last couple of years, it certainly drew 12 my attention. 13 And certainly as time moved on and further 14 conversations took place with the regional folks, it 15 certainly came that -- it certainly became a reality and 16 was less of a chance happening to be more of a factual. 17 Q: All right. And when you say the 18 regional folks, do you mean the local Officers? 19 A: Inspector Carson and the DIC's RIC's 20 and things like -- the DIC's or sorry -- the District 21 Intelligence Coordinators or the Regional Intelligence 22 Coordinators, which are the same people. And maybe I'll 23 just refer to them as regional to avoid any confusion. 24 Q: As long as we know what you mean by 25 that, that's fine. Okay.

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1 And were you tasked with anything, any 2 duties or functions as a result of this information? 3 A: From Inspector Carson? 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: I don't believe so. 6 Q: All right. So you were at this 7 point, to just continue working on your profile binders? 8 A: To continue to work on the profiles 9 binders as well as continue liaison with other 10 intelligence entities including headquarters, to 11 determine if there was other means available to 12 corroborate the Park occupation or anything further on 13 the Base. 14 Q: All right. And were you able to 15 identify any information of a confirmatory nature or the 16 opposite with respect to occupation or the likely 17 occupation of the Park? 18 A: There was CI information that was 19 passed onto me, if you turn to page 21 and Tab 6. 20 Q: Yes, your notes dated September 1, 21 '95? 22 A: That's correct. The conversation 23 with Pete Lollar who was the Detective Sergeant in the 24 Intelligence Section that looked after the First Nations 25 portfolio. And Detective Sergeant -- Detective Sergeant

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1 Lollar had a confidential informant that had attended at 2 the Base on the 30th of August. 3 And as part of the information provided by 4 that individual, they indicated there was no specific 5 talk as to the occupation of the Park. 6 And that would be down where you see: 7 "No talk of Ipperwash occupation." 8 That's referring to the Park. No 9 specifics, but alluded that there could be maybe spring, 10 next winter, next week. So again, that continued to make 11 one believe that there was some -- there was some thought 12 process going on with the further -- further land 13 occupation. 14 Q: All right. So this is something that 15 you had to take seriously? 16 A: Correct. 17 Q: It wasn't a mere rumour or 18 speculation? And you talked about Pete Lollar, can you 19 just tell us again what his -- what his role, specific 20 role in relation to Ipperwash was at this timeframe in -- 21 in August, September '95? 22 A: He would be somewhat of my peer in 23 Orillia at Headquarters -- 24 Q: Hmm hmm. 25 A: -- in that he was a sergeant. And I

297

1 believe he had a couple of detective constables that were 2 under his regime that looked after the First Nations 3 portfolio. So their portfolio was, in fact, the 4 province, so they looked at the provincial overview as 5 far as First Nations issues. 6 And, obviously, with Ipperwash being a -- 7 a spike, like I referred to before, that was obviously a 8 focal point for his attention. 9 Q: So it's a spike as of, what, August 10 the 18th? 11 A: Well -- 12 Q: Or earlier? 13 A: -- certainly with -- it became -- 14 when the Park became -- when Ipperwash Provincial Park 15 became -- came out on the radar scene as a possible 16 further occupation -- 17 Q: Right. 18 A: -- again our -- you're correct it was 19 a spike and our attention heightened, and certainly 20 Orillia would become more involved and more interested. 21 Q: All right. So I'm sorry, and that 22 would have been as of around August the 10th '95 when you 23 had that meeting with the RCMP? 24 A: Correct. 25 Q: And to your knowledge, did -- did

298

1 Officer Lollar do his own work-up with respect to the 2 situation in August of '95? 3 A: Work-up with regards to the 4 information obtained from the CI -- 5 Q: Well -- 6 A: -- like to evaluate the information? 7 Q: Yes. 8 A: The CI that was being utilized on 9 this occasion I believe was a CI that had been utilized 10 for some time by Detective Sergeant Lollar and that had 11 established credibility within the Intelligence Section 12 and certainly with Pete. 13 Q: And if you would go to Tab 3, please, 14 this is Inquiry Document 2004320, dated August the 18th, 15 1995, Memorandum to the Director Intelligence System -- 16 sorry, Section Investigation Support Bureau re Native 17 Occupation Camp Ipperwash, Department of National -- 18 National Defence. 19 And this appears to be a report that was 20 authored by P. J. Lollar, Detective Sergeant, 21 Intelligence System -- Section, excuse me. 22 A: That's correct. 23 Q: And were you provided with a copy of 24 this report in or around the time it was prepared? 25 A: It looks like if you -- if you go

299

1 past the -- the last page where you saw the signatory 2 section -- 3 Q: Yes. 4 A: -- it would appear as though the 5 London JFO received this report on September the 11th, 6 1995. 7 Q: Were you, nonetheless, apprised of 8 its contents, its essential findings, prior to the 9 occupation of the Park? 10 A: The general -- general nature of the 11 findings, yes. 12 Q: All right. I'd like to make this the 13 next exhibit, please? 14 THE REGISTRAR: P-1645, Your Honour. 15 16 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1645: Document Number 2004320. 17 Report of D/Sgt P.J. Lollar, 18 August 18, 1995. 19 20 THE WITNESS: There's an interesting -- 21 with regards to the dissemination reports, I could draw 22 something to your attention I find -- I think would be 23 beneficial to the Inquiry. 24 25 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA:

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1 Q: Yes? 2 A: If you look at the two (2) documents, 3 the first one you'll see, "Native Occupation," and 4 there's no restriction level? 5 Q: Yes. 6 A: Whereas on the second one there's a 7 restriction level? If you'll note, that's directed 8 directly to the Director of Intelligence Section for 9 their review. 10 The second document has the dissemination. 11 As such, it required a restriction level as to who could 12 share that information. And in this case, this report 13 was locked down to the recipient of the information, 14 unless they had prior approval from the Director of 15 Intelligence Section. 16 So, for instance, this document, I 17 couldn't pass on photocopies and the like and hand it on 18 to other individuals unless I had the approval of, at 19 that time, I believe, Superintendent Crane. 20 Q: All right. 21 A: Inspector Crane at that time, sorry. 22 Q: All right. Well, do you know whether 23 or not you had or were shown a copy of this report prior 24 to September 1st? 25 A: I wouldn't have seen this report

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1 prior to but certainly I had conversations with Pete 2 which information was shared that's contained within the 3 report. 4 Q: All right. And fair to say that 5 there's important information here with respect to, in 6 particular, the -- the -- the analysis concerning the 7 leadership component of the occupiers? 8 A: Yes. 9 Q: And what did you learn from Detective 10 Sergeant Lollar prior to the 1st with respect to his 11 findings concerning the leadership structure and makeup 12 of the -- the Stoney Point Group in occupation? 13 A: That the -- there had been a shift in 14 the direction from what we'd seen as a localized 15 leadership to outside leadership from individuals that we 16 -- were indicated to be from the United States. 17 Q: All right. So there -- 18 A: So that the dynamics were changing. 19 Q: All right. And why was that 20 important? 21 A: We'd seen that over the course of the 22 occupation when we had local leadership I think that the 23 relationship, although at times may have been strained, 24 was subject to an open to discussion and negotiation. 25 And I think the fear was that with outside

302

1 influence that the ability to communicate might be 2 somewhat lessened and the fact that these individuals, I 3 believe, had ties to violence and that was a concern to 4 us as well. 5 There was also, I believe, an incident 6 where there was a plate -- a vehicle observed with plates 7 from North or South Carolina that indicated some -- not 8 sure if it was Warrior type activity or not but someone 9 that would indicate violence. 10 So the potential for violence seemed to be 11 heightening if you looked at the leadership and that's a 12 concern. 13 Q: All right. And did you -- were you 14 provided with specifics in terms of the identities of 15 these external individuals who appeared to be comprising 16 the leadership within the occupation group? 17 A: As part of our work ups we had become 18 aware of these individuals. So, again, that was, if you 19 look at the collection and evaluation, et cetera, when we 20 were determining the information provided by this 21 individual, that would assist us in confirming and 22 establishing the reliability of factors that we'd -- we'd 23 attribute to it. 24 Q: All right. And did you specifically 25 provide Detective Sergeant Lollar's findings and

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1 conclusions in this respect to Inspector Carson? 2 A: I believe I had conversation with 3 Inspector Carson on page 25, Tab 6. 4 Q: This is of your notes? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: Perhaps -- okay. 7 A: Continue? 8 Q: Page 25 did you say? 9 A: Page 25, Tab 6. 10 Q: Yes. 11 A: At the bottom. 10:35 I advised 12 Inspector Carson of the information from Detective 13 Sergeant Lollar that had been provided to me at nine 14 o'clock on the 1st. 15 Q: And that was on September the 1st, 16 1995? 17 A: That's correct. 18 Q: And you provided him with specific 19 identities as well? 20 A: The information that I more or less 21 provided him was that that's reflected on page 21. 22 Q: Right. The information that's at 23 nine o'clock entry September 1, 1995. 24 A: Outlining that the CI had attended at 25 the base on the 30th. He had attended at the Barracks...

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1 Q: Sorry. 2 A: And there were two (2) individuals 3 there. And there was also a third male that had left 4 shortly thereafter. 5 Q: And just for the record, while 6 there's a redaction here there is -- there isn't any 7 barrier to our publishing the information that the -- the 8 names with respect to the attendance at the Barracks are 9 Les Jewel and Buck -- Buck Doxtator were present? 10 A: I believe so. 11 Q: And then third male believed to be 12 Terry Doxtator left after five (5) minutes? 13 A: Yes. 14 Q: And then the final redaction: 15 "Les Jewels send them..." 16 Sorry -- said -- I can't read the rest of 17 that, sorry. 18 A: "Said there would never be a clean up 19 of the Base." 20 Q: Okay. And had -- this was 21 information obtained from Peter Lollar? 22 A: It had been passed on to Peter from 23 his informant. 24 Q: All right. And I note if we go to 25 page 20, the page before this is an August 23, '95 entry

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1 at 14:50 in your Maple notes at Tab 6, there's a call -- 2 it reflects a call from Peter Lollar? 3 A: Yes. 4 Q: And is this when you likely received 5 the information or his findings and conclusions as 6 represented by his August 18th report? 7 A: Yes. 8 Q: Okay. And why did you wait until 9 September the 1st to pass on this information to the 10 Incident Commander? 11 A: With regards to the change in the 12 management of the Base? 13 Q: Yes, the leadership, the composition, 14 the findings and conclusions of Peter Lollar? 15 A: It would be my understanding that the 16 change in leadership with regards to the Jewels was 17 becoming more -- was relatively well known. And it would 18 be my belief that Inspector Carson was already aware of 19 that. 20 Q: All right. And when you apprized him 21 of these events on September the 1st, did he indicate -- 22 give you any indication that this was news to him? 23 A: There was -- to be quite candid, 24 there was very -- very rarely did I give any information 25 to Inspector Carson that was news to him.

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1 Q: Okay. Thank you. 2 3 (BRIEF PAUSE) 4 5 Q: And I just note as we're looking at 6 the Lollar report at Tab 3, Exhibit P-1645, just to clear 7 up what could be confusing, the first copy of this report 8 as you said doesn't have a restricted access. 9 It appears to be addressed to the Director 10 Intelligence Section, no copies are provided to anyone. 11 However, the second version which is date receipt stamped 12 of September 11, '95, evidences that a copy was sent to 13 Acting Superintendent John Carson and to yourself. 14 And is it your belief that that would have 15 been distributed in or around or received in or around 16 September 11th? 17 A: Yes, sorry, yes. 18 Q: Thank you. Now, what was the most 19 relevant information from your perspective in terms of 20 the intelligence operation which you learned of or 21 received over the course of the summer of 1995 relative 22 to Ipperwash? 23 A: What was the most relevant? 24 Q: Yes. 25 A: Well certainly from a source

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1 perspective the source had been cultivated by Detective 2 Sergeant Lollar was our closest eyes and ears to actually 3 be going in to see what was happening in there. 4 We had received several pieces of 5 information over the course of the last couple of years 6 relating to firearms and the like. And the most 7 startling piece of information that was provided by 8 Sergeant Lollar's informant was that he never saw 9 firearms per se in the Base. 10 Q: All right. And why was that 11 startling? 12 A: Well, it was startling to me because 13 of the numerous accounts that we had been provided with 14 from various sources, whether it be the RIC's or the 15 intelligence regional folks that were on the ground 16 camping, heard gunfire, the civilians that had heard 17 gunfire, the -- you know the CI reports with regards to 18 you know, firearms coming from various outside sources et 19 cetera. 20 So this was the one (1) person that had 21 gone in there and said that based on what they had seen 22 that there weren't any. 23 Q: And what did you take or what did 24 that tell you about the reliability of that informant? 25 A: Well, again you know, based on what

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1 he had been telling us and his experience in the past, 2 you have to see him as a reliable informant. 3 But, again if I look at the overall 4 process, the intelligence process and if I can take a 5 look at, you know, identify a particular flaw, you know 6 much has been said with regards to the analysis, and 7 analytical component to the process but I think I eluded 8 to earlier that I don't believe that there was anybody in 9 a better position than Inspector Carson to analyse the 10 information that was provided to him. 11 From an analytical standpoint I could see 12 the benefits of an -- an analyst to -- to compart -- to 13 put things in a compartment, if I can get my tongue to 14 work, and provide him with one (1) piece of information 15 with regards to the intelligence that's coming forward. 16 So I could see an analyst providing 17 because of their organizational skills, providing him 18 with a clear cut document, a one (1) piece, one (1) 19 source document where he could gather the information on 20 weapons and the like associated to the Base and the 21 various sources. 22 But as far as provide -- an analyst 23 providing Inspector Carson with direction as far as where 24 to go, take tactical priorities, I don't' see that as a 25 benefit. I could see them as putting those -- a package

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1 together that being a benefit. 2 Where I see the flaw in -- and where it 3 comes into contact -- or I can draw parallels with Pete's 4 informant, is that in a collection phase and in the 5 prioritization, certainly Ipperwash was not a priority 6 for London JFO except when we had our -- our spikes which 7 was in May of '93, August of '93 and then we started to 8 ramp up for lack of a better term, as the information 9 came forward with regarding to the Ipperwash Provincial 10 Park. 11 The problem with a confidential source 12 that was going in on the base was in fact that this too 13 was an outsider. This wasn't a person that resided at 14 CFB Ipperwash, it wasn't a person that resided at Kettle 15 Stony Point of this immediate area. 16 So they would be privy to what people 17 wanted them to see. And I'm not quite sure that if the 18 First Nations occupiers didn't smell a rat per se and 19 wanted to just paint a certain picture. 20 That's one (1) thing we'll never know. We 21 have no reason to think necessarily lean that way but 22 that's something that if you're doing an assessment, you 23 certainly have to be cognisant of. 24 So there's always that little bit of doubt 25 even though this informant's been providing well fairly -

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1 - relatively bang on information in the past. Where I'm 2 going with here is, because it wasn't a priority, we 3 didn't spend the necessary time, a requisite time in the 4 collection phase. 5 Ideally what I would have, you know, in 6 hindsight some eleven (11) years later, to take a look at 7 the situation back in 1993. You know, we didn't see this 8 problem going away. We didn't see it escalating to the 9 violence that it did. Certainly we didn't want that. 10 But we should have taken the foresight and 11 utilized intelligence process to its fullest degree. We 12 should have put our guys and girls on the ground. Left 13 them there, get acclimatized to the community. 14 Work within the community, work with the 15 local officers, develop your own sources. Have a pool of 16 sources within the Stoney Point occupation group, within 17 Kettle Point group, within the community that in fact you 18 could put firm reliability factors on. 19 We should have taken a look at developing 20 agents. An agent being different from an informant and 21 that's somebody that you give direction to and works more 22 or less on behalf of the police and try to have somebody 23 go in to the occupied area. 24 You know, that's so in going out there and 25 it's, you know, a very political issue but certainly to

311

1 have somebody in there would have been our eyes, ears and 2 perhaps would have seen exactly what was going on and be 3 able to give us an un -- no doubt a reflection as to what 4 was going on in the Base. 5 Certainly as times get closer to the, you 6 know, the incident, things were getting a little 7 unrattled in there. Perhaps they would have been taken 8 into a position of trust if we'd gone in there in '93 and 9 developed that relationship all the way through. 10 Then we would have had some solid ground, 11 some solid information, some really good intelligence 12 that we could have passed on. That intelligence may have 13 been there are lots of weapons here. Conversely it could 14 have been there aren't any weapons here. They have no 15 intention of using weapons. That we don't know. 16 We also should have looked at using 17 other, you know, the traditional means that we use all 18 along in surveillance. 19 Having surveillance teams in the area. 20 You know, all this though has to be taken into account of 21 capacity. We don't have as an organization nor does 22 anybody endless resources. This is a perfect, you know, 23 in a perfect world we have surveillance teams to do this. 24 We have the foresight to set up cameras 25 and the like in certain areas to capture information.

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1 Perhaps we get proper authorizations in some capacity as 2 general warrants became prevalent I think closer to the 3 date to get information that you couldn't get in the 4 general scheme of things. 5 If we had done the collection phase as 6 I've outlined to you now, we would have been in a lot 7 better position to give the Incident Commander the 8 intelligence that the intelligence process is designed to 9 give an Incident Commander, but we weren't. 10 Q: And whose responsibility was it to 11 make that decision? 12 A: Well, certainly, you know, within the 13 scheme of things and the London JFO our priorities are 14 set by the JMT. 15 Q: The...? 16 A: The Joint Management Team. 17 Q: All right. Well, what about specific 18 to Ipperwash though? 19 A: Well again, within -- the Joint 20 Management Team sets direction certainly within the JMT 21 the Director of Intelligence Section could have provided 22 the -- the focal point for that direction. 23 Q: Hmm hmm. 24 A: But again, at the time it wasn't seen 25 as a necessity because it was taken that over time that

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1 the problem was going to be resolved and the fact that 2 the land was going to be returned as soon as the 3 environmental clean-up had been completed. 4 So having regard for capacity again and 5 taking a look at what you have for resources and again 6 having regard for the, you know, numerous other factors 7 and -- and groupings and mandates within the JFO and 8 within the OPP and other police services you have to make 9 best with the resources you have. 10 As I've said what I've outlined is in a 11 perfect world and having hindsight and eleven (11) years 12 later knowing what happened that would have been the 13 ideal thing to do but that's where the -- that's where we 14 failed or that's where the flaw was in my mind was in the 15 collection phase because in the analytical phase John 16 Carson, he had the tools that he needed to make the 17 necessary decisions. 18 Q: All right. Now, in terms of that -- 19 that collection phase we -- we know that there were some 20 other officers out there collecting information and I 21 just want to take you to a couple of examples. 22 23 (BRIEF PAUSE) 24 25 Q: And you should have these in front of

314

1 you but they're two (2) documents, one (1) is Exhibit P- 2 411 called CFB Ipperwash Incidents and the other is 3 Exhibit P-413 CFB Intelligence Report. 4 Do you have those in front of you? 5 A: Yes. 6 Q: All right. And we understand that 7 these were compiled basically on -- on the ground if you 8 will at the London Detac -- or London, at the Forest 9 Detachment and contains information as reflected in them 10 and I'm wondering whether you had -- at the London JFO 11 did you have access to these reports and logs? 12 A: My involvement, the constables -- 13 Detective Constables Morse and Whitehead and Keegan were 14 more or less on the ground. My role with regards to 15 Ipperwash generally became more heightened when the 16 spikes were occurring. 17 My recollection is that the officers had 18 more of a dealing, more of a liaison role with the RICs, 19 with the detachment regional folks that were gathering 20 intelligence than I did. My knowledge with regards or 21 involvement with regards to these documents to be quite 22 candid I -- I don't really have a recollection, however, 23 I do recall that the officers having an awareness of 24 this. 25 Q: And is this information though, that

315

1 would have been of value to have integrated into a -- a 2 more detailed collation process which was under the 3 direction of your unit? 4 A: I'm going to have to ask for a moment 5 to take a look at these documents -- 6 Q: Certainly. 7 A: -- because I don't recall them. 8 9 (BRIEF PAUSE) 10 11 A: So I believe the intelligence report 12 would be the campers and I know that our officers within 13 the JFO were talking with the campers so we did -- we 14 were cognizant of the information that was coming in. 15 And again basically without taking the 16 time to go through each entry these are observations that 17 they're making at the time and I would sense that this is 18 somewhat inappropriately titled, Intelligence Report as 19 far as what "intelligence" actually stands for because 20 without actually reading it I don't know if it had 21 entered any of the phases of the intelligence cycle. 22 So what I would suggest is this somewhat 23 of a chronological log relating to their camping or the 24 information they've gathered as a result of camping. 25 Q: The -- the undercover surveillance

316
  1  conducted on the ground?
  2                 A:   Exactly.
  3                 Q:   Okay.  Thank you.  And did you attend
  4  at a meeting held at the London Detachment on September
  5  1, 1995, at which the Project Maple operational plan was
  6  discussed?
  7                 A:   Yes, I did.
  8                 Q:   What was your function at that
  9  meeting?
 10                 A:   I was representing the London JFO at
 11  the request of Inspector Carson to establish what the
 12  intelligence function would be in the event of the First
 13  Nations occupying Ipperwash Provincial Park.
 14                 And the meeting was chaired by Inspector
 15  Carson and for lack of a better term his co-chair would
 16  have been Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright.
 17                 Q:   Right.  And you're looking at your
 18  notes are you?
 19                 A:   Yes, I'm referring to Tab 6 page 24.
 20                 Q:   Yes. 
 21                 A:   Dated the 1st September '95 and it's
 22  first entry is DHQ boardroom and underneath that is
 23  Inspector Carson/Acting Detective Sergeant but, it should
 24  actually say Acting Detective Staff Sergeant Wright.
 25                 Q:   All right.  And this is Exhibit P-

317

1 1641. And what was your understanding as to what the 2 overall objective of this policing operation was? 3 A: The objective was made perfectly 4 clear to everyone in attendance that we were to contain 5 and negotiate a peaceful resolution if in fact, the 6 Provincial Park is occupied. 7 Q: And what did that mean to you, at the 8 time? 9 A: That meant to me that as a policing - 10 - as a law enforcement body for that area, that we were 11 going to negotiate with the First Nations and not enter 12 into conflict. 13 Q: And how did that objective impact or 14 inform your role as an intelligence officer? 15 A: My role basically didn't change 16 because this is what I had seen as our objective to be 17 all along, whether it be with the Park or with the Base 18 or any dealings with regards to occupations. 19 Certainly, we want to avoid conflict at 20 any time and negotiate wherever possible. 21 Q: Okay. And if you go to Tab 4, as 22 well, you can keep your notes open if you wish, but Tab 4 23 of the counsel -- Commission Counsel brief. And this is 24 Exhibit P-421 it's the minutes from that meeting of 25 September 1, 1995.

318

1 Would you have received a copy of the 2 minutes? 3 A: Did I receive a copy of the minutes? 4 Q: Yes? 5 A: I don't believe so, however I did 6 make extensive notes. And in my preparation they pretty 7 much mirror each other. 8 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And I note that 9 on the bottom of page 1, there's the following comment: 10 "Natives in the Military Base do have 11 weapons. There has never been any 12 situation where the OPP have been 13 challenged with a firearm. No 14 confrontation with any Native during 15 the recent fatal motor vehicle accident 16 at Ipperwash. The outsiders are the 17 concern. Investigative team Ident with 18 video running all the time to identify 19 every person that is in the area. TRU 20 video printer will be needed. Forest 21 Detachment Members can identify these 22 people in the event their identity is 23 required for charges." 24 And the next comment is: 25 "There is potential for violence."

319

1 And what I'd like to know is, what was 2 your -- was any specifics mentioned in relation to the 3 potential for violence? 4 A: I believe that the comments were made 5 as taken down by the scribe. I don't believe there was 6 anything specific with regards to the potential other 7 than what was outlined above. 8 Q: Okay. Fair enough. And then if you 9 go to page 3, there's a comment fourth paragraph, if you 10 will, a single line that reads: 11 "Kids and women may be used on the 12 front line by the Natives." 13 Do you understand what gave rise or what 14 the source of the assumption was there? 15 A: I believe that was a result of 16 information that Inspector Carson or Wright whoever the 17 person was speaking, I believe that information was tied 18 into other occupations or other situations where First 19 Nations people had been involved and they were applying 20 it to this particular situation. 21 Q: All right. So this wasn't something 22 that came from your Intelligence unit? 23 A: No. 24 Q: All right. Did you -- were you -- 25 was one (1) of the spikes, if you will, the takeover of

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1 the barracks, you didn't mention that, but was that one 2 (1) of the spikes? 3 A: July 29th? 4 Q: Yes. 5 A: Certainly it raised our level of 6 awareness but it didn't -- it wasn't as -- it didn't 7 cause as much interest, say, as the helicopter shooting 8 or the initial it was something that we saw as an 9 evolution of the -- the takeover of the Park until the 10 negotiations went to the point where it was given back. 11 Q: You mean of the Army Camp Base? 12 A: Yes. 13 Q: Yeah. And -- all right. Is it 14 possible or do you recall whether this comment was 15 informed at all by -- by the takeover of the barracks? 16 A: I can't say. 17 Q: Fair enough. And if you go to page 4 18 there's a reference to intelligence, the first full 19 paragraph: 20 "Intelligence will be under Trevor. 21 Analyst will be under Trevor as well. 22 That person will not have any definite 23 responsibilities, will be computer 24 literate to assist with intelligence 25 information to be entered into a

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1 database. This will Jimmy Dyke." 2 Now, first of all do you have any 3 recollection of that discussion? 4 A: Yes, I do. 5 Q: And who -- who is Trevor? 6 A: Detective Sergeant Trevor Richardson. 7 Q: All right. 8 A: I believe he was the sergeant in the 9 Crime Unit in Chatham Number 1 District Headquarters. 10 Q: And to your knowledge was he -- did 11 he have independent specialization as an intelligence 12 officer? 13 A: No. 14 Q: And what was your understanding was 15 to be the role of -- at least the reporting relationship 16 if you will of the -- the intelligence unit under Project 17 Maple? 18 A: That we would report through Trevor 19 who then in turn would report up through the chain to 20 Inspector Carson. 21 Q: And so did this -- this then 22 represented a change in the reporting relationship -- 23 A: Yes. 24 Q: -- that you had because now that you 25 go through Trevor Richardson?

322

1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: And how -- were you given any 3 explanation as to why you were to go through Trevor 4 Richardson instead of directly to the Incident Commander? 5 A: If you turn to the Project Maple plan 6 Tab 7. 7 Q: I think it's Tab 5, at least in our 8 brief. 9 A: Oh, sorry, it's Tab 5. 10 Q: It's Exhibit P-424. And are you -- 11 you're going to the Coordinated Investigation Team 12 Organizational Chart? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: I wonder if you could just wait for a 15 moment and perhaps you could put that on the screen, 16 please? 17 18 (BRIEF PAUSE) 19 20 Q: All right. This is part of the 21 Project Maple plan and we have the -- the organizational 22 chart for the coordinated investigating team? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: All right. 25 A: What I'm going to do here is identify

323

1 what I perceive to be another flaw in the process. 2 Q: All right. 3 A: If you can see in the chart, this 4 chart I believe was designed by Acting Detective Staff 5 Sergeant Wright in response to some recent training he 6 had had as far as organizing major events or coordinated 7 investigations and the like. 8 Q: Was it a case management course? 9 A: That's my understanding. 10 Q: Yeah. Thank you. 11 A: It was sort of the -- what I would 12 say the predecessor of major case management. 13 If you see in the -- I think I alluded to 14 earlier that traditionally Intelligence reports directly 15 to senior command and I think my opinion on that is 16 generally that it eliminates any potential for 17 misinformation going out or non intelligence. 18 Q: Hmm hmm. 19 A: And as we proceed down the road 20 you'll see that as the events unfold post the events 21 leading to the tragic death of Dudley George, 22 Intelligence was later moved to an area where they did 23 have that closer reporting relationship to the senior 24 command. 25 Q: The Incident Commander?

324

1 A: Even higher than the Incident 2 Commander -- 3 Q: Okay. 4 A: -- to closer to -- 5 Q: Inspector Hutchinson? 6 A: -- Chief Coles. 7 Q: Coles? 8 A: Coles to -- to Hutchinson through to 9 Chief Coles. 10 If you'll see in this chart here it's 11 clear that Intelligence is an -- is an after thought or 12 an add-on to this box. 13 Q: And let me just ask you, why is that 14 you say that? 15 A: The font and the style of box doesn't 16 match the remainder of the template. 17 Q: Fair enough. 18 A: And in charting world it would look 19 like the scene investigator actually reports up, and I 20 may have some reporting relationship with that scene 21 investigator, and then I go to the primary investigator. 22 And in reality I believe that I should 23 have been a side bar off directly reporting to Trevor if 24 you look at the true meaning of the chart. 25 Q: All right. So you would have -- well

325

1 perhaps I -- I have an extra copy of that chart. Perhaps 2 we could hand it up and perhaps you would just simply 3 mark on this diagram what you think was -- would be a 4 more accurate representation of what, in fact, took 5 place, well, or should have taken -- well no -- let me -- 6 I'll -- I'll clar -- I've got it. 7 8 (BRIEF PAUSE) 9 10 Q: All right, I'm sorry. Perhaps you 11 just would explain what you have done. And -- and use 12 the laser pointer and show us what you -- 13 A: It's not working. 14 Q: It's not working? 15 A: Either that or I'm technically 16 challenged. 17 Q: Oh no. More defective equipment. 18 19 (BRIEF PAUSE) 20 21 A: Thank you. Now what I did is, that 22 line there -- 23 Q: Yes, the line that you've got going 24 parallel, or at least perpendicular to the vertical line. 25 A: Which takes me up to Trevor.

326

1 Q: Yes. 2 A: I move that line and put myself 3 directly off Trevor showing a direct reporting 4 relationship to Trevor. 5 Q: So the left of him. 6 A: To the left of Trevor. 7 Q: Okay. 8 A: That takes me out of that loop there. 9 Q: And the loop is -- just to explain. 10 The loop is between the scene investigator, Detective 11 Speck, and the primary investigator, Detective Sergeant 12 Trevor Richardson; is that right? 13 A: That's correct. 14 Q: Okay. So you weren't part of that 15 loop -- as a matter of fact, you weren't -- as it played 16 out, you weren't part of that loop? 17 A: No. 18 Q: Okay. Thank you. And what you're 19 showing, is that an accurate representation of what, in 20 fact, transpired between the 1st and the 6th of 21 September? 22 A: Yes. As -- up until the 6th and the 23 unfortunate events. In fact, I reported up through 24 Trevor and the information was passed on via that route. 25 Q: Okay. And perhaps we could make your

327

1 chart the next exhibit, please; the marked chart. 2 THE REGISTRAR: P-1646, Your Honour. 3 4 --- EXHIBIT NO. P-1646: Coordinated Investigations 5 Team (CIT) Organizational 6 Chart marked by Witness 7 Det/Sgt. Don Bell, June 06, 8 2006. 9 10 CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 11 Q: And at the time of the September 1st 12 meeting, when it was discussed that the intelligence 13 would report to Trevor Richardson, did you have any 14 concerns at that time with respect to the alteration and 15 your reporting relationship with the Incident Commander 16 or the Senior Command? 17 A: I didn't have any real difficulties 18 with reporting up through Trevor. I had known Trevor 19 since I come to London. I had a great deal of respect 20 for him. I also had the confidence that the information 21 would be -- that I provided him would be portrayed in an 22 accurate manner. 23 Certainly I appreciated the fact that 24 having regard for the size of the operation, that things 25 had to be put into specific categories and that this --

328

1 having regard for Mark making this chart, this was the 2 best means he saw putting intelligence into the flow of 3 information. So I had no difficulty with Trevor. 4 Q: All right. And so you didn't raise 5 any concerns at this meeting? 6 A: No. 7 Q: And it indicates that there is to be 8 an analyst brought into this operation at this point and 9 that that analyst would be Jimmy Dyke. 10 Now had Jimmy Dyke, to your knowledge, had 11 any prior role in the intelligence function, relative to 12 Ipperwash? 13 A: Prior to the 1st? 14 Q: Yes. 15 A: No. 16 Q: All right. Did you know him? 17 A: Yes. 18 Q: And were you consulted about him 19 being added to the team, so to speak? 20 A: No. 21 Q: And what was -- what was your 22 understanding with respect to his qualifications? 23 A: Again, I knew Jim Dyke as a criminal 24 -- excuse me, criminal investigator that worked out of 25 the London Detachment and perhaps the London Crime Unit.

329

1 He had a stellar reputation as a criminal investigator. 2 As to his abilities as an analyst, I 3 wasn't aware of any at that time, although I may have 4 been privy to afterwards. I -- I don't recall if he's 5 had analytical training or not. 6 Q: All right. But in your experience, 7 at least, as an intelligence officer, you didn't know him 8 to be an intelligence officer? 9 A: No. 10 Q: All right. And did you have any 11 concern with him being put into the role as an analyst 12 joined, or at least as part of the intelligence function 13 for this operation? 14 A: No, I more than likely welcomed it 15 because at that time I was down -- Darryl Whitehead was 16 actually on a course, I believe, taking the analytical 17 course at CPC in Ottawa. So I was down bodies. So more 18 than likely I welcomed having somebody to assist in the 19 preparation of the binders. 20 Q: All right. And what you've said is 21 important, that your anticipation was that he would 22 assist in the preparation of the profile binders? 23 A: That's correct. 24 Q: And that's distinct from providing 25 analysis with respect to the intelligence cycle?

330

1 A: That's correct. 2 Q: All right. Now, did you have any 3 concerns, generally, about -- well let me ask you this: 4 What was your understanding with respect 5 to who would make the decision, under this organization, 6 as to what information, in the form of intelligence, 7 would go to the Incident Commander? 8 A: My expectation was what I reported to 9 Trevor would be reported up in its entirety. 10 Q: So without any filtering or other 11 judgment being attached to it? 12 A: Correct. 13 Q: All right. And that's because as a 14 crime investigator, while he would certainly have 15 experience in collection and identification for units and 16 that type of thing, the rest of the intelligence cycle, 17 the analysis, the evaluation, that really wasn't his 18 bailiwick; is that fair? 19 A: That would be fair. 20 Q: Okay. Thank you. 21 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Ms. Vella, 22 I know it's after 5:00, but I don't want you to stop at a 23 point where it doesn't make sense for you to stop. 24 So I would ask you to keep your eye on 25 some place where we can stop for the day.

331
  1                 MS. SUSAN VELLA:   I appreciate your
  2  reminder.  Thank you.  
  3                 That's fine -- I think that -- let me just
  4  -- let me just ask one (1) more question.
  5  
  6  CONTINUED BY MS. SUSAN VELLA: 
  7                 Q:   Page 6 of the minutes, of the
  8  September 1st meeting, Exhibit P-421, the last line:
  9                   "Crime has to make sure that ident
 10                   takes pictures of everything, i.e., of
 11                   the Forest Detachment garage, so they
 12                   have a picture history of everything
 13                   we've done."
 14                 Now, what did that mean?  What did you
 15  understand that to mean?
 16                 A:   I just have to go up a bit.
 17                 Q:   Certainly.
 18  
 19                       (BRIEF PAUSE) 
 20  
 21                 A:   I don't know if I can put that into
 22  any context for you.
 23                 Q:   Okay.  Is it fair to say, based on
 24  the discussions of September the 1st and the chart that
 25  we looked at under Project Maple, was the intelligence

332

1 function, in effect, subsumed by the Criminal 2 Investigation Unit? 3 A: Basically, what the -- there was -- 4 London JFO was doing what would be considered traditional 5 intelligence. What was being done by -- what was being 6 referred to as intelligence by the Regional counterparts 7 was simply information gathering. 8 And that's, you know, where we have to 9 draw, sort of, a line in the sand, in that there was no 10 evaluation or coalition analysis, per se, done. 11 Our binders were provided to the Incident 12 Commander. However, I think the difficultly was there, 13 you know -- again, I meant to go on that when we were 14 talking about this chart, is, although Trevor was 15 identified as the, you know, the primary investigator, 16 intelligence, file coordinator, where everything should 17 have been going through that person, and, in fact, I 18 reported to Trevor, that necessarily wasn't the case for 19 everybody else. 20 Because of the relationship and, as you 21 know, Inspector Carson has a history in that area, I 22 think a lot of people felt comfortable with going 23 directly to him and providing him with information. 24 And there's specific incidents of that, 25 you know, throughout the occupation. And that's where

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1 the difficulty lies, in that everybody is not privy to 2 the same sort of information. 3 Ideally, everybody would have gone to 4 Trevor and Trevor would have passed that information up. 5 And that was, in fact, corrected, I believe, in and 6 around September the 12th, when Detective Inspector 7 Hutchinson made me the conduit for intelligence and 8 everything was to go through me. Then you have one (1) 9 person as the focal point, the receiver of the 10 information and they can look after the processing as per 11 the cycle. 12 So that's where I said before, although I 13 didn't see an analyst being of particular benefit for 14 establishing tactical priorities, it would have been good 15 for Trevor to have that one (1) person there perhaps to 16 take all that information, be able to sort it and put it 17 in one (1) area, so he could take that forward to 18 Inspector Carson. 19 So you would eliminate all the tentacles 20 going to him and then -- because with those tentacles you 21 lose control of the information and there's potential for 22 something slipping through the cracks. 23 Q: Well, and in fairness, given that 24 there were a number of different collectors of 25 information over this operation, wouldn't it have been an

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1 option, and perhaps a wise option, for all the 2 information to have gone through you here, so that you 3 could then bring your expertise, as an intelligence 4 officer, to bear on it and then up through either Trevor 5 Richardson unfiltered or directly to Inspector Carson? 6 A: Certainly in -- in hindsight, you 7 know, and especially having regard for what took place on 8 September the 12th, that would have been, in my opinion, 9 a better route to take. 10 Q: All right. And we'll certainly get 11 to that tomorrow. And perhaps this would be an 12 appropriate time to break for the day, Commissioner? 13 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Yes. 14 Yes, Mr. Millar...? 15 16 (WITNESS RETIRES) 17 18 MR. DERRY MILLAR: Perhaps before we 19 break, I just wanted to do one (1) administrative matter. 20 I've filed with the Registrar copies of 21 the prints that are marked Exhibit P-1638, the front and 22 back of the T-shirt, plus electronic copies. 23 COMMISSIONER SIDNEY LINDEN: Thank you, 24 Mr. Millar. Okay. We'll adjourn now until tomorrow 25 morning at nine o'clock.

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1 THE REGISTRAR: This Public Inquiry is 2 adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, June the 7th at 9:00 3 a.m. 4 5 --- Upon adjourning at 5:09 p.m. 6 7 8 9 10 11 Certified Correct 12 13 14 15 ___________________________ 16 Carol Geehan 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25